Leonid Bondarets, Senior Expert, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Terrorism is a centuries-old problem. Due to historical circumstances, however, the word itself (‘terrorism’) has became an enduring part of our vocabulary. From around the mid-1990s, politicians and specialists in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have frequently used it, following notorious actions by Chechen rebels in Russia. After the 1999 armed insurgency and conflict in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan it was tied to the word ‘extremism’.
In Central Asia, these terms have generally acquired a pervasive religious colouring, as a result of the influence of external information and religious ignorance. In the overwhelming majority of cases, terrorism and extremism are associated with Islam. Representatives of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are referred to as ‘religious extremists’. The Islamic factor plays a defining role in the way that Chechen, Kashmiri, Palestinian and Philippine terrorists and extremists as well as Uighur separatists are perceived. Many people openly refer to the organisers and perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 as Islamic terrorists.
Yet, there is no single definition of terrorism and extremism that includes the religious factor in general or the Islamic factor in particular. In more general definitions, for instance, ‘terrorism’ is described as: the conscious, premeditated use of violence by organised groups or individuals against non-military targets to exert pressure on certain sectors of the population or on organs of the state to achieve goals that cannot be met through lawful means. The concept of ‘international terrorism’ presupposes an identical course of action taken with political objectives in mind against any foreign state, international organisation or representatives of the above in times of peace or war, which is damaging to international relations and global law and order.
‘Extremism’ is regarded as a kind of radical negation of a state’s prevailing social norms and rules by individuals or groups. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, it assumes the use of illegitimate means, including terror, to satisfy certain goals. It is interesting to note that, although the nature of extremism meant that it was initially directed at the state in the terrorists’ home country, it has more recently acquired an external dimension— beyond the boundaries of the terrorists’ homeland. One example is the radical Hizb-ut-Takhrir organisation (‘Freedom Party’), established in 1953 in Jerusalem, which has extended its activities to Central Asia: the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (China) and Azerbaijan. According to certain sources, it has also set up cells in Russia’s Muslim republics. This organisation is said to be actively supporting Chechen separatists and to be involved in recruiting mercenaries to their ranks.1
The linking of religion with the concepts described above is resulting in a highly negative image of members of the Muslim faith as potential terrorists and extremists. This means that governments associate terrorist and extremist acts abroad with domestic acts of terrorism. Hence, one of the greatest religions and cultures is placed in opposition to other religions and cultures, as well as to the secular authorities of Muslim states, including, first and foremost, those of Central Asia. This is why there is a threat of violent confrontation on religious grounds inside the Central Asian countries themselves, as has been demonstrated in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, this could heighten Muslim minorities’ separatist sentiments and encourage their struggle to establish independent nation-states.
Nevertheless, a religious dimension to acts of terrorism and extremism in Central Asia cannot be ruled out entirely. This can be attributed to two factors.
First, terrorists and extremists use religious slogans to generate support. Analysts of terrorism often see injustice and a low standard of living as two of the main elements behind modern terrorism.2 The same can be said of modern extremism. These are key factors in explaining the emergence of terrorism and extremism in Central Asia.
A sense of injustice became acute among one-time Soviet citizens for a number of reasons. As a result of errors made during privatisation, the bulk of what was once national property fell into the hands of top Communist Party officials, the new national bourgeoisie, representatives of organised crime and others, while the vast majority of the population was deprived of its fair share.
In addition, the perestroika era and the early years of independence saw a reappraisal of political values and stimulated the inevitable pursuit of real democratic freedoms. The incumbent authorities, however, perceived the desire for such freedoms, criticism of the state and the establishment of opposition parties and movements as an attempt to deprive them of their powers. This led to persecution on political grounds and ultimately hindered the formation of a fully-fledged, constructive political opposition. Those attracted to terrorist groups are critical of the lack of political restraint shown by certain officials in the campaign against dissidence, together with the impunity enjoyed by law-enforcement officers. Likewise, the quest for political power driven by the self-interests of certain sectors of society or groups and attempts to maintain and prolong the life of existing power structures by any means, including restricting freedom of speech and independent political activity, bringing criminal actions against political opponents, and preventing potential contenders for power from being politically active, are viewed unfavourably.
