The threat posed by the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles poses one of the central security challenges of the 21st Century. To address this challenge, the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme seeks to provide balanced and objective assessments of proliferation threats promote development of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy, and support international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and deal with the most dangerous regional proliferation threats while also exploring how nuclear energy can safely be harnessed for sustainable economic development. The programme also seeks to encourage a stronger congruence of non-proliferation and arms control policies. By lending our convening power and analytical weight to the disarmament topic, the IISS can provide space, both figuratively and literally, for a neutral, non-polemic discussion of the policy and strategic implications of moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons.
The IISS has convened a series of meetings involving officials and experts from key countries to improve dialogue and encourage greater cooperation on proliferation issues, with particular emphasis on improving transatlantic cooperation. The objective of this effort is to help develop a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy that incorporates and integrates elements of prevention, defence, and pre-emption, along with the military, political, diplomatic and economic instruments necessary to deal with proliferation threats.
In addition, the IISS engages directly with officials and experts from countries of proliferation concern, such as North Korea and Iran, and organises meetings to support international efforts to address these threats.
Among other publications on proliferation issues, the Institute’s Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme’s research has produced a series of IISS Strategic Dossiers, including, most recently: Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: in the Shadow of Iran (published in May 2008) and Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (May 2007). Previous strategic dossiers assessed weapons programmes capabilities in Iran (September 2005), North Korea (January 2004) and Iraq (September 2002),
In 2008 the IISS completed a study on the political and technical requirements for the abolition of nuclear weapons, published as Adelphi Paper 396, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, by George Perkovich and James M. Acton. In examining the challenges that exist to abolishing nuclear weapons completely, this rigorous analysis argues that the difficulties of ‘getting to zero’ must not preclude many steps being taken in that direction. It thus begins by examining steps that nuclear-armed states could take in cooperation with others to move towards a world in which the task of prohibiting nuclear weapons could be realistically envisaged. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more distant prospect of prohibiting nuclear weapons, beginning with the challenge of verifying the transition from low numbers to zero. It moves on to examine how the civilian nuclear industry could be managed in a nuclear-weapons-free world so as to prevent rearmament. The paper then considers what political–security conditions would be required to make a nuclear-weapons ban enforceable and explores how enforcement might work in practice. Finally, it addresses the latent capability to produce nuclear weapons that would inevitably exist after abolition, and asks whether this is a barrier to disarmament, or whether it can be managed to meet the security needs of a world newly free of the bomb.
For details of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme Conferences, please click on the links on the left.
