Plenary session 2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The session was dominated by the Persian Gulf’s two most pressing issues: violence in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear programme. Demographics and labour issues, as well as America’s role in the region, were additional themes.

 

Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s Foreign Minister, offered a general assessment of Gulf security, a defence of Iran’s nuclear programme, an explanation for Iraq’s violence, and a sharp denunciation of Israel. He said the security of the Persian Gulf should be ensured by comprehensive cooperation on issues of common interest, including energy, commerce, tourism and the fight against narcotics. It was threatened by the interference of Western powers, which had contributed to the growth and expansion of fanatical movements. An example of such Western interference, according to Mottaki, was the effort by some countries outside the region to create anxiety about Iran’s nuclear activities.

 

Iranian nuclear activities were peaceful, Mottaki said. They had started decades ago with the cooperation of the United States, Germany, France and South Africa. But after the 1979 Islamic revolution, American, German and French companies had abandoned incomplete nuclear projects. The Islamic Republic had decided to continue, on the basis of its legitimate rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to develop the nuclear fuel cycle. It had cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It did not believe in nuclear weapons, said Mottaki; indeed, the time when such weapons were useful had gone. Possession of nuclear weapons did not prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union, and did not avert Israel’s defeat in Lebanon.

 

In Iraq too, Mottaki pointed to the activities of foreign occupiers as the cause of conflict and a dangerous situation. The key to rescuing Iraq from this situation was the departure of foreign forces, and the cooperation of countries in the region. From the outset Iran had predicted that the occupiers of Iraq would be caught in a quagmire, and this was what had happened. The keys to establishing security and stability in the country were ending the occupation, strengthening the central government and involving all countries in the region in Iraq’s reconstruction. If the United States changed its behaviour in the Gulf and the Middle East, Iran was willing to help facilitate the withdrawal of its forces.

 

Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, argued that the best way for Gulf countries to preserve their own security was to assist with the creation of a secure northern neighbour, an Iraq with a representative government that could stand on its own feet and calm its spreading sectarian tensions. Those who decried the results of regime change in Iraq had short memories – the last two decades of the twentieth century had been marked by the wars of Saddam Hussein, who fought for eight years against Iran and invaded Kuwait. Now Iraq had a government that represented all of Iraqi society, was accountable to parliament, and was at peace with its neighbours.

 

The sectarian tensions within Iraq had implications, said Zebari, for the whole Middle East, including Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Lebanon. Countries in the region should be careful not to take sides among various components of Iraqi society – this would only deepen the tensions and draw outsiders into Iraq’s conflict.

 

The other issue of great import for regional security was the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq had not said much about Iran’s nuclear programme, for reasons that were obvious, according to Zebari. But, as a matter of policy, he emphasised that the Iraqi government opposed acquisition or development of WMD in the region. Iraq was a living witness to the consequences and suffering that resulted from Saddam Hussein’s programmes to develop and use such weapons against Iranians and against his own people. Iran was entitled to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes – the legitimate right of all countries – but transparent and credible cooperation with the IAEA was also important, Zebari maintained.

 

Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, saw four interlinked challenges to Gulf security: demographics, extremism, sectarianism and terrorism. Rapid population growth, if it outpaced employment opportunities, infrastructure and social services, would foster the discontent and divisions that fuelled extremism and terrorism. The employment problem had a particular feature in the Gulf – the need to attract talent and human capital from around the world while ensuring that the resulting large expatriate communities did not deprive local workers of jobs. Bahrain was focusing on labour-market reforms to provide Bahrainis with training and access to employment.

 

Social development needed to reach all parts of society, Sheikh Khalid continued. This was one answer to sectarianism, which he ranked among the worst contemporary threats. Its violent consequences in Iraq were on painful display. Education and human development to counter exclusion and extremism must be seen, therefore, as security policies; indeed, all policy areas had a security dimension.

 

The Gulf region, according to Sheikh Khalid, was beset by three conflicts – more than it could handle. The fundamental obstacle to overall Middle East peace remained Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories, which must be ended on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions and the trade of land for peace leading to two secure and viable states. Iran had legitimate security concerns, and the right to a peaceful civilian nuclear energy programme, but this should be within a framework that satisfied the concerns of all sides. In Iraq, as the Iraq Study Group had reported, a serious situation was worsening. It was a danger to the entire region. Outside intervention has aggravated the problem, and had spurred guerrilla groups. Regional players should not interfere: the consequences of state failure, violent spill-over, and even the break-up of the country would be in no one’s interest.

 

Sheikh Mohammed Al Abdallah Al Sabah, Director of the Kuwaiti Citizens Services and Governmental Bodies Assessment Agency, reflected on sectarian nature of Iraq’s conflict and the potential impact that civil war could have on other states. He noted the controversies in the United States that had attended efforts to find a solution. The US did need to change its policies, but there was one thing it must not do: withdraw its forces prematurely.

