'Reconciliation with the Taliban: The View from Kabul'
Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen,
Allow me to start by thanking the International Institute for Strategic Studies for providing this opportunity. My special thanks go to Rahul [Roy-Chaudhury], who made possible today’s engagement.
As with almost every major issue related to Afghanistan, the question of “reconciliation”, re-integration and peace negotiation often prompts conflicting and competing views and sentiments. It seems there are more questions than answers as how to locate this issue in the overall picture of Afghanistan. For some it is the magic solution to the Afghan crisis, whereas some see it as immoral and for some it is an unimportant issue at best.
In today’s engagement, I will try to shed light on some issues and factors related to the topic. I will begin by identifying one important reason for that current state of confusion that has inhibited progress on many fronts, including reintegration and reconciliation efforts. This will follow by sharing with you my analysis and understanding of the Taliban movement and phenomenon. In the third part, I will update you on the multiple channels of communication and efforts in reconciliation and reintegration. In the concluding part, I will assess the degree of importance of reconciliation efforts in ending the vicious cycle of violence in Afghanistan, and the criteria and components of an effective reintegration strategy.
In February 2009, a high-level Afghan delegation visited Washington DC to meet with the new US administration, including Bruce Riedel and his colleagues who were appointed by President Obama to oversee reviewing and articulating a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In our discussion, the Afghan delegation shared Afghan assessments of major shortcomings and successes of the previous administration. We identified 18 major shortcomings, miscalculations and mistakes by the previous administration. On the top of this list was the US failure to articulate a strategic vision for Afghanistan and its mission in the region. We also told our American friends that the most valuable success of the US has been maintaining the goodwill of the Afghan nation.
However, it has not been only the previous US administration who failed to articulate a mission statement. In fact, many important stakeholders remain uncertain and unfocused. The uncertainty and confusion have resulted in pursuing compartmentalized analysis and short-term policies.
One important manifestation of the absence of a comprehensive and integrated approach has been the confusion and disagreement on who are the friends and enemies. For some of us, the main enemy and adversary is al-Qaeda, for some it is the Taliban. Some elevate corruption as the main challenge, whereas for some of us it is the civilian casualties.
Unlike us, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and their external supporters do not have difficulties in knowing their enemies and missions. Their certainty is perhaps their most potent asset and weapon. Our state of confusion and uncertainty and our adversary’s clarity reminds me of the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who said, “If you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win a hundred battles without a single loss.” As long as we remain confused about ourselves and our enemies, we will not be on the winning side.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Afghanistan faces four interrelated challenges: terrorism, drugs, weak state institutions and socio-economic challenges such as poverty and growing unemployment.
I will be focusing on the first cluster of the threat, which is terrorism. For the sake of clarity, we can speak of a triangle of terror, comprising of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the ISI of Pakistan. No doubt, there are differences between and among the three angles, in terms of organization and motivation. But, they also share many tactical, strategic and ideological ends. There is almost a universal consensus as well as abundant research and information on the nature and organization of al-Qaeda. For a number of reasons, there is little information, studies and understanding about the terrorist component of the Taliban and the ISI. Speaking of involvement of a state entity in terrorist activity might be indigestible to some. But I can refer to you more than 20 international treaties and covenants as well as many studies on state-sponsored type and category of terrorism. Recent assessments by General McChrystal have also addressed the role of the ISI. But as the focus of my talk is reconciliation with the Taliban, I will limit my focus on only one angle of this triangle.
In my view, prior to any form of engagement with the Taliban, it is imperative to know more about them, including their organization, motivation and background. From the outset, I must admit the Taliban, as their invisible leader, have been under-studied by most of us.
In order to acquire a better understanding of the Taliban, we can identify four pillars and components that constitute the Taliban as a movement. These four includes external institutional support; their ideological component; a hospitable social context and financial support and motivation, including the drug money. Any counter-Taliban strategy must address all these factors and pillars.
Perhaps, one of the major failures has been the conceptual misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Taliban, by characterizing the Taliban as a local insurgency group, a Pashtun nationalist movement or upset brothers. The hospitable social context, mainly in the tribal area is only one factor that first contributed to the rise of the Taliban and later to its resurgence. It is a Eurocentric and simplistic view to see the Taliban in its entirety as an indigenous and authentic Afghan or Pashtun movement and phenomenon. There has not been any public and voluntary endorsement of the Taliban and their ideologies among the Pashtuns, either in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. In fact, according to almost every opinion poll across Afghanistan, the Taliban remain the most despised group. For example, the International Republican Institute’s opinion polls in May 2009 found Afghans ranked the Taliban at minus 49, when there were asked to name their favorable organization. [1]
Another major and dangerous shortcoming has been ignoring the totalitarian ideology that the Taliban openly and proudly subscribes to it. The ideological component of the Taliban dates back to the first revolutionary and puritan movement in Islamic history, which was the Khawaraj movement. As the students of Islamic history will tell you, the Khawaraj brought havoc on Muslims, by terrorizing towns and villages, which included the assassination of the fourth Khalifa Ali.
I fully agree with Pakistani’s president’s characterization of the Taliban as a cancerous movement. It is their totalitarian and fundamentalist interpretation of the Sharia that has made them such a lethal threat to the region and stability of the world. In my view, the ideological component of the Taliban is far more dangerous and destructive than al-Qaeda’s ideological component and foundation, because of the Taliban’s access to thousands of madrassas across the region.
