Fourth Plenary Session – Setting National Security Priorities – Avelino Cruz Jr, Secretary of National Defence, the Philippines

 

The security environment inevitably shapes national security priorities. Our assessment shows that as a developing nation, the Philippines faces greater internal rather than external security threats. For decades, the Philippines has been beset with a protracted insurgency that is fought in several fronts. Our security forces are confronted simultaneously with the communist insurgency being waged by the New People's Army (NPA) and terrorism being perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and the Jemaah Islamiyah.

 

 

Setting aside other factors for the moment, a historical analysis indicates a significant correlation between economic development, national and local governance and the capability of security forces on one hand, and the rise and fall of the strength of internal security threat groups, on the other.

 

The imposition of Martial Law in the 1970's resulted in heightened militancy in various sectors of Philippine society. The crippling oil crisis in the 1970's added to the economic hardship. During this decade and extending to the early 1980's, the Philippines saw a dramatic rise in the strength of the NPA. Notably, this phenomenon took place despite a military organization that was adequately equipped and sufficiently motivated. From a handful of armed dissidents not exceeding 100 in the late 1960's, the collective strength of the NPA reached its peak of nearly 26,000 by the time the People Power Revolution of 1986 successfully ousted authoritarian rule.

 

The restoration of freedom and democracy following the peaceful revolution in 1986 contributed much to the decline in the strength of the NPA. The communist insurgents broke up into several factions with some factions entering into peace agreements with the government. The period saw a substantial number of communist insurgents returning to the fold of the law and becoming productive members of society. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) also concluded a peace agreement with the government in 1996 that led to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

 

These successful peace initiatives and the resurgence of the Philippine economy in the early 1990's contributed significantly to the dramatic decline in the strength of the insurgents. After reaching its peak of nearly 26,000 armed insurgents prior to 1986, there were less than 6,000 armed NPA rebels by 1997 representing a nearly 80% drop. Because of these significant gains, the responsibility of addressing the insurgency was transferred, by law, from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the newly formed Philippine National Police.

 

Unfortunately, shortly after seeing these positive developments in the internal security environment, the Asian Financial Crisis struck. This coincided with shortcomings in governance from a government that was subsequently ousted from office in early 2001. During this period, the declining capabilities of our security forces also began to show. From the period beginning in 1998 up to the year 2000, the Philippines saw a significant resurgence in the strength of the insurgents. Notably, it was also around this period that the Abu Sayyaf in Southwest Mindanao gained notoriety. As a result, the responsibility of addressing the insurgency was returned to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by law.

 

Evidently, these internal security threats have had a negative impact on the Philippine economy. A weakened economy severely limits spending on social services and defense capabilities. This leads to underdevelopment in remote areas and a hampered response from our security forces. These provide insurgents and terrorists opportunities that they are quick to exploit. This is the vicious cycle we aim to stop once and for all.

 

 

With improved governance, our security forces, particularly the Armed Forces of the Philippines, have achieved relative success in confronting these threats despite limited resources. Since 2001, we have seen an annual decline of about 13% in the strength of the NPA.

 

During the same period, we have also seen the beginnings of a resurgence of the Philippine economy. Despite the continuing rise in global oil prices, the Philippine economy continues to grow significantly. Last year alone, our Gross Domestic Product grew by 5.5%. Fiscal reform measures introduced last year at significant political cost to the national leadership have also yielded substantial revenues that enabled us to check the budget deficit and increase spending on basic social services.

 

If we are able to sustain this positive momentum, there is reason to be optimistic that the communist insurgency can be resolved within the next 10 years, if not sooner.

 

 

It may be useful to note that the growth of the Philippine economy is driven by the service sector. This makes our renewed economic growth extra-sensitive to peace and order concerns. The resolution of our internal security threats will evidently foster a climate conducive to faster economic growth. Consequently, security sector reform and significant investments in capabilities of our security forces, particularly the Armed Forces of the Philippines, are our highest national security priorities. These are crucial components of national development planning. Thus, we have made sure that these priorities were reflected in the Philippine Medium Term Development Plan.

 

Our modest gains in improving the current security situation in the Philippines gives us the opportunity to emphasize the need to invest some fruits of our economic recovery in security sector reform and capability upgrade. We are confident that this investment will pay handsome dividends.

 

We are not wanting of examples to support our case.

 

 

The Province of Bohol in Central Philippines tells an inspiring story. From being listed in 2001 as the 7^th poorest among 79 provinces in our developing nation, a combination of effective local governance and a successful counter-insurgency campaign against communist insurgents turned the province around to become the 23^rd richest province by 2005. Because of the improved security situation in the province, major infrastructure projects supported by local and foreign investment became possible to implement. By promoting eco-tourism, Bohol has seen steady growth in its economy. The province saw a phenomenal increase in tourist arrivals from around 150,000 foreign and domestic tourists visiting the province in 2000 to 1 Million tourist arrivals in 2005. In 2005 alone, the province saw a 37% increase in tourist arrivals compared to the previous year. This year, investments in the tourism industry in Bohol has grown by over 480% compared to the previous year. This steady growth has created jobs and prevented the resurgence of insurgency in the province.

