Provisional Transcript:
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University
Dr. Fox, you started on a very demonstrative note concerning the new approach of your government and concluded on a very promising note about new opportunities. It sounds confident, but what is your government’s attitude to President Obama’s views on withdrawal from Afghanistan next year. This kind of declaration tends to produce an asymmetrical type of warfare, where the weaker party can pursue guerrilla tactics, hide and then pursue their aims following withdrawal. Second, in relation to the NATO alliance, Article 5 refers to proper commitment, but as far as we understand what is happening in Afghanistan, a number of NATO members have been observing and strictly following caveats, which undermine the military operation in Afghanistan. What is your new government’s approach on these two issues?
Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Chairman, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
The UK and Australian speakers have both emphasised the importance of the Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA) and Senator Faulkner has emphasised the historical background, particularly Konfrontasi, Indonesia’s policy towards the region. You also spoke about the importance of revamping the FPDA. Is that a rewriting of the threat perceptions? Are talking about a revamp, where the FPDA remains as a rather exclusive and exclusionary? Second, Senator Faulkner, what is your response to ASEAN’s ideas about expanding ASEAN and maybe inviting the US and Russia into this? Would it be more manageable to do this in a step‑by‑step manner?
Dr. Moonis Ahmar, Professor and Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi
Dr. Fox, what is the policy of the new British government in relation to the Kabul regime’s attempts to have a dialogue with the Taliban?
Dr. Thomas Wright, Executive Director of Studies, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Dr. Fox, you said that the UK government recognised that world is multi-polar. I wonder if you could identify the poles in that multi-polar order and say whether you think multi-polarity is conducive to increased cooperation or competition between the major powers.
Dr. Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia
Dr. Fox, in light of the reality that since the 1970s, Britain has at best been a marginal player in defence and military terms in Asia and its armed forces are currently overstretched, could you tell us in a bit more detail how Britain might contribute in a more substantial way to stability in this region. Perhaps you could also address the question of whether the most efficient and effective way of doing this might be as part of a common European approach to Asian security.
Dr. Liam Fox
In the first week that I was appointed as Defence Secretary, my first visit was to injured troops returning from Afghanistan and I asked myself, looking at the human cost of conflict, should we be there. My answer was unequivocally yes. We could not afford to allow Afghanistan to become a failed state once again, a security vacuum into which might be drawn the forces of transnational terrorism, which were unleashed on us in the past. Equally we could not afford the regional instability that might result from destabilisation across the border in Pakistan, so I think it is absolutely essential for us to be there.
Are there too many caveats? Is there too little ambition and engagement from our partner nations? The answer is undoubtedly yes, but the number of caveats is coming down and a new opportunity exists for countries that have found it difficult for one reason or another - politically or constitutionally - to send combat troops and that is the NATO training mission. There is no reason why any nation should not be willing to contribute more troops to NATO training, to enable the Afghan national security forces to attain the critical mass they require to be able to look after their own internal and external security. That is the challenge that I think many of us will be taking to the NATO summit next weekend in Brussels.
How would we take forward the political solution in terms of the dealings with the Taliban? Firstly, that has to be the responsibility of the government of Afghanistan. I think the term Taliban is bandied around as though we are talking about a single, homogenous group, with a uniform and a clear identity. We are talking about a range of different groupings and I think we have to be sensitive to the complexity of that particular problem. Clearly reintegration and reconciliation will have to be part of a wider political solution, if the maintenance of stability is to be possible, when the international security forces leave.
In relation to what happens in the region and British contributions, we are just beginning a defence review in the United Kingdom and we have actually asked our partners here in the region and elsewhere what they would like from the United Kingdom, when it comes to our review. I think it is a good policy to ask our friends now and again what they want from us, rather than tell them what they can have at any one time. Of course help in military terms goes beyond the availability of hardware; it encompasses training and joint procurement. We want to take an open view of that. We believe that military diplomacy plays a very important part in the influence the United Kingdom can have.
Is multi-polarity a good or bad thing; does it promote conflict or harmony? I used to tell my patients that there was no point in complaining about the air, when there is nothing else to breathe and I think we have to accept the world as we find it. There are opportunities and risks in changing shape of global power. Whether we are able to do deal with them successfully or not, we can adapt to the changes; make the best of them and turn it to opportunity rather than risk. That is what politics is really all about.
Senator John Faulkner
In relation to regional architecture, one of Australia’s key objectives has always been to encourage debate and discussion among Asia‑Pacific countries about the adequacy of our regional institutions and about the desirability of having a leaders‑level forum with a mandate to discuss key political, economic, security and other challenges. We have made clear that the region has been well served to date by the existing arrangements, but there is a lack of a leaders‑level institution with the membership and mandate to deal with the breadth and depth of emerging challenges.
