We now have just shy of 20 minutes for questions, and I already have four or five people on my list, and I will endeavour to do my best to include those who have just now lifted their plates, but I might have to carry over a few to the next session. I shall do my best.

 

I think to increase our efficiency, Minister Antony and General Zhang, I might invite four or five people to ask some questions and make some comments first, and then bring it back to the panel to reply as they each judge fit to those questions that they felt were addressed to them.

 

Thank you, John, and thank you General Zhang. I think it's very important that you are at this conference, and I applaud you and your colleagues for attending. It has made an important contribution to this dialogue.

 

We have, and you, discussed the issue and importance of transparency - transparency being important in order to determine one's capabilities, and hopefully one's intentions. But as every military person in this room would say, capabilities are really important because intentions can change rather quickly. So the need for transparency becomes imperative on two counts.

 

Secondly, there is a need for communication. That is why we have the Shangri-La dialogue, in order to share ideas and thoughts and ways in which we can proceed peacefully.

 

And in your final point, number three, you talked about strengthening information sharing, early warning sharing, enhancing cooperation, academic exchanges, joint training and exercises, and I was wondering if you would recommend, and whether you would support, establishing a direct hotline between the Chinese military and the Department of Defence and the United States - whether that level of communication would be important in order to avoid either mistakes or miscalculations about one's intentions or activities.

 

Thank you, and next from David Shambaugh. David, if you could just raise your name plaque so the camera can capture you, and then go ahead.

David Shambaugh

Thank you, John, and let me also join in welcoming General Zhang and the PLA delegation to this dialogue. I think it's a very important indicator of China's participation in regional security architecture.

 

I have two questions for General Zhang. The first concerns the transparency issue which has already arisen quite a lot, and I appreciate your comments and responses to Secretary Gates concerning Chinese transparency.

 

I would like to ask you know whether the PLA has any concerns about American military transparency and intentions and footprint and deployments around China.

 

And my second question has to do with China's contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations in recent years, which I think have also increased, and are a very important indicator of China's contributions to global governance. There are, I believe, something like 1600 Chinese PKL forces deployed in about 20 countries around the world today.

 

My question is: what have the lessons been, and the conclusions drawn, by China from this increased engagement in PKL operations, most of which have been in the area of engineering corps, logistics, military medicine, and people's armed police.

 

Will we see contributions out in addition to those areas, in another, shall we say, more uniformed contributions to such operations in the future. Thank you.

 

Thank you very much, and the next from Charles Grant of the Centre For European Reform. Charles, thank you very much.

Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform

I have a question for General Zhang about Chinese views on America's deployment of defences against ballistic missiles. The Russians are making a lot of noise and complaining very much about American systems being deployed in Europe, although evidently those systems are not any real threat to Russia's strategic forces. However, some of the systems that America is deploying, or was thinking about deploying, could potentially be a problem for China's strategic forces. Is China really indifferent to the missile defence systems that America may deploy, or are they rather critical of the deployment of those systems?

 

Thank you very much; and the next, Francois Godemont. Francois, if you could raise your name plaque, thank you very much. Could you do it one more time?

 

Francois Godemont

My two questions go to General Zhang. The first one is on the relevant unit for security dialogue in your region. You have mentioned the Asia Pacific as a whole, but you have also given examples which relates mostly to Asia, with Asian participants.

 

What do you think in the future should be that unit of dialogue? Should it incorporate all big countries, and participants into the region, or should it be more Asian in characteristic?

 

And my second question is also, like my neighbour, related to peacekeeping, but more narrowly. What lessons do you draw from your participation in peacekeeping for UN reform, to make the UN more effective, given the fact that you do not want to engage into unilateral conflicts. Thank you.

 

Thank you, and the next question from Mark Fitzpatrick.

 

Mark Fitzpatrick

Thank you. Continuing the theme of transparency from some of the earlier questioners, I wonder if I could ask about the policies on nuclear weapons of the two countries.

 

India's nuclear weapons development has usually been characterised as a response to a perceived Chinese threat. Given Minister Antony's positive description of the significant improvement in Indo-Chinese relations, can we envision a more transparent enunciation of India's minimum credible deterrence policy?

 

The current negotiations between India and the United States on the details of a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement suggest that India would like to keep open the option of future nuclear weapons testing, and to keep open the option of reprocessing plutonium for weapons purposes from the uranium obtained under such a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. I wonder if these concerns are exaggerated.

 

And for General Zhang, the other four recognised nuclear weapons states have an announced policy of no further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It is understood that China has also stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but not as a stated policy. Can we look forward to more transparency in this regard?

 

And then, finally at least for this round, and we may not have another round, but Barry Desker.

 

Barry Desker

Thank you, John. I would like to thank General Zhang for his excellent statement of the principles of Chinese defence policy.

