Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Singapore
Thank you, John. Colleagues, Minister Phung Quang Thanh, Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo and friends, it has been a great delight for us to be able to welcome you to Singapore over these last few days. We hope that you have had good discussions and, if there have been any shortcomings, please accept our apologies.
Last year when we met, we were in the midst of the global financial crisis. The financial crisis has receded, but global economic recovery remains fundamentally fragile. The European debt crisis has hit international financial markets and the world watches with bated breath to see if global economic recovery will be sustained.
Asian economic powers like China and India continue to grow much faster than the US or Europe, and these powers have weathered the global financial crisis relatively well, maintaining positive growth as the developed countries went into recession. The shift in the balance of global economic weight towards Asia, set in motion in the last decade of the 20th century, has clearly been accelerated by the financial crisis. Intra‑Asian trade too has grown in tandem, with final demand in Asia absorbing an increasing proportion to output. The strategic weight of Asian powers, especially China and India, has also grown.
With the shift in the balance of economic weight comes a shift in the balance of geo‑strategic weight. With such geo‑strategic shifts inevitably comes strategic uncertainty. Questions are asked about whether new powers will assert themselves to protect their growing economic and security interests and pose a challenge to existing powers and the stability of the regional order. In the Asia‑Pacific, this strategic uncertainty is compounded by various security challenges facing the region – the access and security of sea lanes, overlapping maritime claims, terrorism, WMD proliferation and other transnational threats – but traditional challenges remain too.
The security situation on the Korean peninsula, which has dominated our discussions at this year’s Shangri‑La Dialogue, is now highly precarious. It provides a grim reminder that there are still traditional flashpoints that, in the blink of an eye, can potentially destabilise the entire region. The existence of these flashpoints compounds the already complex security challenges facing our region.
In the face of these developments, we are seeing the renewal of commitment to multilateral cooperation, and we welcome this. Our structures have to evolve. For example, the G20 evolved out of an urgent need to deal with the global financial crisis. This recognises the inability of then existing arrangements such as the G8 to deal with the problem, as well as the new realities of global financial and economic power, which were inadequately reflected in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In April, we also saw the convening of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, where leaders of 47 countries came together to tackle one of the most critical threats to global security.
Therefore, in the midst of this strategic flux, what kind of security architecture should we be evolving in the Asia‑Pacific to meet the challenges before us? The current ASEAN‑centred regional architecture has served the region well. It will come as no surprise to you that the three speakers on this panel this afternoon support such an ASEAN‑centred structure, but I was also happy to see that, over the discussions in the last two days, various countries – in fact, almost all countries that I listened to – supported such an ASEAN‑centred architecture, and these included the US, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea.
Over the years, ASEAN has played an important role in bringing together the major powers for dialogue on security, economic and other issues, even when it was not convenient for some of them to meet bilaterally. It is at ASEAN‑centred forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) that all the key players in the region come together.
Going forward, ASEAN will continue to serve an important role as the fulcrum of the regional security architecture for a number of reasons: ASEAN is neutral, consultative and open to engagement. The ASEAN way – patient, consensus‑building, based on consultations and mutual respect – has been criticised by some for being slow and ineffective, but it is also this very spirit that has enabled ASEAN to do certain things very well, such as facilitating dialogue, building trust and confidence and fostering consensus. Sometimes the slower way takes us to our destination faster. Through this process, ASEAN helps to ensure that mistrust or disagreements do not lead to tensions, and that tensions do not spiral into confrontation and conflict.
The ASEAN‑centred regional architecture continues to evolve to take into account the geopolitical shifts in the region. At the ASEAN Summit in April 2010, ASEAN leaders had a substantive discussion on evolving the architecture to further engage two key players in the region, the US and Russia. They discussed various modalities for doing so, including having the US and Russia in the EAS or as part of an ASEAN+8 mechanism that meets every two to three years. In the meantime, in May 2010, after thorough discussions over the past four years, ASEAN established the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM‑Plus) in an ASEAN+8 format. ASEAN is welcoming eight countries – Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US – to join the inaugural ADMM‑Plus meeting to be held this October in Vietnam. In some ways, the defence sector is leading ASEAN and has broken away from the current numerology of ASEAN plus one, three or six, and has found a way of including Russia and the US, two key countries, in our security discussions.
