Minister, thank you very much for those detailed and forensic remarks, and also for the emphasis you placed on the enduring challenge posed by private proliferation networks. It is one of the important missions of the IISS to make available to the expert community and to officials the best possible research and analysis on strategic questions. When we hear that research cited by a minister we know we are coming closer to accomplishing that mission.

 

I might also add that we are now in the process of producing another research document that looks at the proliferation of civilian nuclear reactors and how the proliferation risks of that might be correctly contained.

 

We have had an excellent set of presentations. We have just about 40 minutes to dissect them and to query the ministers on their presentations. I now invite questions from the floor.

 

Both Minister Kyuma and Minister Kim Jang-Soo talked about the importance of the six-party talks. Certainly the five members are united on their objective of denuclearised Korean peninsular; that is, North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons programme. North Korea has agreed to the same objective several times. We wonder how many times they can agree to it in the future.

 

The differences are interesting. Three of these five parties have nuclear weapons: the United States, China and Russia. Two do not: Japan and the Republic of Korea. Of the three countries that have nuclear weapons, two seem to be able to rely on deterrents to be able to deal with North Korea. They do not feel compelled to build missile defences. The United States does seem to feel that it needs defences as well as its own nuclear arsenal.

 

The two non-nuclear countries – Japan and the Republic of Korea – both rely on extended deterrents from the United States. However, one of them – Japan – feels that it also needs to build missile defences. The other – the Republic of Korea – does not.

 

Based on these interesting different approaches by the five members of the six-party talks, my question for Minister Kyuma would be: if these six-party talks are successful and North Korea in fact gives up its nuclear weapons, does Japan need a missile defence programme?

 

My question for Minister Kim Jang-Soo is the reverse. If the six-party talks are not successful, and if North Korea persists in maintaining and perhaps increasing its nuclear arsenal, does the Republic of Korea require missile defences to deal with this?

 

I want to address my questions primarily to Minister Kim Jang-Soo and Minister Kyuma, building on Denny Blair’s comments. For Minister Kim: both the US and Japan have said that patience is limited in dealing with North Korea. What, in your view, would cause the window of opportunity that you discussed this morning to close?

 

Also, more importantly, is there some common definition, in your view, among the US and the Republic of Korea and the others, as to what would constitute failure or what we should be doing next if the North Koreans failed to live up to their obligations under the September 2005 and February 2007 agreements?

 

Somewhat related, I would also note that there is at least a perception that trilateral cooperation among the US, Korea and Japan has deteriorated significantly in recent years. This has been attributed in part to Korea’s hesitancy to do anything that might ‘offend’ the North Koreans and, quite frankly, to what some perceive as deterioration in relations between Korea and Japan. I wonder if you could characterise for us your view of the current level of cooperation between Japan and Korea in general terms and, more specifically, as regards cooperation vis-á-vis North Korea. I would of course welcome Minister Kyuma’s perceptions on that same question.

 

Obviously, countries around the world will be looking at how the international community deals with North Korea. It would be very unfortunate if they were to reach the conclusion that however isolated a state was during the development phase of nuclear weapons that once they actually possessed them they would be rewarded with talks, concessions and compromise. I wonder what our three speakers feel that Iran will have learned already from the way in which we dealt with North Korea.

 

New Zealand is probably unique in this audience in having a Minister of Defence who is also Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control, and does not regard that as being in the least inconsistent. My question follows from that and it is really directed to all three members of the panel.

 

New Zealand would, I suspect, strongly share with every member here in the audience a strong commitment to non-proliferation. We are active in the PSI; we support the G8 global partnership; we have strongly opposed the North Korean attempts to test nuclear weapons; we are against Iran acquiring control over nuclear weapons. Equally, we share with others the nightmare scenario that weapons of mass destruction may well find their way into the hands of terrorist groups.

 

We also have a huge concern about the failure to make progress in the area of disarmament. We are conscious that, in 2000, the Non-Proliferation Treaty set out 13 steps and an unequivocal commitment by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons, but very little progress has been made.

 

We are conscious of the fact that the CTBT has not advanced; that we do not yet have a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. We are conscious of the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has stagnated now for decades. Just yesterday the President of Russia, President Putin, pronounced that there was a nuclear arms race underway, signalling the testing of new missile delivery systems.

