Resetting the US–China Security Relationship

Recent tensions emerging along China’s maritime periphery have prompted some to declare that a ‘new Cold War’ is descending upon East Asia. These strategists cite heightened Chinese rhetoric on disputed South China Sea claims, failures to call out North Korea’s provocations and related warnings against US–South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Beijing’s less-than-subtle reaction to the recent seizure of a Chinese fishing vessel and its crew by the Japan Coast Guard as evidence of China’s new aggressive stance. Arguments for stronger US commitments and military presence in the Pacific are gaining ground, underpinned by anxious appraisals of new Chinese weapons systems, such as the recently unveiled J-20 fighter. Against the backdrop of renewed scrutiny of China’s internal political workings and continuing critiques of Beijing’s currency policies, anti-China sentiment has now reached a fever pitch in Washington. Though armed forces must always hedge against the worst case, a new ‘get tough’ approach overall is not actually warranted.

The December 2010 visit by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to China seems actually to have sharpened bilateral military tensions rather than eased them. Moreover, the January 2011 visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Washington DC focused on thorny ‘low politics’ issues favoured by various domestic constituencies rather than grappling with the ‘high politics’ of geo-strategic tensions that truly undermine the basis for peace and security in the twenty-first century.

Weighed in the aggregate, China’s rise remains a peaceful process, and the record to date should engender significant confidence. Beijing has not resorted to a significant use of force against another state in more than three decades. Its deployments of troops as UN peacekeepers to hot spots such as Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have played a helpful role, as have the counter-piracy operations of its fleet in the Gulf of Aden. When dealing with weak and occasionally unstable states on its borders, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Beijing has not resorted to military intervention, nor even flexed its military muscles to gain advantage. Chinese maritime claims, whether in the South or the East China seas, are generally being enforced by unarmed patrol cutters, a clear signal that Beijing does not seek escalation to a major crisis on these matters. Contrary to the perception that China’s senior military officers are all irreconcilable hawks, one influential People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral recently said in an interview, with reference to lessons learned from recent border negotiations on China’s periphery: ‘If there are never any concessions or compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a breakthrough in border negotiations.