"The North Korean Nuclear Issue: Challenges and Opportunities"
* Speech delivered by H.E. Kim, Jang Soo, Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, at the 6th IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-La Dialogue) on June 2, 2007
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin by thanking Dr. John Chipman, Director General of IISS, and the government of the Republic of Singapore for providing us with this invaluable forum of discussion.
Today, I would like to address you on the challenges and opportunities raised by the North Korean nuclear issue; one of the most pressing security matters for the international community, and especially for Northeast Asia.
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent trend of globalization have increased exchange across national borders and have intensified mutual dependence between them. These changes necessitate a peaceful and cooperative order in Northeast Asia. The North Korean nuclear issue is an aberration of the flow of the times, representing a serious challenge to the peace of Northeast Asia and the world.
In my address, I would like to discuss how the international community can come together to overcome the challenge of the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, I would like to offer you my thoughts on how we can convert this challenge into an opportunity to establish a new security arrangement in the region.
North Korea’s nuclear program disrupts the military balance of the Korean peninsula, increases the possibility of a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia, and poses a serious challenge to the international community’s WMD non-proliferation efforts. UN Security Council Resolution seventeen eighteen, adopted unanimously in the immediate aftermath of last year’s North Korean nuclear test, reinforced the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue is a matter of international security; untenable and requiring urgent resolution.
In the midst of these developments, the February 13th agreement of this year’s six-party talks spelt out the initial actions to implementing two thousand and five’s "September 19 joint statement." As you will recall, the September 19 joint statement laid out a blueprint for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The February 13th agreement raises the possibility of fundamentally lifting the shadow of tension and danger the North Korean nuclear issue casts on the Korean peninsula. Despite complications and difficulties along the way, the six-party talks are opening a window of opportunity to settle the North Korean nuclear issue and to usher in a new order of peace and security in the region.
Agreements reached through the six-party talks process can be distinguished from the nature of previous agreements by virtue of two innovations to the talks: one, ‘reaching agreements through the deliberations of a multilateral cooperative body,’ and two, the adoption of a ‘comprehensive approach’ to the talks.
If I may elaborate on the first innovation, the six-party talks are composed of all affected parties to the North Korean nuclear issue and operate as a framework for multilateral consultation and international cooperation.
The six-party talks process is flexible enough to allow bilateral consultation within a larger multilateral framework, while also providing room for mediation and compromise between the parties to the talks. Moreover, because agreements at the six-party talks are reached under the consensus of all parties, their implementations have a certain binding power. Through its capacity to promote international cooperation, the six-party talks stand as the only consultative body capable of conceiving and realizing a workable and fundamental solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.
As to the second innovation, the approach of the six-party talks can be characterized as comprehensive because they encompass a variety of political, economic, and security discussions in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.
The North Korean nuclear issue is complicated by several factors including North Korea’s perception of its own security and the environment for sustaining its regime. The foreign strategies of regional players with a stake in the nuclear issue as well as their policies towards the Korean peninsula are other factors. Because multiple factors are in play, the efficacy of narrow-ranging solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue is limited. What is therefore required is a comprehensive approach; an approach that deals with the nuclear issue in conjunction with political, economic, and security-related topics pertaining to the Korean peninsula.
Along these lines, the approach of the February 13th agreement qualifies as having been comprehensive because in addition to seeking a new order of peace and security in the region through dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, it dealt with others as well. These other issues include the normalization of relations between the US and North Korea, and between Japan and North Korea, as well as the settlement of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The comprehensive approach of the February 13th agreement is what gives it significant meaning.
The effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula through the six-party talks is in effect an effort to create an opportunity; an opportunity for realizing a future, stable security order in Northeast Asia. However, windows of opportunity leading to futures of hope and promise tend to be fragile.
That is why it is so important to stably manage the process of realizing the future goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula. To that end, I believe there are three important points to remember.
First, the six-party talks should be, in no uncertain terms, firm and uncompromising on the principle and objective of solving North Korea’s past, present, and future nuclear ambitions and the products thereof.
Despite promising to abandon its nuclear programs through the 1994 Geneva "Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea," North Korea reneged on its promise in subterfuge. This broken promise culminated in last year’s underground nuclear test. If we were to approach the North Korean nuclear issue as a stitch repair exercise limited to mere non-proliferation efforts without seeking a fundamental solution, we would be guilty of repeating the errors of history.
It follows that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through the complete eradication of North Korea’s past, present, and future nuclear programs and their byproducts should be the principle and objective under which the six-party talks operate.