 

Therefore, my question is: are we really serious about disarmament today or does it not really matter? If we are serious about disarmament – at a time when we already have 28,000 nuclear warheads – what new initiatives do we need to advance that aspect on top of what we are doing in non-proliferation?

 

General Zhang Qinsheng

During the end of the last session, the chairman hoped that I could address some of the questions about nuclear issues in this session. Regarding China’s nuclear policy, China’s nuclear policy is about self defence. Its objective is to deter other countries from using nuclear weapons against China.

 

There are five aspects to China’s nuclear policy. Firstly, China adheres to the principle that in any kind of circumstance or situation, China will never be the first one to use nuclear weapons. China makes the commitment that China unconditionally will never use nuclear weapons or threat to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear-free zone or country.

 

Thirdly, China encourages the total elimination of nuclear weapons and force. Fourthly, China’s development of nuclear weapons is limited. Fifthly, China ensures the safety and reliability of its nuclear capabilities. It is under strict control. There will not be an accident or unauthorised use.

 

Regarding the second question about nuclear policies about China’s attitude towards the joint deployment of anti-ballistic missiles by the United States and Japan. China is quite concerned about this intention of the United States and Japan. We are worried that this type of deployment will destabilise Asia and the Pacific region and that it will create uncertainties in terms of the stability and peace.

 

If Japan and the United States deploy a missile defence system that covers Taiwan we are going to oppose it very strongly. China believes that any bilateral military corporation should never target a third party or infringe the interests of a third party.

 

During the tea break, some delegates asked the delegates of the Chinese delegation about the point made by the Secretary of Defence of the United States, Mr Gates, about the report about China’s military capabilities published by the Department of Defence of the United States in May. On May 25^th, the Defence Department of the United States published a report about China’s military capabilities. In response to that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Ministry of Defence, and China’s researchers and senior officials all expressed their concerns about such a report against China.

 

Regarding this report, I have the four following points to make. Firstly, this report is unreliable. It is not to be believed. Secondly, this report is a product of the Cold War mindset. Thirdly, this report creates the so-called ‘China threat’ theory in the international community. Fourthly, this report is detrimental to the current development of the relationship between China and the United States, and the relationship between the militaries of the two countries.

 

I will continue ploughing of the furrow of the contrast among the parties to the six-party talks. I want to direct a question to the Japanese Defence Minister. It was remarkable that Secretary Gates emphasised so heavily the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq, and discussed North Korea only in passing and in a somewhat reassuring manner. However, you seem to present North Korea as a very direct and urgent regional threat.

 

Are you concerned that there is a divergence of views developing about the nature of the threat that North Korea presents between Washington and Tokyo?

 

My question is to Dr Brendan Nelson. Non-proliferation was a concern which was a common thread running through the representations of all the three ministers and I think it is probably shared by everyone around this room, but you repeatedly referred to the AQ Khan network and the nuclear supermarket that he had put in place. With the manner in which the proliferators have been likely let off the hook and the whole issue has been allowed to be swept under the carpet, do you not think it sends a signal to other people who want to proliferate that it is really worth the cost and the risk? Thank you.

 

I am going to begin and then end, because my question was actually posed by Minister Gough. I would only add that I think it would be very interesting to hear some reflections on the disarmament part of the bargain from representatives of three countries who are formally allied with the United States but are non-nuclear weapon states.

 

Because I am sitting behind some taller people, I raised my hand very fast but I was almost ignored. I have two questions. The first is to Minister Kyuma. You mentioned that the defence policy for Japan is for peace and stability. That is very good, but in the past two decades or so we have noticed some notable developments in the military policy or strategy of Japan. Notably, there was an amendment to the Japanese constitution, which is regarded as a peace constitution, and in the guiding strategy and operation of the Japanese army.

 

There has also been an enlargement of the area with which Japanese security is concerned. Last year, when North Korea held their nuclear test, I also heard noise from Japan that there was a possibility that Japan would have nuclear weapons. My first question is whether Japan is ready to develop nuclear weapons, with or without the success of the six-party talks on North Korea. If the six-party talks fail, perhaps you would have a good excuse to develop nuclear weapons. My question is whether you have a long-term policy or strategy to go nuclear. That is my first question.

