We live in a time of history that offers great hope for peace and prosperity but also poses great challenges.  There are plate tectonic-like shifts taking place in the strategic landscape.  While the regional security architecture was previously characterised by alliances formed around a clear ideological divide, it is now more appropriately described as a loose, overlapping pattern of partnerships formed around functional areas of interest, with varying memberships and varying agendas.  As those with a role to play in shaping and building this evolving regional security architecture, we have a responsibility to cast this structure on a firm foundation so that it will continue to support peace and stability in the region, even as tensions caused by strategic shifts ebb and flow. 

 

Much has been said about the rise of China and India, and how their economic growth seems inexorable.  Less has been said about the underlying dynamics of existing partnerships and alliances, and how these have transformed as a result.  Intra‑Asian trade has grown.  Let me provide some perspective on this.  China has become the largest trading partner of many Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea and – I am told – of Australia as well.  China is also India’s second‑largest trading partner.  It is well known that China has a large trade surplus with the United States (US).  It is perhaps less well known that China has a large trade deficit with Taiwan and South Korea.  The value of this large US trade deficit is around 1.6% of the United States’ GDP.  By comparison, Taiwan enjoys a trade surplus with China equivalent to 9.2% of Taiwan’s GDP and Korea’s trade surplus with China is 4% of Korea’s GDP. 

 

While the trade flows between Japan and China, and between Australia and China, are more balanced, they have been growing at a noticeably fast pace.  Between 2000 and 2005, the value of Japan’s exports to China increased at 34% year‑on‑year.  In comparison, Japan’s total exports only increased at an annual rate of 5% over the same period.  Similarly, Australia’s exports to China increased at an annual rate of 23%, compared with 7% growth in exports to the rest of the world over the same period. 

 

India is catching up fast.  It is not just trade, but investments and services as well, such as tourism, education, and financial and medical services.  While it is well known that many companies have outsourced operations to India, it is less well known that Indian companies have also branched out in a big way.  This year, India’s foreign direct investment outflow is expected to surpass inflows, which will push India to the number three spot for capital outflows in Asia, ahead of China and Korea, and behind only Japan and Australia. 

 

These shifts in the economic landscape present their own challenges.  With industrialisation comes the need for energy and other resources.  70% of Japan’s and 80% of China’s oil imports sail through the Malacca Strait every year.  Japan and China are extending and strengthening their maritime reach, to have a greater direct ability to influence the security of the sea routes through which their energy supplies pass.  While that is to be expected, countries in the region also expect that this should be done in a way that is constructive and consistent with international law. 

 

Since the Second World War, the US has played a pivotal role in promoting peace, stability and growth in Asia Pacific.  The US military presence contributes to the security of the region as a whole.  The US is also a major economic partner of Asian countries.  American multinational companies possess technology and generate investment and jobs on a scale that Chinese and Indian companies cannot yet match. 

 

Many have posed the question of how China’s peaceful development will interact with American pre-eminence in the Asia Pacific region, in the three dimensions of security, economics and ideas – or, as some have succinctly put it, ‘military, money and minds.’  The outcome is likely to be more complex, less clear-cut, and involve more players than just these two. 

 

Our actions today will determine whether we leave a legacy of enduring peace, where our peoples can develop and thrive, or whether we evolve a system where we have Cold War, or Cold Peace that chills the region for decades to come.  Our job today is to build a robust regional framework, but we are not painting on a fresh canvas when we talk about the regional security architecture.  The existing architecture already consists of overlapping networks with myriad memberships and agendas.  Allow me to expand on some of these. 

One key element of relationships in this region is the set of US alliances.  This is underpinned by defence treaties that the US has with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.  Singapore is a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the US, a term that captures the relationship as being more than just friends, but not treaty allies.  These strategic partnerships have provided the overarching peace and stability for regional economies to grow and prosper. 

 

Regional multilateral frameworks are looser and less institutionalised.  The largest is the 26‑member, soon to be 27‑member, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with a membership that stretches from the Pacific Rim to South and Southwest Asia.  The ARF can muster a wide range of opinions on defence and security issues.  The challenge for the ARF lies in translating talk into action, but we have seen a few encouraging signs.  Singapore hosted the ARF Maritime Security Shore Exercise earlier this year, and Indonesia and Australia will co‑hosts a table top exercise in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief next year.  Such steps build mutual understanding, create habits of cooperation, and move from the conceptual to the practical.  They point to what is possible.  It is important to maintain the momentum. 

 

Another large framework is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).  Primarily established to facilitate economic growth, trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region, the 21‑member forum has in recent years expanded its agenda to include security issues such as terrorism and supply chain security.  That security issues have made their way into APEC’s agenda is a reflection that security today encompasses more than the traditional military and policing dimension and extends into important areas like economics, the environment and health, which are now closely intertwined.  It is positive that APEC has been able to tackle such security‑related economic issues, as these will continue to be important in the future. 

 

The East Asia Summit (EAS) is one of Asia’s newer forums.  Built with ASEAN at its core, the 16‑member EAS comprises ASEAN member countries Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, the so‑called ’10 plus three plus three’.  Despite holding only its second summit in Cebu earlier this year, the EAS demonstrated strong collective resolve by adopting the Cebu Declaration on East Asian energy security.  The Declaration paves the way for the EAS to tackle the complex and multifaceted challenge of energy security. 

Filling an important niche in the multilateral framework is this Shangri‑La Dialogue.  The Shangri‑La Dialogue has an informal ‘track two’ type of atmosphere, cocooned from the demands of political deliverables, and yet it is well supported by security establishments from the region and beyond.  It is a forum like no other in the Asia Pacific.  Some argue that it is precisely because of the Shangri‑La Dialogue’s informal environment that it has proven conducive for creative ideas to emerge. 

