Good afternoon. I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all our distinguished colleagues and friends who attended the Shangri-La Dialogue over the past two days.
Today, it is my honour and privilege to join Col Gen Kien and Secretary Browne in addressing this session.
Defence and security relationships in the Asia-Pacific have been evolving to meet the geopolitical context and the region’s security needs. Vestiges of old Cold War security structures are still with us, but adapted to today’s security environment.
Examples include the US’ bilateral security treaties with Japan and the ROK in Northeast Asia, and the ANZUS treaty signed by Australia, New Zealand and the US.
In the South Asian subcontinent, the old Cold War alignments were superimposed on regional rivalries, and these are still reflected in the substantive relationships that India and Pakistan have with Russia and the US.
In Southeast Asia, the dividing line was drawn across Indo-China where conflict raged for five decades from the Second World War. Within every country in South East Asia in the 1960s, there were also active and violent insurgencies.
However, the security architecture here was not as sharply divided as the two competing Cold War blocs in Europe. The original ASEAN-6 – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – were anti-communist and sought close ties with the West.
However, attempts to form a Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in the 1960s and 1970s never gained traction.
Instead, bilateral defence pacts were the order of the day, with the Philippines and Thailand establishing bilateral defence pacts with the US, while the other original ASEAN countries maintained close bilateral ties with the US and other Western countries, but with a looser structure.
On the other hand, we also see the continuation of ties between Vietnam and Russia, even as Vietnam today reaches out for closer ties with the US and China.
With ASEAN incorporating all 10 South East Asian countries today, closer integration and cooperation between all the ASEAN countries is in progress.
B. Need for modes of security cooperation to evolve and adapt
The old Cold War logic no longer holds true, as countries in the region adjust to new strategic challenges and realities, and find new ways to forge cooperation. They do so by building on current relationships, partnerships and alliances. They also look beyond their traditional partners to cooperate in configuring partnerships and structures that best address the future security needs as well as issues at hand.
The security challenges we face are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. They come from “360-degrees”. Many of the new security challenges are also transnational in nature and require multilateral cooperation. Issues such as energy security, and food and water security affect us all. Other examples of these new “360-degree” security challenges include maritime security, pandemics, non-proliferation, terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The devastating effects of Cyclone Nargis in Southern Myanmar and the earthquake in Sichuan province of China last month serve as a sobering reminder of the importance of international cooperation in relief efforts in the aftermath of large-scale natural disasters.
In this regard, I would like to extend our sincere condolences to the people of Myanmar and China. Singapore stands ready to provide assistance to the respective governments to bring speedy and effective relief to the victims.
No country, no matter how big, is able to muster all the resources and specialised capabilities necessary to attend to all the needs of the victims. International aid organisations and rescue services from other countries can bring much needed assistance. Armed forces too have a crucial role to play in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
They have the resources and manpower to fulfil an important quick response role in the crucial first stages of disaster relief and rescue operations.
Armed forces can transport aid to where it is needed most in the affected locality and help in its distribution. It is not the value or quantity of the aid, but whether it can be delivered right to the point where it is needed, to the victims who need it. They in turn pave the way for civilian agencies and international organisations to follow up in the subsequent phases of disaster management.
There is one key objective in such operations – bringing relief speedily and effectively to the victims. It is the responsibility of the national government to do everything that is within its power to achieve this objective. Other considerations should be subordinate. International assistance can play a useful and even crucial role.
C. Enhancing regional security through new and multiple modes of security cooperation
In the Asia-Pacific, the security architecture is still evolving.
A matrix of overlapping structures – comprising multilateral security fora and groupings – is emerging as a result of the changing geopolitical landscape and new security environment.
At the broadest level, we have large multilateral security fora like the Shangri-La Dialogue and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that bring together all stakeholders that can make useful contributions to regional security.
These meetings are opportunities for the members to exchange views and ideas on key security challenges, and to move these ideas from the conceptual form to concrete solutions.
For instance, the ARF is now shifting its focus from confidence-building towards undertaking more concrete initiatives in areas such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, maritime security and HADR.
Similarly, the Shangri-La Dialogue has played a useful role in shaping common perceptions and norms of behaviour. Over the years, the Shangri-La Dialogue has facilitated discussions on specific issues such as maritime security in the Malacca Strait over a number of meetings, leading to a consensus over a set of common principles and the successful “Eyes in the Sky” initiative for combined maritime air patrols.
