Plenary session No.1
The United States and the regional balance of power
Saturday 8 December 2007, 9.00 am
SPEAKER
Dr Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense, United States
As in previous years, events in the weeks leading up to the Manama Dialogue served to underline the crucial role that the United States plays in the security affairs of the Persian Gulf region. Iraq, invaded by a US-led coalition in 2003, saw late in 2007 a decline in levels of insurgency and sectarian violence that seemed to be partly the result of a temporary ‘surge’ in the American troop presence in Baghdad. Washington accused neighbouring Iran of fomenting trouble in Iraq, as well as of trying to develop nuclear weapons. But just before the Manama Dialogue, US intelligence agencies issued a new assessment, contradicting their previous assertions and concluding that Tehran had halted its nuclear-weapons programme in 2003, albeit continuing to press ahead with other nuclear activities. This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was treated as a victory in Tehran but left America’s regional partners struggling to understand how Washington worked. Efforts to tighten international pressure on Iran were in disarray. Meanwhile, President George W. Bush had launched a final attempt to make progress on the Israeli–Palestinian issue by convening a conference in Annapolis, Maryland, though expectations were not high that much could be achieved before the end of the Bush presidency.
In view of these developments, it was timely for the IISS Regional Security Summit to hear an authoritative address from Dr Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense. He told delegates that America’s commitment to the security and stability of the Gulf went back several decades, spanning multiple US administrations. The previous Manama Dialogue, he recalled, had been held in December 2006 against a backdrop of escalating sectarian violence in Iraq – a deteriorating situation that had prompted doubt in many quarters about whether the United States would be able to sustain its commitment in Iraq, and in the region as a whole. Gates said: ‘The record of American activity over the past year should dispel that uncertainty. The United States remains committed to defending its vital interests and those of its allies in Iraq and in the wider Middle East.’
Over recent months there had been a reduction in the level of violence in Iraq and the return of a semblance of daily life in many places. Since the surge of US forces had begun early in 2007, civilian deaths across Iraq had fallen by 60%, and by 75% in Baghdad. This was due to a change of US military tactics to emphasise protecting Iraqis from violence; to increasing effectiveness of Iraqi forces; to some militia groups halting operations; and to ordinary citizens resisting the al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia group and protecting their neighbourhoods. There were additional positive signs: the economy had improved and there had been a trend towards political reconciliation at the local level.
This progress was fragile. The Iraqi government needed to use the breathing space to pass legislation that would reinforce reconciliation and national identity, as well as to improve government services. With US troop levels in Iraq about to start falling, regional governments needed to be involved in securing further advances. The consequences of failure in Iraq would be felt ‘in all the capitals and communities of the Middle East well before they are felt in the United States. The forces that would be unleashed – of sectarian strife, of an emboldened extremist movement with access to sanctuaries – do not recognise national boundaries and would surely target any government perceived to be a hindrance to their expansion of power.’
Gates warned that any nation supporting insurgents or militias in Iraq was harming itself as well as all the people of the Middle East, whether Sunni or Shia. The primary victims of al-Qaeda had been innocent civilians. Wherever al-Qaeda had seized territory, it had made clear its dark vision for the world, characterised by fear, intimidation, murder and chaos. A secure, stable and prosperous Iraq, on the other hand, would bring benefit to the region as a contributor to security, as a trading partner, and as a paradigm of effective governance. Gates urged regional governments to exercise their influence with the Iraqis. ‘Iraq is not an island, and its future is closely tied to the behaviour of its neighbours – for better or for worse.’
Turning to Iran, Gates found Tehran’s response to the American NIE on its nuclear programme to be a ‘watershed’. He said: ‘Astonishingly, the revolutionary government of Iran has this week, for the first time, embraced as valid an assessment of the United States intelligence community – on Iran’s nuclear weapons programme.’ He hoped Tehran would also accept American intelligence assessments on its funding and training of militia groups in Iraq, supply of weapons into Iraq and Afghanistan, support of terrorist organisations, and development of medium-range ballistic missiles. He pointed out that the NIE concluded that Iran did have a nuclear-weapons programme, developed secretly and in violation of international obligations, and that it continued its uranium-enrichment work. ‘The estimate is explicit that Iran is keeping its options open and could restart its nuclear-weapons programme at any time – I would add, if it has not done so already.’
