Dr John Chipman
Thank you very much for such a strong speech. We were interested last night to hear from the Prime Minister his ‘wish list’ for a future president, and it was equally interesting to hear now the Secretary’s benchmarks for how the stirring of a new regionalism would be compatible with international security and the interests of all powers engaged in the Asia Pacific. I am sure what the Secretary said will inspire a great deal of discussion.
Professor Simon Chesterman
Thank you Dr Chipman, and thank you Mr Secretary for your very wide-ranging remarks, and in particular the forward-looking nature, but I would like to encourage you to give us a bit of backward-looking discussion. It seems to be memoir season in Washington at the moment, and without asking you about any specific memoirs, it might be an appropriate time to think about the legacy of the Bush administration. Within the US and globally this appears almost certain to be defined through September 11 and Iraq, but I wonder how you think and how you hope the security legacy of the Bush administration will be regarded in this part of the world.
Dr Robert Gates
I actually think this will be an area where there will be a strong and positive legacy in the future. I would tell you that, having been absent from government for almost 15 years when I came to this job, two of the developments in the world that struck me as the most dramatic were the significant improvement in the US-Japanese relationship, and particularly the security relationship, and also the advances in the US-Indian relationship. It seemed to me that these have come quite a long distance, and in a very positive way. I also think that the administration has fostered a degree of collaboration with a variety of partners here in Asia that built on an already-existing strong foundation, they added to it, and they positioned the next administration in a very strong way looking to the future, as you look at this part of the world. Regardless of the controversies that attend Iraq and other policies, here in Asia the overall legacy is a pretty straightforward and very positive one.
Daniel R Fung
Secretary Gates, thank you very much for your masterly overview of the US vision for enhancing Asian Pacific security. Is there any truth to the long-standing market rumour of the proposed sale of the Kitty Hawk to India, how does that enhance the US vision for Asian security, and how does that square with US pressure on the EU not to lift the arms embargo on the PRC?
Dr Robert Gates
I expected this to come up during my visit in India, and was surprised when it did not. I am aware of no such plans.
Pierre Lellouche
Mr Secretary, thank you very much for your overview. As a European I have two direct questions to ask you, in your speech there were a number of elements that made it hard to define what exactly your role is in the future Asia. You have mentioned old elements, such as insisting on strategic access, freedom of navigation, freedom from domination of outside powers. You have mentioned a role of the US as a dialogue provider, referee, but what exactly is the strategy? Are you going to be a protector, a guarantor, or an architect of the system? There is also a preoccupation with not being excluded from the future architecture. I am sorry to ask you so directly, but I did not quite understand what the US strategy is in the area.
The second question relates to the first, the least decade, because of 9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, has seen a major shift globally in US power, in Europe the Middle East, and now Asia. As Secretary of Defence with a global view, how is it that you view the allocation of resources and assets on essentially those three areas, Europe, the Gulf and Asia. I am sorry again for being a little blunt in my questions.
Dr Robert Gates
For someone who has spent a quarter of a century testifying in front of our Congress, I found your comments quite diplomatic actually. First, I see our role in Asia as partner and collaborator, and it will take many different forms under many different circumstances. We will be a protector if that is required, in the context of our security alliances. We will be one who brings humanitarian assistance when that is required. We will partner in training and equipping as that is required. It is a very broad-based set of relationships and roles that we have out here, but we see ourselves most broadly as partners and collaborators in Asia in the 21st Century. In terms of the allocation of US military assets, the reality is that we have a very large military, because we have worldwide interests, and we will protect those worldwide interests. Therefore, we continue to maintain a strong presence in Europe, we clearly have a strong presence in the Middle East, and it is evident, particularly from a sea power point of view, a very strong presence here in Asia. I believe that future presidents will sustain an American military that can protect our interests, and our allies and friends, in all three of those regions. I must tell you I think that there is, based on 18 months of testifying in front of Congress, broad bi-partisan support in the Congress to sustain those capabilities to meet our needs. I am not sure that we are in the fortunate position, but we are in the required position that, as a global power with global interests and friends and allies around the world who look to us for help and support, to sustain those capabilities.
Barry Desker
Secretary Gates, the US has made significant gains in ensuring non-proliferation through its meetings with North Korean. However, there is today a new administration in South Korea, which is adopting a realist policy and a much more critical attitude to Pyongyang. My question is, is US policy on North Korea today aligned with South Korea?
