Plenary session No.4
Iraq and the neighbourhood
Sunday 9 December 2007, 10.00 am
SPEAKERS
Vecdi Gönül
Minister of Defence, Turkey
Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie
National Security Adviser, Iraq
Bob Ainsworth
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, United Kingdom
While three frank and detailed speeches highlighted the progress made in Iraq during 2007, the presentations and subsequent discussion were dominated by the continuing security and political concerns that continued to destabilise the country and to unsettle the region beyond. In particular, it was clear that Iraq’s neighbours and the wider Gulf region had deep concerns about the continuing violence in the country and the problems that Iraq’s uncertain future might cause them.
Vecdi Gönül, Turkey’s Minister of Defence, began by mentioning the ‘considerable progress’ that had been made in Iraq after the population had been rescued from dictatorship. Progress had been achieved through democracy, which was the only way to build Iraq’s new political institutions. However, violence in Iraq remained a serious concern. ‘Prolonging instability in Iraq might well have a terrible effect on the whole region’, putting in doubt a lasting peace in the Middle East. The only way to halt the violence was though a political settlement at a national level. ‘Turkey attaches utmost importance to the territorial integrity of Iraq and this can only be achieved through national reconciliation.’ Turkey called on the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the wider UN, NATO and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to work towards this goal.
Turkey’s own relations with Iraq were multidimensional. It was working multilaterally with the UN and NATO to help stabilise Iraq. Diplomatically, Ankara had developed links with the Iraqi government at the highest level, with the foreign minister visiting Baghdad in October 2007. Meanwhile, Turkey also maintained a dialogue with groups supporting a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Stressing the breadth and depth of his country’s relations with Iraq, Gönül said there were plans to open a consulate in Basra in the coming months. Turkey was training 100 Iraqi officers under the auspices of NATO. It was trying to improve daily living conditions by supplying basic foodstuffs and electricity. In the private sector, Turkish firms were managing over 250 construction projects in the country, and over 100 trucks a day crossed into Iraq from Turkey.
Gönül spelled out the four main security concerns of his government. The first was the disintegration of Iraq. Turkey was working towards ending the risk that the country would fragment along ethnic and religious lines, which would have a profoundly negative effect not only on Iraq’s neighbours but also in the wider region. Turkey was against any division of Iraq: this could drag the whole region into conflict. Secondly, Turkey was concerned about the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, which has a large Turkoman community. Kirkuk could become a flashpoint for regional conflict in the near future. The minister called for postponement of a referendum on the city’s future as part of a permanent negotiated agreement that would turn the city into a special region rather than integrating it into the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The third worry was the KRG itself. Gönül argued that it appeared to be disregarding the policies of the national government. The increase of autonomous action was a matter of profound concern.
Turkey’s fourth and most important concern was the actions of the Turkish Kurdish organisation the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK had moved from the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to northern Iraq in 1991. Since then there had been an enormous increase in violence, with 140 victims in 2007. Warning that ‘we will not tolerate the use of Iraqi soil for the purpose of launching terrorist activities’, Gönül called upon the Iraqi government to gain better control over its borders and impose control over the PKK, and said the Turkish goverment expects Iraq to close terrorist camps and extradite leading PKK terrorists to Turkey for prosecution. On 17 October 2007, the Turkish parliament had voted unanimously to support cross-border operations to target the PKK. In the event of cross-border operations by Turkey, no local Iraqi government institutions would be targeted. This would not be an invasion but an operation with one target – ‘the destruction of the PKK presence in northern Iraq’.
The Minister concluded with an attempt to soften the tone of his statement on the PKK. ‘Turkey’s Iraqi policy is based on internationally recognised norms ... the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and national unity of Iraq should be preserved ... our earnest desire is to see Iraq as a democratic, unified, prosperous country that is at peace with itself and its neighbours.’
Iraq’s National Security Adviser, Dr Mowaffak Al Rubaie, began by directly addressing the United States and its policy in the Gulf region. Rubaie argued that regional security was indivisible: ‘You cannot stabilise Iraq and destabilise Iran, for example, at the same time ... it is one package’. Unless Washington seriously engaged with Iran and Syria, long-term regional security was in doubt. He saw positive movement on this issue, saying that the ‘United States and Iran have learned the hard way that they have to cooperate in Iraq’. Against this background Rubaie believed it was possible for Iraq to have a strategic partnership with the US and a good relationship with Iran: the two were not mutually exclusive.