Widespread use of force to resolve economic, political, social and cultural problems among various sectors of the population3 and official corruption and abuse also provoke a sense of injustice.
As for the standard of living, socio-economic as well as political factors lie behind the endeavour for change. Since the Central Asian states regained their independence in 1991, poverty has increased among the population, a significant proportion of which still recalls the more prosperous Soviet era. In November 2002, for example, 80% of the workforce in Kyrgyzstan received a salary of less than 1,000 som, while the living wage was 1,274 som.4 Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of former Soviet citizens, raised on collectivistic ideas, has found it next to impossible to adapt to the new individualistic conditions, which presuppose tough competition in the fight for survival.
Thus, the new democratic authorities failed to fulfil their promises. In other words, they failed to provide normal political, economic and social conditions in which the citizens of their countries could live a normal life and they failed to uphold people’s lawful rights and interests. This has contributed to a sense of disappointment in regard to the actions of the political élite and has prompted part of the disgruntled population to turn actively to Islam, which besides offering a system of social relations that was apparently more just than the existing one, was, to a certain extent, also perceived as a way of ensuring acceptable living conditions.
Second, the difficult process of religious revival is providing terrorism and extremism with a religious element. Following the demise of Communist ideology, no constructive national idea was put forward in the newly independent states as an alternative that would establish moral and ethical values befitting the new way of life. In circumstances where the people were focusing only on their everyday struggle to make ends meet, attempts by the authorities to rally the population by reminding them of national epics and history failed. The authorities evoked images of the past that contained historical figures most of whom the public had never heard of, some of whom had been regarded in a negative light until only recently, and others who were not necessarily of the right national or ethnic group.
The loss of firm moral and ethical guidelines and the political and economic blunders of the authorities created an ideological vacuum, which was immediately filled by a religion that had been persecuted by the Soviet regime and thus held considerable allure. What is more, Islam offered familiar collective values.
However, the process of the revival of religious sentiment attracted proponents of radical Islam to Central Asia, who found fertile soil for planting their ideas in the minds of an aggrieved population that was largely ignorant about religion.
Experience shows that, as a rule, radical Islam manifests in places where orthodox Islam holds a tenuous position and where freedom of conscience has been restricted by the ruling regime. The renunciation of religion during the Soviet era prohibited active links between the small religious communities and the countries of traditional, orthodox Islam, preventing the consolidation of its essential principles.5 It is not surprising that the common form of Islam that survived in Central Asia proved neither ready nor able to withstand its own radical tendencies. Absence of a system of traditional (dogmatic) religious education and of a sufficiently intelligent body of clerics has taken its toll. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, only 30–40% of imams have further-education qualifications in religious instruction. Consequently, the state has assumed responsibility for upholding the purity of the religion. This campaign has taken on the most deplorable forms in Uzbekistan. Although Wahhabism is the official local target, eyewitness accounts testify to widespread, indiscriminate persecution on religious grounds of Islam in general. Believers are arrested and tried for attending meetings in mosques and even for growing a beard.6
It follows, therefore, that those who practice Islam could side with terrorist and extremist organisations in protest against the injustice that they see about them, as well as to restore justice and to ensure that their rights and interests are upheld. On the basis of detailed analysis, however, it is possible to claim that, in this particular instance, religion is only indirectly related to domestic and international terrorism — that is, by virtue of the fact that the ‘terrorist’ belongs to a religious community. Instead, the driving forces are political and socio-economic factors. According to Konstantin Syroezhkin, the head of the information and analysis section of the Kontinent journal, ‘the fight for the redistribution of property, for the right to own, buy and sell land and natural resources, and political power are the real reasons behind the majority of the so-called “ethnic” and “religious” conflicts of our time’.7 Meanwhile, the leaders of terrorist and extremist organisations use religious slogans to attract supporters.
