Chapter 4
Making defence policy in uncertain times
Plenary session no 3
Saturday 31 May 2008, 11.30 am
SPEAKERS
Lee Sang-Hee
Minister of National Defence, Republic of Korea
Joel Fitzgibbon
Minister for Defence, Australia
M.M. Pallam Raju
Minister of State for Defence, India
The third plenary session was opened by Lee Sang-Hee, Minister of National Defence, Republic of Korea, who said the new century had brought new security threats, which added to the traditional military threats long experienced by his country. The expansion in information systems had accelerated the speed at which such threats proliferated. However, the changing nature of threats made it increasingly difficult to understand and predict them.
Security on the Korean peninsula showed a confluence of traditional and non-traditional threats. Although inter-Korean exchanges were increasing, the military threat from North Korea remained unchanged. Pyongyang retained the world’s fourth largest regular army and much conventional weaponry. Meanwhile, North Korea’s unconventional-weapons programmes continued, with these ‘posing a serious threat to Korean security and even regional stability’. The Korean peninsula was also increasingly vulnerable to non-traditional threats such as international terrorism, piracy and cyber crime.
Such uncertainties had been addressed by moves away from traditional military-centred responses towards a comprehensive approach, encompassing economic, diplomatic, social and environmental considerations. South Korea viewed the correct security posture as consisting of three areas: adequate military capability; integration of the civilian, government and military sectors; and the promotion of international cooperation. Regarding the first, Seoul had, since 2006, been engaged on defence reforms designed to transform its military into a technology-intensive force, while reorganising force structures to include response units designed to deal with peacetime transnational and non-military threats. Secondly, South Korea had started to integrate the crisis-response capabilities of its civilian, government and military sectors for national contingencies. Thirdly, consolidation of nations’ collective capabilities would lead to the most effective response. The nations represented at the Dialogue should be willing and able to combine their capabilities. For its part, South Korea intended to play a greater role in multilateral security dialogue and cooperation, and was making efforts to revise the legislation governing deployments for international peacekeeping operations.
Lee offered proposals to improve regional cooperation. Nations should work together to improve global disaster management and should share their experiences in order to respond more effectively to threats. South Korea was ready to share policy experiences with other nations on such subjects as defence reform, peacekeeping and disaster relief.
In his first visit to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Joel Fitzgibbon, Australia’s Minister for Defence, noted that Australia was deeply committed to engagement in its own region and that ensuring solid defence relationships in the Asia-Pacific, based on mutual understanding, was a priority. Developing defence policy was complex and challenging, a point not lost on Canberra as it sought to develop its first Defence White Paper in eight years, during which there had been profound changes in the security environment. The role of militaries was changing, with armed forces involved in a wide range of non-traditional operations, while the influence of a wide range of non-state actors was ever more apparent. Meanwhile, other factors such as the potential impact of climate change, energy security and food security added to the uncertainties facing defence planners.
Australia was dealing with these uncertainties by adhering to basic principles of policy development: developing a clear policy vision; aligning vision and strategy with resources; and consultation with government and non-government bodies. However, defence planning remained difficult because it took place over long time-frames while the acquisition of defence capabilities was expensive. The new White Paper would ‘highlight some areas where we can use our resources more efficiently so that Australia can focus expenditure on maintaining and equipping the ADF [Australian Defence Forces]’.
Defence planning in uncertain times needed to consider the potential shape of the future security environment and the likely roles a nation’s armed forces should play. But it was also important to maintain international partnerships, given the varying expertise possessed by nations. Indeed, multilateral approaches would be needed to address certain challenges such as transnational crime, climate change and environmental degradation. Such cooperation was not just required internationally; within governments, future challenges would often cross departmental boundaries, making a whole-of-government approach important. Thus Canberra was developing a National Security Statement ‘to provide a cohesive and strategic approach to national security policy in the twenty-first century’.
Flexibility and adaptability would be the key attributes for defence forces in the future. Australia’s forces should be capable of undertaking a wide variety of operations at short notice, while also developing and maintaining capabilities for a major conflict. Australia also placed great importance on interoperability, both within the ADF and with international partners, seeing this as providing benefits in terms of flexibility and outcome. This was why the ‘options being developed and considered as part of Australia’s White-Paper process will be set in the context of joint, interagency and coalition operations’.
