Provisional Typescript:
Adam Ward, Director of Studies, IISS
This is a question for General Ma. In the previous session, we heard from Secretary Gates, that his feeling was very much, in essence, that the suspension of military‑to‑military contacts between China and the US were nonsensical. What conditions would China stipulate for a resumption of military-to-military ties, in the spirit of the agreement alluded to by Secretary Gates that he reached with President Hu?
Secondly, how is the absence of that military‑to‑military dialogue to be reconciled with the tone you struck in your speech of consultation, and assurance to the region?
Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman, IISS
My question is also directed to General Ma. Some decades ago, Chairman Mao stated that power flows from the barrel of the gun. That, of course, begs the question: who controls the barrel of the gun? In his recent statements, Robert Gates has singled out the role of the PLA and expressed some concern in this regard. Could you give us your view of the current relationship between the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA in terms of defining security and defence policy?
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies
My question also goes to General Ma Xiaotian. In the past two years, there has been a significant easing of tensions between Mainland China and Taiwan. This is something that the international community welcomes. Yet, China has continued its military build‑up opposite Taiwan, which is inconsistent with this trend. I would suggest that the path to addressing China’s concerns about continuing US arms sales to Taiwan would begin with a gesture in this regard to begin to reduce the military threat opposite Taiwan. What are the circumstances and conditions under which China would be willing to undertake such a gesture to Taiwan?
Dr Jonathan Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, US Naval War College; IISS Member
General Ma, my question is really very simple. A year ago at this forum, our meeting occurred in the immediate aftermath of North Korea’s second nuclear test. There has been nothing in the intervening period of time in my view that suggests that North Korea has any intention of giving up these capabilities, let alone resuming some kind of a constructive process to address such concerns. China is the only power that has meaningful access and interaction to the leaders to the North. Can you impart to us your own sense of what China can achieve through this process and whether China believes there is any meaningful way to have North Korea as part of an Asia‑Pacific region, rather than standing outside it?
General Ma Xiaotian
[As translated from Chinese: In light of the fact that Mr Gates has just spoken at such great length about the military relations between China and America, and also in view of the fact that our delegates showed such a great deal of interest in the matter, I might now take some time to explain the situation in more detail. China and the United States are the two most important countries in the world today, and their relationship is the most important bilateral relationship globally. China is committed to establishing the very best relations with the United States, a partnership of comprehensive mutual cooperation for the 21st century, just as the heads of state of the two countries have proclaimed. I would like to remind you all that this kind of relationship includes military relations, and China always believes that mutual trust and cooperation are the most important factors in the Sino-American relationship in military fields. We shall always demonstrate a willing spirit of respect, mutual trust, reciprocity and mutual benefit in treating the relationship with the United States, just as we shall expect this spirit to be reciprocated by the American counterparts in so many fields of exchange and cooperation.
But, as you all can see, and as our colleagues in the Department Of Defense have agreed, Sino-American military cooperation relations are lagging behind other fields of cooperation between the two countries. Since diplomatic relations were established between the two countries 30 years ago, our military cooperation has been trapped into a cycle of development, stagnation, further development, and again stagnation and so forth. Both sides are striving to do everything they can to break this vicious cycle, but unfortunately we still cannot see any tangible breakthrough. The United States talks about sustainable and reliable development, which requires serious contributions from both sides, rather than relying on unilateral efforts.
We believe that there are three main obstacles in the development of military relations: the first is the sales of arms to Taiwan, the second is the intense spy and patrol behaviours of US planes and ships in South China Sea and East China Sea, and the third is the "2000 National Defence Authorization Act," adopted by the United States Congress in 2000, as well as the "DeLay Amendment", adopted a year later. So we feel that, if anyone has been setting up barriers to cooperation, it is certainly not us.
