Chapter 3
The future of East Asian security
Plenary session no 2
Saturday 31 May 2008, 10.10 am
SPEAKERS
Shigeru Ishiba
Minister of Defense, Japan
Lieutenant-General Ma Xiaotian
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, PLA, China
The second plenary session featured presentations from representatives of East Asia’s two largest indigenous powers, China and Japan. These are two countries that have a significant bearing on the security dynamics of the entire region, but which for the last ten years have suffered from turbulent and truculent bilateral relations and the absence of a strategic dialogue commensurate with their importance. In the months leading up to the Shangri-La Dialogue, however, some progress towards a rapprochement had been recorded, and the desire of both countries to put their relations on a more even keel was marked by the visit to Tokyo in May of Chinese President Hu Jintao – the first such Chinese presidential visit in a decade. The Shangri-La Dialogue thus provided a rare public opportunity for the two countries to build on this progress and set out their respective visions for their contributions to the security and stability of the region.
Introducing a wide-ranging set of remarks, Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba expressed his pleasure to have returned to the Shangri-La Dialogue after an interval of four years, during which he had been out of office.
Turning to his theme, Ishiba noted the ethnic, religious, economic and political diversity of East Asia, which he saw as at the root of many security challenges in the region. During the Cold War, these had been contained by a wider architecture of a ‘balance of terror’. After the end of the Cold War, he said, many of these structural problems began to reassert themselves. New problems surfaced, too, principally those posed by international terrorism, which it was hard to deter and which could not be adequately addressed by state-centric institutions such as the UN and other mechanisms. Japan had had its own experience of mass-casualty terrorism in 1995 in the form of an attack by the Aum Shinrikyo sect that sought to gain by acts of indiscriminate violence what it could not secure through an electoral process. Japan had lived afterwards with the uncertainty of where the next attack might fall and what means might be used to kill civilians. In such circumstances, he said, the most important course of action was, as it is now, to ‘resolutely stand up against the action that denies the
principles we uphold: democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of religion and belief, freedom of speech’. As for the wider operating principles of statecraft, Ishiba argued for a pragmatic realism in which balance of power approaches would help to keep conflicts in check. But one could not rely entirely on such policies, he felt. Constant engagement among the region’s powers was necessary.
Ishiba then addressed himself to China’s role in East Asia. ‘Japan’, he said, ‘does not purposely overstate China as a threat.’ But Tokyo did wish to see a greater degree of transparency from China regarding the scope and purpose of its evolving military capabilities. It hoped to be able to sustain a greater degree of dialogue in the region on this question. As for Japan’s own role, he felt there was no contradiction between a strengthened US–Japan alliance and a more engaged and forward-leaning Asian diplomacy by Japan. The US–Japan alliance was no mere bilateral affair, but a regional ‘public good’ that had a contribution to make to wider stability and security. Japan had no plans at the present to revise its constitution to remove the formal bar on participation in collective defence, but it did feel a moral imperative to contribute to the security of those countries that made a contribution to Japan’s. He acknowledged, however, that Japan’s regional and international role would have to develop with some sensitivity for regional opinion: ‘It is essential that the Japanese people living in this century accurately understand the grief and bitterness which Japan left to the people of Asia and win the trust of Asian people.’ In this regard, Ishiba also offered reassurance that Japan would not seek to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability – an eventuality that would lead, he said, to the collapse of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Japan instead would exert itself in seeking to stem further proliferation activity and supporting international institutions geared to that purpose.
Ishiba then offered a description of the international activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, including airlift missions in Iraq and logistic and replenishment support offered to NATO missions in Afghanistan. Both of these missions were time-limited, however, and required further parliamentary mandates. Ishiba implied that the requirement to develop ad hoc legislation to allow Japan to respond to security contingencies as they arose was undesirable from the perspective of planning. In order to fulfil its responsibility to contribute to security and stability, Japan needed to consider ‘what Japan should do, what Japan can do and cannot do under the restrictions of the constitution’. Japan, he argued, ‘should establish a general law for international peace cooperation activities showing a menu for responding proactively to the needs and requirements of the international community’. At issue were questions such as whether requests from the UN Security Council were a precondition for Japanese action; should such action be limited to humanitarian reconstruction and logistic support; what the rules of engagement for Japanese forces would be; and what role the Japanese Diet would take in decision-making processes.
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda had, Ishiba said, mandated policies that would allow Japan to be a ‘peace-fostering state’. As part of these efforts, Japan aimed to establish within two years a Peacekeeping Operations Center intended as a public good for the region. More broadly, the newly constituted Japanese Ministry of Defense was undergoing a programme of reform to its structure and equipment to move away from a Cold War-era posture. Ishiba would ensure that these changes were effected promptly.