 

The second question should have been addressed to the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Gates, but I did not have a chance. It is again about cooperation based on shared values or ideology. We have heard a lot about that recently, the so-called ‘alliance of democracy’, or ‘democratic concert’, or ‘circle of freedom and prosperity’ and so on.

 

There are a number of these ideas, which all share the characteristic in that they are based on so-called democracy, shared values or judgement. In that case, is there a possibility that countries of the world will be divided into two separate categories? Would it be possible that there were would be new blocs opposing each other? Would that be beneficial to the defence of stability and peace? This question can be answered by any of you. Thank you very much.

 

Thank you very much. I think I should give time to the three ministers to respond to the various questions posed, many of which focused on the different perspectives and priorities of Korea and Japan towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and the pace and patience that they were thinking of adopting towards the resolution of that issue. There were also questions about whether Japan would give up its missile defence programme if there was enduring satisfaction in those six-party talks or whether, by contrast, South Korea would consider adopting a missile defence programme if they became more pessimistic about their outcome.

 

We had two very powerful presentations about the importance of keeping the broader disarmament agenda at the forefront of our considerations. Many were also animated by Brendan Nelson’s reference to private proliferation networks and one challenged whether there was sufficient deterrence in the system against private proliferation networks, given the difficulty in completely punishing those who have been allegedly involved in them.

 

Could I please invite the ministers to address these questions in the same order in which they spoke?

 

I think it is impossible, but in each of the countries I think there are some rational decisions made. There will not be any rash actions taken. However, in the case of North Korea, it is a totalitarian country and so I think it is important that we deter the development of nuclear weapons in that sort of situation. Fortunately, we are able to participate in the six-party talks. We have seen much effort expended by North America and by China. We are looking at economic sanctions and so on in order to ask and demand that North Korea abandons its nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, Japan is unable to carry out these matters alone and so we are interested in international developments.

 

In addition, in relation to different countries, I do not feel there are significant threats as such. However, if there is a spread of nuclear problems and if this spreads to terrorism, then it is very difficult to stop. Even if a small amount is spread to terrorism, it becomes a very large threat. Therefore, we need to use something like the MD to protect ourselves. If terrorists have weapons and we do not have any countermeasures, then we will be in trouble. I think that nuclear deterrence between states does work, but unless we have some sort of countermeasure for terrorist groups, then we are in trouble. That is why we feel that we need to pursue missile defence programmes. With regard to content[?], we will be working to further suppress nuclear proliferation as well.

 

Of course there are other concerns with regard to our constitution, but we have not made any amendments for 60 years. It may be time that we do so. However, even if we are to amend our constitution, the main policy of pacifism is going to continue. This is something that all Japanese people support and we are going to continue on with this mission. Even if the constitution is amended, I hope we can ask you to pay attention to that aspect.

With regard to security issues, I think there are very different concerns with regard to our policies. Our policy is exclusively one of self-defence. With regard to overseas operations, we have to look at the extent to which we are involved. We cannot just go overseas and say, ‘Help’. Of course, some are of the opinion that we should be able to do certain activities. There are discussions, which will continue into the future, about using military force while we are overseas. There are very strict regulations against that and this is a principle that we will uphold in the future as well. Our basic stance will not change. Up to now, we have been suppressing all of this 120%, but we may reduce this to 100%. If our neighbours are attacked, then of course some people would say it is strange for us to just watch and stay where we are. There are many discussions and controversies about this. We need to continue on with these discussions, but this does not mean that our posture or our position has changed at all.

 

[In Korean]

Irrespective of whether the six-party talks succeed or fail, Korea will continue its efforts.

 

As for the second question, I believe the second question was concerned with our patience. People talked about our cooperative relationship with Japan. In the process, people talked about what would be the window of opportunity or the limitations for the Korean government. I have already said that Korea needs to have patience and other countries have said that there are limitations to patience. There have been some imbalances in that regard. What are the limitations of that patience? No country has clearly stated a position with regard to the limits of that patience, but I think that is a decision to be made in the political process or by the pride of a nation’s people. I think that might be the determining issue.

