Break-out Group 2

 

 

 

 

This break-out group had two rather separate themes, reflecting the respective preoccupations of those who made the opening remarks: the situation in Iraq, and issues surrounding foreign workers in Gulf states. Underlying the group’s proceedings, however, was the growing concern over the Sunni–Shia sectarian divide in the region. This was seen as the main context against which most modern security threats throughout the Arab world may today be set, with particular reference to the conflict in Iraq.

 

Participants were conscious not only of the historical background to the divide but also of the public debate surrounding it in the Arab world today. Many conferences have been held to try to narrow the gap between the branches of Islam, and these have produced calls to avoid an internal war within the faith. For example, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi – well known in the Arab world in his role as the star preacher on the al-Jazeera television network – has called on Iranian Imams to halt their missionary activities within the Sunni world, especially in Egypt, North Africa and the Gulf. He has warned that Iranian activities in Iraq aimed at undermining Iraqi Sunnis would lead to an Iraqi civil war, and has accused Iran of fuelling sectarianism in the Arab world through organisations like Hizbullah.

 

The roots of the Sunni–Shia divide are deep, dating back more than 1,300 years to the disputed succession to secular and spiritual authority on the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 CE. Shi’ites view Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, and his descendents as the Prophet’s rightful heirs, but the defeat and death of Ali’s son, Imam Hussein, in battle at Karbala in modern Iraq in 680 CE meant the establishment of dynastic Sunni power in the Islamic world in the persons of the Umayyad Caliphs. When Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran in 1979, he pledged to amend ‘history’s mistake’.

 

With this divide as the background, the session featured expressions of negative views about democratic reforms and the US policy of democratising the Middle East, precisely because of their impact on the sectarian problem. Within the Arab world, democratic reform in Iraq was seen as tantamount to handing the state to the Shi’ites. The administration of George W. Bush, one participant said, had failed to understand that politics in the Middle East region was generally not about a balance of power, but about the relationship between the individual and the state. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi society had been entirely staterun. Now, the role of the state was much diminished and that of civil society much greater. This, in turn, increased the need for religion to play a stronger role in setting moral and ethical values. But when politics and religion came together, problems resulted. On this Arab view, there was concern that if democratic reform were to sweep the region, Bahrain and even Lebanon could become Shia-dominated countries. One participant asserted that the Americans needed to understand that democracy was not helpful if it gave the state to one sect and ignored the rights of others.

However, another Arab view was that democracy could work if minorities were treated wisely: quota systems reserving specific representation for minorities were an example of just such an initiative. Sectarian violence tended to break out in reaction to the oppression or marginalisation of particular sections of society, and the effect was to radicalise people on all sides. But good governance, and wisdom on the part of foreign actors, could set things on a different course. The opinions of a Western participant seemed in tune with this view: experience of sectarianism elsewhere suggested that suppression was unlikely to be a successful response; nor was partition, which tended to produce massive bloodshed. The third option was for power-sharing formulas to be developed within civil society – though this would take time. Was there a role for external actors in providing security guarantees to minority groups?

 

The rise of sectarianism in Iraq led participants to question the role of its neighbours and other external powers within that country. One Western participant asked whether there was a role for the US-led coalition at all given that the main problem was sectarianism, while another suggested that the primary activity of American troops was in fact to protect Sunnis from militias and Shia violence. An Arab delegate accused Iran of interfering in Iraq and fostering militias. A further important question was discussed: if Western forces could achieve only limited success in dealing with sectarian violence, could Iraqi forces do any better? One participant argued that Iraqi forces had not met the challenge because they preferred not to get involved in Baghdad, and because they were, in any case, infiltrated by militias. It would continue to be very difficult to persuade and train Iraqi forces to act in the national interest rather than on a sectarian basis. Other participants – both Iraqi and Western – felt strongly, however, that the West should better equip Iraqi forces to deal with domestic challenges, stepping up its supply of armaments to them. One Iraqi response to such comments from outsiders was that ‘you are adding fuel to the fire’. The country’s neighbours were meddling in Iraq’s affairs and sending suicide bombers. Iraq was seeking to deal with this by engaging each of them directly and on its own – without American prompting.

Iraqi participants agreed that sectarianism was the most severe challenge to the country, but otherwise presented strongly contrasting views of the situation in Iraq. One described a state of affairs far better than is usually portrayed in the media, while another saw it as far worse. On the optimistic side, participants were told that 80% of Iraq was secure and that in 14 out of 18 provinces people were living a normal life. In three and a half years, there had been two elections, a constitution had been written and security forces had been built from scratch. Standards of living and purchasing power had risen sharply. According to this optimistic view, the issue of sectarianism was driven by fringe groups on both sides of the Shia–Sunni divide, and Iraq was not likely to descend into a civil war. Nor would it break into three separate entities: that Iraq’s territorial integrity should remain intact was in the interests of all the competing elements. It would take time to bring peace to all of Iraq’s provinces, but this would be achieved. It should be done by a combination of the strengthening of Iraqi security forces and moves towards national reconciliation, including an unconditional general amnesty. A ‘paradigm shift’ was under way from the old to the new in Iraq, and patience was required.

 

However, other participants saw Iraq as mired in mass violence and corruption, and ruled by gangs. Decisions made by the earlier US-led Coalition Provisional Authority had meant that political power had been built on a sectarian basis. As an example of the current levels of corruption, one participant stated that a $100 million contract was awarded to build a military camp for which the true price was $6m. The view was expressed that American contractors were charging the government far more than the going price for any project in Baghdad. It was also stated that the insurgent groups were better equipped and better armed than the Iraqi security forces.

In a separate strand of the group’s discussion, it was argued that migration created imbalances within the communities of the Gulf. Given the small size of the indigenous population in some Gulf states, foreign workers substantially outnumbered the local workforce in a number of countries. While this was to the benefit of countries such as Libya, Lebanon, India, Pakistan the Philippines and Indonesia, it was to the detriment of the local labour force and its skills base. It could also have an impact on the religious balance of what were high-density population areas. One solution would be for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to introduce immigration quotas. It was argued that the labour force phenomenon could have an impact on regional security because it might lead to societies lacking in harmony and was more likely to produce divisions. It could also hinder efforts to integrate GCC policies. One Western participant argued, however, that no such security threat was presented. If Gulf states felt that there was such a threat, they could solve the problem by making their visa regimes more restrictive.

 

Meanwhile, it was noted that the substantial movement of people out of Iraq was creating problems for neighbouring countries including Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. One Iraqi view was that Iraq had witnessed more emigration during the Ba’ath regime than it had done afterwards, for example, following the accession to power of the Ba’ath regime and the nationalisation of the Iraqi industries, and during the Iran–Iraq War. Nevertheless, delegates were aware that the mass displacement of people in Iraq as a result of sectarian violence was serving to underline the scale of the distress within Iraq, and that the impact of Iraq’s problems would continue to be felt far and wide.