For the second consecutive year, China was represented by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, who has key responsibilities for handling China’s military-to-military contacts and its defence diplomacy. Lieutenant-General Ma Xiaotian began by thanking delegates for their expressions of sympathy regarding the deaths caused by the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008.
Ma described the current global scene as characterised by ‘irreversible multipolarisation, deepening economic globalisation and robust regional cooperation’. China’s future was intertwined with that of the world. Although many traditional and non-traditional security challenges confronted the region, China would ‘hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation and unswervingly adhere to the path of peaceful development’. This was a ‘strategic choice’ made by the Chinese government and the Chinese people. At the same time, however, a strengthened defence capability was necessary to safeguard China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Speaking only a few weeks after the inauguration of a new president in Taiwan who wishes to move away from the confrontational approach of his predecessor, Ma nevertheless highlighted continuing separatist tendencies in Taiwan as a danger to China. He also referred to terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism in China that ‘seriously threatens the harmony and stability of society’. Further afield, there was growing need to ensure the security of sea lines of communication through which China’s trade is channelled. All of these challenges argued for improved ‘capabilities for diversified military operations’. China, Ma said, would have to keep up with military developments elsewhere in the world and modernise its forces, albeit ‘within the limit of affordability’. Measured against China’s GDP, or against the expenditures of other states, China’s defence spending was still low, Ma said. And, come what may, China ‘will not enter
the arms race and we will not be a military threat to any country. We will never seek hegemony or expansion’.
Ma noted the improving relations among the ‘key powers’ of the region, and of the constrictive role military-to-military contacts were playing in building confidence, including through joint exercises. Some regional security flashpoints, such as tensions over North Korea’s nuclear activities, were dampening down. Regional mechanisms, including various combinations convened and led by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were building a regional security culture and community. Against this, however, Ma urged vigilance against any expansion of military alliances, criticised efforts to develop a US-led missile defence system, and warned against the weaponisation of outer space.
Ma then provided a detailed accounting of the contribution the PLA had made to disaster relief in China following the Sichuan earthquake. He expressed his country’s appreciation for the efforts of other countries in this regard, noting also China’s past efforts to assist in humanitarian relief beyond its own borders – it had done so in 16 instances, Ma said. Rounding off his remarks, Ma stated it was the goal of China to ‘build a harmonious Asia-Pacific region of lasting peace and shared prosperity’.
Questions and answers
Yoichi Kato, theAmerican Bureau Chief for The Asahi Shimbun, drew attention to the fact China had decided not to accept Japanese aid assistance for the earthquake that was to have been flown to China on Japanese Self-Defense Force airplanes, due to the sensitivity of Chinese public opinion. He asked Ma if the offer had been premature, and Ishiba what Japan could do to win greater trust from China. Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, asked Ma to explain why China regarded missile defences in Asia as destabilising, but Chinese deployments of offensive missiles as contributing to stability. How did he explain this anomaly? Andrew Yang, Secretary-General of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS) in Taipei, asked Ma about the possibility of greater confidence-building measures between China and Taiwan. Dato’ Dr Mohamed Munir Abdul Majid, Chairman, Malaysia Airlines, asked Ma to expatiate on the role of the United States in security affairs. Michael Yahuda, Emeritus Professor at the London School of Economics, asked Ma about the role that China’s navy might play in countering piracy and patrolling the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea.
Not all of these questions could be answered in the time available. Given the opportunity to respond to some of these questions, Ishiba expressed understanding for China’s reluctance to receive aid on Japanese military transports. In the context of the issue of trust having been raised, he then turned again to the issue of Chinese military modernisation. Ishiba said that he would not criticise China for increasing its level of military spending per se, but he did think that the level of spending and degree of defence modernisation went beyond the requirements for self-defence, and that this needed to be explained by China.
In his responses, Ma said that the ‘historical, psychological and cultural factors’ that led China to decline Japanese aid sent on military aircraft would be well understood by all. Addressing the question of US missile defence, he described it as a not entirely defensive system since it ‘includes offensive tactics of real-time attack when the missile is fired from the enemy’s soil’. China lacked these capabilities and was thus placed at a disadvantage. China opposed ‘any party deliberately breaking the balance [of forces]’ in a way that missile defences implied. On the matter of Taiwan, Ma noted positive developments with the change in government there. Ma said he believed ‘the principle of ‘one China’ should be upheld to further strengthen dialogue and communication between both sides of the strait … seeking common ground while respecting differences to achieve peace’.
