As Delivered:
The Philippines Perspective
Antonio C Santos Jr, Undersecretary for Defense Affairs, Department of National Defense, Philippines
Dr John Shipman, my co-panellists, defence security leaders, friends, ladies and gentlemen. I am privileged to deliver this plenary on behalf of the Secretary for National Defence of the Philippines, Gilberto Teodoro. The Secretary has emphasised that these are his personal thoughts on the topic regarding counter-insurgency campaigns.
The subject of defeating insurgency should be differentiated from winning counter-insurgency campaigns. The former has the element of finality and is an unmistakable choice of the people of a state to rid themselves of that condition, and the latter is a crucial springboard leading to the fulfilment of the former. Just as each country has conditions that are uniquely its own, insurgencies differ in nature, scope and severity, and millions of qualitative factors or intangibles often lead to concepts such as morality and justice.
To develop a specific theory on how best to proceed, it is obviously difficult. One must therefore be confined to general concepts in one’s own experience. With this in mind, let me therefore share in this forum my own personal thoughts on what I think needs to be undertaken if campaigns against insurgency are to be won. In doing so, reference to my own country is unavoidable.
The insurgency in the Philippines is both a reflection and a cause of difficulties facing us as a society composed of several ethno-linguistic national groups, in trying to build our statehood, meaning the presence of a state that could serve as a locus of identity for various groups of people living within its territory. In a multinational society like the Philippines, our government has to work doubly hard in keeping the entire society together, and preserve social integrity to allow and maintain the systems of the various nations within our geographic boundaries in order to ensure unhampered development and prosperity.
All too often we hear the dictum ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ as the key weapon against insurgency; making this phrase almost a mantra in government. Winning the people’s heart and minds, while a necessity for winning a counter-insurgency campaign, is simply not a prescription. The character of the political philosophy behind such campaigns is more vital, and the government must pursue its campaign within a philosophy of imposing a structural and institutional political order, within a framework of enforcing its own legal systems. It is therefore crucial for government to assert its legitimate authority and to enforce national laws. This is exactly the task of our government today, to enforce the laws of the land against those who commit violence against the people, or who risk the integrity of our republic.
We hear reference to certain root causes of insurgency, in additional to political, economic and social issues that need to be addressed in order for insurgency to be solved. Yet there are societies that are confronted with the same issues, but are not faced with insurgency. The difference, perhaps, lies in the fact that in those societies the state has been able to facilitate its authority and enforce laws and rules. It is therefore crucial that the state consolidate coercive power and be the sole possessor of armed power, otherwise the state will not be able to consolidate its authority. This is a classic weak-state scenario. The state, being unable to formulate policies for general application or implement national programmes, will find that those adversely affected will have failed expectations, something that could be exploited by sectors in society to mobilise people against governments. Lacking the infrastructure to address these challenges, a government will resort to a series of compromised measures, with, eventually, the old state institutions, resulting in an unstable security situation.
In the case of the Philippines, insurgents are one of the sub-centre groups in society that attempt to wield power, challenging government authority through armed force and intimidation. While diverse views and opposition to the state are allowed in a democratic society like ours, being constitutionally guaranteed, armed resistance is something that should not be tolerated. Insurgency or, for that matter, rebellion, should never be allowed to be taken as synonymous with expression of political disagreement against government.
The first consideration, therefore, in winning the fight against insurgency, is the realisation that the state has the right to utilise all the instruments of national power, to include force when necessary. Fighting insurgency is definitely one of those instances where force has to be employed, because insurgents use violence to challenge government authority. The use of armed force against government by insurgents has to be addressed through a more powerful response.
Our experience with insurgency clearly illustrates this point. For the past several decades, the Philippines has been saddled with the problem of what we now call a [inaudible] insurgencies, waged, on one hand, with the New People's Army across the country and, on the other hand, by the cessasionist movement in the [inaudible] region. Today, the New People's Army, while ostensibly professing a communist ideology, does so in an atmosphere of question and doubt. Worse, it now engages in criminal activities, making its members no longer deserving of being called rebels. To do so would merely glamorise them and what they do in the remote areas of the Philippines: inflicting harm on the public and extorting money from legitimate business firms. Joint police and armed-forces operations are currently being conducted against the group. Meanwhile, separatist extremism in the Philippines is a complex issue, for it is not only ethnically based but also has religious underpinnings. Worse, it is said to be linked to global and regional terrorist groups.