Yesterday, I hosted a Ministerial Luncheon for my colleagues who were here for the Shangri-La Dialogue. Over lunch, the Ministers discussed how multilateral cooperation in HADR could be guided by three broad principles. Firstly, the affected country has the primary responsibility to respond to disasters occurring within its territory in a prompt and effective manner; secondly, where needed, the affected country shall facilitate external assistance from other countries and international organisations in its HADR efforts to achieve the objective of prompt and effective disaster management and relief; and lastly, external assistance shall be provided with the consent of the affected country, and the HADR efforts should be under its overall control and supervision. The Ministers also discussed useful ideas on disaster relief, including the concept of having pre-positioned equipment and relief supplies for quicker response.
Besides the pan-regional groupings like the ARF or the Shangri-La Dialogue, there are sub-regional security groupings in Northeast Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia with more select memberships.
These include ASEAN, the East Asia Summit (EAS), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Like the other regional fora, these groupings must also evolve and adapt to changes in the regional security landscape.
In this aspect, ASEAN has taken several steps to strengthen the ASEAN defence sectoral and to enhance practical security cooperation through the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (or ADMM).
In the spirit of fostering an open and inclusive security framework, ASEAN has established the ADMM-Plus process to engage ASEAN’s friends and dialogue partners in the security arena.
We are currently drafting a blueprint for the ASEAN Political-Security Community, which when ready, will be proposed for adoption at the ASEAN Summit.
This blueprint will spell out greater details about the development of the ASEAN defence sectoral, and by extension, the South East Asian security architecture.
Functional groups with a more focused and niche membership for addressing specific challenges form yet another important layer of the regional security architecture.
These include the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (RECAAP), Six-Party Talks, and Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).
These more focused groupings are useful for translating dialogue more effectively into practical action and concrete solutions.
We should continue to establish such groupings where necessary and ensure their continued relevance and inclusiveness through the involvement of all parties which can make useful contributions on the issues.
To illustrate, the Malacca Straits Patrol started with the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – and is being expanded to include Thailand.
This recognises that while the primary responsibility of maritime security in the Malacca Strait lies with the littoral states, the international community and major user states also have a role to play.
Complementing the layer of multilateral fora is the web of bilateral defence ties between the Asia-Pacific countries.
The US has a set of bilateral treaties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, ROK, Thailand and Philippines, while the US, China and India have also separately signed defence agreements with a number of South East Asian countries.
Among the ASEAN countries, there are also bilateral defence ties that are long-established and close.
Bilateral defence cooperation and interactions between countries serve to strengthen mutual understanding and respect.
These three layers – broad multilateral groupings, focused regional or task oriented groupings, and bilateral relations – are all important components of the evolving regional security architecture.
Each layer serves a purpose and facilitates progress and development of the other layers, strengthening the overall security architecture and helping it to move forward.
In this regard, this year’s Shangri-la Dialogue has once again played an important role.
It has brought together all the key defence and security leaders from the wider Asia-Pacific region, as well as key partners from beyond the region.
I’m pleased to note that representatives from 27 countries, including 22 ministers, are here and contributing meaningfully to this year’s dialogue.
Looking ahead, we need to build capacities that are capable of accommodating different modes of cooperation between different configurations of countries.
No one wants to see a new divide, playing to a zero-sum outcome.
New structures for avoiding conflict and solving new problems have to be established.
Through confidence-building measures and practical cooperation, countries can build up trust and understanding with their new partners, identify and address common security challenges, and be ready to cooperate in times of crises, even in non-traditional configurations, if necessary.
The issues of energy, food and water security, if not properly handled, can easily become zero-sum flash-points for conflict between nations.
But if we can find creative ways to break out of this mould, we can maintain peace and build better lives for our peoples.
Instead of competing over water, or food or energy, we can increase our collective security by cooperating to harness alternative energy sources and increase food supply.
In 3 weeks’ time, from 23 to 27 Jun 08, there will be a Singapore International Water Week which will examine sustainable water technology to conserve water resources and multiply them through recycling and re-use.
We can also find creative and cooperative ways to increase our collective security in response to the other “360-degree security challenges” mentioned earlier.
For example, enhancing maritime security should be seen as a collective benefit – more secure sea lanes for all of us – rather than a zero-sum game where one party’s security is enhanced at the expense of another’s.
We can see that the regional security landscape is changing. We should continue to work towards an open and inclusive security architecture which can accommodate different modes of security cooperation to devise innovative strategies and implement practical cooperation to tackle the new and diverse challenges.
This is the agenda before us in the coming years, and which our discussions in the past two days have made significant contributions to.
Thank you very much.