Iran’s policy of fomenting instability and chaos, Gates said, was a threat to the interests of the United States and of every country in the Middle East. The international community should demand that Iran reveal the extent of its past illegal nuclear-weapons development, and that it should suspend enrichment.
Turning to broader regional security arrangements, Gates said present-day challenges demanded international cooperation ‘in ways that previously may have seemed unnecessary or even unwelcome’. In the past, bilateral arrangements with the United States had helped to maintain a balance of power in the Gulf region. While these remained important, Washington was seeking to encourage more multilateral ties. This could bolster capabilities and inter-operability of nations in the region, while not diminishing bilateral relationships or US commitments.
Gates argued that the peace process begun in Annapolis would produce new possibilities. Cold War arms negotiations, while not necessarily producing breakthroughs, had helped each side to understand the other’s intentions, and ‘laid the groundwork for gains that ultimately brought the Cold War to a close. With persistence, courage, and good faith on both sides, I believe it will be possible to see what President Bush called “the expansion of freedom and peace in the Holy Land”.’ The region as a whole could reach a peaceful and prosperous future.
Gates stressed that the resolve of the United States to participate fully in reaching that outcome should not be underestimated. ‘Over the past century, many nations and empires and movements have looked to our shores in search of signs of vulnerability – signs that Americans are weak or undisciplined; that we are stretched thin and unable to fulfil our commitments; that we do not have the patience or the will to face a long-term challenge; that open and vigorous debate in our democracy reflects underlying divisions and irresolution with respect to defending our vital interests. Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union – all made this fundamental miscalculation. All paid the price. All are on the ash heap of history.’
Questions and answers
Gates’s address prompted a vigorous discussion dominated by the topic of Iran, but also featuring strong criticism of the United States from regional delegates.
Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, followed up Gates’s remark on the value of the US–Soviet dialogue by noting that Iran had not been invited to Annapolis or to the US-initiated Gulf Security Dialogue, but had been invited to the Manama Dialogue – though in 2007 it had chosen not to attend. Could informal discussion between the US and Iran take place at dialogues such as this?
Gates recalled that he had co-chaired in 2004 with Zbigniew Brzezinski a study on US relations with Iran, which had called for greater engagement with Iran on the basis that Tehran had ‘actually been doing some helpful things in Iraq, as well as doing some harmful things. They had been helpful in certain respects in Afghanistan, as well.’ However, there had since been a change of leadership in Iran. The government now seemed bent on confrontation with its neighbours, had been subverting stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, had threatened the existence of other states, and had ignored UN Security Council resolutions. ‘So I guess I would say, as a person who embraced the idea of engagement with Iran, the behaviour of the government of Iran since the current leadership came to power has not given one confidence that a dialogue would be productive on a range of issues.’ Iran’s suspension of its uranium-enrichment programme would provide the basis a dialogue. With the fourth round of lower-level discussions with Iran due to take place in Baghdad in January, ‘Iran has to take some steps to show that a dialogue would be meaningful, rather than sitting and shouting at each other across the table’.
Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council, commented on the recent NIE that officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency had been quoted as saying that ‘we are not that generous with Iran’. Gates had pointed out that the picture painted by the NIE was actually rather different from Tehran’s gleeful interpretation of it. Yet the question remained: what caused the initial spin given to the public presentation of the NIE?
This question led Gates, a former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to provide a lengthy explanation that revealed his own frustration at the workings of the US government machine. The degree of independence of American intelligence assessments, he said, was not well understood either in the United States or around the world. When the CIA was created in 1947, President Truman had insisted that it should be independent of other government departments so that it could provide completely independent judgements to the presidents. However, as Congressional oversight increased, ‘the CIA found itself poised equidistant between the Executive and the Congress’. The result was that the government had virtually no say over the content or timing of national intelligence estimates, which were issued to Congress and usually to the press.
