Introduction
Dr John Chipman, Director General and Chief Executive, IISS
The second plenary of the 9th Shangri-La Dialogue is on the theme ‘New Dimensions in Security’, and we meant the word dimensions to be fully interpreted by all of our speakers, to include types of security challenges, but places in which security challenges take place: maritime space, and the like. We have three excellent speakers who can represent different points of view from the Asia-Pacific on this issue, and I will introduce each of them in turn before they speak.
First, we are delighted to have representing India at this plenary, Shivshankar Menon, who many of you will have known as Foreign Secretary in India; he also had a stint at the Department of Atomic Energy as an advisor to the Atomic Energy Commission. He has had diplomatic postings to a number of countries, and particularly the People’s Republic of China. He has been High Commissioner to Sri Lanka and Pakistan, and after being Foreign Secretary for a number of years he became the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India.
We are delighted to have such an authoritative perspective from India on the issues of new dimensions of security, and I would invite Shivshankar Menon to take the floor.
Shivshankar Menon, National Security Advisor, India
Minister Kitazawa, General Ma, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for asking me to speak to this increasingly important dialogue forum on Asian security and defence issues, and to our hosts Singapore, who have offered the dialogue a wonderful home. I was asked to speak on new dimensions of security and have, in the interests of saving time for a discussion later, circulated a fuller text. Now I will concentrate on a few points, and highlight those at the beginning of our discussion. I will speak briefly on the situation today as we in India see it; the new dimensions of security; and particularly the Asian dimensions; and then the way forward.
We live in a time when global and regional balances of power are shifting rapidly, as a consequence of economic shifts and technological change, and the region of most rapid change is Asia. Uncertainty in the international system is probably higher than it has been for a very long time. We in Asia are witnessing the rise simultaneously of several parts, each convinced that its position relative to the others will improve rather than worsen in the years to come. This shift is occurring as a result of globalisation. The economics of the major powers have been integrated to a degree unknown in history, and when their dependence on the outside world for their continued prosperity is also unprecedented.
By one account, emerging economies, which accounted for about 27% of global GDP in 1995, will now produce a little more than half of global GDP this year. The geopolitical consequences of the financial crisis and the economic crisis include an acceleration of past trends towards multi-polarity, while strengthening the interdependent nature of the present international, economic and political system. What this means in practice is that, to a greater extent than before, transnational peace and security can be regarded as a global public good, in the sense that no single state can deliver them on its own. As power is increasingly widely distributed in the international system, between states and even to some non-state actors, peace and security have become global public goods. This is not to say that there is less incentive for competition amongst states for power, influence and resources, with the goal of determining or affecting the behaviour [of] other states or non-state actors. The nation-state is still the basic unit of international security, and sovereignty and territorial integrity remain the foundation of the international system, as do traditional security concerns, zero-sum competition between nation-states. While such competition continues with its attendant risk, it occurs within boundary conditions imposed by the globalised and interdependent nature of our security.
This is more than just saying that in a globalised world both security challenges and their answers are global. This is actually to argue that security challenges have acquired new transnational dimensions, because of recent geopolitical, technological and economic developments, and that these have to be dealt with differently from traditional security issues. If we try and list some of these new dimensions of security in this light, one would certainly include thwarting the spread of weapons of mass destruction high up on the list. The world may now be at a proliferation tipping point, in terms of both nuclear weapons and the militarisation of outer space. For India, clandestine proliferation networks in our neighbourhood have already adversely affected our security; the risk of nuclear weapons or of other weapons of mass destruction falling into extremist or terrorist hands is real and has to be factored into our thinking. It is clear that a new non-proliferation paradigm is necessary to deal with issues of nuclear security caused by the rise of non-state actors and their links to formal or organised structures in weak states. Today, India is the only nuclear weapons state to announce an unequivocal no-first-use commitment and to declare that a world without nuclear weapons will enhance our security.
Second, fighting terrorism: anarchy on land and on sea has been empowered by new technologies, as piracy and cross-border terrorist attacks have shown. Our own experience in India of cross-border terrorism shows some of the complexity of what we are dealing with. The 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, for instance, were planned and organised in one country where the attackers were trained, but the logistics chain and the communications support extended over at least seven countries, while the attacks took place on Indian territory. Terrorist groups today are networked to an unprecedented extent, and it is no longer possible to segment them by ideology or by their targets. Located as we are in India, beside the epicentre of global terrorism, we are acutely aware of the value of collaborative counter-terrorism efforts, and of the need for more to be done.
Third, energy security and stability: the politics of energy, which is linked to climate change, will be a key to global stability. The limited physical availability of hydrocarbon resources and the high energy import dependence of several major powers is a recipe for resource nationalism and competition. Technological solutions available today have not prevented the competition for hydrocarbon fuels from becoming much sharper.
