As Delivered:
Cooperation or Confrontation
Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chairman of the Chief of Staffs Committee and Chief of Naval Staff, India
Dr John Chipman, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed a singular privilege to be able to share a few thoughts with you at the eighth IISS Asia Summit. I would like to thank the organisers, the state of Singapore and the IISS for this opportunity.
Let me start by stating that change is upon us in many parts of the world, but perhaps nowhere more so than in the oceanic expanses and the littoral regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This changed security environment is characterised by two apparently opposite strains: on the one hand, the individual security strategy of each individual nation is increasingly enmeshed with that of the collective – a theme that has been spoken about this morning, and also last evening; on the other hand, the quest for human security is coming into sharper focus. As such, the term ‘security’ has now assumed increasingly dominant political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions. It jostles for space with the traditional military one and, yet, the two strains are linked, since human security transcends both national borders and the Westphalian constructs of sovereignty.
As a consequence of these changes we stand today at a fork in our journey through space and time. One path leads to cooperation and the other to conflict. As these paths meander along, they often run very close abreast and sometimes even overlap. These proximities and overlaps bring many questions in their wake. For instance, how can economic competition for finite resources in geographically coincident areas be prevented from transforming itself into conflict? What degree of relevance should we attach to a historical review of Japan in the period leading up to the Second World War, vis-à-vis the present‑day competition for energy and minerals by major powers within the Indian and the Pacific littoral? Does economic interdependence increase or decrease the probability of armed conflict? The liberal school argues that it does, because nations would rather trade than invade and, yet, the realist school dismisses this theory by highlighting historical evidence of the First World War when major European powers, particularly Great Britain and Germany, had reached unprecedented levels of interdependence and, yet, went to war. Which is truer of our regions and our times? Is the form of government necessarily an indicator of the external behaviour of a nation? These are some of the questions that confront us, the answers to which will determine our future.
As I said a little while ago, the individual security strategy of each nation is today increasingly enmeshed with that of the collective. It is here that the role of major powers assumes importance. Firstly, let me broach yet another facet of change by suggesting that the expression ‘major power’ is no longer limited to a single nation‑state entity alone. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a prime example of a major power of the newer kind, as is the European Union. In some cases, major military blocs such as NATO have either already taken over roles and functions that would characteristically be performed by individual nation states or show a marked tendency to do so.
Today, we have come to live in an era characterised by the rise of insidious and malignant forces that have redefined security responses the world over. Here, I refer to the rise of the malevolent non‑state actor. Even more ominously, the occasional coursing of the state with the malevolent non‑state entities has created an evil hybrid that we might describe as ‘state‑sponsored non‑state actor’. It is this hybrid that lies at the heart of our current security dilemma, which, for India, has been made all the more pressing by the tragic events in Mumbai in November 2008.
Should our preventive, curative and punitive security efforts be directed principally towards the state sponsor or the non‑state entity? How are the linkages between the two to be laid bare for the world to see? These changes are altering the geo‑strategies of our aid in a fundamental manner.
Can a contextually specific case therefore be made out, whereby cooperation among nation states is used to combat malevolent non‑state entities, terrorists and pirates? What then should be the legitimate and most responsible role that major state powers should play? What organisational constructs would be the most apt for such a goal to be realised?
Perhaps the foremost issue for any organisational construct that seeks to address the demands of such a holistic security paradigm is acceptability. I do believe that region‑specific acceptability is a sine qua non for any meaningful progress towards cooperation. The cultural and societal context of Asia is very different from that of, say, the Americas or Europe. Cultural sensitivities in Asia must be acknowledged, understood and respected. This is a complex business because Asia is heterogeneous in the extreme. Newer powers, often imbued with both the exuberant energy and the impatience of youth, need to resist the temptation of simply extrapolating what works for them upon the entirely different civilisational paradigm of Asia. Regional issues are best tackled by regional sensitivity. This is precisely why we look upon regionally focused structures, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) or the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), with so much hope and expectation, even though they are basically navy‑specific constructs.
Having said that, I must emphasise that for any security construct in Asia to succeed its architecture must be evolved in a manner that reduces friction and reassures smaller states of their rightful place within such a construct, without prejudice to size, economic stature or any other consideration. The onus for this clearly lies with the larger economically stable and militarily stronger states of the region. Regional and extra‑regional powers, whether established or emerging, of course have a crucial role to play. No cooperative, consultative or constructive endeavour can succeed in the face of opposition from major state powers, yet no meaningful conflict can be waged against malignant non‑state powers without state powers joining hands in cooperative endeavour. For major state powers, there is actually no choice but to support and participate in cooperative, consultative and constructive endeavours to defeat such forces. I might quote here Martin Luther King Jr, who once said, ‘We may all have come on different ships, but we are in the same boat now.’
