[Transcripted from remarks]

 

I would like to express my gratitude on behalf of the Indonesian delegation to the staff of IISS Asia and to the Government of Singapore for this opportunity to present Indonesia’s views on this particular topic at this very important occasion. 

 

I will speak in broad general strategic terms about the role of maritime security in the regions covering Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and their links to the Gulf region in the Middle East.  I think it is important to emphasise - as have been observed by many speakers yesterday - that the Straits of Malacca is an extremely important trading and naval transit area in the region and for the world economy at large. 

 

It covers 40% of the 95% of sea borne trade.  People often do not realise that in this globalised world, despite tremendous advances in air transportation and cargo, 95% of world trade is still conducted through the sea.  The straits of Malacca account for about 40% of that 95% of global sea-borne trade.

 

The Malacca Straits, therefore, is very important for Indonesia, very important for the countries in the region and very important for the stability of global economy, which I will explain in a moment.

 

The United States remains the dominant regional military power throughout the Pacific.  It has been so for the past 70 years.  The difference now is that we see the rise of Japan and China, two world economies, Japan with a GDP of 4.5 trillion dollars, and China with 2 trillion dollars. The Republic of   Korea is more than 1 trillion dollars, India is approaching 1.2 trillion dollars. 

 

The whole of ASEAN - if I may speak for the ten member states of ASEAN - accounts for less than 650 billion dollars.  It is very important, therefore, that these economic dimensions be linked to   regional and maritime security.   Northeast Asia and South-East Asia are linked by trade, investment, finance and security interdependence. 

 

This is why  we in South-East Asia, especially the littoral states of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have direct interest in  safeguarding the Straits of Malacca, not only for the economies of South-East Asia, but because  of their importance of energy supplies to the countries in Northeast Asia.  The power houses of Japan, China and Republic of Korea underscores the importance of maritime security. 

 

The importance of Japan, China and the Republic of Korea to the United States is simply because these three economic power-houses currently underwriting  United States trade and financial deficits to the tune of 41% of America’s trade and current account deficits.  It bears into the calculation about “burden sharing” of financing US troop and equipment presence in these three countries: Japan, South Korea and parts of South-East Asia, more specifically in Thailand and here in Singapore. 

 

The United States remains the dominant security provider in terms of  strategic military power because the US Pacific Command has  the largest number of ships, planes and missiles that provide the strategic  environment within which trade linking   Northeast Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle East  is made secure. In other words, the United States “secures the waters” that underpins intra-regional trade, investment and economic growth.

 

With the rise of Japan and China as economic power houses, there is a now need to recognise that these two major countries will also want to co-determine the terms and conditions of Western Pacific security, including maritime security.   Enhancing the naval capabilities of both China and Japan within Northeast Asia and across to South-East Asia are major concerns of the nexus  between  the sea lines of communication and their links with energy security to the Gulf region. 

 

Historically as well as contemporarily the role of maritime security involving these countries will be important for us in the region.   Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia work closely together to provide what we call “sovereign space” in guaranteeing safe passage of all naval and commercial traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore simply because we have an important stake for the communities in the region, along with our concern for the environment, and the safety and livelihood of fishermen within the adjacent areas. 

 

I would like to broaden the notion of securing the waterways, not only in terms of naval deployments, naval presence and naval power, but also in terms of the concern for the fishermen in south-east Asia as well as the environment impact arising from the level of naval traffic that we have in the region as a whole. 

 

I would like to end by saying very simply that we must look at the nexus of politics, economics and security in the wider sense because the level of American willpower to provide strategic security depends on how it overcomes the trade and financial deficit that it must sustain.  So long as China, Japan and South Korea underwrites these deficits, the United States will have to bargain with each of these countries over the terms and conditions of its military presence in Northeast Asia. 

 

That will affect also the viability of security in the wider sense and the salient aspects affecting the waterways of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.  Because all of South East Asia is also linked to the economies of both Japan, China, and to South Korea, there is tremendous interest for us in South-East Asia to link up and provide some degree of comfort level, military-to-military relationship among   the defence forces of the South-East Asian countries and those in Northeast Asia.