 

I think the window of opportunity needs to be continued. Given that we had consensus and good organisation in the six-party talks, I think we need to utilise the window of opportunity. Unless we do that, the Korean Peninsula will [not continue in our prosperity?].

 

You talked about our cooperative relationship with Japan in terms of the six-party talks. Japan has said that they have a priority in terms of the abduction of Japanese nationals. From the Korean perspective, we agree with the Japanese position. We agree that the abduction issue needs to be resolved. Japan should actively participate in the six-party talks; that is our expectation.

 

There are no tensions in the relationship between Korea and Japan. However, in the past, in the historical context, there have been conflicts. Because that historical conflict has not been absolutely resolved as yet, Korea and Japan must understand each other and make concessions where necessary. On that basis, we need to work together. [This is not about free democracy or the free market, because we are maintaining satisfactory relations in that regard?]. We also have practical cooperation on a military basis. We have good working relations in that respect.

 

Those would be my comments.

 

Thank you very much, John. First of all, Liam Fox raised an interesting point about Iran observing the outcome or otherwise of the six-party talks on North Korea. Whilst they are similar problems, they are also different and occur in a different context. Personally, I would doubt that Iran could or should or indeed can take any comfort or otherwise from progress that may be made in the context of the six-party talks. Nonetheless, the threats in terms of non-compliance are different. In relation to Iran, it is about ensuring full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency for nuclear fuel to be used for peaceful purposes. I think we all know what the issues are that are currently not allowing us to progress that.

 

Phil Gough, who is a great friend of mind – we love New Zealand, they love us – raises a very good question about disarmament of the major powers. Would I sleep more soundly at night if we had 20,000 nuclear warheads out there instead of 28,000? Yes, I would. However, if I thought for a moment that the major powers were distracted from dealing with what is essentially a global insurgency we are facing at the moment through the Middle East, Europe, North Africa, and Central and South Asia, in the form of terrorism and the possibility of these people acquiring, in a real sense, precursors or indeed fully developed WMD, then I would be somewhat concerned. Australia joins with New Zealand – and I am sure everybody here – to see that further progress is made in terms of reducing stockpiles. Whilst we would like to see that happen, we certainly would not like to see it be at the expense of tightening up the gaps which still exist in our non-proliferation community and the very real threats that presents to all of us.

 

Mr Tewari asks whether proliferators are sent the wrong signal, to use his own expression, if they are ‘let off the hook’. In other words, the penalties that are applied to those who have been so far detected and brought to justice – and some would question the latter – might in some way be inadequate to discourage others. Whilst it is easy for someone like myself and countries like ours to express views about the punishment that is meted out to these people, if we were to do so I think we would actually be undermining what this is really all about. We have different cultures; we have different legal systems; we have different ways of seeing justice is done in each of our countries. The key thing from our point of view is that all of us, as I said in my remarks, are absolutely focused on the importance of preventing proliferation; in particular, interdiction, disruption and prevention of the networks such as AQ Khan. In the end, so long as the people involved in that are no longer able to continue with that activity, how they are contained is ultimately a matter for the jurisdictions within which those individuals would fall.

 

From a personal point of view, if we lived in a world where every nation state was working to its maximum capacity in terms of its policing, intelligence, military, diplomacy, secure financial networks and working with one another in an interlocking way to prevent proliferation and the transfer through these illegal networks, then I think that would be a much more fruitful way for us to push it, rather than seeking to see harsher punishment meted out. From Australia’s point of view, anyone engaging in supporting or giving encouragement in any way, shape or form to a terrorist activity should receive significant punishment, but we would be undermining the importance of a PSI, for example, if we started lecturing other nations about how they deal with individuals. Thanks.

 

Thank you very much indeed. We have had an absolutely splendid morning of formal statements and spirited dialogue. I thank the three ministers who have spoken in this final morning plenary, Minister Kyuma, Minister Kim and Minister Nelson, for their prepared remarks and for the candour of their response to questions. I would also like to thank all of the delegates for your participation in this morning’s meeting. Thank you very much indeed.