However, one of Maliki’s early successes was the appointment of Hussein Shahristani as the new minister of oil. Shahristani is a key member of the UIA but has refused to join any of the parties that make up this coalition. Amongst the new ruling elite his reputation for moral probity is unrivalled. Shahristani trained as a nuclear scientist but fell foul of the old regime for refusing to help further its nuclear ambitions. After imprisonment and torture he escaped into exile amidst the chaos of the 1991 uprisings. By putting Shahristani in charge of the oil ministry, the prime minister has acknowledged the need for a non-partisan figure to oversee the country’s major source of wealth. He has also moved to staunch the wave of complaints about the high levels of corruption and mismanagement within Iraq’s oil sector. The reappointment of Hosheyr Zebari has also been positively received. As foreign minister, Zebari, a Kurd, has sent a powerful message about the politically multi-ethnic nature of the new Iraq. He has also proved to be a redoubtable diplomat, cementing strong ties in Europe and at the United Nations whilst also performing well in negotiations with both Iraq’s Arab and non-Arab neighbours.
The limitations placed upon the prime minister’s powers of appointment are highlighted in his choice of other cabinet ministers. Bayan Jabor is a key member of SCIRI and a former commander in its militia, the Badr Brigade. As minister of interior in the last government, he was the focus of sustained criticism for sacking large numbers of staff and replacing them with many of his old comrades from the Badr Brigade. Under his leadership, the ministry’s special commandos were accused of hastening Iraq’s descent into civil war by their use of death squads. Although Maliki has succeeded in moving Jabor from the interior ministry, the politics of coalition government mean that he has simply been shifted sideways to take up the position of minister of finance. The demands of UIA politics also mean that members of Muqtada al-Sadr’s organisation, twice involved in extended and bloody rebellions against coalition forces, are now responsible for shaping the minds of the country’s youth and its health care: Sadr was awarded the ministries of education and health. (Sadr’s organisation is effectively comprised of two groups: the Mahdi Army as the military element; and the Sadrist Current, his political organisation in parliament.)
Tasks ahead
Maliki has passed his first test as prime minister by forming a cabinet from Iraq’s divided and antagonistic ruling elite and then securing parliament’s approval. However, that he could not build consensus about who to appoint to Iraq’s most important ministries indicates the size and nature of the problems he has to face in the future.
It is from within parliament that the main opposition to Maliki’s government could develop. The presentation of the cabinet to parliament was marked by protest when 15 parliamentarians walked out of the chamber, led by the head of the smaller Sunni coalition, Salih Mutlak of the National Dialogue Front. Mutlak damned the new government for being divisive, sectarian and unfocused. In the aftermath of the elections the unity of the UIA itself was damaged when one of its members, Fadila or the Virtue Party, walked out of the coalition, taking its 16 members of parliament with it. This leaves Maliki’s own alliance with 112 of the 275 seats in parliament. The danger of this parliamentary arithmetic is that Maliki’s government will become severely constrained as it attempts to forge a new voting bloc within parliament for each successive piece of legislation. While the prime minister is devoting his time to this task, the government could revert to business as usual, with each minister carving out a fiefdom within his own ministry, running it for personal or factional benefit and not engaging in the pressing need to build state capacity and extend it across the geographical extent of the country.
The most immediate problem that the new government will face is the redrafting of the constitution. The constitution, passed in a national referendum in October 2005, ushers in a highly decentralised federal system. On the eve of the vote, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad brokered a deal to secure Sunni political participation in the plebiscite. This mandates a committee of the Iraqi parliament to review and possibly redraft its most divisive aspects. However, given the current makeup of parliament, the chances of substantial changes to the constitution look slim. Parliament would have to vote in favour of any revisions before a new draft could be submitted to another national referendum. Although the constitutional committee may well become a focus of intense and acrimonious debate it will probably not deliver political compromise, creating renewed resentment amongst the Sunni population, the majority of whom voted against the constitution in 2005.
The selection of Nuri al-Maliki as prime minister and his formation of a new government does represent political progress. However, the danger is that in the aftermath of a successful election in December 2005, politics in the Iraqi parliament and cabinet, locked away as they are within the fortified Green Zone, will quickly become removed from the everyday concerns of the majority of the population. Iraq is a country without a functioning state, struggling to prevent an insurgency degenerating into civil war. If the new government follows the path of its predecessor and becomes mired in the incestuous politics of party competition, then it may well hasten Iraq’s descent into inter-communal strife.