Slowing climate change: some of the geopolitical and security effects of climate change are becoming apparent, changing the environments in which we operate, and we are seeing adverse impacts on human security - migration, water stress, and food shortages are likely consequences, and will most affect the poor and weak who are least capable of mitigating or adapting to climate change. National plans, like India’s National Missions, provide a robust response, but within the limits of one state, and there is no escaping the need for matching and equitable international responses, based on the UNFCCC. For countries like ours, many proposed international actions actually sound like a cap on development, or an attempt to perpetuate an unsatisfactory distribution of the limited carbon space; equity and a cooperative mindset are essential if we are to find cooperative solutions to this.
Maritime security: sitting in Singapore beside the Straits of Malacca I do not think we need to be reminded of the importance of the oceans, or of the common interest of littoral and other major users and powers in keeping these sea lanes open and free. However, most of the debate among strategists that we hear is phrased solely in adversarial terms, as a zero sum game. Efforts to keep vital sea lanes open from Suez and Hormuz to the US west coast are presumably in the common interest of all the littoral and user states of these oceans. India has begun a process of consultation and cooperation among littoral navies in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. To be truly effective, this effort needs to encompass the entire Indian-Pacific oceanic domain. India would be happy to work with the other littoral states and naval powers in this domain to see how we can address the threats at sea from terrorists, pirates, proliferators, and organised crime. The experience of working together against such transnational threats may encourage the navies’ concern to higher transparency and build confidence among them. Such mutual confidence is essential today when there is such a rapid accretion of strength in several regional navies.
Managing the security of the global commons - outer space, the oceans, cyberspace, and global transport and communication networks – today there is hardly any aspect of our lives that is not touched by outer space or by information technology. As this intensifies, we have seen a steady technological shift in favour of the offence over defence in both these domains. There are major issues regarding the placement of weapons in space, and of weapons designed to attack space-based assets. Military uses of space-based assets for intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, are a reality, where we are at a point where rules of the road are required as soon as possible.
Cyber security is also a problem that recognises no boundaries or rules today, at a time when ICTs are critical … in communication, development, infrastructure, security, and defence. Cyber security may actually be the exception to the rule that these new dimensions of security require collective international effort. Cyber attacks are global, occur at the speed of light, or close to it, and skip the battlefield. Conventional deterrence or suasion is therefore relatively ineffective in this battle space, and there is a premium offence at these high rates of operational manoeuvre. Cyber security threats have reached the stage of undermining public confidence and of sowing distrust among nations; and yet, dealing with this challenge is largely left to individual nations. If there are arms control approaches available to deal with these threats, they are yet to even be widely discussed in the international community.
In effect, we are speaking here of the security of the global commons: that which no one state may own or control, and which is central to life as we know it today. The very definition of the global commons has been expanded by technology. Cyber security is a good example of national public goods and ‘bads’ going global. To us in India, it appears that only collective effort can meet such common challenges, which require new global partnerships involving those powers with the capacity to address these issues. In each of these areas new paradigms are necessary to cope with the changes wrought by technology, and by shifts in the balance of power. The world order defined by World War II or Cold War victors no longer suffices.
In Asia we sometimes bemoan the fact that the rapid shifts in the balance of power that we see among nation-states in India are unmitigated by institutions or collective arrangements for security, and yet that may actually turn out to be to our advantage. While Cold War institutions in other regions seek new roles for themselves, Asia is free to build the open, inclusive, plural and flexible architecture required to deal with these new transnational dimensions of security. Whether Asian states will be able to do so is a real test of our wisdom and skill. A promising beginning has been made in the proposed ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+8 that is planned for later this year. ASEAN must remain the bedrock on which this region deals with these issues. India looks forward to working with Singapore and with other partners in ASEAN on traditional and new dimensions of security in the border region.
What then is the way forward? It is probably much easier to describe the things we should avoid in the way forward in trying to deal with these new dimensions. We must certainly avoid the tragedy of the commons, when multiple individuals, acting individually, and solely and rationally consulting their own self interest, will ultimately deplete or destroy a shared limited resource, even when it is clear that it is not in anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen. The existing organs of power in the international system should certainly be rebuilt to reflect today’s realities. We also need to build structures which can cope with the new dimensions of security, such as the power of non-state actors. We need to build structures that are inclusive and flexible enough to avoid the inadequacies of existing international organisations. Logically speaking they would need to counter the nature of the threats we face, and be networked. The security situation around the Straits of Malacca offers a striking example of the success that results from like-minded countries working together, and most important, we need to build the habits and experience of cooperation that will enable us to deal with the unpredictable challenges that will certainly confront us. Our navies have made a beginning, showing us the way.
We in Asia today are learning as we go. India is ready to participate actively and constructively in this process. Thank you.
