Break-out Group 3

However, there was profound disagreement about the intentions and actions of some of the states in the region.

The first part of the meeting focused on which states should be defined as regional actors, and which countries were perceived to have legitimate interests in the area to protect. Should intra-regional dialogue, with the aim of increased stability and energy security, be conducted between the states that share a coastline with the Gulf to the exclusion of all others, or would it make more sense to expand the definition of legitimate regional actors to include all major oil-producing countries? The latter proposal gave rise to a debate about the regional–international interface of the area, with the majority of delegates agreeing that because of the global significance of its major export, oil, the region should be redefined to include the major global powers which projected influence into the Gulf region in an attempt to protect their own energy security. Countering this, a less inclusive definition was proposed: a strategic ellipse that included the four countries in the world with over four billion tons of oil reserves: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Russia. It was argued that a dialogue among these four major oil states could have the potential to give greater leverage to oil producers in discussions over regulating demand.

This led the group to discuss the global importance of the Gulf region for the stability and growth of the world economy. As oil was seen as key to stable world economic growth, participants agreed that the region was of international strategic importance. The geo-strategic significance of the region was bound to draw major states into the area in pursuit of their own energy security. Against this background, the aftermath of regime change in Iraq, coupled with Iran’s dispute with the international community over its uranium-enrichment programme, gave rise to fears that the region might be heading towards another extended period of instability. The danger was that problems with their genesis in regional states could quickly and uncontrollably acquire the potential to destabilise the wider international arena.

 

Fears about increasing political volatility drove the group to discuss the potential economic, political and military sources of future instability. The majority of participants recognised that there was the beginning of a dialogue process between the states bordering the Gulf. The group emphasised that all participants would welcome an extension of this process. However it was felt by a number of delegates that the belligerent rhetoric deployed by certain states when they engaged in regional diplomacy was a major hindrance to good relations and was not in the spirit of the near-universal support for greater dialogue.

 

Once delegates had agreed on the potential for increased regional instability and the positive role a specifically regional diplomacy could play in defusing tension, the meeting went on to focus on the two major sources of concern: Iraq and Iran.

 

Even within an area dominated by oil reserves, Iraq stands out as one of the world’s best-resourced countries, with geology ensuring not only substantial oil reserves, but also very low oil-production costs. Geographically, Iraq sits between two distinct areas within the greater Middle East, being part of the populous Arab Middle East, the mashreq, and part of the Gulf area. The meeting voiced its concerns about the lack of progress towards stabilisation on the political, economic and security fronts since the US-led regime change of March and April 2003. Iraq’s long and porous borders with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria gave it the role of a swing state in terms of either regional stability or instability. During Saddam Hussein’s rule, from 1979 until 2003, it had acted as a font of regional instability, invading Kuwait and being the trigger for two international conflicts. The delegates expressed grave concern about the possibility of its continued slide into sectarian violence. If this happened, the fear was that domestic Iraqi violence could not be contained within the country’s borders. Against this background, if regional states and the broader international community could not develop a collective approach to stabilising and then rebuilding Iraq, then there could very well be a catastrophe in the country, with reverberations felt well beyond its borders.

 

However the meeting also heard persuasive voices of optimism arguing that the current situation in Iraq represented a substantial improvement when compared to the immediate aftermath of regime change in 2003. The Bremer plan for the handover of sovereignty back to Iraqis had laid down a number of clear milestones to mark the passage towards democracy. Iraq, it was argued, had met them all. The elections on 15 December 2005 would be the final and most important milestone to date: the appointment of a government with a four-year term of office.

 

It was argued that Iraq was in the midst of transformation, steadily heading towards an emerging federal democracy and a free-market economy. But even these voices of optimism agreed that there was clearly still much to do. Movement forward would be on three fronts, firstly the political, and then the economic and military. The defining theme guiding the government’s approach to reconstruction had to be good governance. The government had made tireless efforts to reach out to all communities within Iraq. An example of this was the new electoral law that set aside 45 seats for those minority groups, parties and communities that would not ordinarily meet the electoral threshold for gaining members of parliament.

 

On a regional basis, the Political Accord Conference in Cairo opened the possibility of a collective Arab approach to Iraqi stabilisation along with encouragement for more domestic political participation in the elections.