Dr Robert Gates
Yes, very much so. We are both committed to the six party talks, and in the continuing effort to try to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons capability. I participated in the meetings when the new President of South Korea was in Washington, and there is a good alignment between the Republic of Korea and the US on this issue.
Mikhail Margelov
Mr Secretary, thank you very much for your remarks. As a European I should ask direct and specific questions, I know that, but being at the same time Asia, I would like to ask a philosophical question. How would you describe what US foreign policy is based on: ideology or pragmatism?
Dr Robert Gates
Yes. I gave a speech last fall as part of the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the founding of Jamestown. The title of the speech was: a realist looks at idealism in American foreign policy. The reality is, from the very beginning of our republic there has been a blend of hard-edged realism coupled with a desire to propagate liberty, to stand for freedom. We have tilted to one direction or another at various times in our history, the two extremes, if you will, historically were John Quincy Adams, who basically said we wish everyone well, but you are on your own, to Woodrow Wilson, who vowed to make the world safe for democracy. Throughout its history American foreign policy has contained this blend. From the standpoint of hard realism it was our first president, George Washington, who basically, if I may use a contemporary figure of speech, was willing to throw the French revolution under the bus, in order to avoid a war with Britain, and then proceeded to sign a treaty with Britain, and he was accused of selling out the principles of 1776.
By the same token, the US often in its history has supported those who sought freedom, including those in Eastern Europe and many here in Asia. I would say that you will see differences of emphasis from one president to another, but throughout most of our history, presidents have combined both their commitment to the propagation of freedom, liberty and the protection of human rights, as well as hard edged realism in terms of protecting our interests.
Professor François Heisbourg
I would also like to ask my ‘Indian’ question to you. The US and India have signed a nuclear agreement. That agreement has been caught up in Indian domestic politics, but it has not been ratified in the US either. What would be your recommendation, at this stage? To have it ratified by Congress before the end of the Bush administration? What would be your recommendation with regards to the next American administration on this agreement? I hasten to add that I ask these questions as an analyst who has some misgivings about an agreement which erodes the distinction between those who have signed the nuclear non proliferation treaty and those who have not.
Dr Robert Gates
This is one where I am not sure that I know the answer to your question. I know that we are committed to the agreement. I know that the Indian Government is committed to the agreement. However, it clearly faces domestic challenges. I believe it has been the position of the US to be patient as the Indians work through this issue. In so far as whether it would be a good idea for us to go ahead and ratify it ahead of the Indians, frankly I have not been engaged or involved in discussions about that, and I do not know what the right answer is.
Rear Admiral Pradeep Chauhan
Secretary Gates, good morning and thank you for your brilliant coverage. My question is related to the issue of inclusiveness in security constructs within a pan-Asian paradigm. Obviously, like everyone else, I am sure I was gladdened by the commitment to inclusiveness. I was also somewhat intrigued by the comment about no room being available for a separate East Asian security initiative. My question relates to the fact that, if we are going to have a pan Asian all inclusive construct, we must simply deal with numbers. Within the recently launched security initiative of the Indian Ocean, called the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), we already had to deal with over 30 countries. These were merely the littoral states. Therefore, in what form do you propose a construct which would actually be inclusive enough to include all countries of the Asia Pacific, which of course includes Asia and the Pacific Region?
Dr Robert Gates
I think there are existing forums, and I am not sure that larger numbers preclude being able to make progress on important issues. It has been an interesting experience for me to return to a NATO that no longer has 16 members, but now has 26. It does mean more speeches to listen to, and meetings are therefore longer. Personally, I am open to a variety of constructs, depending on the circumstances. In other words, if something new is needed, in terms of the Indian Ocean initiative.
There are ways in which you can orchestrate these things to make progress. I will give you an example within the framework of Afghanistan. We have 40 countries participating in Afghanistan, in the ISAF operation. A number of them, including some like the Australians who are significant participants, are not members of NATO. Yet we have found ways, for example, to take the countries that comprise regional command south, and work together in a subset that then coordinates with the larger group of nations. The fact that a number of nations are involved is not an obstacle to making progress or getting things done. It just requires a little ingenuity.
Koutaro Tamura
Thank you, Secretary, for your forward looking speech. I do not think that I am necessarily backward looking, but I have concerns. The US may use interest in this region in two ways. In one way, it is with the economy. You could take care of other parts of the world because your economy was booming until recently. However, your economy will see more turmoil. Therefore, you will have less time, less energy and less money to spend. You will have to take care of your domestic economy. The US administration might be losing the appetite to take care of other parts of the world. This is my first concern.
