Seeking long-term solutions
Dealing with the problem of poppy cultivation remains central to counter-insurgency and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. Money earned from its culture helps to fund the Taliban insurgency and induces crime and corruption, thus undermining the building of government institutions. It severely complicates the mission of NATO forces, many of whose governments use the drug problem to help justify their deployment to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, drug abuse is growing across the country. With the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) forecasting that production will increase again in 2007, there is a growing acceptance within the international community of the need for a longer-term approach to this urgent problem.
According to the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2007, the opium economy accounts for 30% of Afghanistan’s GDP and provides 92% of the global supply of heroin. The area under cultivation increased from 104,000 hectares in 2005 to 165,000 hectares in 2006, with 62% of the cultivated area being in the southern provinces – 40% in Helmand province alone. In its 2006 report, the International Narcotics Control Board stated that 0.6% of the adult population uses opium and 0.2% heroin: 20.6% of poppy growers are drug users. Rising production, enabled by a steady supply of pre-cursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride, which is brought into the country through its porous borders, encourages domestic consumption.
The illicit system
Afghanistan’s opium economy is deeply rooted. The farmer grows poppy to support his family and also so that he can get a good credit rating – lenders are comfortable with the poppy farmer, as they know he can sell his product. Poppy is grown and harvested in six months, is easily stored and can be sold at any time of year. There is no shortage of men to help the farmer with the harvest, given the large numbers of unemployed and dispossessed. Such men may also turn to drug-running, typically carrying 10kg of opium or heroin, earning $100 per kilo. Many perish on the minefields of the Iranian border or are shot. In the village of Bunyat, in the western province of Herat, there are more than 300 widows, mostly of runners, in a population of some 1,200 families.
Traders sell mostly to drug barons, who need protection which is mostly provided by the Taliban, which in return receives logistical support. The Taliban also profits financially from this trade, receiving funds via warlords, some of whom may have links to local and central government. It is not known exactly what this amounts to, but it can be assumed that it is enough to cover the relatively low costs of the insurgency, which has simple logistic requirements. The insurgents have established links to smugglers of all types, and are believed to have set up a system of taxation of the crop in some areas in return for protection from the Afghan government’s eradication forces. The government’s counter-narcotics strategy may in fact have encouraged the creation of cartel-like groups, which may include former and even current adversaries who band together in the face of a common threat to their way of life.
Some employees of the Afghan Security Forces who earn very low wages take bribes from those involved, many of whom have made money from poppy cultivation for decades and who will protect their main source of income in any way they can. Such corruption can be seen at many levels. During the resistance against the Soviet occupation which lasted from 1979 to 1989 a number of mujahadeen who are now working at various levels of government were – and may still be – involved in the drugs trade. Corruption impedes progress in building capacity and sustainable institutions. Afghan Attorney-General Abdul Jabbar Sabbit recently appealed for international assistance in rooting it out.
The counter-narcotics campaign
The legal basis for the campaign against poppy cultivation starts with Article VII of the Afghan constitution adopted on 4 January 2004 which stipulates that the state shall prevent the cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, despite some provision for licensing opium production for specific purposes. As poppy cultivation is illegal, the law says that those owning land on which it is grown must destroy the crop or face prosecution. Agencies charged with enforcing the law are the Counter Narcotics Police, Afghan Special Narcotics Force, National Police, Border Police and Customs. These unequivocal legal instruments are new to Afghanistan and their untraditional character may in itself inhibit the execution of policy.
The National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS) of the Afghan government has five main components: institution-building, judicial reform, law enforcement, encouraging alternative livelihoods and demand reduction. There are four main priorities in the execution of the strategy: targeting the trafficker; strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihoods; reducing demand; and developing state institutions. Recently, there have been successes in interdicting and arresting traffickers, although these have tended to occur in the safer areas of the country. Coordination of the various components of the NDCS has been lacking in some areas, and critics point to the emphasis on eradication ahead of finding replacement livelihoods for farmers.
While there has been an increase in cultivation in six southern, three western, three central and three eastern provinces, there has been a reduction in cultivation in seven northern provinces. This is thanks to a relatively benign security situation, which allows farmers to switch to sustainable legal crops and to market them. An incentive scheme known as the 'Good Performance Fund’ has been set up to reward villages for moving away from opium.
The policy of NATO’s 39,000-strong International Security Assistance Force is to support the government’s counter-narcotics campaign, although the Alliance has no formal role in either eradication programmes or in dealing with traffickers. NATO and Afghan National Army commanders, lacking the resources, expertise or mandate to do more, act in support of provincial governors by providing security where necessary. Military commanders are uncomfortable about playing a broader role in eradication programmes, because this may undermine their efforts to gain popular support for the counter-insurgency campaign.
