Alexey Ignatyev
Deputy Director, Transborder Cooperation Programme, East-West Institute
The East-West Institute (EWI), an international non-profit-making organisation, has been in existence for over 20 years. Under the motto ‘bridging new divides’, the EWI is active in conflict resolution, international cooperation, security (in the broadest sense) and what is known as building civil society. This broad scope is combined with clearly-established priorities and practical action.
One focus of EWI’s work is the future eastern border of the expanding European Union (EU). For several years, EWI has been implementing a complex cross-border cooperation programme along the length of this frontier. The Russian component of the programme includes a number of projects in north-west Russia. The Institute sees the Kaliningrad oblast as a key region because the problems of, and opportunities for, European integration are readily and clearly apparent there. One of EWI’s main projects in Kaliningrad is intended to help the oblast to become a pilot region for partnership between Russia and the EU. This project has included an analysis of the situation in the oblast, is close to completion, as is the concept for developing it as a pilot region.
Two fundamental concepts are important: Kaliningrad oblast as a ‘region of cooperation’, and as a ‘pilot region’. These two concepts are often conflated, but should be kept distinct. The basic idea behind the concept of a ‘region of cooperation’ is that Russia should request help from the EU to overcome the difficulties and problems that it encounters in Kaliningrad in connection with EU enlargement. At the same time, Russia should retain full responsibility for, and exclusive jurisdiction over, the region’s development. The key words here are ‘problem’ and ‘cooperation’.
The advantage of this concept is that it does not require a great deal of effort from the parties concerned. It also fits neatly into the existing pattern of Russia–EU relations, which can be described as ‘us and them’. Understandably, this idea is particularly attractive to those who are satisfied with the situation as it stands today, in which external influences are effectively minimal. The fact that this approach is restricted to Kaliningrad oblast, and arouses displeasure and incomprehension on the part of both the federal authorities and representatives of other Russian regions, is the downside of this concept.
Some Russian officials believe that a certain ‘Kaliningrad style’ of thought and behaviour has emerged; in other words, a hopelessly dependent attitude among Kaliningraders, who are convinced that their situation is so dire that the region could not possibly survive without outside help. According to these officials, this is the motive behind the concept of a region of cooperation: ideas such as this are designed to squeeze as much money as possible out of Moscow and Brussels. Sceptics ask what makes Kaliningrad any more deserving than any other region of Russia. Why should it get so much attention?
The fundamental difference between the idea of a region of cooperation and the idea of a pilot region is that the main aim of the second is not so much to develop the region, although this will, of course, be one of the main outcomes, as to establish new relations between Russia and the EU. These are to be based on genuine partnership, using the opportunities that the ‘Kaliningrad factor’ presents. The key words here are ‘opportunities’ and ‘partnership’. This approach is about trying to foster relations in Kaliningrad oblast free of divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, with Russia and the EU as truly equal partners whose willingness to act is based upon their recognition of common interests and a common desire for strategic partnership.
Such an approach would mean implementing a major Russian–European pilot project in Kaliningrad oblast. This would involve drawing up a plan for its development, joint investment and the use of resources, joint management and, of course, a division of responsibility for project outcomes that is approved by both sides or, better still, drafted jointly.
The main disadvantage of this option is its innovative aspect, which requires the key players to reassess existing principles and stereotypes of cooperation, as well as notions of sovereignty and reducing ‘soft’ security threats. The main advantage is that it meets the challenges of the twenty-first century. The so-called ‘Kaliningrad conundrum’ is both an example of these new challenges, and a possible key to solving them.
It will, however, be years – possibly even decades – before the idea of creating a common European economic, legal and humanitarian space can be put into practice, even though, as President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stressed, this is both needed and wanted. Enormous amounts of resources will be required from both sides. Nonetheless, this extremely important issue should be resolved without delay; a partnership project should be tested in Kaliningrad, with the prospect of extending it to Russia–EU relations as a whole if it succeeds.
This is the context in which the Kaliningrad issue was discussed at the meetings of the so-called Kiel international group of experts from April through to October 2002. Following difficult discussions and even disputes over the text of the Kaliningrad in Focus document1, questions about the future of Kaliningrad oblast as a pilot region for partnership were eventually resolved. Another important outcome of the work was realising the need for international experts to combine their efforts to fine-tune and promote the idea of Kaliningrad oblast as a pilot region, working on the basis of genuine partnership. An international association of experts on the development of Kaliningrad was set up, comprising specialists from Russia, including Kaliningrad and Moscow; Germany, Ireland and Denmark; EU candidate countries; and the US. The association is open to any individual expert or organisation that shares a constructive approach to the development of Kaliningrad oblast, and wishes to make an intellectual contribution to this work.
Is the concept of a pilot region and genuine partnership between Russia and the EU possible given that there is no agreement on seemingly straightforward issues, such as transit through Lithuania for Russian service personnel and their children without passports, even though a political decision has been taken on these matters? There is indeed a gulf between the concept for European partnership with Russia using the Kaliningrad factor and the reality of the negotiating process under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia. This is a serious problem. The solution should be sought in two ways: by recognising Kaliningrad’s considerable significance in current and future Russian Federation–EU relations in general; and making more active use of existing expert resources when determining and aligning positions on fundamental issues around strategic partnership. The first should lead to the creation of either a subcommittee on this issue within the framework of the Cooperation Committee (which is less probable), or a high- (or medium-) level group along the lines of existing groups, particularly the group on the Common European Economic Space. As for the second track, the expert group has proposals on how this can be done in practice. It is encouraging that Andrei Stepanov, the Russian President’s representative, is in favour of Kaliningrad oblast being a region for EU–Russia partnership and it is to be hoped that the EU will also support this.
Footnote
1 Kaliningrad in Focus: policy recommendations in the perspective of problem-solving The Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research SCHIFF/SHIP-text No 67 Kiel October 2002