Alongside the risk of civil war in Iraq was the danger of renewed civil war in Lebanon. Civilised dialogue among political factions had broken down, replaced by the language of escalation. The parties need to refocus their concern on the future and people of Lebanon.

 

An intensified crisis also loomed over the Iranian nuclear issue. Like the other speakers, Sheikh Mohammed confirmed Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes. But Iran had not offered full cooperation with the IAEA to build confidence in the region and the world about its intentions.

 

Finally, Sheikh Mohammed spoke of Palestine, calling for an end to Israeli occupation and expressing support for efforts among Palestinian factions to coalesce around a government of national unity. He concluded by emphasising the principles of realism and neutrality through which the Gulf region and its problems should be addressed.

 

Michael Gordon, National Security Correspondent of the New York Times, asked the Iraqi Foreign Minister for his reaction to three of the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations: the establishment of an international Iraq support group, involving all of Iraq’s neighbours plus the UN Security Council; withdrawal of US combat forces by early 2008, putting the burden of Iraq’s security on its own security forces; and the setting of ‘benchmarks’ under which, if Iraq did not make progress on political reconciliation and economic development, the US would start to withdraw military and economic support.

 

Zebari responded that the government would set out its official reaction to the Iraq Study Group report, but he had some comments of his own. Firstly, it was unfortunate that the Group seemed to pay more attention to the views of non-Iraqis, such as UN bureaucrats, than to Iraqi leaders. Secondly, there had been no lack of outreach to international conferences and groupings to help formulate answers for Iraq’s problems. Supporting another such conference would depend on its aim – if the aim were to reverse the political process, then it would be unacceptable. Thirdly, he noted that 22 Foreign Ministers had traveled to Beirut to show support for the Lebanese government as Israel was fighting Hizbullah on its territory. Why couldn’t there be a similar show of solidarity with Iraq’s government, in the form of an international conference of government leaders in Baghdad? Fourthly, regarding withdrawal of US combat forces, the Iraqi and US government had agreed to speed up the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. On benchmarks, the Iraqi government was committed to a process of national reconciliation, drawing in even Iraqis living abroad. But it did not need threats, implicit or overt, from the United States to move forward.

 

Professor Aboumohammad Asgarkhani of the University of Tehran asked Zebari if the legitimacy of the Iraqi state had to be questioned, because it was not capable of maintaining the security of its own citizens. Zebari rejected the suggestion, noting that 12 million Iraqis had braved terror and death to vote for a new government. This was a basic source of legitimacy. Moreover, though security was problematic in some areas such as Baghdad, much of the country was safe.

 

Turning to Iran, Michael Gordon put to the Iranian Foreign Minister one of the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations: for engaging Iran in efforts to stabilise Iraq. Iran did not seem very interested, Gordon suggested. Would it participate in such a diplomatic effort, even if the goal was not immediate withdrawal of US forces? James Hoagland, Associate Editor of the Washington Post, followed up: Mottaki had spoken of Iran’s willingness to help the US get out of Iraq. What, specifically, could Iran do? More broadly, when the Iranian minister spoke of a regional security mechanism, did he mean something like the Helsinki process in the Cold War? In his vision, would the United States have any residual role in Gulf Security?

 

Robert Hunter, former US Ambassador to NATO, referred to reports that Iran in summer 2003 had sent an unofficial message to the United States regarding the possibility of talks to resolve a broad package of issues, including the nuclear programme, alleged support for terrorism, American sanctions and the possibility of security guarantees. He asked the Iranian Foreign Minister if there still might be scope for such a grand bargain.

A final question came from Major-General Jamshed Khan, President of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, on the Palestinian issue. Wasn’t this the critical issue for Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia, and what could be done to resolve it?

 

Mottaki answered that withdrawal of US forces from Iraq was not the only important concern. But just as the US said it must keep forces in Iraq because of terrorist activities, the terrorist groups were saying that the occupation by foreign forces was why they must continue terrorist activities. If America decided to withdraw, thereby removing some 50% of the cause of Iraq’s violence, then everybody would help.

 

Mottaki insisted that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes and that it was cooperating with the IAEA. The parties that cast doubt on Iran’s intentions included one power that had actually used atomic weapons and others that had started world wars that killed millions of people. Iran, by contrast, had suffered eight years of war against Saddam Hussein, who used chemical weapons against the Iranian people. Imam Khomeini had forbidden the development or use of such weapons, even in retaliation. The referral of the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council was selective and unfair, Mottaki said. The Security Council should be a forum for promoting security, not threats against a UN member. The age of unilateralism was over.