Future in the balance
General Pervez Musharraf’s seizure of power eight years ago was widely popular in Pakistan because his coup followed 11 years of chaotic democracy in which four successive governments – two led by Benazir Bhutto and two by Nawaz Sharif – were dogged by accusations of corruption and incompetence. He has led the country through a turbulent period, including provision of support to the American ‘war on terror’, military confrontation and subsequent talks with India, an increasing incidence of extremist terrorism, and a devastating earthquake. In 2007, however, the future of Musharraf’s leadership has come increasingly into question. As presidential and parliamentary elections approached, he lost domestic support and appeared to be facing a crisis of legitimacy. The return of Bhutto from exile on 18 October – when her procession was targeted by a suicide bomber who killed 140 people – further clouded the potential outcome.
Pakistan’s political future carries strategic importance because the country is intimately bound up in the security issues that are of greatest concern to the world’s leaders:
Pakistan sits at the centre of the world’s struggle against Islamic extremist terrorism. The top leadership of al-Qaeda is widely believed to have found refuge in its ungoverned tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. From there it is able to instigate and influence acts of terrorism around the world. A number of British terrorists have visited Pakistan for training.
Extremism is a growing factor domestically. The incidence of suicide terrorism has risen markedly. In 2007, the centre of Islamabad was the scene of a long siege that ended in carnage when troops overran the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), a hotbed of radicalism with strong links to the tribal areas.
The Pashtun-dominated North Western Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas have a significant impact on Western efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan. From these areas, the Taliban leadership, of which important elements are apparently based in the southwestern province of Baluchistan, infiltrates fighters into Afghanistan to fight NATO and Afghan forces.
Pakistan is the only Muslim-dominated country with nuclear weapons. For almost 60 years it has been in dispute, and sometimes at war, with its neighbour India, which is also nuclear armed. Through a network led by the scientist A.Q. Khan, Pakistan sold nuclear-weapons technology to countries including Iran, North Korea and Libya.
Political turbulence
Pakistan’s domestic politics are therefore being watched closely. It has become harder than ever to predict their likely course. In presidential elections on 6 October, Musharraf won almost all the votes cast by an electoral college made up of national and provincial assemblies. But opposition parties boycotted or abstained from the vote, and the Supreme Court has still to rule on the legitimacy of Musharraf’s candidacy while still retaining the office of Chief of Army Staff – his lawyer has said he would give up the post if re-elected. It is unclear what his response would be were the court to rule against him. The judiciary has been at the centre of unrest since Musharraf’s suspension of the Chief Justice, which provoked widespread protests and strikes. The Supreme Court subsequently ordered the judge reinstated, and also ruled that Sharif should be allowed to return from exile, though when he did so Musharraf immediately had him deported.
Parliamentary elections are due by the end of January 2008. Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, returned from exile to contest them by making a deal with Musharraf under which corruption charges against her were dropped in return for her not opposing his continued tenure of the presidency. Following the attack on her motorcade, it is unclear whether it will prove possible to hold elections according to the constitutional timetable – the government has said it will ban political marches in the interests of safety, with rallies to be allowed only in spaces that can be protected from attack. If elections are held and Bhutto wins, it is unclear whether Musharraf and Bhutto will be able to overcome their deep mutual antipathy and achieve some degree of collaboration – and what the balance of power between them would be. Much would depend on the precise outcome of the elections.
Musharraf might seek to postpone elections and remain as both president and army chief, but this would further alienate potential political allies, some of whom are upset by the deal with Bhutto. Given his declining authority, there can be no certainty that the army would tolerate such a move.
Extremist pressures
Pakistan does not at present seem at risk of takeover by extremists. Nevertheless, there is a rising tide of violent Islamic extremism. The army and security forces are fighting a battle on three fronts: against a resurgent al-Qaeda and Taliban in the tribal areas; against indigenous extremist groups infuriated by the government’s storming of the Lal Masjid in July, which resulted in the deaths of many militants; and against a Baluchi separatist movement. This level of domestic instability is unusually high. There are increasing doubts about both the will and the ability of the security forces to tackle the problems. After the Lal Masjid operation, a truce with pro-Taliban militants was terminated, and Pakistani security forces resumed military operations in parts of the tribal areas. However, their lack of success was vividly demonstrated by the abduction of nearly 300 Pakistani security personnel by militants in South Waziristan on 30 August. There are signs that the rank and file of the armed forces are increasingly demoralised by having to fight compatriots and fellow Muslims. Suspicions remain that both the Taliban and indigenous Kashmiri groups – supposedly closed down amid partial rapprochement with India, but in reality only mothballed – continue to benefit from clandestine Pakistani government support.
Foreign policy
The outcome of domestic political travails will influence Pakistan’s foreign-policy stances. Washington, which stopped Musharraf from declaring a state of emergency in August, has cautiously supported the process of ‘reconciliation’ with Bhutto, in the hope that this will shift Pakistan in the direction of democracy while keeping a lid on instability. Musharraf’s support for the United States has been deeply unpopular domestically; he has survived several assassination attempts. Yet he has also come under considerable foreign pressure to achieve more against extremism – to curb the power of the madrassas, or Islamic schools, and to take stronger action against the Taliban and other extremist groups. The overriding interest of the US is in reducing the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The use of American force in the tribal areas is strongly opposed by the Pakistani government, fearing it would further exacerbate domestic tensions. Pakistan is unlikely ever to be able to satisfy US expectations. It is preoccupied by the fear that if the extremist problem were ever resolved, Washington would abandon it, as occurred at the end of the war against the Russians in Afghanistan in 1989.
The outcome of political troubles in Pakistan will have wide-ranging implications for the region, for the US and many other nations. A struggle is being waged for the identity of the country between the progressive, liberal section of society whose outlook reflects that of Pakistan’s founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and more extreme elements. In the final analysis, however, it is likely to be the army that will determine the outcome if the going becomes really rough. It is undoubtedly reluctant to continue to dominate the political scene, but sees itself as the ultimate guardian of the nation.