If you are interested, we can take a look at the joint-statements regarding Sino-American relations over the past 30 years and beyond. We often refer to The Three Joint Communiqués, the first was declared upon President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, the second, known as the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, was made in 1979 under President Carter, and the third was released during the Reagan administration in 1982, also known as the August 17th Communiqué. In this third communiqué, America reaffirmed its position regarding the Taiwan issue, which had been set out in the second communiqué. The August 17th Communiqué of 1982, made three years and four months after the Taiwan Relations Act, reiterates America's stance towards Taiwan, and the common view between America and China that the United States would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. The United States guaranteed that the arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed those of previous years, in terms of quantity or quality, and that it would adopt certain new measures to solve the issue ultimately. Although this resolution was accepted finally, the issue still has not been fully resolved thirty years on.
Herein lies an issue of a strategic mutual trust; there is a problem based on bilateral political cooperation, as well as a problem on how both parties go about dealing with their own commitments. So today, both sides come together to proclaim that they promise to shoulder all necessary burdens. If both sides stay true to this commitment, then we shall undoubtedly see a significant change in the state of our bilateral relations. We do not believe that arms sales to Taiwan can be looked upon as an ordinary problem. The United States says that it does not support Taiwanese independence, and we hope that it can take positive steps in improving the relations with the Chinese people across both sides of the Taiwan Strait, not only in word but in deed.
The sales of arms to Taiwan cannot be seen as a normal event. It is a special case, which has been a source of great disruption to Sino-American relations throughout the past thirty years. Moreover, the United States has never veered from its original stance, insisting that it will not be forced to cease in its trading of arms to Taiwan. But this is not our goal. We do not wish to see our behaviour force the US to change its ways, because we know that we do not have the ability to do so, much less the desire. But then, once the US had done this, what should our response be? What kind of attitude should we adopt? I think other people cannot compel us to do things either.
I just mentioned a 'disruption' in relations, but I do not actually believe that Sino-American relations are disrupted. In fact, we believe that the relationship is very important to both sides. We have just become temporarily held up in certain areas, such as high-level dialogue. But there are still a number of areas that we believe to be crucial; namely certain low-level mutual visits, working face-to-face on relevant issues so as to exchange our views, as well as the continuation of our existing Department of Defence system. It is equally important that we maintain the meeting of the Sino-US military maritime security systems. We hope that we can communicate effectively through these channels, and that over time we will be able to discuss any problems concerning our collaborations and move forward as a result.
Only by following these guidelines can we reinforce the importance of Sino-US relations, and allow our relationship to mature. We believe that this is not only morally right, but mutually advantageous. There are many benefits to be seen. One is that both sides would hope to oversee the peaceful development of the world, as well as regional security and stability, so as to achieve the benefits for the entire human community. Another is that cooperation brings our common interests in line with each other. It also allows us to fully safeguard our own core interests. On the subject of Sino-US relations, I would like to say the following:
With regards to the aforementioned issue of arms, we can go back the birth of the Chinese Communist Party in early 1927, when many armed struggles took place. At this time, our founding leader Chairman Mao Zedong said that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". Nowadays, China's guns, that is to say, China's armed forces, are commanded by the Chinese Communist Party. We ourselves do not have our own armed interests or particular standpoint. We are under the command of the Party and subject to the command of the Chinese government. Everything we do is to serve the interests of the Chinese people.
With regards to the issue of nuclear test in North Korea, ever since the first nuclear test, China has stated, not only in its participation in the multilateral international forums, but also in its contact with our neighbour, the North Korea people, that it is committed to denuclearisation of the peninsula, and is opposed to nuclear proliferation. We hope to resume the six-party talks, and we propose three specific steps, which we hope can dispel the effects of the serious events that have occurred recently. We will try to promote the peninsula's denuclearisation on the platform of six-party talks. This is our specific contribution to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear arms.
As I just hinted, I think that, if we have enough patience, if we have enough political wisdom, and if the international community makes a strong enough effort, then we can be confident of a positive outlook.
