Foreign involvement
The Indian government was quick to link the attackers with Pakistan, and it seems undeniable that Pakistanis were involved. Much detail so far reported about the attack emanates from accounts of the interrogation of the one terrorist captured, named as Ajmal Amir Kasab.
While these accounts cannot be viewed as authoritative, Kasab appears to have be a member of LeT, which was established to oppose Indian dominion over Kashmir. Kasab and his colleagues reportedly spent at least five months preparing for the operation at an LeT training camp in Pakistan. The group’s discipline and commitment points to prolonged training, and their tactics, including an absence of suicide belts, fit established LeT methodology.
The specific objectives of the terrorists remain unclear. When some of them made contact with the Indian press and were asked to specify their demands, they initially appeared unsure of what those were, before talking about Kashmir and the need to release (unspecified) mujahadeen in Indian jails.
Immediate consequences
The issue of terrorism in India has become heavily politicised, not least because of a reluctance to address the problem of Hindu extremism, which has undoubtedly help radicalise India’s Muslim population.
In the run-up to a general election in summer 2009, it is difficult to envisage any serious forensic inquiry into the Mumbai attacks along the lines of the US 9/11 Commission. The best that can probably be hoped for is the introduction of specific anti-terrorist legislation and moves to set up some kind of homeland- security apparatus. Much action is likely to be cosmetic, such as increasing the size of the NSG and better equipping it, rather than addressing the underlying institutional and political issues.
The state of India–Pakistan relations will largely depend on what further facts emerge about the Mumbai attacks. While the Indian government is not predisposed to think that Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari knew about them, there will be suspicions of possible involvement by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The ISI maintains a close watch on organisations such as LeT, and it is hard to imagine that at least some elements would have been unaware of operational preparations this large.
There is no sign of India’s massing troops on the border with Pakistan as happened after the December 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament. As it did then, the US has launched a diplomatic effort to minimise the risk of conflict between these two nuclear-armed nations, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visiting both countries.
However, with ongoing provincial elections in parts of India and the forthcoming general elections, the unprecedented public criticism of the central and Maharashtra governments has shaken the Congress Party, which leads both. The party’s central leadership and its alliance partners could pressure the government to take some sort of action in response to the terror attacks, and to ratchet up the pressure on Pakistan.
In such a scenario, an early casualty could be the peace process between the two countries. Even if there is no military mobilisation, there remains a risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two governments, especially at a time when mutual trust is in such short supply.
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