My second concern is about the priority. You have many parts of which you have to take care. For example, the Middle East, South America and Russia. I am not sure if you will stay, in the next government. How do you secure that you will never forget us?
Dr Robert Gates
As a former president of the United States, Gerald Ford, once said: ‘We ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.’ Taking the second part of your question first, I go back to an earlier answer. The US has the capacity to be engaged in all of these areas. We are engaged because our interests are involved in these areas. We have economic interests; we have security interests; we obviously have political interests. The US has the resources, has the intellectual capital, and has the governmental organisations to be able to deal with all of these parts of the world at the same time. That really goes to the first part of your question: ‘How does Asia know we will not lose interest?’
Partly, we will not lose interest because we are an Asian power. I referred to the fact that we are a ‘resident power’. We have been here a long time and we will continue to be here. This is not only because we have sovereign territory in the area – I mentioned the Aleutian Islands and Guam – but because we have some very long standing relationships here. People would have been surprised, perhaps, in 1945, to see the US, 60 years later, still engaged even in a larger way and a broader front in Asia than we were even at the end of the war. I frankly think that there is no one who I am aware of in the American political arena who does not attach high priority to our relationships and our role in Asia. Regardless of who is elected, regardless of whether we have a slowdown in our economy – after all, we have had slowdowns in our economy before in the last 60 years, many much more severe than this one appears to be – and it has not affected our commitments out here. Nobody should have any worries on that score.
Senator Joseph Lieberman
I would like to make three points, briefly. Firstly, in this public forum, I would like to thank Dr Gates. Anyone who knows him or listens to him, knows that he is a very rational man. Notwithstanding that, when President Bush asked him to leave the presidency of Texas A&M University, he did something very irrational by saying yes. Our nation, our allies, and the world have benefited from that decision. As I listen to you, I think of the famous words of Teddy Roosevelt about ‘speaking softly and carrying a big stick’. You speak softly and thoughtfully, but you carry the big stick of America’s military power with an honour, straightforwardness and restraint that is in America’s interests and the world’s interests. Thank you for that.
Secondly, I would like to say ‘Amen’ to what Secretary Gates has said about the breadth, depth, longevity and bipartisanship of America’s commitment to the Asian Pacific region for all the reasons he said. We are a Pacific power; we are intertwined economy in the most fundamental ways. In terms of our national purpose and our national ideals, we look with great gratitude and excitement on the spread of democracy throughout this region. I am always struck by the fact that today there are more people living in democratic countries, under democratic governments, in the Asian Pacific region than anywhere else in the world.
I understand the concern here. The fact is, in our public discussions of foreign policy, in the US, we have been focused, post 9/11, on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the general global war on terrorism. However, we are committed here as far forward as the eye can see by the geographic reality that we are a Pacific power and by the economic and even ideological realities that continue to draw us here.
Thirdly, just from within the Congress, I would like to say two things. There is one element of the American political discussion today that I think is troublesome in terms of our relations with Asia. That has more to do with international economics than it has to do with security, although obviously one relates to the other. As Dr Gates has said, the tremendous growth in prosperity here in this region is part of the reason why countries are increasingly intertwined and why the prospects for stability here are so much greater. There is, to me, a very unsettling growth of economic protectionism in the US. That is going to be one of the great and most important political debates, both in this campaign and in the years ahead within the American political system. It will obviously have an effect on our relations with this region. It is very important that it comes out right.
The final point is in response to the gentleman who asked about the nuclear agreement with India. I believe there is broad bipartisan support in Congress for the agreement. It is not universal, but it is broad. I also think that the sense of Congress at this moment is not to go forward, but to wait until, hopefully not before long, there is, within India, enough support to accept the agreement. Congress will then follow, I believe, quite quickly.
Professor Tommy Koh
Mr Secretary, you spoke so well with so much understanding and empathy for Asia. I hope it is in your karma to serve the 8th President of the United States. I apologise for asking you a rude question. Could you please try to help to explain to my Asian colleagues and me the apparent contradiction between US policy towards North Korea, which is based upon engagement and dialogue, and your policy towards Myanmar, which is based upon the failed policy of isolation and sanctions? I will be so bold as to say that it is a failed policy, given that your 50 year old policy towards Cuba has proved to be totally counterproductive.
Dr Robert Gates
First of all, I think that there is a principle here. Well, it is less a principle than it is my view as a ‘realist’. For a productive dialogue to take place, it is necessary for both parties to feel a need to engage in that dialogue. One of the reasons we are engaged with the North Koreans is that the North Koreans, under pressure, came to the table as part of the Six Party Talks. I would add that we are engaged with North Korea in the context, not simply of a bilateral dialogue, but in the framework of a multilateral discussion. As I indicated earlier, the success of that discussion really depends very much on the constructive role that China has played in that discussion.