Australia welcomes the discussion that has been generated since the proposal was launched, including the discussion at the recent ASEAN summit. The discussion at ASEAN is absolutely consistent with Australia’s objectives. I can assure you I and my ministerial colleagues will continue to encourage that discussion and cooperate closely with other countries both inside and outside ASEAN to take that conversation forward.
The second issue that was raised with me went to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and again, I try to suggest – with very good reason – that this is a multilateral agreement that has been very positive in terms of security and stability in the region. It has been critically important in terms of how defence forces in the five powers can work together. Interoperability, commonality on issues such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and also we have seen this as critically important in terms of the role in East Timor. Therefore, I think there should be no suggestion at all that there is anything threatening about this. The absolute reverse is the case: This should be seen as a positive and successful model, and something that I believe we can build on.
Dr Evelyn Goh, Reader in International Relations and Director of Graduate Study, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London
Minister Kim, I am interested in this idea of a grand bargain, which also came up in President Lee’s speech last night. I have two questions. Firstly, regarding the parties to this grand bargain – is this perceived as a North/South potential bargain? Yesterday, President Lee spoke of the need to focus on the negotiation of this grand bargain, regardless of the progress of the Six-Party Talks. Secondly, at a bilateral level, what would your government focus on in negotiation of this grand bargain? What particular leverage does the South have vis-à-vis the north at that bilateral level?
Dr Robert Ayson, Professor, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington; IISS Member
My question is for Senator Faulkner. Senator, you mentioned a number of relationships that Australia has and I just wondered if you would place Australia’s relationship with China in terms of the way you’ve been depicting some of Australia’s relationships with other countries in the region? Also, second to that, what would Australia’s view be on the best way of encouraging a resumption of high-level military discussions between China and the United States?
Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University; IISS Member
My question goes to Mr Kim. I have been involved to some extent in financial dialogue between Chinese and Korean think tanks and I am aware that there is still some kind of misunderstanding between each sides. For example, take the critical points in recent months regarding the strategic partnership between China and South Korea. My understanding is that there are still very important implications regarding the strategic partnerships between the two sides. Not only on the Korean peninsula, but also in keeping stale relations between China and South Korea and China and North Korea. We have a lot of common ground at a regional and global level. Therefore, I am curious about your personal assessment and the definition of the strategic cooperative partnership between China and South Korea?
Rajiv Sikri, Former Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, India; IISS Member
My question is to Dr Fox. You mentioned about new thinking for a new century and the need to get out of an out of date view of the world. NATO is an institution that goes back to a different world. It is not clear what the new strategic concept is and I would appreciate hearing a little about that, particularly as the role that NATO would have in the Asia-Pacific. There are many countries which are members of NATO and have bilateral or regional alliances. However, there are also other countries that are not part of this allied grouping and are unlikely to become so. Therefore, what would be NATO’s role? There has been some talk that the future of NATO is in the East and that it is a regional organisation with a global role. I would appreciate if you could elucidate a little on that.
Dr Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chief Executive Officer, Russkiy Mir Foundation
My question is to Dr Fox. Since you were appointed as responsible for Afghanistan in the previous session, my question is about Afghanistan. One of the major national security concerns for the Russian federation is definitely drugs coming from Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become the major producer of Heroin – 95% of all global production, almost legal – which kills around 30,000 Russians a year. Also, many dozens of thousands of people in every country represented in this room. Does the coalition have any plans for dealing with that issue?
Dr Jabin Jacob, Research Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
I have a question for Dr Fox. In your presentation you began with the mention that this was the first post-Cold War government and you also ended your presentation with the statement that the institutions were increasingly outmoded. My question is very specific – in the spirit of your presentation let me take you to the question of the Reform of the UN Security Council. How willing would the UK be to push Asia-pacific members such as the United States and China in the reform of the UN Security Council? I don’t think you quite answered Dr Huxley’s question about the increasingly marginal role that Britain plays in military affairs and in that same vein, would part of the UN Security Council reform involve Britain giving up its permanent seat in favour of a single EU seat.
To Minister Faulkner, you mentioned the centrality of ASEAN to the regional architectures in this region a couple of times. However, is your call for the Asia-Pacific Community (APC) and acknowledgement of ASEAN’s political weaknesses? I mean, there is an increasing feeling that ASEAN is in some kind of a mid-life crisis, and is that why there is this new call for the APC?
