Leonid Vardomsky, Head of Department for CIS, the Institute for Economic and Political Affairs, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
The decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union has clearly revealed the uncertainty surrounding the development of the newly created post-Soviet states. The acute problems that these countries are experiencing are linked to the transformation of administrative borders to national frontiers. The post-Soviet states are increasingly independent in regard to shaping their economic and political direction. At the same time, they have become increasingly polarised in social and economic terms. The creation of new national borders is inevitably leading to geopolitical and geo-economic consequences. The scale of these ramifications depends on the progress of, and the prospects for, bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation.
Nation-building and new borders
Borders are considered an essential attribute of nationhood. In the past decade, the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have made considerable progress in relation to nation-building, although this process is continuing. The search for an individual identity deepens the institutionalised distinctions between them. This has manifested, inter alia, in the adoption of different economic-reform models, the different pace of reform, and different levels of state intervention.
While these countries have the experience of the transition to a market economy in common, different political systems and models of economic organisation reflect their search for a balance between respective cultural and political tradition and desire for dynamic modernisation. In the process of finding their identity, the cultural differences between them grow. In addition, they are seeking new international partners and are pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy, which is a reaction to the high degree of interdependence established between them during the Soviet era, as well as to the threats that they pose to each other.
The drawing of new national borders, therefore, is inextricably tied to the shaping of the identity of the post-Soviet states. It is worth noting that, in the process of delineating new frontiers, the dominant function of the borders is to serve as a barrier. The need to defend against external influences is also connected to growing economic differentiation. Today, the countries of the region differ considerably in terms of their consumer and industrial standards and prices and their customs, fiscal and monetary policies.
The accelerated development of the barrier function has significantly complicated economic links for businesses and individuals. There are many obstacles to freedom of movement and cross-border contact.
The new states are not rich, limiting the effective financing of social policy. In the majority of the post-Soviet republics, most of the population lives below the poverty line. Growing socio-economic differentials between these states and the transnational movement of social problems (crime and disease, for example) has also highlighted the need to fortify the barrier function of the borders.
The challenge of integration
The huge economic, political and social costs of disintegration fairly quickly dampened post-independence euphoria and dispelled any illusions that economic and political sovereignty would guarantee speedy growth and improvement in the population’s standard of living. New integration initiatives emerged in the CIS in 1992 and went through several phases.
During the first phase, which lasted until the second half of 1993, there were attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet states by maintaining the rouble zone. This concept, however, proved totally unrealistic, and was replaced with the classic model of stage-by-stage development (see below), involving the creation of an Economic Union from a Free Trade Zone, a Customs Union, a Common Market for capital, goods, labour and services, and a Currency Union.
The second phase started with the signing, on 24 September 1993, of an agreement to establish an Economic Union. In April and October 1994, respectively, the parties agreed to set up a Free Trade Zone for the CIS and Customs and Settlement Unions. This period came to an abrupt end, though, and was superseded in late 1994 by the concept that each state should integrate with others at its own pace. This was because not all of the CIS countries were ready to implement the agreements signed in 1993–94 in accordance with conditions dictated by Russia. At the same time, each country could appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of the Free Trade Zone and the Customs Union. It was now that attempts to preserve the Soviet Union’s outer borders also collapsed.
The third phase began in January 1995 with the signing of an agreement to set up a Customs Union between Russia and Belarus. Kazakhstan joined the arrangement at the end of January 1995, followed by Kyrgyzstan in 1996 and Tajikistan in 1998. In March 1998 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed a treaty to intensify economic integration and people-to-people contact between them.
The fourth phase is linked to the emergence of alternative organisations. It started in 1997 and reflected dissatisfaction with the implementation of the integration agreements signed previously, particularly the one to create a Free Trade Zone.
In Strasbourg, in summer 1997, Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova signed a memorandum on the establishment of a new organisation (GUUAM) with the aim of broadening cooperation and creating a Asia–Caucasus–Europe transport corridor. In 1998, the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC)1 was set up, comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In April 1997, Belarus and Russia signed a Union Treaty.
By this time, the single border space inherited from the Soviet Union had practically ceased to exist. With national border guards incapable of preventing illegal border crossing, Russia was faced with the need to protect its frontiers reliably.
A new phase of integration began at the end of 1999. It was driven by desire to improve the functioning of the aforementioned regional bodies. A treaty to create a Union state of Belarus and Russia was signed in December 1999, the Customs Union was transformed into the Eurasian Economic Community in October 2000, the GUUAM Charter was signed in June 2001, and in 2000–01 attempts to create a Free Trade Zone within the CIS became more purposeful.
In autumn 2001, Russia adopted a new border doctrine under which its frontiers were to become more open to international cooperation and individual contact between citizens. There was to be a more effective system of entry for cargo, people and transport, improved border controls, and greater effort to curb illegal migration. According to General Andrei Nikolaev, Chief of Russia’s Border Guards and member of the State Duma, the new approach presupposed that border controls would allow the opening or closure of the frontier to be regulated ‘like a zip fastener’ 2 – that is, making the new borders more open to encourage legitimate human contact, while simultaneously strengthening their barrier function.
The post-Soviet states did not achieve the results that they desired from reintegration in the 1990s. They failed to prevent the weakening of trade links between them. The process of creating a Free Trade Zone within the CIS framework is far from complete. In regard to the Customs Union, there is a serious problem with unifying external tariffs because member states have different economic structures and do not produce many types of goods themselves. Furthermore, the Customs Union includes the richest and the poorest CIS countries. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan, which is a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), cannot alter its import tariffs to meet the stipulations of the Customs Union.