Concessionary political deal-making or compromise, in any way allowing North Korea to possess nuclear weapons contravening this principle and objective should not be allowed to pass. This view is shared by North Korea’s counterparts at the six-party talks.
Second, the process of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula will only succeed when all parties to the talks adopt a patient and mutually cooperative posture.
Despite the sufficient presence of will and commitment by the interested parties, progress on the February 13th Agreement is proving laborious because of technical difficulties related to the Banco Delta Asia issue. However, the inordinate amount of time and effort spent on solving this snag offers many suggestive points. One prominent point is that there will be many unforeseen difficulties along the road to fully eradicating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs. Another is that navigating these obstacles will require a great deal of patience, cooperation, and coordination between the parties to the talks.
Therefore, the process of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula will move forward stably when all parties to the talks embrace a patient and cooperative posture in managing the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, the momentum from the six-party talks must be sustained.
Third, it is critical to ensure that anxieties over security in what is already an uncertain and fluid denuclearization process do not occur.
What we should always keep in mind in seeking a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is the fact that today’s peace and security cannot be sacrificed for tomorrow’s, which are by no means guaranteed. In other words, we must make sure that peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region are not negatively affected, and that no security crisis is allowed to befall the Korean peninsula in the process of dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.
In adherence to this line of thinking, the Republic of Korea armed forces actively support the Korean government’s policy of endeavoring a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, all the while maintaining its deterrence capability and crisis management posture vis-à-vis the North Korean nuclear threat.
Put differently, the Korean armed forces retain an autonomous conventional deterrence posture against North Korea, coupled with a nuclear deterrence capability afforded by the US nuclear umbrella. Moreover, the Korean armed forces maintain a crisis management posture in preparation for an unanticipated deterioration of the situation on the peninsula.
In this way, it is important to remember that in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, deterring today’s security threats and mitigating those of tomorrow require the careful management of the North Korean nuclear weapons and programs liquidation process.
Under the firm principle that North Korean nuclear weapons and programs cannot be sanctioned, the Korean government is taking an active role in the six-party talks to find a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.
Coupled with these diplomatic efforts, the Korean government is strategically conducting inter-Korean dialogue to run parallel with the six-party talks. These talks are intended to allow the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the advancement of North-South relations to mutually facilitate each other. By taking full consideration of any progress made on the North Korean nuclear issue, the Korean government will manage its relations with North Korea flexibly.
However, given a long previous history of existing as a unitary nation, it is, to a certain extent, unavoidable that the Republic of Korea should provide a minimum amount of humanitarian aid to the North in light of its economic depravity and the consequent suffering of its people. For example, North Korea’s chronic food shortage is so severe as to stunt the growth and development of its teenagers. As a result, North Korean teenagers are on average 20 centimeters shorter and 10 kilograms lighter than their peers in the South. The fact is, providing humanitarian aid to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean people is an endeavor shared by Korea, the United States, Japan, and other countries in the world.
Having said that, I would like to state that Korea’s efforts to enhance inter-Korean relations and the humanitarian aid it provides to North Korea remain flexible; flexible under the larger framework of resolving the North Korean nuclear threat and establishing peace on the Korean peninsula.
As we have discussed so far, the six-party talks seek a complete solution to an issue that threatens the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the world. Cooperation between regional players and the joint efforts they make through the six-party talks provide an opportunity to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and to open a new chapter of reconciliation and collaboration in Northeast Asia.
The February 13th agreement opted for a comprehensive approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and to seeking a new, peaceful security order in the region. In other words, through working towards the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, while concurrently pursuing a new peace and security structure in Northeast Asia, the February 13th agreement aspires to herald in a new era of regional peace and cooperation, consigning past discord and dispute to the garbage heap of history.
Moreover, the February 13th agreement also states that directly affected parties would come together to discuss a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula through a separate forum. If realized, such a forum would increase the prospects of true peace finally settling on the Korean peninsula after a post-Korean War armistice that is a harbinger for neither peace nor war.
This kind of political and diplomatic approach combined with economic aid to North Korea leverages the North to systemize reform and to adopt a more open posture. This is in turn hastens North Korea’s transformation as a responsible member of the international community. Such a change for North Korea would represent a significant step forward along the road to establishing peace and order in Northeast Asia, and to advancing the cause of world peace.
In this manner, the six-party talks provide a window of opportunity leading to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation body in Northeast Asia, and to the settlement of a permanent peace regime between the two Koreas.
I hope the parties to the six-party talks and the international community at large will see the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a window of opportunity beyond which a future of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and a peaceful and cooperative security order in the Asia Pacific region awaits.
Thank you.