The government, across various administrations, from President Ferdinand Marcos to the current Arroyo administration, has attempted to address insurgency through a combination of military and non-military means; a combination of what is commonly referred to as right and left approaches. Yet a closer look at how these approaches were actually implemented reveals that is the left-hand approach that has dominantly been undertaken. Indeed, the Philippines military has actually been utilised to the fullest, but ironically not in using force but in implementing programmes and projects – building bridges and paving roads, constructing school buildings and conducting civic action activities – all in the name of winning the hearts and minds of our people, who, apparently, were providing the insurgents with assistance or serving as their mass base.
These development and programmes and projects, to a certain degree, may have won the hearts and minds of our people, but definitely not those of the insurgents, whose hearts could no longer be won and whose minds could no longer be convinced otherwise. It is those leaders who continue the fight against our government. This explains why insurgency in the Philippines has lingered. In no way do I mean that insurgency could be addressed solely by the government's armed operations. There are certainly political and economic issues surrounding an insurgency. This needs to be addressed with corresponding political and economic programmes. Foremost is the availability of channels for political dialogue, so that the insurgents would have a venue for discussing issues, which would hopefully make them less inclined to continue waging armed resistance. In the conduct of political negotiations, the operative framework ought to be the laws of the republic, with the aim in view of producing changes in these laws were necessary and where needed.
Furthermore, insurgents should not be brought to the negotiating table at equals as government, for they are not. We must have them disarm before meaningful negotiations can be undertaken. Of course, insurgents will see their weapons as bargaining tools to have leverage with the government and would resist the idea of disarming. What is practicable, however, is to require them to show a sign of goodwill that they are sincere in arriving at a negotiated settlement. Full disarmament should then be made part of any peace agreement between government and insurgents resulting from negotiations. Political dialogue has to be undertaken with a clear view of arriving at a negotiated political settlement and a set of compromises that are not, of course, lopsidedly favourable to the insurgents. Furthermore, negotiated arrangements have to be practicable, otherwise frustration will result, not only among the insurgents but also among the general public – frustration that could be exploited by those who want to challenge government authority.
Meanwhile, government needs to be sure that insurgents are not able to utilise political negotiations to further enhance their armed ability. Last, it is imperative that overwhelming military pressures be kept in the affected area for some time during this exchange, in order to serve as an effective deterrent.
Avenues for increased and enhanced political representations need to be made available. In our country, freedom of speech is a guaranteed right of every citizen. One is free to express any ideology or belief. That includes the right to utilise legitimate political techniques to further them. We have repealed the anti-subversion law, which proscribed membership of leftist organisations. What remains proscribed is the use of force to pursue one's beliefs. As a result, we have several former rebels who have been elected to various positions in government. Thus, with the availability of various mechanisms for political dialogue and political participation, insurgents do not have an excuse for continuing armed resistance.
Of course, alongside the political problems are the socio-economic projects that need to be put in place, not because economic difficulties are the root causes of insurgency, but in order to deprive insurgents of an issue to exploit. For those who want armed actions against government, but have realised the merits of returning to their communities, social and economic programmes are available to help the transition to living as responsible members of society.
Over the long term, building strong institutions, particularly a state that is able to enforce its authority, will ensure that the fight against insurgency is finally won, so the citizens will not entertain the idea of becoming insurgents, neither will they see the utility of waging an armed struggle against their own government. It is this quest that our government is currently pursuing – undertaking necessary reforms to enhance the capacity of our institutions to respond to the needs of our people and, more importantly, to deliver effective governance to citizenry.
In conclusion, let me reiterate that to win the campaign against insurgency necessitates two basic tenets. Firstly, the state needs to enforce its authority and, if necessary, to use force against those who disregard our laws, inflict harm on our population and take arms against government. Secondly, the state equally has the obligation to engage in dialogue with those who are willing to pursue a negotiated political settlement. One without the other would lead to a continued cycle of violence and conflict, derailing efforts to develop. The enterprise is also one of the understanding the fundamental norms and institutions upon which a particularly society is founded and making them work. Thank you for your attention.
John Chipman
Undersecretary, thank you very much indeed, and please pass on our thanks to Minister Teodoro. Next, for the perspective from Pakistan that I am sure will also encompass Afghanistan, General Syed Athar Ali, Secretary of Defence of Pakistan.