In the longer term, Iraq was looking for a regional security agreement, like NATO ‘or even the good old Baghdad security pact’. This would counter extremism, terrorism and narcotics. Iraq’s relations with the US would be at the heart of this new regional organisation: ‘We have started a process of strategic partnership agreements with the United States ... to ensure that the strategic direction of Iraq is very clear to everybody in the region. We are heading West. This will greatly reassure and create a peaceful atmosphere, this partnership agreement. It will create a very peaceful and positive atmosphere ... This is going to be similar to the other arrangements of the United States government, with other countries in the region.’
Rubaie then turned to the contentious issue of interference in the domestic politics of his country. Some regional countries were tempted to meddle in Iraq’s affairs, just as ‘weak bodies attract viruses’. From Baghdad’s perspective, they saw ‘competition turned into conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, on the soil of Iraq’. However, the Iraqi government had started a successful process of regional engagement. ‘We have recently observed some good measures from Iran on tightening the control along the borders and making it difficult for arms shipment to the militias ... There are some good measures that the Syrians are taking to tighten the control in Damascus airport, stopping foreign terrorists from crossing the borders to Iraq. Our engagement with Saudi Arabia encouraged Saudi Arabia to apply effective measures on the flow of Saudi young men, so-called jihadists, coming to Iraq. It has also encouraged Saudi Arabia to apply tighter control on the flow of funds.’ The Iraqi government, with the help of the US, had also persuaded Turkey not to invade
northern Iraq.
Turning to the member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), Rubaie said that if they became economically and diplomatically engaged in Iraq, they will get the ‘lion’s share of the huge economic reconstruction opportunities’. In addition they would get better security because ‘we are fighting the same enemy’. Rubaie argued that there was a symbiotic relationship between the Gulf and Iraq, and national Iraqi reconciliation needed to be linked to regional reconciliation. GCC states should not be worried about an Iraq dominated by Shias and Kurds. ‘Iraq is a democratic, parliamentary, constitutional system. That is what you have to accept.’
On the domestic security situation, Rubaie stressed the ‘excellent work of the coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces’ in fostering the ‘awakening’ movement in western Iraq. Insurgents had given up fighting there for two reasons: because they realised they could not win, and because the government had ‘provided an honourable exit and a peaceful way of coming back to the national fold’. This was the beginning of an aggressive national reconciliation process, a bottom-up process. Rubaie concluded that the region had endured ‘a decade of simmering conflict’. The choice now was between ‘regional reconciliation or regional pettiness’.
The final speaker of the session was Bob Ainsworth, British Minister of State for the Armed Forces. He began by comparing the evolution of the United Kingdom to that of Iraq. Britain had taken 300 years to create the Act of Union and had still not finished working on the relationship among England, Scotland and Wales. ‘By contrast, Iraq is trying to unite three main groupings within a nation at break-neck speed.’ Although Iraq was not at peace and did not have the full cooperation of its neighbours, security had improved.
The British government was proud of the work it had done in the south of Iraq. Iraqis were now managing their own security, with the smooth handover of former coalition bases to the Iraqi army. Ainsworth argued that transition to Iraqi control in Basra did not mark the end of British involvement. Instead the British government would switch the focus of its assistance to economic development and security training. The UK had a clear stake in Iraq’s future through military and development programmes, which would grow in significance if they made progress. Iraq’s neighbours had a much greater stake in Iraq’s future. Ainsworth reminded delegates that ‘90% of the suicide bombers in Iraq are non-Iraqi’.
Looking more broadly at GCC relations with Britain, the European Union and NATO, Ainsworth said a stronger GCC would benefit all. It had much to gain from developing ties with NATO and the visit of NATO’s Secretary-General to Bahrain in spring 2008 would help to cement these. A nuclear-armed Iran, he said, would ‘hugely destabilise the region’, so diplomatic efforts to get Iran to meet its international commitments should be stepped up.
Questions and answers
Rubaie’s remarks prompted a barrage of comments and questions. Prince Faisal bin Abdullah Al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Chief of General Intelligence, was clearly unhappy with Rubaie’s claim that the Saudis were competing with Iran on Iraqi territory. ‘We love Iraq and Iraqi people’, the prince said. There had been a misunderstanding. Saudi Arabia, as the holy place of Islam, competed with no one, but sought only the good of humanity. Rubaie quickly agreed with Prince Faisal’s statement.
Khalid Fahad Al Khater, Director of International Relations, GCC Secretariat, asked what the Iranians would make of Rubaie’s statement that Iraq was ‘heading West’. In the same vein, Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Professor of Political Science, UAE University, asked how he thought the Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr would react. He took issue with Rubaie’s effort to shift the blame to neighbouring countries. ‘I think if there is any one party to be blamed, it is the Iraqi elite themselves, of which you are one. I think you have been given a historical opportunity to ... build a new Iraq, but after five years, you have let the Iraqis down.’ Did the new Iraqi elite that came to power after Saddam Hussein share in any of the blame and in the misery of the Iraqis?
