The Challenges for an International Stabilisation Force in Lebanon
8 August 2006
It is difficult at this stage to judge the precise timing and mandate for the possible deployment of an international stabilisation force to Lebanon. However, IISS military experts attempt below to outline some of the possible principles governing the deployment, and the elements that might make up the force. It is assumed that a multi-national Lebanon International Stabilisation Force (LISF) would only be deployed after there had been a cease-fire agreed by all sides, including Hizbullah. It is also assumed that there would be a United Nations mandate governing the deployment.
Mission
Under a UN mandate, the LISF mission may be similar to that given to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. Echoing the principles of that deployment and the Military Technical Agreement signed by KFOR and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, all sides would agree that the LISF would deploy and operate ‘without hindrance’ within Lebanon – albeit in cooperation with indigenous Lebanese security forces – and ‘with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens’ of Lebanon and Israel. The LISF commander would need the authority to do, without interference or permission, all that he judged necessary and proper, including use of military force, to protect international military and civil personnel and to carry out responsibilities inherent in a Military Technical Agreement. The LISF would have the right to monitor compliance with a cease-fire or peace agreement and to respond promptly to violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. This would include actions to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces, ensure the return of displaced Lebanese nationals and provide assistance to international entities. The LISF would need to establish liaison arrangements with local Lebanese and Israeli civil and military authorities.
Parties to the conflict would need to agree that the LISF commander had the right to compel the removal, withdrawal or relocation of specific armed forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the commander determined a potential threat to the international force or its mission, or to another party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate or cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the LISF would be subject to military action by the LISF, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance.
LISF Area of Responsibility
The LISF Area of Responsibility (AOR) is likely to run along the whole of the Israeli–Lebanese border. It would run to a depth that would prevent rocket or missile attacks against Israel from within the AOR.
Force Structure and Capabilities
The international force would have to be combat capable. It would have to be equipped to protect itself, international governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the local community. There would have to be sufficient numbers to patrol, police and detect any militant activity that would undermine the cease-fire. LISF assets would have to be capable of preventing the restocking and rebuilding of militant positions. Commanders would need robust and clearly defined rules of engagement.
Land
The LISF’s primary role would be to deny freedom of movement within Lebanon to anyone wishing to target Israel. From this perspective the overriding emphasis would be on a land-forces element.
The deployment to Kosovo at its height involved over 45,000 troops, but estimates of 15,000–20,000 have been suggested for Lebanon. Predominantly the force would require a mix of light mobile troops with considerable support from support aviation and engineers. Artillery would be required to provide fire support if the cease-fire was broken, and air defence systems would be required to counter rocket or missile threats.
The multinational land forces element would consist of a mixture of heavy and light infantry, artillery, armour, ground-based air defence, the full range of logistic support, utility helicopters, Special Forces, specialist engineering support to provide communications, accommodation and utilities. There would also be a need for specialists in intelligence, public relations, medical, civil policing and explosive ordnance disposal (see Figure 1).
Maritime
Maritime forces would play a vital part, alongside international monitoring of the Syrian–Lebanese border, to prevent outside agencies from re-supplying Hizbullah. One precondition for the cease-fire would be the removal of the naval blockade by Israel. However, Israel would need assurance that an element of sea control within Lebanese waters would be maintained to ensure that Hizbullah could not re-arm or re-supply by sea. On this basis a limited maritime component of four to six ships is envisaged, with supporting auxiliaries. These frigates, corvettes and fast patrol craft would conduct maritime security operations, including maritime interdiction operations, and they should have the ability to exercise stop and search procedures and conduct boarding operations (both unopposed and opposed). This force would augment existing Lebanese naval assets.
Maritime forces could also make a significant contribution in providing humanitarian, disaster relief and reconstruction assistance. A wider maritime component could be assembled to enable essential re-supply, medivac and hospital facilities, in addition to providing logistic and manpower support for the reconstruction effort.
Air
The LISF air component would consist of reconnaissance and transport assets. An Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft would be needed to monitor Lebanese airspace, including an air safety zone such as that outlined in KFOR’s Military Technical Agreement for the Kosovo operation. Maritime Patrol aircraft would be needed to watch the sea approaches and littoral, and Reconnaissance Aircraft/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles would be required to monitor sensitive locations and potential supply lines. Given the present state of Lebanon’s roads, a support helicopter force (12–20) would be needed to lift LISF forces and to enable rapid-reaction troops to be deployed in a timely fashion.
Future Challenges
Immediate issues to be resolved include coordination with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon which numbers 1,994 personnel, cooperation with the Lebanese Army, and the sustainability of the LISF, which would probably be a long term deployment.
