Break-out Group 2

he region has been jolted by an Iranian revolution, an Iran–Iraq war, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a conflict in Yemen, and now the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Today, security challenges centre on the future of stability in Iraq, the policies of an Iran governed by hard-line conservatives, and the general problem of religious extremism and terrorism (both state sponsored and conducted by non-state actors).

These challenges have produced strategies focused on basic objectives of national interest: securing national and territorial sovereignty, preserving prosperity, hedging against uncertain neighbours outside the Gulf, and seeking ways to clamp down on terrorism. Large Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, see a singular role for themselves in the region as well as in the wider Islamic world, whereas smaller Gulf countries such as Kuwait are keen to advance collective security.

 

The break-out group heard that the security challenges to the region had altered considerably over the past decade. The problem of transnational terrorism was at the apex of security concerns. Consequently, strategies adopted by regional actors were undergoing a period of reflection, debate and change. Participants concentrated on five issues: Iraq, terrorism, Iran, governance and external actors. In addition, they focused on strategies for improving security, especially the concept of a developing regional security architecture.

 

Instability in Iraq posed the most immediate security challenge with the insurgency and clashing domestic political and sectarian forces challenging a fledgling government still in transition. While the Gulf states agreed with the objectives of foreign forces, they did not subscribe to the means taken to stabilise Iraq. No one in the group expected an early end to Iraq’s insurgency and sectarian political violence.

 

Regarding the instability in Iraq, two key threads of discussion were the regional dimensions of the threat and the role of the United States. Actors in the Gulf find the region to be increasingly interdependent. However, these linkages mean that instability in one state has a direct effect on other states in the region. While Gulf states hope to play a larger role in supporting the emerging Iraqi government, they also generally want the US to continue to play a leading security role.

 

Even those regional voices that supported America’s military role in Iraq expressed concerns about US actions and perceived missteps in Iraq. In particular, there was concern about America’s willingness and ability to listen and learn from others inside and outside the region. For example, when it dismantled the pre-existing security infrastructure in Iraq, the US did not heed warnings regarding the possible ramifications of this action. Nonetheless, despite strong doubts in the Gulf region regarding the methods implemented in Iraq, there was still strong support for the US and coalition forces’ efforts to support the new Iraqi government.

 

A second challenge to the Gulf region was posed by terrorism and there was acknowledgement that more Muslims die from international terrorism than any other group. Whereas most break-out group participants saw terrorism as a common threat, they differed on the specific threats or remedies. A multi-faceted set of national and regional policies, with military intervention as only one policy instrument, seemed to be required. There could also be wider cooperation among Muslims on confronting the false narratives of those using a distorted version of Islam to justify indiscriminate killing.

 

The growth in transnational terrorism has taken advantage of technological developments. For example, the broader al-Qaeda-inspired ‘movement’ has exploited the internet and mobile technology. While in the past terrorism was geographically limited, the internet now pushes the boundaries of terrorism’s reach and ideology. Governments, both inside and outside the Gulf, must learn to manage terrorist groups’ ability to use technology to organise their activities.

 

Although terrorism is a common threat, it is paradoxically difficult to forge effective international cooperation against it, one reason being that the definition of terrorism itself is value laden. However, although terrorism was viewed as a personal issue for each nation, overall, many participants supported deeper and wider intelligence sharing and recognised that their nations must work towards collective action to counter terrorism.

 

Terrorism and political violence are difficult to separate from insurgency and war. Nonetheless, break-out group members concentrated on the limits of more traditional military means in addressing terrorism. Some cited historic case studies within Europe (with the Red Brigades, ETA and the Provisional IRA mentioned) as evidence that al-Qaeda would, in the long run, have to be combated by a host of wider tactics and policies including enhanced intelligence analysis, penetration and communications intercepts, as well as political means such as dealing with and settling reasonable grievances, assuring the regulation of police methods, and even amnesties. Some participants also said that combating terrorism should not just be seen as involving military operations or law enforcement, but also the establishment of liberal institutions of governance.

 

The growing influence and regional role of Iran poses a third challenge. While external participants worried about Iran’s nuclear programme, clandestine support for terrorism and its desire to have a controlling hand in Iraq, many participants from within the region seemed more anxious about Iran’s ascendant power. These concerns were seen as groundless by Iranian members of the break-out group and could best be addressed, they asserted, by direct contacts between Iran and regional actors, without the participation of Europe or the US.

The prospect of an Iranian nuclear-weapons programme received a great deal of attention and Gulf states expressed interest in a more active role in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. However, European and US voices suggested that the troika of European powers (the UK, France and Germany) that have played a leading role in negotiations, would not be strengthened in their diplomacy by adding the sometimes inchoate views of Gulf states with respect to proliferation. Most agreed however that the Gulf countries could contribute to non-proliferation efforts, for example by doing more to clarify the risks of proliferation for the region.

 

For other break-out group members, the issue of nuclear capabilities was salient because of a concern about Iran’s regional intentions. These participants found Iran’s government not only radical, but a strong regional security threat. This was compounded with the historic territorial disputes within the Gulf region: it was feared that Iran wanted to gain an expansive role in southern Iraq, let alone western Afghanistan, and that it exported violence as well as radical and destabilising propaganda.