 

Given that there is a lack of a demarcation of maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, with six claimant States or entities, and this creates a risk of misperception and mis-judgment, and since we have also had good progress on issues other than territorial claims, such as joint development, would China now be agreeable to a dialogue on territorial claims which could lead, for example, eventually, to adjudication by the International Court of Justice?

 

Barry, thank you very much. Well, we have a very large menu of questions. I think I should like first to tender to Minister Antony to answer the one specific question asked of him about the doctrine relating to India's minimal credible deterrent, and if you, Mr Antony, could answer that question, and then I will turn over to General Zhang to answer the five or six questions specifically addressed to him.

 

Minister Antony

First of all, I would like to tackle the (inaudible) that our nuclear policy or any other military policy is against any country, or a country specific, our policies we want to be friendly with our rivals, and also we want to be friendly with all the nations, so there is no question of any country centric military policy as far as India is concerned.

And actually what has happened in the past, or the last few years, our relations with China is growing considerably, and I said earlier we will try to settle our issues through negotiations for that as the first step we have started a lot of conference building measures.

 

With regard to the agreement on civil nuclear energy with the United States, under agreement reached by our Prime Minister with President Bush, we think it is a matter of breakthrough because of the Cold War prevalence even though we are the two larger democracies, our relations with the US is not that vital to that extent, but over the last few years, our relation with the US is improving remarkably, and one of the major milestone is the agreement on civil nuclear energy cooperation.

 

But regarding this testing, even before this civil nuclear eneFrgy agreement, India's (inaudible) and we have committed in the (inaudible) of forums also. We believe in a nuclear free world. For that we have committed a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing. It is a (inaudible) that we are already committed.

 

And with regard to the reprocessing, at this stage I do not want to go into the details, because our negotiation with the US is in a crucial stage. Even yesterday there was serious discussion with the representative of the United States. So at this stage I do not want to go into details, but I am sure that we will be able to form an amicable solution to the remaining issues also; and our disagreement will help us to find a longstanding solution to a longstanding energy security issue.

 

Thank you, sir. General Zhang, you were asked many questions. I think key amongst them was whether the PLA would support the establishment of a direct hotline with the Pentagon; whether you had concerns about US military transparency; what your evolving approach would be to peacekeeping operations - whether China was more concerned about potential deployment of ballistic missile defence capacities in Europe, given that they might be interpreted as being able to constrain your strategic rocket forces effectively; what your approach was to fissile material cut-off, and whether you would feel comfortable in having an international arrangement to resolve the remaining territorial duties in the region.

 

You have four or five minutes to address those challenging issues.

 

General Zhang

The delegates of this forum asked many questions to the Chinese delegation. You have not asked so many questions for me to answer.

 

Regarding the questions that have been posed to me, I would like to, first, address the question posed by the former Secretary of Defence of the United States, regarding military transparency and the establishment of a hotline between the Departments of Defence of the two countries.

 

Regarding military transparency - in the spring of last year, I actually met a gentleman from the United States headed by Mr Roderman, who came to China for the eighth round of consultation. On that occasion I made it clear how China understood the concept of transparency.

 

China believes transparency, first, is about strategic intents - whether a country has a clear strategic intent. I think China has a very clear strategic intent. The core of 10 national defence policy is about self-defence on the Chinese territory to deter aggression and evasion. We practice a policy of active defence, but we never initiate aggression or envision.

 

China does not have any military bases overseas. We are not prepared or are going to invade any other country or region, so regarding China's strategic intents, you can find it in China's constitution, which is about defending the national sovereignty, and a territorial interpret of China to protect the Chinese people.

This is such a clear strategic intent. I think everybody here, we are all senior officials and officers. You are senior researchers who have been studying strategical matters for so long, so it is not difficult for you to understand the importance of strategic intent regarding transparency.

 

Secondly, regarding the development of China's defence capabilities - the international community has this kind of opinion that China's military capabilities go beyond what China needs. They should make the right judgment regarding the development of China's military capabilities.

 

To do that there are three elements to consider. First, China is a large country; China's borderline totals 40,000 kilometres, China's total territory is 9.6 million square kilometres, and China has a population of 1.3 billion people.

 

In response to this kind of size, China should have a proportionate military capability, and China also has another problem which is the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan authorities still challenge the integrity of China. Some people in Taiwan are still doing things to - about secessionism, so China's military must be prepared to cope with this kind of threat, and if anything happens, China's military must be able to respond.

 

China will never allow Taiwan to be separated from the Chinese territory. Taiwan is a core interest of China. Regarding the Taiwan issue, China will try everything, including political diplomatic, economic and even military forces to defend the territorial integrity of China to present Taiwan's secessionism.