Overall, the regional security architecture is being put together pragmatically rather than dogmatically, based on the needs of the region with an eye towards inclusiveness and effectiveness, but certainly more can and needs to be done. In particular, a shift is needed in the way we view multilateral security cooperation and the regional security architecture. Many countries still approach multilateral security cooperation with some caution, perhaps because they are looking through old spectacles, where they see mutually opposed blocs and alliances. This is despite widespread recognition that multilateral cooperation is essential for dealing with the complex challenges that we face.
We need to embrace a new cooperative paradigm where countries want to work together towards positive, cooperative relationships on issues of shared interests, despite differences in other areas. In such a paradigm, the regional security architecture would provide a framework where national, regional and even global interests can be served concurrently. We already see such a paradigm in the international counter‑piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, where navies from around the world are working together. They may operate under different multinational or national commands, but they have been able to coordinate their actions remarkably well, each doing what they are able and willing to do to make a strategic international sea lane safer for the entire international maritime community.
In the Asia‑Pacific region, there is a growing web of complex interdependence and shared interests that can provide the foundation and impetus for such a cooperative paradigm. There is already a strong degree of economic interdependence in terms of trade, commerce and resource flows. This will be further amplified as global trade continues to rise. There are also significant shared interests in preserving the security of and freedom to access to the strategic sea lanes of the Asia‑Pacific. These are, after all, vital arteries through which the trade and commerce that underpin global economic growth flow. Shared interests also exist in other areas, like counter‑proliferation, supply chain security, disaster relief and counter‑terrorism.
One good example is the US‑China relationship, arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the region and the world right now. This has evolved into a relationship of complex interdependence. Cooperation and disagreements coexist, as we have certainly seen over the past year and, indeed, the past few days. More often than not, however, both sides recognise the need to manage their disagreements and engage cooperatively, given that each has a stake in the other’s wellbeing. The recently held US‑China Strategic and Economic Dialogue is a good example of this.
The regional security architecture in the Asia‑Pacific already has a good mix of institutions of different configurations and formats, both formal and informal, which provide flexible opportunities for this new cooperative paradigm. The architecture is open and inclusive, allowing stakeholders, big or small, to plug in and play, to have the opportunity to have their voices heard and to work together to resolve issues of concern. It is a multi‑layered regional architecture with each layer playing a distinct but complementary role to another. One layer comprises pan‑regional, dialogue‑focussed groupings. The Shangri‑La Dialogue is one example and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) too. These groupings build trust and confidence by promoting dialogue on issues of common interest.
They also provide opportunities for translating dialogue into action.
The Shangri‑La Dialogue in particular fills a unique niche. Although it is an informal Track 1.5 platform, key personalities and countries are here and the discussion is enriched by academics and other experienced people, who come and share their views. At Shangri‑La countries can have a full and frank exchange of views and have greater licence to explore novel approaches to enhancing security. It was at the Shangri‑La Dialogue that innovative initiatives such as ‘Eyes in the Sky’ saw first light.
This year a number of speakers have already touched on the dangerous situation we currently have on the Korean Peninsula. It was also a matter of intense interest and discussion at the ministerial luncheon I hosted yesterday and I am sure at many of the bilateral meetings held on the sidelines. These discussions will help key decision makers understand the situation better, appreciate the views and concerns of the various countries, and help them to clarify their thoughts as they make key decisions in the days ahead.
More focussed regional groupings like ASEAN and the East Asia Summit (EAS) form another layer. These forums can address more focussed, cooperative agendas and take ideas through to action. In yet another layer are functional groupings like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia and the Malacca Straits Patrols. These groupings have niche roles and allow member countries to work together more nimbly and in a practical way to address specific challenges.