Asia today is witnessing the historical and simultaneous rise of at least four major powers, namely China, Japan, India and the 10 countries of ASEAN.
These Asian powers are witnessing unprecedented economic activity and, even in these recessionary times, the economic performance of India, China and Indonesia is indeed impressive. On the other hand, Asia is also the crucible from which many of the world’s most obscurantist and malevolent forces are taking frightening form and substance. The challenge, therefore, is to keep the engines of growth running through trade, commerce and every other form of human endeavour, while at the same time keeping disruptive forces at bay.
This is no mean challenge and no country, however large or powerful, has the wherewithal to insulate itself from the omnipresent threats of which terrorism is the newest and most grotesque manifestation. Other universal concerns that nation states face today include: threats from nefarious traffickers of drugs, arms and human beings; organised poachers; ships that clandestinely discharge oil and toxic cargo into the sea or onto the shores of unsuspecting and ill‑informed states; mercenaries; and modern‑day pirates. There are also non‑traditional security threats encompassing a wide range of potential crises, including environmental degradation, infectious diseases and illegal migration. While these challenges are not within the purview of the more traditional military concerns, they may nonetheless pose a challenge to national security and regional stability. Put together, they constitute a deadly cocktail that constitutes a common challenge that can only be faced through common resolve.
This will require many overlapping and interlocking structures, multiple opportunities and mechanisms for constructive engagement. It will need a transformation in the way we think and the way we look at one another. It will also require those nations that have the necessary resources and the wherewithal to pick up the burden of public good, in ensuring all forms of security to life, trade and property to ensure the wellbeing of the region.
Concerted efforts at capability enhancement and capacity building of the smaller countries of the region, through active assistance of larger neighbours, would be crucial to such efforts in the long term. Many of us – and that includes India – have some ongoing programmes in this direction, and they have also been referred to by Secretary Gates this morning, but I think we could do with some fillip over here.
India is indeed committed to building a secure environment, in which trade and economic development can proceed unhindered. We see the Indian Navy as a significant stabilising force in the Indian Ocean region, which safeguards traffic bound not only for our own ports, but also the flow of hydrocarbons and strategically important cargo to and from the rest of the world across the strategic waterways close to our shores. As Asian economies, including that of India, are expected to grow at higher than world averages in the decade to come, so will our vulnerabilities, which arise from the disruption of sea trade.
And so, the safety of SLOCS will always remain a priority for India in the foreseeable future. The Indian Navy has been a trendsetter in anti‑piracy efforts off the Gulf of Aden and, while there has been a reduction in piracy incidents, much remains to be done to optimise global efforts in that fragile region.
Benign operations comprise one of the cornerstones of India’s reasonable engagement. The tsunami relief operations of 2004, the non‑combatant evacuation operations from Lebanon in 2006 and the more recent responses to cyclones Nargis and Sidr, which struck Myanmar and Bangladesh respectively, as well as medical relief to Sri Lanka in the wake of the recently unfolded humanitarian crisis, are examples of our commitment to our neighbours and the safety of our diaspora.
We have also been mindful of the need to assist our smaller neighbours to help themselves. Our capability‑enhancement and capacity‑building initiatives with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius have adequately enabled them to deal with many of their security concerns on their own. I am convinced that, as India grows in economic and military stature, it would have to take upon itself the role of further equipping its neighbours in ways that would not only enhance their own security but contribute positively to regional stability as well. On the navy‑to‑navy level, IONS [Indian Ocean Naval Symposium], which was launched in February last year, is a significant military construct to bring together regional navies aimed at addressing common concerns. We hope that, in the due course of time, this will shake hands with other such constructs across into the other oceans.
Let me conclude therefore by stating, quite emphatically, that my vote, whether for cooperation or conflict, would go definitely for the former. The future of this planet hinges on how Asia conducts itself in world affairs in the next few decades. Our rise to eminence or fading away to insignificance would depend on whether we choose to cooperate or confront each other. I firmly believe that there is room for everyone to grow without being confrontationalist in our approaches. On this note, let me end with the words of Benjamin Franklin: ‘If we do not hang together, we will hang separately.’ Thank you for your attention.
