Nikita Lomagin
Associate Professor, School of Economics, St Petersburg State University
‘Soft’ security threats are those of non-military origin. Hard security concerns are considered more important in Russia, to the extent that some members of the political elite do not even know what soft security threats are. Because of the region’s proximity, soft security problems in northwest Russia receive more attention from the EU than other issues, although these problems are in no way limited to this region. The traditional Cold War security dilemma, based on the perception of a military threat between East and West, has largely given way to a variety of new, non-military security challenges – so-called soft security threats, such as nuclear safety problems, infectious diseases and illegal migration connected with transnational organised crime). These are not merely internal Russian or Baltic Sea region problems, but existing or potential problems for other countries as well.
Nuclear safety
The three main soft security threats to northwest Russia are nuclear safety, infectious diseases and illegal immigration. The West is clearly most concerned about nuclear safety. The three obstacles facing nuclear safety in Russia are ageing and poorly maintained plants, nuclear waste and a lack of funding to deal with these problems. There are nine operational plants in Russia, with 29 reactors. Western states view all nine plants as dangerous and badly managed. Russia, however, plans on using these plants for the next three years and will build another four or five plants within the next 15 years. Much of the nuclear waste in Russia was inherited from the Cold War period. While some of the waste has already been dumped in nearby seas, the Russian government still has to find storage sites and funding to deal with the remaining waste.
Infectious diseases
Social conditions in Russia also produce soft security problems. High on the list are infectious diseases. Tuberculosis has re-emerged as a serious concern. In 2000, 75,000 people were identified as being infected with active tuberculosis. Prison inmates account for much of the infected population. The problem has been exacerbated because 30,000 prisoners released a year are believed to carry an active form of tuberculosis. About 240,000 annual releases are believed to carry a latent form of the disease that can become infectious in the future. Most released prisoners head to big cities like Moscow or St Petersburg, with the latter posing a threat to nearby Finland. HIV/AIDS is another major health concern in Russia. The first case was reported in 1986. According to the Federal Centre for AIDS Prevention, in March 2001 there were more than 100,000 people infected with the HIV virus in Russia. The World Health Organization recently issued a warning about the spread of AIDS in Russia, saying the real number of HIV sufferers was up to ten times that indicated by the Russian health ministry.
Illegal immigration
Illegal immigration is the final major soft security threat, but compared to the above issues, it is secondary in its severity. From the EU point of view, in worst-case scenarios it constitutes a cross-border risk. Of the EU member states, Finland is the only one with a common border with Russia, and could be an ideal route from Russia into the EU. Illegal immigration to Finland has so far been very rare, although illegal immigration from Russia might increase due to a number of factors. The most important are:
1. the high level of socio-economic disparity between Russia and its Western neighbours (according to some estimates, a ratio of 1:20 for instance, between Russian Karelia and Finland);
2. an open border regime between Russia and almost all CIS countries that makes Russia both a transit country for illegal migrants and a huge reservoir for all those who do not want to live in their home countries;
3. a lack of resources and experience to deal with the problem of illegal migration;
4. the lack of a mechanism to deport foreigners, stateless persons and nationals from developing countries who violate the Russian law on exit and entry; and
5. inadequate attention to the problem of illegal migration from federal and local authorities.
The main routes for illegal migrants are through the states of Central Asia. There is a constant flow of illegal migrants from Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The main concern in northwest Russia is about national diasporas of Tajiks and Moldovans. Every summer their number increases tenfold. 10,000–15,000 migrants from the above-mentioned former Soviet republics now reside in the suburbs of St Petersburg. Once in Russia, illegal migrants mostly use the railways, which are least subject to control by law enforcement authorities. And Russia is not merely a transit country for those who want to immigrate to the West: it has become a destination for illegal migration itself. There are an estimated 300,000 illegal immigrants in the city of St Petersburg and Leningrad oblast, and 2.5 million in the whole of Russia. In spite of the public debate and news coverage in the West, which is often sensationalist and extremist, Russian federal and regional authorities keep migration into the northwest Russia under control. Although the escalation of conflicts in areas bordering Afghanistan resulted in an increase in the number of refugees coming to the St Petersburg region, these numbers have now declined, as many Afghan refugees have been returning home since the end of the Taliban regime.
Soft security policymaking
Soft-security decision-making in Russia is a key issue for existing and potential international partners in cross-border cooperation projects. Not only is there a lack of information concerning the nature and gravity of the problems, there is also a dearth of information on the local, regional and federal authorities in charge of solving the problems as well as on the division of labour between them. It is often difficult to find the responsible party to negotiate with, and the information obtained through the federal administration is not always reliable. The continuing turmoil in the Russian political system is a fundamental reason for the difficulties with information flows. Examples of this turmoil are the dismantling of the environmental administration and its merger with the Ministry of Natural Resources, the dismantling of the Ministry for National Politics (which used to deal with migration) and its merger with the Ministry for the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, reforms concerning centre–region relations have had an impact on the policy-making process. The recently formed institution of governor-generals lacks both the intellectual and financial resources to fulfil its mission in any of the seven newly formed federal districts. A major challenge in addressing soft security issues is simply the fact that there is so little money allocated in the Russian budget to resolving these challenges. Russian officials are slowly showing more concern for soft security threats, but in general the situation is quite dismal.
The most powerful decision-makers on soft security issues are naturally in the executive branch, but business and civil society also play an important role. The gas, electric and metal industries are now the most powerful businesses in Russia, as the oil industry has been somewhat fragmented. Civil society plays an extremely important role in soft security matters, as it is the only entity that can provide the public with a real picture of these issues. Non-governmental organisations have been active by organising seminars and bringing cases to court. They often act as environmental watchdogs and have brought more than 60 ecologically related cases to court.
International cooperation
The terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the emergence of a wide-reaching international anti-terrorist coalition including former foes has created a new atmosphere for dealing with soft-security issues in general, and in the Baltic Sea region and northwest Russia in particular. However, for the moment, international procedures for soft security issues, especially those that might be applicable to the soft security problems of northwest Russia, are fragmented, poorly developed and poorly articulated. Although there are many agents involved and substantial resources are available through the EU and bilateral programmes, there is no common opinion on the preconditions for problem solving politically through international cooperation. Paradoxically, a good starting point would be to take a look at the ‘hard security’ side where several well-functioning confidence-building measures and joint monitoring procedures exist.
International cooperation in the fight against soft security problems in Russia has been somewhat uneven. The Scandinavian countries have been quite supportive, as have the European Union, the United States, NATO, and the United Nations (including the World Health Organization). However, international efforts have been poorly devised and implemented. This state of affairs is reflected in the EU's and Nordic countries' inability to make balanced decisions. In connection with this, the creation of a database on soft-security issues for the Baltic Sea region (and for northwest Russia in particular) is still an ambitious task. The EU and the Nordic countries should also think about how to exploit the expertise of the various Russian NGOs more effectively, since they often have the most extensive understanding of problems downplayed or neglected by the Russian authorities. To achieve this, the role of Western NGOs as natural partners to their Russian counterparts will become essential.