Complementing these layers is the web of bilateral defence relationships between Asia‑Pacific countries. When seen in the context of the wider regional aspiration for cooperation, such bilateral alliances, including the US’s bilateral alliances, as well as the web of bilateral defence relations between ASEAN countries, also serve to foster trust, understanding and cooperation.
Open and inclusive multilateral dialogues and exchanges at multiple levels and in different forums remain the best avenue for comprehensive awareness and appreciation of shared interests. As more areas of shared interests are identified, countries will find new and broader bases for cooperation; however, this is only the first step. The next step is for countries to move towards cooperation in practical ways in more of these areas.
For only through working together can one truly understand each other’s viewpoints and constraints, reducing suspicions while increasing comfort levels to work better together. The momentum gained from cooperating in one area may then spill over to other areas, where there may be differences, spawning positive externalities. Practical forms of defence cooperation among countries, such as military exercises and exchanges, complement the role of dialogue in enhancing transparency, reducing the chances of misunderstanding or miscalculations, and building confidence and trust in each other.
The track record of the region is quite encouraging. Armed forces already share a longstanding history of conducting joint exercises through various frameworks such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Five Power Defence Arrangements. We are even coming together for discussions and exercises in traditionally sensitive areas like intelligence and submarine operations. The Asia‑Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC), for instance, provides an informal forum for Asia‑Pacific intelligence chiefs to discuss common intelligence challenges and opportunities. APICC was first convened in 2007 in Kuala Lumpur; the second APICC was held last year in Singapore with 25 countries present, including the military intelligence chiefs of Australia, China, Indonesia and the US.
The triennial submarine rescue exercise, Exercise Pacific Reach, last held in 2007, saw eight countries participating, with nine sending observers. Singapore will be hosting the next exercise in this series this year, with more than 20 countries, including Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the UK and the US expected to be present. Such multilateral exchanges and exercises are particularly valuable, as they provide opportunities for countries that would not normally interact or exercise together to do so.
We are also seeing some green shoots in practical cooperation to address real regional challenges. Maritime security is one example where countries have started to cooperate closely. The littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand conduct sea and air patrols together; and at the Singapore Navy’s Information Fusion Centre, inaugurated in April 2009, international liaison officers from seven countries currently work together to fuse, analyse and disseminate the sea situation picture. This enables the early detection of potential maritime threats, as well as timely and more effective responses to these threats. Today we have been discussing other areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
With the inauguration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus 8 (ADMM-Plus 8) this year another platform for cooperation between militaries will be available. The ADMM-Plus 8 provides an inclusive yet focused configuration, bringing together for the first time the defence establishments of all the key players in the region. The ADMM-Plus 8 has great potential to bridge both dialogue and practical cooperation. Over time it will provide a platform for us to enhance defence cooperation across the whole spectrum of security issues through the conduct of exchanges, capacity building to joint training and exercises, within a multilateral framework.
The regional security architecture in Asia‑Pacific is multilayered and flexible and continues to evolve. Asia‑Pacific countries need to embrace a new cooperative paradigm that enables us to discover shared interests and tackle the security challenges that confront us. As it evolves, the regional security architecture should remain inclusive, bringing together countries big and small with significant security interests in the region so they can work together to build understanding and trust in a cooperative framework that will provide the foundation for peace and security in our region in the future.
Dr John Chipman
Deputy Prime Minister, thank you very much for that. I will mention two points. Firstly that your preparatory remarks about the relationship between economic and financial change and geo-strategic relationship is a subject dear to the heart of the IISS. We are now, ourselves, working on that vital link between economic and strategic change. Secondly, your broader point about how to understand regional security architecture in this region really comprises three types: The flexible, plug-and-play grouping; the focused institution; and the functional organisation. I think that is a very useful way of thinking about this complex matrix of arrangements with which we are now working. You also stressed the recent innovation of the ADMM-Plus grouping, which all the other ministers have also mentioned, so I very much look forward to questions, points, comments and pieces of advice as the region moves towards building houses, pavilions and larger mansions – but in general, a happy home for as many as possible.