While there were often allegations of political influence over the content of NIEs, Gates said: ‘I have found those occasions to be incredibly rare over the decades.’ In fact, on many occasions NIEs on controversial subjects, assumed to come from the policy side of the American government, had caused confusion about the US agenda. Therefore, there was nothing new about the frustration felt by the president, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense over the diplomatic problems caused by the latest NIE on Iran. ‘The reality is that the timing and the content of the national estimate were determined entirely by the Director of National Intelligence and the policy-making arm of the national government was left to deal with it.’
‘The estimate clearly has come at an awkward time’, Gates said. ‘It has annoyed a number of our good friends. It has confused a lot of people around the world in terms of what we are trying to accomplish.’ But it was necessary to ‘get past the give-and-take about how it happened and focus on the entirety of the estimate, and the key judgements that have been released and the continuing challenge that we face by Iran’s enrichment and their ability to return to a nuclear-weapons programme at any time they choose’.
Dr Mamoun Fandy, IISS Senior Fellow for Gulf Security, commented that in spite of Gates’s remarks about America’s commitment to regional security, its friends in the region sometimes felt sidelined on key issues of regional stability. For example, US engagement with Iran on the question of the stability of Iraq had left them feeling marginalised. They believed that this dialogue signalled acceptance of Iran’s regional hegemony. They therefore felt that ‘they are being undermined rather than helped by America’.
Gates responded that ‘the United States absolutely does not accept the notion of Iranian hegemony in this region’. It wanted Iran to become a constructive regional player. ‘I have spent the last 29 years looking for the elusive Iranian moderate; I have yet to find him’, he said. Gates said he himself had been attempting to have a dialogue with America’s friends. ‘My view is that we have something to learn from everyone that we interact with among our friends and allies.’ He had been in office only for a year and was ‘not going to speak to history’.
Fleur de Villiers, Chairman of the IISS Executive Committee, commented on Gates’s call for the maintenance of international pressure on Iran. She asked: ‘Given the reluctance of at least two members of the Security Council to exert ultimate pressure, is the dominant sound after the release of the National Intelligence Estimate not one of slamming doors and bolting horses, and has the likelihood of that international pressure ... not been totally destroyed?’
Gates did not think so. Russia, he said, considered Iran to be a serious security challenge. Chinese leaders had discussed frankly with him their reliance on Gulf oil and gas, ‘which is not well served by an Iran that is pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, attempting to subvert its neighbours and potentially seeking nuclear weapons’. Their long-term interest in regional security would be best served by working with the international community to influence Tehran to change its policies. France, Germany and the United Kingdom had made clear their determination to continue to seek a new UN Security Council resolution and unilaterally to apply economic sanctions.
Khalid Rashid Al Zayani, Chairman, Al Zayani Investments, Bahrain, asked what would be the American view of Gulf States engaging Iran economically. This could act as a moderating influence on Iran. ‘If they (the Iranians) have a financial interest within the region, they will add stability to the region we live in.’
Gates saw this as a classic question: ‘Do you best produce results in dealing with a recalcitrant and truculent government through the application of carrots or sticks?’ In fact, many countries and companies had done business in Iran. ‘I see no evidence that any of that has exercised any kind of a moderating influence on Iranian behaviour.’ Iranian willingness to engage the international community could create a role for positive inducements.
Dr Mansoor Al Arayedh, President, Gulf Council for Foreign Relations, Bahrain, noted a recent Saudi Arabian proposal on joint production of enriched uranium in a country such as Switzerland, where it would be subject to international monitoring. Would the US support such a proposal? Gates responded: ‘Some kind of independent institution or organisation that could provide access to enriched uranium for civil purposes, and under very significant controls, is a very interesting proposal. I think we should be willing to think creatively about how the international community could provide such a thing.’