M.M. Pallam Raju, India’s Minister of State for Defence, said that, by comparison with the past, ‘we have to deal today with far more variables, which make any security calculations infinitely more difficult’. The making of defence policy depended on management of challenges at domestic, regional and global levels. For India, the internal-security dimension occupied a significant portion of its policy. Facing domestic threats from ‘forces that ideologically challenge India’s pluralistic and secular character’, compounded by the consequences of uneven growth, New Delhi’s defence policies aimed to deter the exploitation by external forces of the nation’s internal vulnerabilities. While India’s domestic challenges were predictable and manageable, this was not the case with its neighbours, some of which were seriously affected by terrorism. To achieve a secure and peaceful periphery, India sought to give its neighbours a stake in its growth through trade, investment and services. The global situation offered a mixed picture. On the one hand, there was considerable scope for new partnerships and initiatives; on the other, there were dangers from state failures and non-state actors.
The long-term challenge for India was its willingness and ability to contribute to the public good. India certainly had the former, Raju said, exemplified by its long history of participation in UN operations with the ability no doubt rising with India’s economic growth. A larger Indian economy would provide a greater resource base for its defence forces, but this would equally lead to greater responsibilities. Much of the answer to India’s security concerns lay in the international political arena, with an acceptable security architecture still far from evolved in Asia. Responses to new challenges must not be determined by ‘old theologies’, while critical threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should not be overlooked for political considerations. India’s defence policymaking would give particular priority to expanding defence ties, enhancing confidence, building cooperation and encouraging greater interdependence.
Questions and answers
Dr Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the US Naval War College, noted that all speakers thus far had focused much attention on international terrorism and counter-terrorism, but that US Defense Secretary Dr Robert M. Gates had not done so. He wondered whether the panel wanted to comment on the proportional attention each nation attached to questions of terrorism in relation to it being ‘significantly less prominent in American strategic deliberations’ by comparison with previous Shangri-La Dialogues.
Commenting on Dr Pollack’s question, US Senator Joseph Lieberman thought that Gates’s remarks did not focus on terrorism because he had been trying to make the point that while Asia would have been the primary focus of US foreign policy if the events of 11 September 2001 had not occurred, the US was strong enough, had enough resources and was still engaged enough in the region to ensure involvement. His question concerned remarks of General Ma of the People’s Liberation Army about the balance of power and alliances. Had China any reason to be concerned either about the bilateral, trilateral or quadrilateral relationships that the US had with the nations represented by the panel?
Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, asked the panel to consider the possibility of the American electorate questioning the US military presence in Asia, given current economic pressures in the US. Was Australian, South Korean or Indian contingency planning considering an Asia-Pacific without a strong American presence?
Mariot Leslie, Director-General, Defence and Intelligence at the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, noted Raju’s comments about the challenge from proliferation and WMD, and asked what new approaches and possibly new instruments were needed at a time when energy security was going to drive greater demand for civil nuclear power. Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, noted the participation of many attending nations in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), of which Australia was a member, and wondered if the South Korean and Indian ministers could comment on discussions concerning prospective membership and the future of such collaborate efforts in Asia.
Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Chairman of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, asked Fitzgibbon if there were any differences between the policies of the Rudd government and its predecessor, the Howard government, in relation to Asian security and defence; whether there were any changes in how Australia intended to deploy its troops regionally; and if he could talk about Australian–US relations. Mario Joyo Aguja, Vice-Chairperson of the Akbayan Party National Executive Committee, Philippines, and Member of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, asked Fitzgibbon how Australia was resolving any conflict between the military and the civilian sector in terms of forging and defining security.
Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia, asked if Lee could comment on enhancements to South Korea’s naval capability, in view of the land-based threat from North Korea. Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, Vice President and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, US, wondered whether the trilateral dialogue among the US, Japan and Australia was likely to be revisited, once the White Paper process is complete, to see if it could be expanded.
Lee responded by saying that 90% of South Korean trade and oil was distributed by sea, and that the navy was still under threat from North Korea. The navy was subject to the overall defence-modernisation programme. Meanwhile, Seoul recognised the necessity of the PSI and was ‘participating as much as possible by considering several security situations and will continually investigate time and appropriateness to participate’.
Fitzgibbon noted Prime Minister Rudd’s Mandarin-language skills but said that he was also focused on Asia more generally. This would likely manifest itself through a greater Australian focus on multilateral forums in the region. The trilateral arrangement among Japan, Australia and the US remained strong, he said, and there had been no discussion in Australia of broadening its structure or membership.
Raju said that India supported the Six-Party Talks on North Korea and would cooperate in every meaningful manner towards the containment of WMD in the region. If the Indian Navy’s presence could be utilised in this regard, India could definitely play a more meaningful and comprehensive role. He hoped that India would have a role to play in the PSI, although there were domestic political considerations at play. Regarding counter-terrorism, India wished to have a dialogue with each of its neighbours; a bilateral treaty with one nation should not be misconstrued by another.
