Regional Security and International Cooperation
As a practical matter, and reflecting current geopolitical realities, the majority of private and public discussion at the Summit dwelt on the preoccupations of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, their immediate neighbours Iran, Iraq and Yemen, as well as those outside powers who are most visibly and materially engaged in matters of regional security – America and Europe.
The final plenary of the Summit, however, was devoted to examining the perspectives of another set of large outside powers who, for their own reasons, take an increasingly strong interest in the Gulf, and for whom developments in that region weigh heavily in terms of their broad national strategies: Russia, China and India. This collection includes two states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, with all the global security responsibilities this implies, and another state which aspires to that status. Whereas Russia has, since the Cold War, been reformulating its extensive relations and contacts in the Gulf, and seeking to put them on a new footing, the rising powers of China and India, both driven by pressing concerns about energy security, recognise the importance of Gulf stability to their own continuing development and prosperity. At issue, then, was how these states viewed the Gulf and its current dispensations, and how they proposed to engage it in future.
Ambassador Chinmaya Gharekhan, Special Envoy for West Asia of the Government of India, noted at the outset that India’s ties to the Gulf were ancient and civilisational. They had taken root long before the region’s energy endowments were known of or had become a factor of importance in world affairs – even though energy matters did now form ‘an important component of the relationship’. Because of this, and because of its geographical proximity, India had a ‘vital stake in the stability, security and well-being of the Gulf region’. Security, in turn, was something that India did not conceive of in purely military terms, although this was a vital factor; instead, economic and environmental matters, too, all impinged on geopolitical order and stability. Particularly when contemplating those factors that do or might give rise to terrorism, he argued that a ‘holistic approach’ was needed if the international community was to stand a realistic chance of eliminating – or, at least, reducing – the threat.
Special Envoy for West Asia of the Government of Indianoted at the outset that India’s ties to the Gulf were ancient and civilisational. They had taken root long before the region’s energy endowments were known of or had become a factor of importance in world affairs – even though energy matters did now form ‘an important component of the relationship’. Because of this, and because of its geographical proximity, India had a ‘vital stake in the stability, security and well-being of the Gulf region’. Security, in turn, was something that India did not conceive of in purely military terms, although this was a vital factor; instead, economic and environmental matters, too, all impinged on geopolitical order and stability. Particularly when contemplating those factors that do or might give rise to terrorism, he argued that a ‘holistic approach’ was needed if the international community was to stand a realistic chance of eliminating – or, at least, reducing – the threat.
As to the specific question of energy security, Ambassador Gharekhan noted that almost 65% of India’s oil and gas requirements were sourced from the Gulf. Flowing in the other direction were the 3.5 million individuals who formed the Indian expatriate community in the region. Annual bilateral trade now amounted to some $16 billion. Both these trade flows and India’s requirements for energy would expand in future, since India’s economic output had in recent years settled on an annual average of 7.5% growth, and might accelerate further. With this, India’s presence on the global scene would also loom larger.
Turning to the question of international terrorism, the Ambassador said that India had learned from long experience – and now saw the fact borne out in Iraq – that political instability in one part of the world could provide an incubator for terrorists who planned action abroad. In such permissive environments, there were also important links to be observed between terrorist networks and the illicit trafficking of drugs and arms – forms of trade that place both monetary and destructive resources into the hands of terrorists. The fight against terrorism, he said, could not be ‘ad hoc, selective or compartmentalised in terms of region or religion’; it had to be ‘long-term, sustained and comprehensive’. The struggle would have to be applied to supporters, sponsors and those who harbour terrorists, as well as to the perpetrators themselves. In this connection, the Ambassador lauded the international conference on counter-terrorism that had been convened in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in February 2005. India had participated, and endorsed the recommendations produced.
The Ambassador then addressed the two issues he felt most significant to the prospects for regional stability: Iraq and the Israel–Palestine dispute. He welcomed the process by which a constitution had been elaborated in Iraq, and expressed confidence that the 15 December 2005 legislative elections would prove a notable milestone in the maturation of Iraq’s democracy. An inclusive government, in which all of Iraq’s main constituencies had a role to play and a stake to hold, would be the surest guarantee of further progress towards stability. Neighbouring powers also had their role to play in fostering communal and political dialogue inside the country: the Iraqi Reconciliation Conference convened in November 2005 under the auspices of the Arab League was an important advance. India, he said, stood ready to help with humanitarian and technical assistance ‘in any field’ that would aid in this nation-building project. On the question of Palestine, he expressed guarded hope for a closer dialogue and welcomed recent efforts by the United States to encourage this. India, meanwhile, was providing financial aid to the economically distressed Palestinian Authority.
In both the instances of Iraq and Palestine, India had demonstrated its earnest wish to contribute to stability, and that it had means to do so. Ambassador Gharekhan concluded his remarks by endorsing the call made at the opening of the Summit by Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, for a ‘strong, cooperative and complementary web of international links’ to safeguard regional security.