 

Discussion then shifted to issues of democracy and governance, internal stability and legitimacy, constituting the fourth challenge. The debate ranged widely, with some seeing the need for more democracy and popular legitimacy, others for integrating the region into the global marketplace of ideas and commerce, and still others for shoring up state security in the face of untethered communications, porous borders and political violence. Military strategy alone, it was argued, is insufficient to cope with modern threats.

 

Participants argued that the US effort to promote democratic reform in the greater Middle East and beyond has floundered in much of the region because of perceptions of US misconduct in Iraq as well as in the attempt to combat terrorism. Although the US has a role in Iraq in changing the character of Iraqi culture by promoting democracy and human rights, to be successful in the region more broadly it must do so responsibly and take local elements more seriously. However, all told, the US presence in Iraq does have the potential to help bring about change in Iraqi strategic culture and also to advance regional peace to such a degree that it would no longer need to import security.

 

There is a regional debate on the role of democracy and development in resolving terrorism. Some participants saw this as a strategic approach to combating sources of terrorism and instability, while others stressed that resolving poverty would not eliminate terrorism. It was argued that while democracy is important, it must be accompanied by economic development – an area in which the region is, in an increasingly globalised economic environment, falling behind.

 

Finally, the region was challenged by external actors. It has depended heavily on ’imported security‘ to deal with its political and military crises in the past two decades: from the Iran–Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait, conflict in Yemen and the Iraq war, as well as more preventive actions, such as in the sphere of maritime security. Meanwhile, the lack of an indigenous regional balance of power causes instability and tension. While many group members wanted the US to have a role, few were happy with the status quo. Many also welcomed Europe’s participation but were sceptical about how engaged the continent would be. Others yet were interested in linkages with rising Asian powers, particularly China and India, as well as Japan.

 

It was posited that chaos would ensue if the US withdrew from the region, given Washington’s role as a guarantor of regional security. This was notwithstanding the fact that the US is both an asset and a liability in the eyes of regional powers. That said, in the long term, what can regional countries do to minimise their dependence on the US, Europe and others?

 

A major problem in the Gulf is its inherent lack of stability or infrastructure that can aid the furtherance of development and security. Participants from Gulf states said they were now ready to start identifying how to restore a structure of stability which they should be able to maintain. This would include the creation of a collective security structure, or indeed strengthening existing structures like the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as welcoming a European role. For instance, a joint effort within the Gulf region to mobilise against terrorism could add a structural context within which these states could interact and cooperate with each other. A first crucial step towards a collective security structure was, said some members of the group, to decrease the US role in regional security. This would in turn require the consolidation of institutions within Iraq to facilitate a significant US military withdrawal from the region. However, some members believed that due to its own, as well as regional interests, the US was in the region to stay, and this held with regard to European involvement as well.

 

The solutions to handling the diverse – and diversely viewed – challenges that are detailed above centre either on creating new security structures and institutions, or else implementing specific programmes. The idea of pursuing a broader Gulf regional forum that ties together the six GCC states as well as Iraq, Iran, Yemen and perhaps Jordan, received strong interest. However, some participants worried that attempts at inclusiveness were premature, and that like-minded nations ought to coalesce in order to at least deal with terrorism and Iraq. Others preferred dealing with specific issues, and put a premium on bilateral cooperation, whether it be through intelligence sharing or combined military exercises.

 

A Gulf security system would mean improving defence capabilities. This would need to include infrastructure for conventional deterrence and combat readiness, as well as early warning and rapid response for potential crises. Even beyond the military capability, the region must train reserves and have interior forces ready to cope with terrorism. However, as identified earlier, members agreed that combating terrorism required more than a simply military focus. Some believed that by strengthening governmental institutions, democracy and civil society, the region would become more resilient to the lure and impact of terrorism. But others felt that democracy alone could not solve the problems that blight the region; instead, they highlighted the need for boosting trust and cooperation.

 

Most Gulf members agreed that a regional security system would need to be indigenous to the wider Middle East, while also including external powers. It was noted that combined military exercises have improved Gulf collaboration by building trust among the region’s armed forces. One prescription, underscored by many, was the importance of the Gulf region in helping the Iraqis to establish stable, capable institutions. Bringing Iran into closer dialogue was also seen as vital for a Gulf security system. Although delegates varied widely on how to do so and what might accrue from such a dialogue, it was thought that opening dialogues with Iraq and Iran could alleviate the impact of the two states as regional challenges.

 

In sum, members agreed that the Gulf region must try to lay the foundations for a greater regional security system, particularly due to the myriad ties that bind Gulf states. While each state within the Gulf region was to a certain extent unique, that was not to say that they could not build trust and work together. Iraq and Iran needed to be part of regional structures. Security did not solely centre on a military posture, and as a consequence civil–military relations must be examined and enhanced. However, participants also noted that the threat of international terrorism was here to stay, and would continue to affect states in the political, economic and military spheres. It was noted that forums such as the IISS Gulf Dialogue, facilitated the free and frank exchange of views that could assist in pointing towards the specific improvements necessary to enhance regional security.