At the same time, there are at least two scenarios in which we could see religion at the heart of terrorism and extremism.
The first arises from the very essence of Islam. It is common knowledge that, unlike other religions, Islam is a way of life rather than simply a doctrine. In the Muslim cultural and religious tradition, Islam is not divided into secular and spiritual principles and in this hypostasis it is inseparable from both politics and government. As the population grows increasingly religious, the secular authorities will be obliged to share political power with political Islam. Otherwise, political Islam will be obliged to take power in accordance with cultural and religious tradition, which could lead to the emergence of a religious opposition and, accordingly, to a struggle with the secular authorities for the right to govern the state — that is, to extremism. The ultimate aim of this struggle will be to overthrow secular political regimes and to install Islamic rule. Any attempts to suppress forcibly the religious opposition could provoke retaliation in the form of terror.
It may be possible to prevent the situation from taking such a turn by separating the powers of the secular authorities and political Islam through negotiation. Meanwhile, the ruling élite of the Central Asian states has viewed the possible involvement of Islam in the political life of the state as highly undesirable. In some cases, as noted above, religious beliefs have become the target of persecution by those in power. It is apparent from the experience of Muslim countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey and others, that the persecution of political Islam leads to the radicalisation of its proponents and to the emergence of extremists,8 as has happened in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
In the second scenario, other forms of Islam, including radical ones, might become sources of terrorism and extremism. As a rule, these come from other states, and, having established themselves, they challenge not only secular power, but also traditional Islam. This scenario is essentially a variation of the above, since Islam in any of its manifestations is inseparable from politics and involvement in government lies at its core.
The fact that a religious basis for terrorism and extremism is contrived is also demonstrated by the policy of double standards that is applied to it. Russian academic Alexander Ignatenko believes that ‘there is a pattern that compels us to think that Western states are actively exploiting Islamic extremism, acting as its external (with respect to the Islamic countries themselves) patrons, sponsors or, at the very least, as its rear base’.10 The examples of Chechnya and Kosovo make it hard to disagree.
Consequently, it is at least wrong to talk about religion and, in particular, Islam as being the foundation for the emergence and spread of terrorism and extremism. The religious factor is widely used by radical religious organisations to achieve their aims, including using terror as a means. They are attracting a sufficient number of supporters by claiming to seek the restoration of justice. However, the problems of ‘Islamic extremism’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’ only manifest when Islam is used to achieve political aims. This is mostly true of domestic terrorism and extremism. But this does not give us cause to level accusations of terrorism and extremism at a world religion like Islam and at Muslim culture as a whole.
Notes
1. Sukhanov, P., ‘Fighting for a New Caliphate’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), 30 March 2001.
2. ‘Terrorism in the Modern World: Defining Features’, available online at www.caarp.kz/show.php?wda2210-01.htm.
3. Lutovinov, V.I. and Panin, I.N., ‘International Terrorism: The Manifestation and Means of Military Counteraction’, Zhurnal Teorii I Praktiki Evroziistva (Journal of Eurasian Theory and Practice), number 13, available online at www.e-journal.ru/besop-st4-13.html.
4. Nixford, A., ‘The Fence Will Have to be Paid for Too’, Vechernii Bishkek, 26 November 2001.
5. Syroezhkin, K., ‘Truth and Lies About Islamic Extremism’, Kontinent, 19(57), 2001, available online at www.continent.kz/2001/19/10.html.
6. ‘Amnesty Declared in Uzbekistan’, www.gazeta.ru, 7 September 2000.
7. Syroezhkin, K., ‘Truth and Lies About Islamic Extremism’, op. cit.
8. Malashenko, A., ‘Islam and Politics in the Central Asian States’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1999, Number 5
9. US Department of State, ‘State Terrorism and Foreign Terrorist Organisations’, 2001, available on line at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1101/ijpr/pj63fto.htm.
10. Quote from Syroezhkin, K., ‘Truth and Lies About Islamic Extremism’ op. cit 