 

And, thirdly, in the 21st century the Chinese society, and the Chinese economy, are now at a new stage. We face traditional challenges and threats as well new non-traditional challenges, including extremism, terrorism, and secessionism; and there are still some factors of uncertainty facing China. That is why China needs to develop its military capabilities to such a degree so ensure China's military intent is achieved.

 

And thirdly, about the military budget of China - in 2007 China's military budget has increased by 17.8 per cent. This increased amount was US$44.9 billion. This US$44.9 billion was mainly used in three aspects. First is to improve the salaries of our man and women in uniform, and to guarantee a good living standards of the retired military man, and this accounts for US$20 billion of the total.

 

And second aspect is on 1 August 2.3 million army man will change their uniforms, and the expense will be allotted from the increased budget; and, third, we will also build some more military schools. Currently there are 67 military schools. If US$100 million for each of them, that means US$70 billion, and we need also to allocate the expenditures for improving the military equipment. That is why we have increased about US $50 billion of new budget.

 

General, would you like to answer the question about ballistic missile defence?

 

General Zhang

Now, I am going to talk about the hotlines between the Department of Defence and the male relations between China and the US.

 

The hotlines between China and US has been under discussion for several years. Last year was a turning point. When our president visited the US, he met with Mr Bush and Mr Rumsfeld and Ms Rice, and they talked about the issue of establishing the hotlines between the two countries.

 

In April this year the US sent a delegation to China to have a technological review about the possibility of establishing this hotline. Currently we have cleared all the possibility - all the technological difficulties. We are prepared that in September this year during the 9th SANO US defence talks, we are going to settle this issue down. That means in September this year I will lead a delegation to the US and meet with the US military officials for the ninth time, and at that time we will finalise the establishment of the hotline. I am not sure if I have provided a satisfactory answer.

 

The third question is about China's contribution to peacekeeping. China is peace-lover, and Chinese people also love peace very much. We are in favour of road for peaceful development, and one more important element is to maintain the international peace and stability all along, as a prominent members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

 

As for the issues relevant to the regional peace and stability - we have great responsibilities. In recent years we have been very active in peacekeeping operations. This shows our support to the international community, and also China's commitment to maintaining the world peace.

 

Of course, we have already accumulated experiences in participating the peacekeeping operations. We have also learned our lessons and in this process we think we need to stick to our own principles.

Our principles include: first, we have always valued and focussed on the precondition of meeting the spirit set by the UN, or embodied in the UN charter.

 

Second, we need to strengthen the guidance of the Security Council on peacekeeping operations. We need to follow the orders of the instructions of the Security Council of the United Nations.

 

And, thirdly, China emphasises that we should not have peacekeeping operations in regions that are not qualified, or do not have proper conditions for that; and, fourthly, we think that there should be no double standards in terms of peacekeeping operations.

 

And the fifth principle is that we believe peacekeeping is a very important means, but it is not an only means. We are more focused on how to remove the root causes of conflicts or crisis and, therefore, provide a comprehensive solution to the conflicts.

 

At this moment China's military has 1600 soldiers performing peacekeeping duties overseas. Starting from February of this year, of 2007, we sent our very first group of soldiers to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. By far, we have completed 17 peacekeeping missions. China has sent a total of 7200 peacekeeping soldiers.

 

Some people asked a question about Chinese participation in peacekeeping operations. They said China only sends to participate in engineering and medical and policing responsibilities. Actually, it is not the design of China. Actually, that is what the United Nations wants.

 

For example, the United Nations last year, after the break out of the Israel/Lebanon conflict, the United Nations asked China to participate in peacekeeping in this region. China sends 1,000 armoured forces to this region.

 

The United Nations was grateful for this arrangement in the very beginning, but later it changed its mind. It hoped that China would send more engineering and medical staff to participate in this conflict region.

 

China has not sent armed forces to participate in peacekeeping operations with the United Nations. Actually, China has a good deal to contribute in this area. China has established a centre of peacekeeping in China and the centre will be completed by July of this year, and going to invite officers in countries that are very experienced in peacekeeping, especially in military affairs, to go to the centre to talk about their experiences to help us train our staff.

 

However, China does have many experiences in terms of performing engineering and medical and policing activities as part of the peacekeeping missions.  

 

General Zhang, I want to thank you very much for addressing those questions.

 

There are two or three left. They happen to be very much concentrated on the nuclear issue, and as it happens, in the next session we will be looking at the problems of nuclear proliferation and the like, and I would very much like to give you the opportunity from the floor of the next session, if you feel willing to answer the questions on ballistic missile defence, and the fissile material cut off treaty.

 

I do not want to bring this session to a close, given how much interest there is in it, but I know the ministers have scheduled bilaterals now, and they need at least 30 minutes to conduct their important private diplomacy, so with your permission, I would like, General Zhang, to thank you very much for your presentation, and to Minister Antony, for yours, and I hope the rest of the participants in this Shangri-La dialogue will do the same. Thank you very much.