Breaking the cycle which perpetuates the illicit trade in heroin and opium is not easy. Wholesale eradication is widely accepted as being unhelpful to the wider aims of the counter-insurgency campaign and nation-building: it could drive disaffected farmers into the grip of the insurgency and carries humanitarian consequences in terms of poverty and deprivation. The Afghan government claims to have eradicated the opium poppy crop across some 30,000 hectares in 2006, but now faces growing American pressure to permit aerial spraying across selected areas, in order to accelerate this process, and to deny funds to the Taliban and its allies. While it is widely believed that some eradication should take place, critics of aerial spraying point to its short-term effect and indiscriminate nature, as well as its unknown health risks for nearby villages.
Alternative solutions
Given the large number of people engaged in it, a long-term solution to the poppy problem will not be found until they have an alternative income. But this is very challenging in a country in which weapons and corruption are endemic. In order to break farmers’ dependence on their poppy crop and to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods, one study has suggested that a range of basic ‘assets’ is necessary. These are: reliable access to water, land and electricity, and guaranteed security. The greater the access to these, the less a farmer’s dependence on poppy cultivation will be. For alternative livelihoods to be adopted, licit long-term finance must be available and agricultural infrastructure must be rebuilt, including irrigation systems which have fallen into disrepair or have been destroyed during years of war. For example, efforts are under way in Helmand province to improve irrigation and access to electricity by developing the Kajaki dam, and in Herat province the Indian government is funding the Salma dam project.
There is much debate on the subject of possible substitutes for poppy. Grain production in the country fell by 50% between 2001 and 2003 following the fall of the Taliban regime and efforts to reverse this have been slow to take root. Limited projects have been carried out in places where the security situation allows, where the soil is suitable and where there is a viable market. For example, in Herat province sesame and saffron are being grown and can be sold in markets in Iran. However, the income from replacement crops is likely to be lower than that from opium poppy and additional subsidies to offset the initial loss are needed. The poor security situation in the southern provinces will inevitably hinder replacement initiatives and the insurgency is likely to do everything it can to spoil attempts at reducing poppy cultivation in this way. Governors and local authorities must be persuaded that the NDCS and alternative solutions are the correct path, with incentives to ensure their support. In the relatively secure northern province of Balkh it has been demonstrated that successful initiatives of this kind can lead to a reduction in the area under cultivation, even though it has remained high in its neighbouring province of Badakhshan, which has strong links to Tajikistan and traditional crossborder drug-smuggling.
The Senlis Council, a non-governmental organisation, has proposed a pilot project for licensing poppy cultivation at the level of an Afghan village. Called ‘poppy for medicine’, it suggests producing morphine and codeine for the global market with financial returns being directed to the village community. It does not suggest a countrywide scheme, but recognises the position of the village as the socioeconomic centre of the rural economy. However, opposition to licensing focuses on the tensions that might emerge across tribal boundaries where one party is licensed and the other is not. Moreover, the United States, which provides much of the funding for the counter-narcotics campaign, as well as for development initiatives, is opposed to licensing as an option.
Another proposal would allow for continued cultivation, but with gradual reduction and replacement over a six-year period. There would have to be flexibility in the application of the law to allow growing to continue, but the proposal takes into account President Hamid Karzai’s constant reminder to his international allies that this is a long-term problem. There are also proposals for micro-credit schemes to allow farmers to diversify into other areas, as well as for providing finance to improve agricultural conditions. Such schemes would enable, for example, the construction of ‘delayed-action dams’ to offset the effects of drought by conserving local water supplies. Other options would include low-level retraining schemes for those involved in cultivation and courses during which the ‘student’ would be paid while gaining the necessary skills for a future after poppy cultivation.
About 80% of Afghanistan’s population of 32 million live in rural communities. Long-term solutions to its complex and interlinked problems – insecurity, warlordism, narcotics, weak institutions at the central and provincial level – must provide livelihoods for this rural population, whether or not they are currently involved in poppy cultivation. There is no ‘silver bullet’ solution, as security and agricultural conditions vary widely across the country. For this reason, Karzai’s best course of action is to employ the full range of alternative proposals according to local conditions in the provinces. Short-term measures, such as widespread aerial spraying, seem unlikely to form part of a successful long-term strategy. Eradication of this kind will inevitably drive villagers to the side of those who oppose Karzai. The president himself, although adamant that the cultivation of poppy must cease, is against spraying and eradication without alternatives. If his international allies ignore these views and fail to provide the appropriate level and type of support, his already fragile position and authority may be further undermined. Acceptance of the long-term nature of the problem, accompanied by an increase in resources for replacement schemes, and the avoidance of short-term solutions, should logically be the guiding principles for Karzai’s allies.