The second statement was made by Ambassador Wang Shijie, China’s Special Envoy to the Middle East. He felt that the IISS Summit provided an ‘important platform for all the relevant parties to discuss regional security’ against a backdrop of profound change. After noting the connection between the stability of the Gulf and that of the wider international system, he went on to survey the regional scene. Domestically, the countries of the Gulf had chosen paths to development to suit national conditions, resulting in significant social and economic development; in their external relationships they had done much to foster cooperation in the interests of the common good. And yet, profound security challenges remained: neither the Israel–Palestine dispute nor the many difficulties of Iraq were close to resolution, while ‘new problems crop up one after another’ – terrorism, extremism, and non-traditional security threats abounded. All of this called for closer regional cooperation, but also for the Gulf states to reach out to and mobilise the international community.
As they had reflected on the basic principles upon which international order might be founded, Ambassador Wang said, China’s leaders had arrived at a ‘new security concept’ that Gulf states might find attractive. At its most elemental it aimed for the pursuit of ‘mutual trust through dialogue, and seeking security through cooperation’. On this basis, and without elaborating in detail, he proposed four core areas for action: increasing efforts to resolve structural regional security problems, notably that of the Israel–Palestine dispute; boosting counter-terrorism collaboration, ideally through an international convention and with due regard for national sovereignty and the principle of ‘non-interference’ in internal affairs; enhancing cultural and social contacts internationally; and renewing the focus on development. China stood ready as a partner in all these efforts.
Mikhail Margelov, Head of the Russian Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, began by explaining that Russia’s foreign policy was aimed at the task of creating relationships with those states on its borders, or in its wider vicinity, that would be sufficiently sound and stable to permit Russia to focus on its internal affairs. Russia was undergoing a political and economic transition. It had, in fact, and for the first time, embarked on a process of building a nation-state rather than an empire, and this was reflected in its approach to its neighbours as well as to the conduct of its foreign policy more generally; Moscow had come a long way in this regard even since the 1990s.
Anticipating interest among delegates concerning the question of the relationship between Iran and Russia, Mr Margelov noted that this tie, too, had undergone some alteration. In the early 1990s, a distressed Russian defence and nuclear sector, lacking business from the West, had as a matter of necessity to welcome cooperation with Iran to build nuclear power facilities at Bushehr. Attitudes and priorities had now changed: no serious politician in Russia, he said, wanted Iran to develop a nuclear weapon; there were a number of such weapons in the region, but Russia was happily responsible for none of these. It was now glad to be involved in international diplomacy to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, where Moscow has made a number of proposals that have been broadly welcomed.
Turning to the wider geopolitical scene, Mr Margelov argued that the world was no longer unipolar; events in Iraq and elsewhere had shown that the United States could not alone be responsible for international security. There was now a ‘non-confrontational multipolarity’, which in some instances was taking institutional form. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which brings Central Asian republics together with China and Russia, was one such example. In the Gulf itself, by contrast, the development of a regional security structure was still at a ‘preliminary stage’; the region lacked a legal or treaty infrastructure to support it, and regional elites had not demonstrated notable unanimity on this matter. Some interesting proposals had, he felt, been put forward to create regional mechanisms under the United Nations, and Russia as a Permanent Member of the Security Council would deal with these reliably and responsibly. Mr Margelov concluded his statement by drawing the attention of delegates to the importance of democracy as a factor in producing stability and security.
Questions and answers
Delegates chose to focus their comments and questions on two themes emerging from the speakers’ remarks: firstly, Iran’s nuclear programme, and secondly, the roles that China, India and Russia could take in helping to improve the security of the Gulf and the surrounding region.
On the first of these themes, Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, noted the important roles India, China and Russia were playing in current diplomacy to address Iran’s nuclear programme, and wondered what the ‘red line’ might be which, if crossed, would lead Iran to be referred to the UN Security Council for its transgressions. Ambassador Gharekhan said that if Iran were found to be in violation of its obligations under the NPT, referral would result; Mr Margelov observed that any enrichment activity pursued in connection with military programmes would produce this outcome. Ellen Laipson, President of The Henry L. Stimson Center, questioned whether India’s conclusion, as a non-signatory of the NPT, of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States adversely affected its credibility with Iran over that country’s own nuclear programme. Ambassador Gharekhan thought it did not.
On the second theme, Dr Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, looking ahead over 15–20 years, asked whether China, India and Russia were prepared to assume more of the burden of ‘hard security’ tasks, thus lessening the role and obligations of the US and others. All representatives said they saw this as likely, but Mr Margelov added the caveat that sometimes there was a regrettable tendency in the US and elsewhere to view Russian activism as signalling the re-emergence of previous imperialist impulses. Alexander Nicoll, IISS Director for Defence Analysis and Publications, asked specifically whether India might take part in Indian Ocean maritime interdiction efforts. Ambassador Gharekhan thought this plausible: India wanted to shoulder greater responsibilities, and the maintenance of secure sea-lines of communication was certainly in India’s own interest.
Responding to a question from Dr Abdullah Al Shayji, Kuwait University, about what more the three powers could do to help stabilise Iraq, Ambassador Gharekhan said that India would await specific requests for help from the new government. India wished to do more. Oksana Antonenko, IISS Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, making the final intervention, endorsed Mr Margelov’s view of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its confidence-building measures, especially on matters of border disputes, as a useful model Gulf states might like to study and emulate.