Finally, on the subject of Taiwan issue, I believe that this matter is part of China's internal affairs. It is an issue that, for a while, created a very tense situation between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait, a situation that has been regarded closely by the international community. But since 2008, we have been holding meetings that have brought with them very encouraging signs, which have been welcomed by people on both sides of the strait, as well as the international community at large. China's military and national defence force is currently under development. But I do not believe that in recent years, there have been any national defence projects against Taiwan, and so we have certainly not seen any increase in military activity on Taiwan of late. We hope to build up a mutual trust in military security with Taiwan, and to resolve the Taiwan issue through peaceful means. We also hope that other countries, including the United States and the international community as a whole, can play a positive and constructive role in the resolution of this matter. Thank you.]
Dr John Chipman
General Ma, thank you very much. I think that was a very important exchange and provided very useful and detailed answers to the challenging questions posed.
Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS
My question is to General Ma, but to Mr Menon as well: it concerns Afghanistan. I think one of the principles in the long, excellent list that General Ma has given us on regional security is a more equitable distribution of burden‑sharing in relation to the most challenging regional security questions. I think there is a perception that China, which has perhaps benefitted from recent stabilisation in Afghanistan, has not done enough actually to contribute to stability in the region. Can you see a more active role that China can play, particularly given the growing economic interests of China in Afghanistan that we have seen?
To Mr Menon: India played a very important role in one of the key donors for reconstruction in Afghanistan. Can you see a more active role that India can play in providing security as the role of the ISAF, perhaps, will be winding‑down in coming years?
Major General (Retd) ANM Muniruzzaman , President, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies
My question is to Mr Menon: I quite agree with that identification of the transnational threat landscape that you have given, but we all understand that the response to the nature of these transnational threats requires a transnational response mechanism. How do you view your neighbourhood policy conducive to growing that kind of mechanism in the South Asian region? Also, would you understand that it will need some kind of an umbrella to grow this kind of mechanism, or do you think that South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) umbrella can be expanded like ASEAN, to cover this kind of mechanism of cooperation? Or, should there be some other mechanism in the South Asian region?
How do you understand and view your current, growing Maoist insurgence in India, and would that have an impact on the region or any spill‑over effects?
Professor Gareth Evans, Co-chair, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Whilst we all appreciate what you said about common, cooperative mutual trust, and China’s commitment to them, is it not a precondition for any of these things, particularly when it comes to serious, strategic dialogue on nuclear issues, that there be real transparency? Not just in doctrine, as China has always claimed, but as to the number of weapons and their disposition. When can we hope and expect for some serious new moves towards openness in this respect, from China?
Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, IISS
My question is to Defence Minister Kitazawa, who spoke of the importance of US-Japan relations and of the role the United States has played in securing the safety of the seas. For the last couple of years, there has been some bumpiness in US‑Japan relations, particularly regarding America’s future ability to continue to secure the seas. Is this bumpiness over, and what role can Japan play in assisting the United States in this security mission?
Pakistan Delegate
My question is directed to Mr Shivshankar Menon: you talked about terrorism, transcending ideology, terrorism having cross‑border tentacles. I want to follow up what Mr Menon said, that according to Dr Manmohan Singh, the major threat facing India today is domestic terrorism. You have more than 100,000 fighters, fighting a social revolution, inside India. Yet, we find that India is not really committing its own combat forces to fight this terrorism. In the last month alone, there have been three major incidents in which more than 100 people have died in each case. Obviously, the danger here is that, one day, they may turn to going after your nuclear assets to arm themselves.
Dr Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs; Editor, Survival, IISS
My question is a follow‑up of Mark Fitzpatrick’s question to Minister Kitazawa. Secretary Gates emphasised both at the beginning and at the end of his remarks that the United States is and will remain a Pacific power, but he also suggested that there had to be some review of the conditions that make a forward‑presence politically sustainable. I want to ask, from a Japanese perspective, what you think the conditions are for the sustainability of America’s forward‑presence, not just in relation to the Okinawa issue but more generally.
