10 Sep 2004 - Prof. Stephen P. Cohen, Prof. P.R. Chari and Prof. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema - South Asia’s Nuclear Crises: Lessons and Opportunities

On 10 September 2004, the IISS hosted a Special Panel Discussion with three senior academics from the US, India and Pakistan, Prof. Stephen P. Cohen, Prof. P.R. Chari and Prof. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema.

Professor P.R. Chari, former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, has been Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Delhi (1975-80); Research Professor, Centre for Policy Research, Delhi (1992-96); and Co-Director and Founder, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Delhi (1996-2003). Currently he is Research Professor at the IPCS, Delhi.

Professor Stephen P. Cohen is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Earlier, he was Professor of History and Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana; Director of the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois; and Member, Policy Planning Staff, US State Department (1985-87).

Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad. Earlier, he was Professor and Chairman of the Department of International Relations as well as the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He also served as Director General in the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan.

The three professors are co-authors of two books on South Asia crises - 'Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia' (1995) and 'The Spring 1990 Crisis in Indo-Pak Relations' (2003) - and are currently writing a third book on the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 2002 India-Pakistan border confrontation. At the IISS, professors Cohen, Chari and Cheema on 'South Asia's Nuclear Crisis: Lessons and Opportunities' kindly agreed to share their preliminary conclusions.

According to Prof Chari, the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 2002 border confrontation challenges two conventional wisdoms: that democracies do not fight wars against each other and that nuclear deterrence is able to deter sub-continental crises. He posed the question of whether nuclear deterrence is being exercised in South Asia. The significant restraint that both India and Pakistan have demonstrated in their behaviour suggests that nuclear deterrence is in place. However, how much of this restraint is due to nuclear deterrence and how much due to the international audience?

According to Prof. Cohen the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 2002 border confrontation have not witnessed a major change in US policy towards India and Pakistan; there have only been minor amendments. However, the US approach to Kashmir has changed. The US has started to view Kashmir as a terrorism issue, not as a 'human rights' or a 'self-determination' issue. In addition, the US has started to emphasise pre-emptive diplomacy on preventing crisis before it actually takes place. The US is determined not to get too closely involved unless there is a real threat of conflict between India and Pakistan.

According to Prof Cheema, the definition of a limited war is an extremely fluid concept - depending on whether the crisis is looked at in isolation or as part of a larger picture. It is often argued that nuclear weapons serve a deterrence mechanism, rather than a fighting mechanism. However, the conventional gap between India and Pakistan is rapidly enlarging. Even though neither country wants an arms race, the possibility is still there. Prof. Cheema disagreed with Prof. Cohen on the issue of whether India won the 2002 crisis, arguing that there were no winners in the 2002 crisis because neither side managed to achieve any clear-cut objectives.