The relationship between the contact and barrier functions of the new borders is still determined not so much by multilateral arrangements, therefore, as by bilateral agreements and treaties. This is often due to unilateral action by countries, such as the imposition of import restrictions or bans, the establishment of a visa regime to allow nationals and foreign citizens to cross a state’s borders, and the introduction of a special regime for foreign visitors staying in the country. Individual nations have introduced such policies when differences with their neighbours have heightened and their national interests do not coincide.
The limited mandate of the border regions
The new border regions of the Russian Federation have acute socio-economic differences. Regional per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is lower than the Russian average. The majority of the regions has relatively low levels of foreign trade.
By and large, the new borders run across economically underdeveloped areas situated between the national and regional centres of the new states. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that, while Russia is a relatively poor country (per capita GDP is seven-to-ten times smaller than that of the world’s most developed countries), it borders even poorer nations. Moreover, most of the border areas of the neighbouring states are themselves the least developed parts of those countries. Although the new border regions differ quite sharply in terms of standard of living, they are generally quite attractive destinations for external migrants, including those from CIS countries.
The establishment of the new frontiers was an additional shock for the border areas. This is because they disrupted trade links forged during the Soviet period; most of which are now economically unviable.
Russia’s relations with some CIS countries deteriorated in the 1990s (because of the introduction of customs and visa regimes at border crossings, for example) and this has had a strong impact on the socio-economic situation in the border regions.
Border cooperation now has a firmer institutional base following the signing of a series of documents drawn up by the member states of the Europe–Asia Economic Community (Customs Union) to increase economic integration and human contact between them. The effectiveness of such agreements is constrained, however, by the varying powers of the regional administrations of the neighbouring countries. The powers of the Russian regional authorities are greater than those of their CIS partners.
The local and regional administrations of Russia’s new border regions have been striving to have a direct influence on the level of contact or protection provided by the borders. They have made attempts to:
1. limit the economic and social damage inflicted by the new borders;
2. ensure the border is a positive factor, boosting regional economic development;
3. increase the local authorities’ powers to engage in cross-border cooperation; and
4. enhance the border regions’ influence on federal policy towards the post-Soviet states.
Until the end of the 1990s, the local and regional authorities in the new border regions tried to persuade the government of the Russian Federation to adopt a special federal law on border regions and border cooperation. But Moscow did not go that far, trying instead to resolve every problem by passing federal laws of a general nature and by signing bilateral and multilateral agreements with the former union republics.
Following pressure from the border regions, the government of the Russian Federation adopted, in February 2001, a new concept for the development of border cooperation. Declarative by nature, it examines the general principles of cooperation between bordering regions of neighbouring countries. Its scope, though, is insufficient to facilitate real improvement in cooperation between specific border regions.
In the late 1990s, there was a change in the attitude of Russian regional governments bordering Kazakhstan towards problems associated with the transparency of the new frontiers, such as illegal migration, increased drug trafficking and criminalisation of the area. This development can be explained by changes in the ethnic make-up of the border regions due to the influx of migrants, worsening inter-ethnic tension, large-scale illegal trade (the only means of survival for many local residents) and the spread of radical Islam. The instability of the Central Asian states and the real possibility of an insurgency by Islamic fundamentalists from the south posed a particular threat. Consequently, local governments of the Russian border regions are now demanding that the new borders’ protective functions be strengthened.
Regionalisation of the post-Soviet space
CIS member states have spent their first decade of independence searching for a reasonable balance between strengthening their newly acquired sovereignty and guaranteeing their national security. To do this, they have exploited opportunities created by the international community and those deriving from their Soviet heritage. Attempts to increase the integration process have failed to prevent growing alienation and differentiation3 between these nation states. The situation at the new borders and the level of border cooperation is a clear reflection of this.
The effects of globalisation on these new states have proved to be a greater force than efforts to develop regional cooperation in the post-Soviet space. The regional bodies that have emerged in the post-Soviet space are formal rather than real.
Correlation between the protective and the contact functions of the new borders varies according to the local characteristics of each border region. The specifics of Russia’s economic and political relations with its neighbours, and the level of market reform, and of social, political and cultural development in these neighbouring states, are all determinants. The issue of the contact and barrier functions of the borders is now viewed not in politically emotional terms but in relation to real threats and opportunities for economic development. In the immediate future, the development of border functions will be determined first and foremost by efforts to prevent potential threats while gaining political and economic benefits.
Second, more differentiation will be observed between policies on Russia’s different borders. It is possible that the Kazakhstan–Russia border will be completely closed. At the same time, there is the real prospect of greater contact on the Russia–Ukraine frontier. Differences such as these between Russia’s Kazakh and Ukrainian borders will continue to persist. The degree of controls in operation on a border is not likely to be affected if Russia is a member of an international organisation aspiring to inter-state cooperation in that particular region, since efforts towards integration are secondary to local specifics.
Third, there is likely to be an increase in the contact functions of the southern borders as far as the movement of goods is concerned and, simultaneously, an increase in their barrier function in relation to the cross-border movement of people.
Fourth, there will be increased contact on an institutional basis to compensate for the growing barrier functions of Russia’s southern borders. Increased contact will be facilitated by financial and industrial groups of companies and businesses from the neighbouring regions. In addition, there will be increased trade in the industrial sector, and institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and information and consulting centres, will be set up. At the same time, the number of modern border-crossing points along the entire frontier will increase. This process will bring dividends for the border regions by boosting their contribution to Russia’s external trade with its neighbours, as well as a balanced border policy and stable inter-state relations.