Farooq Sobhan, President, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute; IISS Member
My question is to National Security Advisor Menon. We have all just heard about the Brazil‑Turkish initiative on Iran’s nuclear fuel problem. Would you like to comment on this? Does this fit in with India’s perspective of new dimensions of security?
Dr Cho Oon Khong, Chief Political Analyst, Shell International; IISS Corporate Member
My question is to Mr Menon: given continued Indian economic growth, there is an expectation by some that Indian demand for energy is poised to ramp‑up dramatically, in the same way that Chinese demand rose considerably about 10 years ago. Given India’s limited domestic oil and gas resources, what strategy will India pursue in seeking increased energy imports from abroad.
General Ma Xiaotian
[As translated from Chinese: Thank you, Dr. Chipman. The questions you have given me could most probably take the remaining 6 to 7 minutes to answer. On the subject of Afghanistan, I think China certainly still has a role to play. China has provided a great deal of civil and economic support for the country. The only difference between us and other countries is that we have not yet mobilised our armed forces and carried out military operations to the same extent as some other nations and international alliances. But China has still contributed a great deal in terms of humanitarian aid.
Regarding the nuclear issue, and that of nuclear transparency, I believe we have reiterated many times that China is a nuclear country, and that over the past half a century, we have been the only nuclear country to have actively advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China asserts that no country should seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons, believing instead that a viable long-term plan should be put into place for total elimination of nuclear weapons, breaking the process down into practically-timed stages of disarmament.
China's nuclear policy is also transparent and known to the public. Under no circumstances will we ever use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons on any non-nuclear countries, or in any nuclear-free regions. China's nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country, and we do not attempt to use nuclear weapons to threaten other countries. We have also adopted a restrained attitude towards the development of nuclear weapons. We are the nuclear state with the least nuclear tests, and our nuclear force is maintained at the minimum level for protecting our national security. We have no desire to participate in a nuclear arms race. We have never had done this in the past, and we never will. We have no intention of deploying nuclear weapons outside of our own territory.
Our policy has always been entirely transparent, but transparency has its limits. We must abide by our principles of safety; we state unequivocally that we will never strike first. Only China has made such a statement.
The country has made a great contribution to negotiations for a treaty leading to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We urge all sides to support this treaty, and hope that it comes into force as soon as possible. To reiterate, China does not wish to participate in a nuclear arms race, but we neither wish to shirk the responsibilities that come with being a nuclear power. We have openly stated our belief that China, along with other nuclear countries should, under the right conditions, initiate a process of multilateral nuclear disarmament. Thank you for your attention.]
Toshimi Kitazawa
[As translated from Japanese: Thank you for your question.
First, on the Japan-U.S. relationship, as you may know, this year marks the 50th year of the security treaty between Japan and the United States. In that sense, we produced a Japan-U.S. 2+2 joint statements in January of this year, and we shared the idea to further promote security and cooperation across a broad spectrum.
After that, on the role of the U.S., as I said earlier, there was a historical regime change in Japan with Prime Minister Hatoyama. And as for Prime Minister Hatoyama’s statements about the Japan-U.S. relationship, he first expressed the basic idea that the Japan-U.S. alliance is an essential foundation for the safety of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the region, and the military presence of the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is positioned to bring about a great peace of mind in countries across the region.
Though Prime Minister Kan will take office early next week, he was the deputy prime minister at that time, and they are also long-time political allies. I have also known him for a long time, so I believe that he has the same stance and shares the same point of view of the Japan-U.S. relationship and Asia as a whole. Since then, he also more recently expressed that he thought things have become a little difficult between Japan and the U.S. with his views on another forward U.S. presence, but now 74% of the U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, and the area of Okinawa is less than 6% of Japan as a whole. Although the feeling that the bases are concentrated in such a small area has persisted for many years, it has turned up again. Being unable to make some kind of breakthrough in the status of these bases with the change in the regime means that although this appears to be nation-wide, if we look at the sentiments of the people of the region with the military bases, it is understandable in a sense, and that expectation was brought about by the problems of the Hatoyama administration. There were a lot of struggles to arrive at a solution, and to a certain extent, this is one of the reasons for his resignation.