I think that there has been little indication that Myanmar or Burma has any interest in engaging with the US. The reality is, as harsh as it may seem, many of those in this room have governments who have tried to engage or do engage with Myanmar and have had zero influence in getting them to open up and accept international assistance for a suffering population. For those who have those relationships, as best as I can tell – with the possible exception of Ban Ki moon who was able to get them to open up somewhat in allowing humanitarian assistance to flow in – governments that have engaged with Burma have had little or no influence in getting them to do the right thing by their own people. It is not entirely clear to me.
We have reached out, frankly, to Myanmar multiple times during this crisis in very direct ways, including Admiral Keating going to Rangoon. We have reached out on a number of occasions – 15 different times – to the leadership of Myanmar to get them to open up. It has not been us who have been deaf and dumb in response to the pleas of the international community, but the government in Myanmar. We have reached out; they have kept their hands in their pockets.
Ralph Cossa
My question builds upon Tommy Koh’s question. There has been a lot of speculation in the press – a lot of it somewhat irresponsible – about forced entry or forced assistance in Burma and Myanmar. I wondered if you could give us your views on what the US position is on that, and on the broader issue of responsibility to protect.
Dr Kurt M Campbell
Thank you for your service, Secretary Gates. I thought it was a terrific and very reassuring speech. I particularly liked your comments about the likelihood of continuity between this administration and the next, regardless of political party. I would like to ask you about an area that is likely to see somewhat of a break between this and the next administration, and that is on the issue of climate change. I think there is a difference between the three candidates who are running and at least the initial positions of President Bush. The incoming teams are likely to be more concerned about climate change and are more likely to try to put in place a plan to address it. Your speech talked a little bit about new security challenges; I think there is an awareness, particularly in Asia, that climate change is going to be a major security issue, not only for the US but for other countries in the region. I would like you to comment on what the roles of defence establishments are in anticipating some of the challenges that climate change is going to pose, particularly in the region.
Dr Robert Gates
Firstly, the US does not support forced assistance – we will respect the sovereignty of Myanmar. My own view is that that would be a serious mistake; it clearly has been the policy of our government and I do not expect it to change. Secondly, with regard to climate change, I confess that this is not exactly an area of my expertise, but it has been an area in which I have had an interest for some time. When I was Director of Central Intelligence, then Senator Al Gore came to me with a project that he had been working on for ten years. He wanted access to the satellite imagery archive that the CIA has maintained for some 40 years of various parts of the world because it was the only kind of record that would show change over time in actual space-based imagery. We made arrangements to clear about 60 scientists in the US and gave them access to that archive.
My first point is I think that there is a constructive role that both intelligence and defence can play in this. One of the concerns that I have that is more direct as Secretary of Defence is we are probably the largest single users of petroleum products in the world and so we have been looking at alternative fuels – the air force has just flown a couple of aircraft using synthetic fuels for the first time. We are looking at ways to recapture used petroleum products and re-refine them, and we are looking at various conservation measures. I suspect, Dr Campbell, that you are right that this issue is going to come evermore to the fore and we have an interest in progress, in no small part because every time the price of oil goes up by $1 per barrel it costs us about $130million and, frankly, my credit card limit is getting narrow on that. I think that we do have a contribution to make but I would say that it is very much in a supporting role.
Manish Tewari
Mr Secretary, first of all let me congratulate you for an excellent exposition. You gave us an overview of the policy of the next administration towards Asia. Would you also care to give us an overview of what the policy of the next administration will be towards Iraq and Afghanistan?
Professor Michael Yahuda
Many people in this part of the world regard the relationship between China and Japan as crucial to the strategic stability here and are concerned about the distrust that seems to exist between them, despite the recent improvement in their relations, and many are wary about the impact of possible rivalry in the region as a whole. I understand that earlier this year a Chinese vice foreign minister proposed to a senior American official that Washington, Tokyo and Beijing should somehow arrange to have meetings so as to increase the trust between the various parties and to contribute to a greater sense of strategic stability. However, the US side apparently did not seem particularly interested. I would very much appreciate any comments that you would care to make about that.