Lord Powell, former Private Secretary to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, said the focus on putting economic and political pressure on Iran was ‘surely very wise for the time being’. However, President Bush had said that no option could be excluded, and most Democratic party candidates for the presidency had said something similar. ‘Therefore, can we be confident that the United States will maintain the capability in the region to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if that were to become the only option?’ Gates responded that all options indeed remained on the table. ‘However, the focus is clearly on international cooperation to bring economic and political pressures to bear.’
Dr Dana Allin, IISS Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs, noted that in spite of Gates’s assertion that the resolve and staying power of the United States should not be doubted, Iraq remained a painfully contentious subject in the US and an unpopular military action. As the 2008 elections approached, how would the US achieve a coherent, consistent, bipartisan posture on the Iraq issue that really would have staying power?
Gates said he had been working over the past year to forge a bipartisan future strategy on Iraq. His approach was that it did not matter how the present position was arrived at, what was important was how to move forward. Failure there would have huge impact for the United States and for the region. In spite of the desire to pull out American troops more quickly, there was growing understanding that it was important to get the next steps right, and that there would be a need for ‘some kind of a residual force’ in Iraq, on terms acceptable to the Iraqi government. This would continue to pursue al-Qaeda, help with border security, and train and equip the Iraqi military forces. Gates felt there was a very good possibility, regardless of who wins the election, of a US policy designed to promote stability in the region and in Iraq. ‘I believe there will be a reassertion of a bipartisan leadership in the United States, in terms of our interests and our actions in this region.’
Ayman Safadi, Chief Editor, Al Ghad newspaper, Jordan, noted that public opinion in the region was mistrustful and suspicious of American policy, following events in Palestine and Iraq. He asked why Arab public opinion would trust the US with regard to Iran. On the one hand there was fear of a US military strike that could inflame the region again, while on the other hand there was concern that it could sign a deal with Iran at the expense of Arab interests and do ‘what it has always done: embarrass its friends, let them down, let its allies down’.
Gates did not accept the premise. He said the United States had helped its friends and allies in the region many times. It had liberated Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion. ‘We have been the primary sponsor of virtually every peace agreement and ceasefire that has been signed in this region for the last 35 years.’ Throughout this period, people had disagreed with aspects of American policy. However, working with friends and allies in the region was critically important. Regarding Iran, it was very important to keep options open. The focus was now entirely on trying to get the Iranians to change their positions by using economic and political rather than military measures. Equally, the US was not going to cut a deal with Iran. ‘Iran must change its policies and its behaviour towards its neighbours, and its own nuclear programme, before the United States is willing to pursue that relationship.’
Dr Majeed Al Alawi, Minister of Labour, Bahrain, asked the US Defense Secretary whether he thought Israeli nuclear weapons were a threat to the region’s security. Gates’s reply was simple: ‘No, I do not.’
Khalid Fahad Al Khater, Director of International Relations, GCC Secretariat, asked whether the United States was ‘still planning to attack Iran’. On the question of Israel’s nuclear weapons, he said: ‘Do you not think that saying that an Israeli nuclear weapon does not pose a danger is another example of the double standard and an arrogant US policy in the region?’ On Iraq, he said the question of ‘how we got here’ could not simply be brushed aside: the US had not listened to its friends in the region. It was responsible for what had happened in Iraq. The region as a whole should ‘be allowed to create its own narrative for the future’.
Gates reiterated that the US was 100% focused on economic and political pressures on Iran. On Israel, he said it was not training terrorists to subvert its neighbours, had not covertly shipped weapons into Iraq to kill innocent civilians, had not threatened to destroy any of its neighbours, and was not trying to destabilise the government of Lebanon. ‘There are significant differences in terms of both the history and the behaviour of the Iranian and the Israeli governments.’ On Iraq, he said: ‘Does it matter how we got here? I am sure that it does.’ Lessons had been learned. ‘Focusing our efforts on the past, however, is not as productive as looking to the future.’ He agreed that Gulf states should create their own narrative. ‘The truth of the matter is that we help you to create the security climate in which you can create your own narrative.’
