Questions and Answers
Gareth Evans, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Crisis Group, Australia; IISS Member
My question is to Minister Hamada and refers to the issue of extended deterrence. Minister, you referred to Japan’s strong historical and continuing commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons but, in terms of maintaining the credibility and momentum of that commitment, is it not time for Japan, along with other US allies, to make clear that you and we understand that the US nuclear umbrella is available only for nuclear threats, and that for non‑nuclear threats – chemical, biological and all the rest – the US deterrent capability, on which you and we rely, is and should be conventional in character, not nuclear?
Dr Chicako Kawakatsu Ueki, Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan; IISS Member
I would like to ask General Ma a question. You mentioned the importance of defence diplomacy and confidence‑building measures, which I completely agree with. You mentioned the positives, and I think we have learned quite a bit about China and are more confident. However, I wanted to ask you what reassurances China received through these activities. What concerns were alleviated? Did that have an impact on any defence policies or their structures?
Professor Simon Chesterman, Global Professor and Director of the New York University School of Law Singapore Programme, National University of Singapore; IISS Member
The subtitle for this panel was ‘cooperation or conflict’ and, by my count, we had three votes for cooperation and none for conflict, which is of course a happy result. I wonder if I might reprise a variation on the question that was asked of Prime Minister Rudd last night, which is: what potential developments most worry the panellists in the near term? What keeps you awake at night?
Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS
I have a question for General Ma. The general mentioned in his presentation the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) several times, as well as the forthcoming Russian/Chinese military exercises. Can the general say a few more words about how China is going to contribute more to stabilisation in Afghanistan? In particular, what SCO mechanisms can he see being utilised for that purpose? How much does he think the improvement in strategic dialogue between the US and China could encourage the SCO to be more open to engaging with the US for the purpose of improving the capacity of regional actors to stabilise Afghanistan?
Dr Chung Min Lee, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asian Security Affairs, IISS; Dean and Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of International Relations, Yonsei University; Member of the President’s Foreign Policy Council; Adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Republic of Korea Armed Forces
My question is for General Ma. General, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has played a very constructive role in the six‑party talks, but the recent North Korea nuclear test has shown that things are quite dicey, as it were. Does the PRC feel threatened by North Korea’s nuclear test and, if so, how does your country feel threatened by this recent development? As you know, General, North Korea has more than 900 ballistic missiles targeted against South Korea and Japan and, yet, China has been resolutely against missile defence in both Japan and South Korea. My question to you, sir, is why is China opposed to missile defence when you have not said that much about the fact that North Korea continues to threaten South Korea as well as other regional states by its growing ballistic missile capabilities?
Ralph A Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, US; IISS Member
Secretary Gates this morning mentioned that, at some point, the strategic arms talks between the US and Russia need to become multi‑lateralised. I had hoped to ask him what that point was but was unable to, so I would like to ask General Ma what he thinks that point is. At what point does China believe it is prepared to enter into the dialogue? There is a great deal of concern in the region that China may exploit the decision by the US and Russia to reduce forces by trying to come up to join it. I wonder if we can have some sort of assurance from China that that will not be the case - that it will stick with its minimum deterrence philosophy.
Professor Han Sung-Joo, Chairman, Asan Institute for Policy Studies; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; IISS Member
General Ma, you said that, as problems in this area, there is a ‘shifting of domestic troubles to others’. Do you have a case in mind? Can you give us an example or two of this shifting of domestic troubles to others? What can we do about it? You also said that there is a Cold‑War mentality in this area still. Can you again give us the examples you have in mind?
Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, IISS
I have a question to Admiral Mehta. In your very eloquent presentation, you stressed the threat posed by state‑sponsored non‑state actors. In this context, you asked how we can lay bare the linkages. You mentioned one example – the attack in Mumbai. I wondered if you would like to take this opportunity to expand upon the linkage in that case.