Dr João Saldanha, Research Fellow, Timor Institute of Development Studies
My question is for Senator Faulkner. Timor-Leste has been very grateful to many countries in this room in terms of forging the nation and creating stability in the country. Over the last three years, while the rest of the world has been going through crisis, the country’s economy has been going over more than 10% of economic growth; double-digit growth for the last three years and expected to grow more in the coming few years. The country is in the middle of making long-term development plans and we are expecting it to sustain economic growth in double-digits for the next ten to twenty years by joining the club of the middle income countries in the region. It is in this context that all countries are in consensus of bringing a pipeline through the Timor Sea to Timor-Leste, which will bring stability, confidence as well as increasing investment to contribute to and sustain the high growth we are aiming for. I would like to ask Senator Faulkner’s views on this issue. We are engaged in discussions both public and private discussions on this issue, but as Secretary of Defence, I would like to know your views?
James Hackett, Editor, The Military Balance and Head, Defence Analysis Department, IISS
I have a number of short questions for Minister Kim. Firstly, in the wake of the Cheonan sinking, do you see the current US force structure in Korea as adequate and will you press for any permanent augmentations to those forces? Secondly, will the sinking lead to any substantial changes in ROK force structures and military policies? Thirdly, will the repercussions of this sinking have any impact on the planned handover of wartime operational control in 2012?
Kim Tae Young
[As translated from Korean: Yes, I will answer the first question. You have asked a question about the grand bargain. As for the grand bargain, it obviously seriously raises the issue of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. The main reason why President Lee Myung Bak is calling for a grand bargain is because throughout all previous negotiations, North Korea has always been approached in stages. Meaning, throughout this time, concerning the issue of closing down nuclear reactors, every time one reactor is closed they demand additional compensation. While carrying out such compensation, some special incident occurs and everything returns to its original state, and in the end nothing is resolved. There is only excessive compensation to North Korea, and everything is halted; such a cycle has been continuously repeated, and this cannot solve the issue between North Korea and the Republic of Korea. The most important matter is how to end all these problems, and the most accurate way is to find a strong solution that can solve them all at once. Such thoughts have prompted the President to present the concept of the grand bargain.
Hence, there is a need to have everything placed in one basket from which a decision can be made. As you may well know, throughout this entire time, North Korea has requested much compensation for even participating in a meeting, and when additional meetings are held, they would ask for additional compensation; there is no denying that they carried out such processes.
Also, this matter is related to the Six-party talks. There were discussions carried out over a considerable length of time on a variety of issues at the Six-party talks, but there weren’t many real results which is why there was controversy - that in many ways the Six-party talks were not effective. That is why if North Korea comes out with an intention to completely abandon its nuclear programme, rather than merely participating in meetings such as in the Six-party talks, only if such a decision is possible and when that intention is fully carried out will we put forward a plan where all countries will jointly help to solve North Korea’s problems, especially economic deprivation. This is the fundamental spirit of the grand bargain and of the Republic of Korea.
Next, I will talk about the Republic of Korea-China relations, as you have requested. Korea-China relations have grown incredibly in terms of the economy and other matters. China has developed rapidly and even entered the stage as one of the world’s most important G2 members. With China growing extremely rapidly, the Republic of Korea and China, as neighbouring countries, have developed a relationship of influencing each other’s economy and culture. Concerning military and strategic issues, matters are continually developing between the Republic of Korea and China. I think that such a development should ultimately develop into one that establishes peace and stability in Northeast Asia. For example, recently there was a summit between the Republic of Korea, China and Japan, and through this trilateral summit we created an opportunity to discuss together many issues concerning Northeast Asia. The trilateral summit’s Secretariat will be established in the Republic of Korea starting this year. Through these matters, I think that we should develop a multi-lateral security consultative body in Northeast Asia. Meaning, with a backdrop of even greater confidence among the countries, we will strive to decisively solve conflict and a security agenda through dialogue and cooperation, as well as to build a long-term multilateral security consultative body in Northeast Asia.
Next, I will talk about the third question that dealt with the issue of military force after the Cheon-an incident. The Cheon-an incident has in some ways maintained the situation of relative truce. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea had considered preparation for a full-scale war or future threat but for this issue it faced an entirely different form of threat. Following this, in regard of the Armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the American Army, the US Armed forces supporting Korea, we are closely discussing the matter. We are talking about what kinds of reinforcement will be needed, and such reinforcements will be continuously supported.
As for the transfer of wartime operation control, the issue of transfer is being closely discussed between the Republic of Korea and the US, but the Cheon-an incident bears no relevance to this. We will review it as an issue specifically for the wartime operational control, and following the Cheon-an incident, our military cooperation and military security issues between the Republic of Korea and the US will be continuously developed.