I leave to other occasions and others to focus more on the main components and pillars that constitute the Taliban, including their ideological identify. However, a sustained and successful reintegration strategy must address these factors and pillars.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In this part, allow me to speak briefly about the ongoing efforts and frameworks for bringing in the Taliban into new political and civilian life. These efforts can be divided into two categories: Implicit and explicit. The former has been the gradual, voluntary and unnoticed return of thousands of the Taliban into civilian life since 2001. Almost in every ministry and sector, including the Afghan Parliament there are people who were former members of the Taliban in different category. Rightly or wrongly, there was not any attempt to purge Taliban’s associates from public life and bodies. It is true, that there was not any representative of the Taliban movement in the Bonn conference. But, it is wrong to say that the Taliban were excluded from the post-Bonn process.
The explicit and focused efforts to engage with the Taliban began in mid 2003. Establishment of the Independent National Commission on Strengthening Peace, chaired by Professor Mojaddadi was the first institutional efforts and means towards this end. As of September this year, the commission has processed 9000 applications. In addition to this institutional means, different channels of communications were established at different levels. The latest one was the Jedda process, which was hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Almost all major state security institutions, including the National Security Council, National Directorate of Security and local governors have been involved in the reintegration efforts in one way or other. In addition to the Afghan bodies, many of our international partners have also attempted to approach the Taliban at the local and provincial levels, mainly via their provincial reconstruction teams and their intelligent agents.
In sum, almost all senior members of the Taliban have been approached on many occasions by someone. Their rank and file members also know there is an avenue to reintegrate into civilian life if they wish.
However and despite the presence of multiple channels of communication and many public invitations, neither the Afghan government nor the international community have been able to dismantle the dynamic of the Taliban. In my view, there are two reasons for our joint failure in this endeavor. The first, which I earlier touched, was misunderstanding of the nature of the Taliban and the failure to appreciate the main pillars that the Taliban are based upon them.
The other reason has been our failure to complement our micro efforts by macro efforts. To be more specific, there are two types of reconciliations: micro-reconciliation and macro-reconciliation. The micro-reconciliation has been our last 8 years efforts, pursued mainly from Afghanistan. The macro-reconciliation is engagement with Pakistan in order to convince its military leadership to severe its ties with the leadership of the Taliban. In other words, there must have been push and pull factors. The pull side is the responsibility of the Afghan government and the push side should have come from Pakistan. As I said earlier, we resorted to all means and channels to pull the Taliban into civilian life. But unfortunately the push factor has not been forthcoming.
Another important factor for a successful reintegration strategy is its consistency with a comprehensive and integrated strategy for Afghanistan and the region. It should not undermine our efforts in other areas. The Afghan people and our international partners rightly expect us to adhere to the principles of good and competent governance and mutual accountability. Reintegration efforts must not undermine and weaken our already fragile and fragmented state institutions.
For example, the Musa Qala accord in 2007, which was facilitated by NATO forces, demonstrated the danger of compartmentalized analysis and short termism. During the absence of NATO and Afghan forces from the district as part of the deal, the district became a booming place for drug traders. In December 2007, when the NATO forces retook the Musa Qala, they found eleven tons of opium stored in warehouses there. [2]
More importantly, we must view reintegration efforts as components of a successful counter-Taliban strategy, rather than as a means to incorporate the Taliban as a movement or a group into political and civilian life or in worst case sharing power with them or as an alternative for a comprehensive strategy. As the failed peace agreements by the Pakistani army with the Taliban demonstrated, the Taliban as an expansionist movement with a totalitarian ideology will not content to remain in a specific geography.
De-radicalization programs must be incorporated into our reintegration efforts. Thus far, the reintegrated former Taliban have not been given the opportunity to examine their interpretation of Islam. As such, they remain vulnerable to back to their former masters and profession. In another words, de-legitimization of Taliban’s interpretation of Islam and their terrorist acts must constitute a pillar of our counter-Taliban strategy, including our reintegration efforts. There are successful examples of de-radicalization programs that can be tailored to situations in Afghanistan, such as the Saudi Arabia’s Al-Munasaha (Advising) program.
Maintaining national and international unity and consensus is another important pillar of a successful reintegration strategy. Bearing in mind that not all Pashtuns are Talib and not all Afghans are Pashtun, we must be sensitive to the concerns of other Afghan communities and groups, particularly women. Also outside Afghanistan, some members of the international community have serious concerns about this issue.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In conclusion, we must view the question of reintegration and reconciliation as an important component of a comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and the region, not as a magic solution. It must address the needs and imperatives of Afghanistan. It should not become a means for speedy disengagement of international troops from Afghanistan. Its aim must be making the Taliban as irrelevant movement and dangerous totalitarian ideology, rather than further empowering and legitimizing them as a group. If not, then even the short-term benefits will not be materialized.
Thank you.
[1]http://www.iri.org/mena/afghanistan/pdfs/2009%20August%2014%20IRI%20Afghanistan%20Index,%20July%2016-26,%202009.pdf
[2] Peters, Cretchen, “Seeds of Terrors: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda”, NY, St Martin’s Press, 2009, p. 122