Dr Fu-kuo Liu, Research Fellow and Chairman, The First Research Division, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
I fear encouragement by General Ma’s remarks this year. Just four days ago, the Chairman of the Kuomintang of China (KMT) ruling party in Taiwan met with President Hu Jintao. Both of them reached an understanding that we need to push military confidence‑building measures (CBMs) across the Taiwan Strait, yet General Ma just remarked that China would like to enhance a regional security dialogue with all partners. I wonder how, looking from a military perspective, China would be willing to do CBMs with Taiwan. This is one element that the civil military security community in Taiwan pays extremely important attention to. On this particular point, I would like to learn from General Ma.
Lieutenant General Dr Mohd Aminul Karim, Commandant, National Defence College, Bangladesh
My question is related to the Defense Minister from Japan. You have only talked about North Korea as a threat, as I understood from your presentation. You support ballistic missile defence (BMD) with American support and you have guaranteed American military support and protection for your country. You also ask for the F‑22 aircraft from the Americans. What else do you have in mind, except for North Korea, since you are attempting the huge modernisation of your military forces? If I understand you correctly, your defence budget has probably exceeded $40 billion.
Dr John Chipman
General Ma, among the questions you received were included: what reassurances has China received as a result of the defence diplomacy it has engaged in? Tell us more about the Russia/China relationship, the SCO. What are the direct concerns you have about North Korea? What support might you give to the concept of missile defence, given the increased missile threat in the region? At what point might you enter nuclear talks? What kinds of CBMs might China engage in across the Strait?
Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian
Translation from Chinese:[I will try my best to answer your questions. I will start from the last question since the memory is the most vivid. The gentleman mentioned certain security mechanisms and security related dialogues, including the establishment of a Taiwan security mechanism. In advance, I want to make it clear that the security mechanisms and security dialogues I mentioned do not include Taiwan. This is because it is an international issue; Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, this makes Taiwan an internal issue of the Chinese people. However, I still want to bring up the establishment of a security mechanism in Taiwan for military security and mutual trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is beneficial for the relief of military security concerns of the mainland and Taiwan. It is also useful for stabilising the security situation in the Taiwan Straits and facilitating the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Straits. Mr Hu Jintao, the general secretary of the CPC, emphasised that we may make contact and exchange on military issues in good time and discuss the establishment of military security during his speech given on the symposium for the 30th anniversary of the release of To the Taiwan Compatriots. To my understanding, a convenient time for two parties to come together should be determined by the two parties themselves. We are now trying to reach economic agreements. According to the principle of “economy then politics”, we can gradually proceed to resolve this issue.
We have mentioned the participation of China in the military dialogues between USA and Russia on the reduction of nuclear weapons. We know that USA and Russia will engage in another dialogue on the reduction of strategic weapons this year. China has not participated into such dialogues just yet. In terms of the scale of nuclear weapons in China, as Vice Minister Gai mentioned, we only have a small fraction of the world's nuclear weapons. In fact, we are not entitled to participate in such dialogues. Besides, China is one of the first five countries who own nuclear weapons and have declared on the first day of nuclear weapon possession that we would not be the first one to use nuclear weapons and would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and regions. I totally agree with Vice Minister Gai that USA and Russia should take the first step in this respect.
In response to the question of what benefits China would obtain when expanding military exchange and security mechanisms and dialogue platforms between different regions; I would say that the benefits are mutual. The military exchange between China and other countries mainly include visits and contacts between the senior officials, strategic mechanism and defence security negotiation and dialogue, professional exchange and training, and cooperation in army discipline. In my opinion, the military relationship is important and supportive to the national relationship. The quality of the military relationship is not only crucial to the national relationship but also reflects the strength of the national relationship to a certain extent. China therefore pays great attention to military exchange.
China has established senior official mutual visits, exchange mechanisms, and training exchanges with the neighbouring countries as well as countries in America, Europe and Africa. China has also conducted such exchanges with Russia. We also pay great attention to the military exchange with USA. The national defence departments of China and USA are currently discussing such issues. We believe that we should all try to implement the common political understanding reached by the leaders of China and USA at the London Summit held on April 1st; for instance to further enhance and facilitate military exchange between China and the USA, which shall be the objective of all relevant activities we’ll carry out. Of course there are also cognitive differences between us during exchanges. However, we believe that by following the principle of mutual respect, mutual trust, equality and mutual benefit, we could gradually eliminate the differences.