I have completed reporting these matters to you. ]
Senator John Faulkner
Let me say in relation to the first question that was directed to me on Australian/Chinese relations, I believe that Australia’s bilateral relationship with China is in very good shape. I would also say that is future prospects have never been better. Not just in engaging bilaterally, but also regionally and internationally. Obviously, my major focus is in relation to our defence relationship. I was very pleased to host the People’s Liberation Army’s Chief of the general Staff, General Chen for the 12th Defence Strategic Dialogue in Australia in October last year. Recently – just last month – we had General Guo visit Australia, effectively China’s most senior military officer. I think that’s a good example of the sort of dialogue we are engaging in. We consider these very important opportunities for us to discuss common security challenges, improve our understanding of each other’s approaches and certainly advance bilateral defence cooperation. I have consistently said to both Generals that given that we expect China to develop a large military that’s commensurate with its economic strength – except that, of course, military modernisation is a normal part of major power development. However, in our view – and I have stressed this strongly – military modernisation needs also to be complemented by transparency to ensure that there is full and complete understanding about the intent behind capability decisions. As I say, I think these dialogues are very valuable opportunities and we were able to recently agree some increased level of bilateral defence cooperation. You asked me if I would care to make a public comment on how my counterparts in the USA and China might care to approach their bilateral relationship, and I certainly wouldn’t be so impertinent as to make a public comment.
A second issue that was raised related to regional architecture and a suggestion that Australia’s initiative was perhaps indication of some form of political weakness in ASEAN. Of course, that is not the spirit that Prime Minister Rudd put forward in his proposal; that there was any suggestion of weakness in relation to ASEAN at all. The government has consistently said that we believe that this region is very well served by the existing arrangements and I cannot say that strongly enough. As I’ve said before, the Prime Minister of Australia has argued that there should be a leader’s level institution with the membership and mandate to deal with the breadth and depth of emerging challenges in the region. Of course, it is also true that at the recent ASEAN summit - which I think was held in early April of this year – we saw ASEAN leaders encouraging the USA and Russia to also deepen their engagement with evolving regional architecture including, as you know, through possible involvement with East Asian Summit. I stress that is the spirit in which this is put forward and I wouldn’t want you to make the misinterpretation that is inherent in your question.
Finally, I have been asked to give a personal view - be it either public or private – in relation to the Greater Sunrise project and possibly other development projects in Timor-Leste. I just have to respectfully reply that I don’t think a defence minister at this forum – or anywhere else – or any Australian minister will be making a private view know. There is a government position that has been outlined by a number of my ministerial colleagues in relation to this and the decisions of the Australian cabinet. Both publically and privately, I am in no position to canvas this any further.
Dr Liam Fox
I shall be as brief as humanly possible without showing any disrespect to the questioners. The issue of NATO is a very large one, on which we could spend a long time. Suffice it to say that in Cold War, NATO had a very clear view of what its political role was; to stop the spread of communism into Western Europe. Its military role; to prevent any Russian invasion of continental Europe. In the changing World, I believe the military roles are still easier to define; that we will be required to protect continental Europe; we will be required to have an international maritime role; we will be required to have expeditionary capability. I think that the challenges lie in burden sharing. I think the way that NATO has gone about burden sharing where every nation is expected to be able to do a bit of everything is both the least efficient way of organising anything and has also shown itself to be unlikely to be put into effect. I think that the political role and the debate about the political role will be the central argument in the meetings that will be coming up for the rest of the year.
My Russian colleague had an excellent question about drugs in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that not only is the continued harvesting of opiates causing a very high human cost in terms of drug addiction and death in the wider world, but it is also providing the Taliban with much of the income that enables them to continue the insurgency. If we are going to see a reduction in the poppy crop, we have to find meaningful alternative incomes for what are often subsistence farmers in Afghanistan. That means finding the appropriate crops in places such as Kandahar where. For example, there is a lot of interest in the Pomegranate as an alternative crop. It also means the elimination of corruption and better governance. I spoke to a farmer who told me, “I’ve been growing wheat, but when I grew poppies, the Taliban would pick it up at my farm gate and that is all I had to do. When I have been growing wheat, I have had to take it through seven checkpoints to get it to market and had to pay a bribe at each one of them.” If we want to get the economic results and getting income to some of these farmers we will have to do better in terms of corruption and governance.
When it comes to the European Union, the UK’s role on the EU as a military force is that we believe the EU has a limited role where NATO cannot or will not undertake any military action. However, we do not believe that the European Union should be or will be a substitute for NATO as a cornerstone of our defence. Do we believe in the reform of the Security Council? Yes we do: We think it should better reflect the growing influence and powers developing around the globe. Do we believe that the EU should have a single seat taking over from the United Kingdom? Absolutely, unequivocally, totally not and if you want a second opinion, ask the French.
Dr John Chipman
Thank you very much indeed.
