Dr Gary Samore
Director of Studies
International Institute for Strategic Studies
One year and a half since the invasion of Iraq in March 2002, the nuclear non-proliferation scorecard is mixed. On the positive side, London and Washington negotiated an extraordinary agreement with Tripoli in December 2003, which has resulted in the complete elimination of Libya's nuclear weapons program in exchange for lifting economic and political sanctions. Moreover, the Libya deal led to the exposure and dismantlement of the A.Q. Khan network, which was responsible for providing assistance to clandestine enrichment programs in Iran and North Korea, as well as Libya, over many years. Finally, these developments created a new international consensus on the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and that has produced a number of important initiatives, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), United National Security Council Resolution 1540, and the G-8 Sea Island Non-proliferation announcement of June 2004.
On the negative side, however, the two most dangerous proliferation threats (Iran and North Korea) have gotten worse. In the run-up to the Iraq War, the US accused North Korea of cheating on the Agreed Framework by pursuing a clandestine enrichment program, but Pyongyang took advantage of Washington's focus on Iraq in early 2003, withdrawing from the NPT and recovering plutonium for a few additional nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of the Iraq War, Washington turned for help to Beijing, which orchestrated the Six Party Talks, but three rounds of talks have made no serious progress towards a disarmament agreement with North Korea.
In the case of Iran, the immediate effect of the Iraq War was positive. Desperate that it was next on Washington's ‘Axis of Evil’ hit list, Teheran sought to open negotiations with the US over its nuclear program. The US refused to engage, but Iran reached an agreement with the EU-3 (UK, France, and Germany) in October 2003 to suspend its enrichment program and accept more intrusive inspections. As America's problems in Iraq have grown worse, however, Iran has felt confident enough to renege on the October 2003. Against the wishes of the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran has now resumed some elements of its enrichment program, and it appears likely that the Board will refer Iran to the UN Security Council when it meets in late November.
How to deal with the twin nuclear threats of North Korea and Iran? In immediate future, the most important factor is the outcome of the US elections. Both President Bush and Senator Kerry would treat North Korea and Iran as the top nuclear proliferation issues, but there are likely to be significant differences on matters of both process and substance between a Bush and Kerry Administration.
On North Korea, President Bush has emphasized his distrust of bilateral US negotiations and agreements with North Korea – because of Pyongyang's violation of the Agreed Framework – and his preference for a multilateral agreement, including China. In contrast, Kerry has said he is willing to begin bilateral negotiations with North Korea within the context of the Six Party Talks.
On substance, a second Bush Administration would probably insist on an agreement with North Korea based on the Libya model. North Korea would be required to completely and verifiably dismantle its nuclear program within a short period of time, before the US would provide substantial benefits. A Kerry Administration would seek the same goal of complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability, but it would be more willing to accept an agreement allowing for a more prolonged, step-by-step disarmament process in which the U.S. would reward North Korea at each stage – in other words an agreement structured along the lines of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In either case, Washington would hold out the threat of sanctions to pressure North Korea to accept a disarmament agreement.
On Iran, a second Bush Administration would probably continue to reject direct negotiations with Iran, relying instead on the Europeans to dangle carrots for disarmament. In contrast, Senator Kerry has already said that he would be willing to seek a deal with Iran, including American guarantees of fuel for Iran’s nuclear power program if Iran agrees to abandon its enrichment program. As in the case of North Korea, both a Bush and Kerry administration will seek to increase pressure on Iran through the threat of international sanctions if Iran refused to abandon its nuclear fuel cycle program.
Whatever path the next American President takes, however, the task of disarming North Korea’s nuclear capabilities or preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons will be very difficult. In both cases, motivations are strong. Pyongyang seems determined to maintain a nuclear hedge to ensure regime survival, and Tehran appears to see the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability as an essential instrument to assert its regional dominance. Against these motivations, the US and its allies may not have sufficient means for either enticement or coercion. Washington’s ability to threaten effective sanctions is weak. The other countries in the Six Party Talks are extremely reluctant to jeopardize their bilateral interests with North Korea over the nuclear issue or face the danger that sanctions could increase the risk of conflict or instability on the Korean Peninsula. Given Iran’s central importance as a source of oil and gas, there is little international appetite for imposing serious economic sanctions against Iran. Finally, the threat of military force to pressure North Korea to accept disarmament is barely credible, while military options against Iran raise a number of very difficult challenges.
If U.S. policy fails, we will face a world in which North Korea retains (and even expands) its presumed nuclear arsenal and Iran makes steady progress towards acquiring one. This would have serious implications for the NPT regime as a whole and for the threat of further proliferation in the Far East and the Middle East.
On South Asia, I foresee very little significant difference between Bush and Kerry on non-proliferation issues. On one hand, no U.S. administration is likely to expend serious resources in efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon or even significantly limit its nuclear and missile programs. On the other hand, I think it is unlikely that the next U.S. administration will decide to invest the effort needed to amend U.S. law or change the international regime to accommodate India and Pakistan as a formal nuclear weapons state. In other words, India and Pakistan are likely to remain in a limbo state between de facto and de jure nuclear powers for the time being. Instead, Washington will focus on reducing the risk of nuclear use in South Asia by encouraging the Indian-Pakistani peace process and agreement on various confidence building measures and working with Delhi and Islamabad to implement strong export controls and security over nuclear weapons and materials.
Finally, both Bush and Kerry would likely pursue measures to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and reduce the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons or fissile material. Among other things, they would seek to strengthen multilateral export control regimes, urge all countries to adhere to the IAEA additional protocol, try to strengthen security and accounting of nuclear materials, and increase barriers to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In approaching these measures, there would likely be differences of emphasis. A Bush Administration would probably emphasize informal multilateral arrangements, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, while a Kerry Administration would stress formal multilateral instruments, such as the CTBT and the FMCT. This more traditional approach towards disarmament may make it easier for the Western group to get agreement on measures to strengthen enforcement and compliance at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, but there is still likely to be strong resistance to some of the more radical proposals to reform the NPT, for example, by institutionalizing restrictions on sensitive fuel cycle technology for peaceful uses.
In conclusion, the non-proliferation agenda for the next US administration will be dominated by Iran and North Korea as the two most pressing threats. As President, Bush and Kerry are likely to follow different strategies, but it is not clear that either will work, in part because American difficulties in Iraq will continue to absorb energy, weaken US leverage and limit options for the time being. In South Asia, non-proliferation will continue to be a secondary concern compared to other security issues, such as counter-terrorism and support for the Indian-Pakistani peace process. Finally, Washington - under either Bush or Kerry - will press for various international measures to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, though there is likely to be strong opposition to many of these American proposals. The challenge for the next US administration will be to build a strong international coalition to meet a growing threat of nuclear proliferation.