 

Many of us will recall that the issue of maritime security was discussed over a number of Shangri‑La Dialogues and consensus over a set of principles then evolved.  This set of principles was translated into a concrete proposal at the 2005 Shangri‑La Dialogue, where our colleague, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Najib Razak, mooted the successful ‘Eyes in the Sky’ combined maritime air patrols.  We are glad that due to concerted effort from the littoral states and the international community, and through initiatives like Eyes in the Sky, security in the Malacca Straits has improved significantly. 

 

Apart from these larger and looser forums, there are a few smaller, more focused groupings with a more functional bent.  The six‑party talks, for example, address the North Korea nuclear issue.  What it will evolve to in the future we can only guess at. 

 

Another functioning grouping is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (RECAAP), which currently has 14 member countries and is focused on maritime security.  At the last session we were talking about information sharing, intelligence sharing, as an important element of maritime security.  RECAAP has an information sharing centre, which is being established in Singapore, and we would encourage all interested parties to come onboard, to contribute and to share in this. 

Then there is the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). 

 

Complementing the strategic/political/multilateral web is an equally important collection of professional military forums.  ASEAN militaries meet regularly under the ambit of the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force and service chiefs’ and intelligence chiefs’ informal meetings.  The well established Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom has evolved with the times and made significant strides in building capacity in non‑conventional areas such as maritime security and disaster relief. 

 

Another useful grouping is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which comprises 18 member navies and six observer states from around the Pacific Rim.  The WPNS has proven successful in forging practical cooperation, mutual understanding and interoperability between member navies.  The WPNS recently conducted a multilateral exercise in the South China Sea involving 10 navies, 18 ships and maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters. 

 

What is interesting and remarkable about these professional military networks is that they exist in parallel and are supported by – some would say, in spite of – all the strategic/political forums that exist concurrently.  That says a lot about the underlying character of professional military forces, to cooperate and to seek common ground. 

 

There is also a growing network of bilateral security and defence agreements and exchanges between countries in the region.  We should continue to encourage all these efforts as they create a web of cooperation in the region. 

 

The matrix of overlapping security networks is here to stay, but this matrix, like an organic being, is also transforming, reflecting the strategic landscape.  To guide the evolution of the regional strategic security architecture, we must judiciously assess its current state of health.  The loose web of overlapping constructs in Asia Pacific provides a framework for cooperation between countries, so that they can adapt to changing needs at the functional level while remaining connected to the destiny of the larger region as the strategic environment evolves. 

 

This web of old and new constructs is far from perfect.  Some forums reflect a past that may no longer be relevant, while others reflect a future that has not yet arrived.  Old alliances and partnerships continue to have utility, but they will have to evolve to take into account the new strategic landscape.  Newer forums whose potential has not yet been fully realised must recognise that being novel is not the same as being relevant or useful.  Both old and new will have to evolve to provide value to their members and to the region as a whole. 

For example, larger, looser forums may be useful for dialogue and promoting international and regional norms of behaviour.  They can help to identify shared interests and needs, and point to gaps that need to be addressed.  Smaller forums formed around functional areas of interest can in turn translate dialogue more effectively into practical action and solutions. 

 

ASEAN is one organisation that is evolving to stay relevant.  Strategically positioned at the crossroads of Asia, endowed with a substantial population and resources yet devoid of big power pretensions, ASEAN is the natural trusted broker in the regional security architecture, but that role cannot be assured unless ASEAN itself evolves.  That is why we are working to adopt the ASEAN Charter this year.  The Charter will help us realise the vision of an ASEAN community that is integrated yet open, dynamic and resilient. 

 

An important pillar in constructing an ASEAN community was established last year with the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), the first meeting held between ASEAN defence ministers in Kuala Lumpur in May last year.  The ADMM reflects ASEAN member countries’ collective political will to address security challenges through practical cooperation.  This cooperative instinct, when extended to friends outside of Southeast Asia through an open and inclusive ADMM+ process, will help ASEAN add value to the regional security architecture. 

 

I believe we share many common ideas about what the regional security architecture should be.  We share a vision that we need a region that is stable and interconnected, hence creating the conditions for economic cooperation and growth.  We also share the view that we need a robust framework of cooperation for all countries that have a stake in regional security, to work together.  The question, of course, is how. 

As diverse as the defence and security networks in Asia Pacific are, I believe that we can use three broad principles to guide the evolution of the regional security architecture.  Firstly, regional security is a collective responsibility.  In today’s environment, the security and prosperity of all countries are closely intertwined.  No single country has the resources to deal unilaterally with all security issues and no country can afford to stand by the wayside and ignore international and regional security issues. 

 

Second, the security architecture needs to be inclusive.  All countries, big or small, as well as international organisations such as the United Nations and its agencies, who are constructive and responsible members of the international community, have a role to play.  We should not let traditional notions of geography limit our framework of cooperation.  We should create new opportunities for cooperation and collective security, not create new divides in the region. 

 

Third, cooperation should be based on mutual respect and be in accordance with international law.  Structures and measures to enhance regional security should be respectful of each country’s sovereignty, conform to regional and international norms of behaviour, and sustain the international institutions and laws that underpin a stable world order.  Only by conducting our interactions on this basis can we build mutual trust and confidence, which is the foundation for constructive dialogue and action. 

 

 

Changes in the strategic landscape will fundamentally alter the regional security architecture whether we want them to or not.  Allowing the architecture to evolve carelessly may lead to structures that encourage adversarial and divisive instincts, but if we proactively guide the evolution of the regional security architecture, embracing ideals of openness, inclusiveness, collective responsibility and mutual respect, we will have laid the foundation for enduring peace and security.  Thank you very much.