Dmitry Trofimov, Counsellor, Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
The author is writing in his own personal capacity as an expert on the issue. The views and assessments in this paper are not the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
This paper addresses the issues surrounding Russia’s foreign-policy strategy in Central Asia. A frequently asked question is: does such a strategy exist?
If one includes Central Asia in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), then, in formal terms, the answer is yes. It must not be forgotten that, as long ago as January 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a document entitled ‘The Main Directions of the Development of Russia’s Relations with the CIS Member States’. Its main tenets were based on the corresponding chapter and new version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which was ratified by Putin in June 2000.
These directives, which, incidentally, are quite frank in terms of their content, have five key conceptual aims:
1. the CIS is to be a priority in Russian foreign policy;
2. the resolution of national security issues is to take precedence;
3. a pragmatic, yet individual approach is to be adopted in regard to partners, depending on their willingness to take Russian interests into account;
4. great emphasis is to be placed on economic cooperation and furthering Russian business interests; and
5. stress is to be put on bilateral cooperation and establishing clearly defined priorities for integration – from the multifaceted CIS to the slightly more specialised Eurasian Economic Community and, to a certain extent, the 1994 Collective Security Treaty.
At present, there are no analogous documents setting out the principles, goals and tasks of the European, Transcaucasian and Central Asian policy directions of the CIS. There are some half-completed conceptual proposals, which, of course, have been developed in line with the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, although these are still in the process of being finalised. Furthermore, experts are still arguing about the methods that should be used to implement Russia’s national interests in specific regions and its policies towards other relevant states.
It should be pointed out that Russia is deliberating, as usual, but this is to be expected, as a few factors are slowing down the process. First, Fyodor Tyutchev’s notion of Russia being a vast expanse that can never be measured or understood can now be applied to the post-Soviet space in general and to Central Asia in particular. Long coexistence with Russia in one state has prepared the Central Asian republics, in my opinion, for using or exploiting Russia effectively. Russia, however, cannot claim to be in such a position, despite its longstanding economic ties and well-developed personal contacts. It is these contacts, by the way, that, at times, have pushed Russia into involuntarily adopting a certain informal familiarity that can damage relations between states. At the same time, though, Russia is demonstrating a wholly unjustifiable and excessive amount of suspicion of its Central Asian partners.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Administration, the Federal Assembly and other Russian government departments have had to do a lot of studying. It is a well-known fact that, during the mid-1990s, Russian state departments and ministries had a severe shortage of personnel with knowledge and understanding of the region as a whole and of traditional Central Asian decision-making mechanisms in particular. Hardly anyone was familiar with local customs let alone native languages. Incidentally, nor was there the necessary expertise in political science in the country as a whole.
It goes without saying that I have no wish to dwell on how a national consensus gradually took shape in the 1990s in regard to Russia’s foreign-policy priorities in Central Asia. All that I will say is that it was not reached easily; it is enough to recall the endless fluctuation between either maintaining a presence in Central Asia or withdrawing from the region.
The past ten years have provided us with an opportunity to acquire the necessary experience of cooperation with Central Asian states. Additionally, we have also been able to appreciate to a significant degree the range of specifically local issues. This enables us now to put forward both our own interests with a large amount of certainty and to propose particular challenges that should be dealt with.
Russia’s national interest, in the broadest sense, can be summarised as follows:
1. Ensuring stability in Central Asia on the basis of the closest-possible partnerships with regional states. We must acknowledge that any destabilisation in the region could have devastating consequences for Russia.
2. Unrestricted utilisation of Central Asia’s transit potential, with the aim of supporting Russia’s relationships with China, India and Iran. As far as China is concerned, it would be a good idea to focus on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); as regards India and Iran, it would be a good idea to make the most of the north–south transport corridor project that is still in the early stages of development.
3. Maintaining a single economic space, incorporating both Russia and Central Asia. In future, it might be necessary to facilitate a breakthrough in the modernisation of Russia’s economy. It is thought that, in the long–term, Russia will need to retain a big enough market to sell its own goods, as well as to accommodate stable flows of imports (at times through lack of alternatives) of a wide range of agricultural products from Central Asia, especially barley, cotton and wheat. Russia’s long-term priorities also include increased Russian involvement in decisions on the use of hydro-energy and raw materials in Central Asia.
4. Exploitation of the region’s geo-strategic potential by seeking solutions to practical problems there and, at the same time, to issues concerning its status as an international and regional power. For the medium term at least, Russia has no alternative but to use the Baikonor space centre in Kazakhstan – it is the launch site for at least 70% of Russia’s space rockets. There is an abundance of sites in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that is of great strategic significance to Russia. Just as much consideration needs to be given to plans, stipulated in the 1999 Russo-Tajik Agreement, to set up a Russian military base in Tajikistan – the Russian 201st motorised infantry division is already based in the country. It is important to note that Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan has been relatively effective in tackling internal or regional security matters, but has not been used as leverage to meet Russia’s long-term political and economic interests.
5. Recognition by the states of the region and external powers of Russia’s right to play a role in Central Asia. This is already happening, at least informally, as evidenced by the invitations to the Russian leadership to participate in sine qua non consultations on Central Asia. These consultations take place prior to any decisions that might influence the region’s geopolitical configuration.
In order to advance these interests, Russia and the Central Asian states need to resolve a wide range of issues, of which I shall mention only a few and in no particular order of relevance.