However, Prime Minister Hatoyama paved the way to a resolution to this problem with the Japan-U.S. 2+2 in May during meetings over the span of about six months. In that sense, it’s as if the role to be played by the U.S. and the foundation for Japan’s support of this role have been developed. However, even though some problems still remain, I think that we want to reach a firm resolution to this based on the policy agreements between Japan and the United States.]
Shivshankar Menon
I think on the first question about Afghanistan, certainly for us, we have an interest in helping Afghanistan to become a peaceful, normal society and state, and in developing its economy. We will continue to do what we have to been doing so far, which is, by our standards, a relatively large programme of assistance. But, whether we are going to replace ISAF, I would be amazed if we did. I do not think that is our function. Primarily, what we do in Afghanistan will depend on what Afghanistan wants us to do and on the limitations of our capacity. Given that, we will certainly do what we can to encourage Afghanistan’s transition into a much better place than it is today.
There was a question about a transnational response mechanism in South Asia, whether SAARC could perform that function in regard to these new dimensions of security. I think SAARC itself, maybe we do not need to overload: it has a clear mandate on the socio‑economic side. If you look at the Charter, it specifically excludes some of the political and security aspects. But there is, I think, apart from SAARC, a need to think amongst ourselves for a more creative approach within the sub‑continent. I spoke of the nature of these challenges requiring an open, flexible approach, and I think that is exactly what we need to do in SAARC and in the sub‑continent. Those who can and who wish to, I think, need to find ways of cooperating to deal with some of these security issues that face us.
On left‑wing extremism, I am not sure where you got some of those figures? They are very far away from the figures that we know or use in India. The fact is that we will combat it in two ways. One is, of course, the immediate law and order issue. I think there is successful experience in India and outside in the world on which we can draw. There is a larger issue of bringing development to areas to make our growth more inclusive, so that we can develop these areas and remove whatever causes there might be for disaffection. In the very few and small areas which are actually affected by it, we mention – and the Prime Minister has said this – that left‑wing extremism is probably the major internal security challenge. The reason we say ‘internal’, is because it does not have the kind of external links that we have seen in other terrorist challenges occurring in the past, or the same kind of external support.
To the question from Farooq Sobhan, ‘Do you see this having repercussions in the region?’ Not yet, and if we are successful in dealing with it in the timeframes in which we are thinking of doing it, then we do not see that becoming an external problem.
Somebody said something about nuclear assets: that is one thing I can assure you about. You do not need to worry about left‑wing extremism affecting the security of our nuclear assets. I speak from some knowledge of this issue.
There was a question about Brazil and Turkey and their initiative on the Iranian nuclear issue, which for us, there are two aspects to this problem. One is that Iran has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it is a right that the international community also accepts. That is what the various attempts - whether last October or this attempt by Brazil and Turkey - tried to recognise. The second aspect is that it also tried to do so in a manner that assuaged or addressed international concerns about the nature of the programme and its peaceful nature in particular. That is an issue on which, ultimately, the IAEA is the best judge. Whether or not the Brazilian and the Turkish initiative manages to do that second part, I am not sure: on the objective evidence, not yet. But these are the two things which we need to do going forward, and that would be where any effort that manages to do both these things, we in India, would be very happy to support. Our stand on the issue itself, I think, is well-known.
Lastly on energy security: you are absolutely right, it is going to be crucial to our own economic future, but also to the future of so many other countries. I think we need to look at it in the broader sense. That is why I said we need to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’, where each of us, in chasing our own individual interests manages to deplete this resource to the point where it works against all our interests. Energy security for us really is among the key new dimensions of security.
Dr John Chipman
Thank you National Security Advisor Menon, Minister Kitazawa and General Ma for your extraordinary speeches and your full answers to questions.