 

On the security front, the Iraqi government was working hard to build up the state’s indigenous forces. Iraqi troops, rather than US forces, were at that moment controlling 40% of Baghdad. Public confidence in the Iraqi security forces was increasing as their own public profile grew. Only when the process had reached its fruition, when Iraqi forces could defend the country as a whole, could US troops begin to withdraw. If the multinational troops withdrew any earlier than this, there was a profound risk of a security vacuum spreading rapidly. It was hoped that the elections would help to isolate the terrorists.

 

It was acknowledged that the Iraqi government did have problems with what were termed ‘administrative bottlenecks’ that slowed the dispersal of resources. But this problem was contrasted with market reforms that had played a central part in re-invigorating the private sector.

 

The discussion on Iraq concluded with a positive appeal for a multilateral approach to all aspects of Gulf security, especially counter-terrorism operations, in which Iraq would play an enthusiastic role. However, it was said that there was clear and continuing evidence that other states in the region were interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. This was undermining Iraq’s confidence in the sincerity of her neighbours. Against this background there needed to be a serious region-wide commitment to fighting terrorism. An ideologically free Iraq was an imperative for more general regional security. It had to be both non-sectarian and democratic for it to act as an anchor for this regional stability.

 

The comparative unanimity of objectives that surrounded the discussions on Iraq was not present when the group turned to focus on Iran. As with Iraq, there was no disagreement with the premise that Iran was a country of global importance. Iran’s oil reserves were second only to Saudi Arabia. It had 1% of the world’s population, 7% of the world’s oil and 10% of proven reserves. The meeting was told about the government of Iran’s twenty-year plan that aimed to make Iran a regional technological power.

 

On the diplomatic front, Iran’s foreign relations were listed in order of the importance that the government attached to them. First were Tehran’s relations with the United States. Second on the list were relations with the European Union. Then came the price of oil. Relations with Iraq, then Afghanistan and finally with the GCC were fourth, fifth and six. The last item on the list of seven was the avoidance of regional crises.

 

Iran, it was argued, wanted peace and had chosen the path of domestic economic and political development as opposed to overseas expansionism. With this in mind, the aim should be to integrate Iran into the regional and international system on the basis of normality. If Iran acted like any other state, it should, in return, be treated by the standard norms of international relations. In short, what was needed was a policy of trust. However it was very doubtful that there could be a ‘grand bargain’ with the US. This was because the Iranian government did not believe the US to be honest in its stated intentions. So, from Tehran’s perspective, there was little chance of compromise.

 

On the diplomatic front, the Iranian government argued that it was struggling against any unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Accusations that it was engaged in destabilising or trying to control the Iraqi government were unfounded; the country was simply not that powerful and it did not have the budget or the capacity to pursue such an ambitious policy.

 

However, participants from the GCC states identified Iranian actions and possible motives as their major source of concern. The nuclear issue dominated their thoughts, with Iran’s approach to negotiations over the issue raising fears of a US military strike. Iran’s influence and motives in Iraq were also seen as a potential source of further instability.

 

The meeting then considered a range of potential confidence-building measures (CBMs) that could be undertaken to reduce mistrust and hence build stability. The CBMs suggested should take the form of a continued dialogue between the regional states on the pressing issues of mutual defence, energy security and proliferation. This dialogue should be aimed at balancing the interests of individual states with those of the region as a whole. There was a pressing need to focus on defence and non-proliferation. It was suggested that in addition to the European Union and the US, Pakistan and India needed to be brought in as dialogue partners.

Energy security, it was argued, would only come from continuing dialogue between the producers and consumers to regulate demand. Ultimately, energy security could not be exclusive to individual states but was, by its very nature, the work of multilateral institutions.

 

The meeting agreed that energy supply and security were closely intertwined. There was a need for a well-deliberated policy on regulating demand. The spare capacity of OPEC was very limited. Oil prices rose after 1999 because of a rise in geo-strategic concern about oil as both a commodity but also a strategic problem. With the rising dependence of Asia on Gulf oil, this problem could only increase. Hence energy security could only be achieved by dialogue between producers and consumers. A single state’s exclusive pursuit of energy security could not provide it.

 

Finally, the meeting concluded that long-term stability in the Gulf could only be achieved when states put aside military and political rivalries and concentrated on the economic and social development of their own populations. This was because the rise of globalisation gave much greater power for change to populations as opposed to governments. There had recently been major foreign direct investment into the countries of the GCC; this could act as a catalyst for much wider, more sustained socio-economic development across the region as a whole. Investment in increasing the capabilities of the populations of the Gulf was the only route towards sustainable regional stability.