I remember that there was a question about the nuclear test of North Korea. As to the nuclear test of North Korea, we understand the worries and concerns of certain countries, especially from the neighbouring countries Japan and South Korea. We are fully aware of that. Being a neighbour of North Korea, we have great concern about its second nuclear test. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has fully expressed our attitude. China maintains a consistent attitude. We are strongly against this nuclear test and we have always been against nuclear proliferation. We hope to realise Korean Peninsula denuclearisation. All relevant parties are expected to handle this issue soberly and properly.]
Dr John Chipman
Admiral Mehta, you were principally asked about terrorism.
Admiral Sureesh Mehta
There were two queries. The first was what gives us sleepless nights. The answer to that is fairly easy: in more recent times, it has been the rise of non‑state actors. The asymmetric threat that comes in front of armed forces bothers us most of all. The rise of phenomenal; it is across the board. Many countries are affected by it. I am sure they all have to face this threat head on, but it is a very difficult threat to face, because you are dealing with somebody who is either not visible, not seen too clearly, or the force that you wish to apply needs to be tempered somewhat. That bothers us most of all and goes on to the specific question that was asked to me; this one was asked of the whole panel.
The specific query pertained to the state‑sponsored terrorism I was referring to. Let me put it like this: there are of course disparate groups that enter into this kind of activity. There is no doubt about that. In the specific context you raised, the Mumbai attacks, one sees a certain amount of professionalism and precision, and a considerable amount of specific planning, which has gone into the manoeuvre that was undertaken. This certainly makes us believe there is covert support for such elements. Be that as it may, the end point would be that states from whose territory such acts emanate, be they from non‑state actors or state‑supported non‑state actors, themselves have a certain moral obligation to ensure that these kinds of acts are not permitted in their territories. To that extent, the countries concerned themselves need to take a certain kind of action to prevent these kinds of things from happening.
Yasukazu Hamada
Translation from Japanese: [Firstly, I think I would like to respond to the last question. For us, when you talk about threats, there are discussions about North Korea, and there are discussions about everything else. But for Japan, with so many restrictions, I clearly said that Japan does not use military force for the resolution of military disputes internationally, and whether it is BMD or conventional weapons, for us, we think it is only being persistently defensive. Because of that, while we have obtained the cooperation of the US in particular on this issue, we have also been operating the F22. However, we are naturally thinking only about the persistent defence of Japan. In that sense, there is no threat, or in other words, Japan is steadily preparing for the future in order to defend itself. As you just said, there is the threat of North Korea, etc.
I have now discussed this some time ago seeing the events up to this point. Unless there are various persistent appeals from other countries, for us it is different. I, myself, made it clear that we would not start anything, so what I mean is that as the target of a threat is quite easy to decide, perhaps it is not necessary. It goes against various actions, so for us, the truth of the matter is that we do it with those thoughts in mind. Actually, the talks are under the nuclear umbrella, and for us, it is from the standpoint of the only country that has suffered nuclear bombings. While really being aware, it is truly important that we work to eliminate nuclear issues or anything to do with nuclear issues and that proliferation not be permitted. Japan does not even have nuclear weapons, and also, you know, Japan even received the first IAEA inspection, so that means it is really about nuclear weapons. That is what I think. I think that, in the future, steadily appealing to each country, even to nuclear powers, is important. And this is also about normal strategy. Similarly, for us it would be the minimum equipment. Actually, it also means that these limitations are natural even from a financial perspective, so I really think that it is vital that we explain this through the ideas of all of those present from each country in a form in which there are no misunderstandings about that. I hope I have answered your question. ]
Dr John Chipman
Minister Hamada, Admiral Mehta, General Ma, thank you very much for your important contributions. General, there was a call for enhanced military‑to‑military diplomacy. We hope the next day and a half will provide just that. Thank you very much.