1. More effective use has to be made of existing schemes for multilateral integration, such as the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty, the Eurasian Economic Community and the SCO. At times since the collapse of the Soviet Union each of these institutions has played a role in absorbing the shock of Russia’s declining influence in the region by creating their own system of ‘checks and balances’. Thus, Russia would be well advised, at least in the short term, to rely on them, while, at the same time, prioritising economic cooperation through the Eurasian Economic Community and the SCO.
2. The need to complete the delimitation and demarcation of Russia’s southern borders. It is clear that, by the mid-1990s, our initial plans to maintain a Russian presence and to have border-control guards posted along the entire length of the former Soviet Union’s southern border were unrealistic and beyond our capability. Since the southern borders of the CIS seem to be essentially porous, the only way to deter unwanted external influences is to install the necessary technical border infrastructure, particularly on Russia’s border with Kazakhstan. However, it would be very onerous to do this and, in present circumstances, it would also be fraught with unwanted political consequences. It is also clear that to fence ourselves off from Kazakhstan, our Soviet partner, by means of engineering and technical equipment is not desirable for economic, political and financial reasons: it would cost Russia no less that $1 billion to equip fully border-control guards along the 6,500-kilometre frontier. Nevertheless, it is essential that a decision be made concerning equipping our southern border – either along Russia’s border with Kazakhstan or along the borders of the member countries of the Collective Security Treaty.
3. Exploitation of Central Asia’s hydro-energy potential. As one might imagine, this issue, which is perhaps the most crucial, requires a series of interrelated steps. For some time, these have been urgent. The task is primarily to facilitate the most active participation possible in joint water-management projects. Experts agree that most attention should be paid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on whose territory 86% of Central Asia’s water is located. The key issue is joint development of the colossal hydro-energy resources of these two republics. This, in turn, will give Russia decisive leverage over the whole region, and will also allow us to be part of the financially lucrative projects to sell surplus hydroelectric power to states in South Asia. On the practical level, what is needed now is an expert study of parallel trilateral projects for the reconstruction or construction and joint use of some hydroelectric power stations and electricity grids. Joint development of hydro-energy should also attract foreign capital from the Arab World, China, Europe, Japan and the US. It goes without saying that we hope these projects will use Russian technology, equipment and contractors.
4. Because the Caspian states are increasingly dependent on Western capital, and considering Russia’s extremely limited financial resources, it is essential that Russia, in order to protect its interests in the region, have priority use of existing Russian export infrastructure (pipelines). Russia also needs to promote its oil and gas companies in the Caspian, ensuring that they have the maximum possible share in relevant projects.
5. Russians resident in other states. This not only concerns the large number of Russians in Central Asia (in 2001, Russians accounted for 11.7% of the 6.5 million-strong Central Asian population), but also Russian-oriented ethnic communities in the region. All of these population groups are, as in the past, natural ethnic and political allies of Russia and a relatively significant and effective channel via which it can maintain its influence. No one can deny that the Central Asian countries will remain a relatively important source of labour in the medium term for Russia. Nevertheless, as far as preserving Russia’s economic and geopolitical presence is concerned, Russia needs not so much to encourage Russians from Central Asia to migrate to Russia (in any case, this would still not fully meet the demand of the Russian economy for labour), so much as to seek ways to ensure the two-way movement of labour between Russia and the Central Asian states. Russians, for example, could work in strategically important and scientifically-advanced sectors of Central Asian economies.
6. Today, Russia could make good use of human resources (in the form of graduates and skilled labour) , bilaterally and multilaterally, to enable it to strengthen its influence in the post-Soviet space without any extra financial outlay. It is a well-known fact that Central Asian graduates from Russian universities (and also students who have acquired work experience in Russia) constitute the most stable pro-Russian group in all of the countries of the region. It is clearly time to increase significantly the number of free places offered at Russian universities to students from Central Asia. At present, the former Soviet republics’ ruling élites provide funding for young people to study in the West. Western universities, in turn, have greatly expanded their educational programmes and have good cause to consider them an effective investment in terms of tapping into the region’s labour reserves. To let the current situation continue unchecked will mean that Russia will lose future generations of talented young people from the Central Asian states.
In formulating Russia’s foreign-policy strategy in Central Asia, the serious changes in the region’s geopolitical circumstances emanating from the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan cannot be ignored. The most important of these is the sharp increase in the US military and political presence in Central Asia. The fact that the US has been granted the right to use some airports and military bases is not really the point. There is another factor that is almost certainly more significant: the readiness of Central Asian states to expand their cooperation with the US even at the price of jeopardising Russian interests in the region.
But there are limits to the expansion of US relations with Central Asian states. Above all, it is doubtful that Washington will come to the financial or economic aid of these countries, although they are counting on continuing US support. Thus, cooperation with the US will not replace the need for the countries of the region to develop further their economic links with Russia. Furthermore, Central Asian leaders will continue to come under pressure from the US to establish democratic systems, improve human rights, accelerate economic reform and demonstrate commitment to Washington. The circumstances mentioned above are likely to result in Central Asian leaders attempting to find a balance between Russia and the US, calculating that they will receive additional protection and benefits from both sides. This model will allow Russia to retain its position in Central Asia, without having to shoulder an excessive burden.