Khalid Rashid Al Zayani, Chairman, Al Zayani Investments, Bahrain, commented that Iraq would never be stable until it was for all Iraqis. ‘We cannot have a Sunni Iraqi and a Shia Iraqi and a Kurd Iraqi.’ The country’s oil wealth was not being fairly distributed to all Iraqis. There was a rich north and a rich south, but Sunnis had been penalised because they were Sunnis. ’Unfortunately, unless the constitution is changed to have all Iraqis as equals, there will be no stability in Iraq.’
Dr Dana Allin, IISS Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs, noted that Rubaie had called on the United States to engage with Iran and Syria. Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defense, had long been an advocate of engagement with Iran, but had said the previous day that he had seen a hardening of Iran’s position, and that avenues for engagement had been closed off from the Iranian side. Did Rubaie dispute his analysis? Dr Toby Dodge, IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, noted that Rubaie had said Iran had moved to stop cross-border flows of arms to the militias. He invited Rubaie to speculate on why it had stopped and on Iran’s aims within Iraq. Claude Salhani, Editor, Middle East Times, United States, asked about Iranian influence on the Iraqi government – Rubaie had indicated that the US should have no concern on this score. ‘When you look at the number of Iranians in Iraq, especially in the southern part of the country, in Basra, is there really nothing for them to worry about?’
Dr Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, President, Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies, Turkey, noted that Rubaie had referred to a long-term strategic partnership agreement with the United States. What would this involve, and was Iraq really ready to make such a longterm commitment?
Rubaie, in his response to these interventions, stated that it was the Iraqi people’s choice to have a strategic alliance with the United States. This had nothing to do with Iraq’s neighbours, and would not threaten their security. There were extremists among both the Sunni and Shia communities, and they would reject this. But the mainstream had decided to go this way. There would be three main components to the partnership: political, economic, and – most important – a security arrangement, intended to be concluded by the end of July 2008.
Rubaie acknowledged that mistakes had been made. ‘However, we are generally on the right track. We are building a new nation and democracy.’ He gave an assurance that all citizens were treated in the constitution as equal. ‘It is one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. Nobody is penalised for the old crimes of Saddam Hussein.’ Oil revenues were being distributed equally. In the budget, revenue was shared across Iraqi provinces on a per capita basis, and this would be enshrined in the new hydrocarbons law.
On Iran, Rubaie noted that the two countries shared 1,200km of border. ‘Iran is with us until judgement day. We have to engage with Iran.’ It was necessary to build a network of economic, commercial, religious and cultural ties so that Iran would think twice before meddling in Iraqi affairs.
On security, there were some early signs that Iran had been playing a more positive role, and there had been a significant improvement in the southern city of Basra. In addition, the Sunni community in Iraq had turned against al-Qaeda. ‘This is what has made the huge difference in the whole struggle against al-Qaeda ... We have to help our Sunni Arab communities in this, through the local citizen programme, through the tribal awakening, through more aggressive inclusion within the Iraqi army, within the Iraqi security forces and within the political decisions and the political process.’
Mansoor Al Arayedh, President, Gulf Council for Foreign Relations, Bahrain, asked Gönül what Turkey expected Iraq to do with regard to the PKK. What could the European Union do to support Turkey’s efforts in respect to the borders?
Gönül said that Turkey, as a candidate for membership, had been involving the EU in the issue and raising it at
meetings on the EU’s defence policy. But there were no specific projects yet for Turkish/EU defence involvement in Iraq’s stability.
Geoffrey Tantum, Director, Gulf Consultancy Services, United Kingdom, noted that Ainsworth had called on Iran to meet its international obligations regarding nuclear weapons. Would he agree that the same obligation should apply to Israel in terms of its obligations under UN resolutions to resolve the problem with Palestine? Abdulaziz Al Salem, Manager, Department of Gulf Affairs, National Security Bureau, Kuwait, asked for clarification of plans for increased investment in southern Iraq.
Ainsworth replied that the UK was exploring how it could do more to help economic development in southern Iraq. Increased economic growth would in itself contribute to improved security. On Israel, he said it should honour its responsibilities. It was debatable whether Israel getting rid of its nuclear weapons would contribute to regional stability and security. ‘However, there is one thing that is not debatable. If Iran gains nuclear capability, it will damage safety and security in the region ... All of us need to do our utmost to persuade Iran that enrichment and non-compliance with its international obligations is massively important to this region and to the wider world.’