Dr Robert Gates
Firstly, with respect to the next administration’s policy towards Afghanistan, based on the broad bipartisan support I see in Congress, I think you will see continued American commitment to Afghanistan in partnership with our allies there in carrying forward that struggle. In fact, it would not surprise me, as the current president announced in Bucharest that it is quite likely that the next president will in fact increase the level of our commitment to Afghanistan. With respect to Iraq, everyone in the room knows how controversial Iraq has been in the US. By the same token, I think that there is broad – if often grudging – admission that there has been some significant progress in Iraq over the course of the past year and I have said that, regardless of what you think about how we got to where we are, it is terribly important not to get the end game wrong in Iraq because the consequences for the entire Middle East – and, frankly, I think for the world – are quite dire if we do.
My hope is that the situation in Iraq will continue to improve and that we will, as General Petraeus indicated in his confirmation hearings, be in a position to continue the draw downs this autumn and see a transition of mission over a period of time there. The issue is really, in my opinion, a question of pacing and how fast we do it and how fast the Iraqis can take on responsibilities – their activities in Basra and their initiatives in Sadr City and also in Mosul are encouraging in this respect. So all I can say with respect to Iraq is to express a hope that we continue to get the end game right and that we do not let our impatience cause us to make a tactical decision that has strategic consequences.
With respect to China, Japan and the US, the US has a longstanding deep security relationship and alliance with Japan and we have to remember the priority that we have to give that. By the same token, the US has every interest in an improved relationship between China and Japan and my view is that if there are ways that we can contribute to that which are consistent with our obligations to Japan and our relationship with Japan, I think that we would be willing to be helpful.
Dr Jia Qingguo
Thank you very much, Mr Secretary. In your speech, you talked about enhancing alliances. At the same time, you talked about developing a new regional security architecture that does not exclude anyone. I have two questions. Firstly, what kind of new regional security structure are we talking about? Is it one of hierarchies in which you would classify members as allies or non-allies or is it an equal regional structure with equal membership? Secondly, what kind of role do you have in mind for values? When we talk about developing a new regional security structure, there has been a great deal of reference in the past year or two to so-called value-based alliances. I am wondering what you think about this kind of concept.
Oksana Antonenko
Thank you, Mr Secretary, for your interesting presentation. I would like to ask you about a region that perhaps goes a little bit beyond Asia-Pacific – Central Asia. It is of course a region that is increasingly important from the point of view of Asian security overall being the frontline in the fight for stability in Afghanistan, and it is important for energy security. It is also very much a test case for the rise of China in a way. In Central Asia, we have unfortunately seen many negative trends emerging in the last several years and I think the legacy of the Cold War has certainly not been overcome there. The zero-sum approach to security is very much in force. We have seen the stirring of regionalism in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a collective security treaty organisation, with the presence of NATO and the US, and there is no comprehensive security framework in place. What do you see the US doing in order to promote regional cooperation there and how do you see Central Asia being included in the wider Asian security architecture?
Dr Robert Gates
Firstly, with respect to the new regional security architecture, frankly, most of the ideas relating to this have been coming out of the region and one of the purposes of my remarks was simply to lay down a marker about how we view the emergence of such an architecture. I think it is more up to those who have been articulating the value or the need for such an architecture to describe what it would look like. I was simply trying to establish through the benchmarks at the end of my speech the things that we thought such an architecture should and should not comprise of. I do not think of security architectures as necessarily being hierarchical – they depend on the issues and on the more specific circumstances that are involved. I think that the closest alliances, such as we have with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and a variety of other countries in this area, are clearly those between the societies and governments that share values. That does not preclude improving relationships and increasing engagement with those with whom we have differences in terms of values or differences even in terms of interests. My view, going back to my remarks, is that the key to all of this is inclusiveness and that all of the parties participate and do so on an equal basis.
With respect to Central Asia, this has been an interesting phenomenon for me to observe coming back into government. Clearly, there are a number of countries there that have a great deal of resources and have the opportunity to make a significant contribution, not only to improving the wellbeing of their own people but to being constructive players on the international scene. There are others that do not have those resources and face some serious challenges. I think the key here is to encourage these countries to keep their options open and to be willing to reach out and establish relationships with Europe and Asia, as they are with Russia and some of their other compatriots. It seems to me – and this is what I have said to them when I have visited a couple of these places – that their interests are best served by keeping their options open and working with a variety of parties.
François Heisbourg
Mr Secretary, thank you very much. I very much understand why Congress so often wants you to give evidence before it. You are hugely informative and engaging at the same time. We thank you for exercising your wit and your interest at this Shangri-La dialogue and we wish you well in the rest of your visit here to Singapore and to Asia-Pacific.