 

This success story does not stand alone. It can be seen in other parts of our country as well.

 

The Province of Basilan in Southwest Mindanao tells another inspiring story. When the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf engaged in kidnappings in 2001, they sought refuge in the mountains of this island province. Military operations effectively resolved the situation. Precise and sustained AFP actions isolated and neutralized the terrorists and pushed their remnants out of the province. Thereafter, development came to the province. Our combined Balikatan Exercises with the United States broke the ground with the successful conduct of civil-military operations designed to uplift the socio-economic condition in the province. The improved security situation also made irrigation projects and the construction of farm-to-market roads possible. Now, farm inputs reach the remote farmlands. As a result, food security in the island has improved with a 40% increase in agriculture production. Small and medium scale enterprises have also began to flourish and the number of community-based cooperatives also increased. What used to be its lair, the Province of Basilan is now no man's land for the Abu Sayyaf.

 

 

We must continue to build on these modest successes.

 

As I have discussed in this forum last year, the Philippine Department of National Defense is in the midst of transforming our institutions while performing our missions. To achieve this goal, we are focusing our efforts on four (4) key priorities:

1. Implementing the Philippine Defense Reform Program or the PDR as part of a more comprehensive security sector reform agenda;

2.      Implementing a Multi-Year Capability Upgrade Plan for the AFP to regain lost capabilities;

3.      Enhancing our capability to fight terrorism; and

4. Supporting the Peace Process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

 

 

Last year, I spoke at this forum on-the comprehensive, systemic and institutional reform agenda known as the Philippine Defense Reform program or PDR that we are currently implementing. This reform agenda focuses on key recommendations distilled from a three-year Joint Defense Assessment of the AFP that we conducted with the assistance of the United States. Philippine Defense Reform is envisioned to transform the AFP into a more `professional and capable institution that can effectively confront current and emerging security threats. We are pleased to report that significant gains have been achieved in this transformation effort.

 

 

To complement our efforts at institutional reforms, we have also started implementing the Multi-Year AFP Capability Upgrade Plan that consists of:

 

1.    Acquiring within the next 5 years, basic individual and unit equipment that are needed in Internal Security Operations to enhance mobility, firepower, communications, force protection and combat life-support. With improved revenues from the fiscal reform measures that have been intrvdiiced, the Philippine Government is now in a positibrt to double the spending for this capability upgrade for the AFP.

 

2.    The re-training of 14 Battalions every year for counter-insurgency ^sand counter-terrorism. In order to achieve our training targets, Training Cerers will be established in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

 

 

Sustained military operations have also resulted in a decline in the recorded stt'eYtgth of the Abu Sayyaf: from a high of 1,200 fully armed members in 2000, to fts 'current strength of less than 400. This year, a number of key Abu Sayyaf leaders have again been neutralized. Relentless military pressure has denied these terrorists r training grounds, lairs and sanctuaries and prevented 'thWir 'esurgence. The AFP aid the Philippine National Police continue to identify, isolate and neutralize operatives of the Jemaah Islamiyah who manage to cross into Mindanao.

 

But the job is far from over.

 

 

Our experience has shown that insurgents and terrorists often take advantage of people in impoverished communities in conflict areas to recruit adherents, gain support, or secure safe havens.

It is for this reason that the AFP continues to support the on-going peace process with the MILF. Experience has taught us that we need to strengthen the hand of our moderate Muslim brothers. With unity of effort, we must drain the pond of poverty, intolerance and injustice from which terrorists and insurgents breed. We are confident that the successful conclusion of the peace process will give the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao the opportunity to deliver the local governance needed to realize the potentials of Mindanao and uplift the lives of our Muslim brothers.

 

In other parts of the country, we must continue to address the issues exploited by the insurgents, as part of our effort to win the peace. We complement the convergence of government efforts in bringing basic services to the remote villages in the countryside by undertaking socio-economic activities to win the hearts and minds of our marginalized countrymen.

 

This year, the AFP Corps of Engineers will bring electricity, potable water and construct school buildings and medical facilities in 500 "Kalayaan B'arangays " or "Freedom Villages" each year and build a network of "Kalayaan Roads" or "Freedom Roads" that provide access and bring livelihood and economic opportunities to these remote villages. These 500 "Freedom Villages" serve as showcases of government concern and provide an alternative to the marginalized citizens in these remote communities. Efforts to improve local governance in these remote locations will also be crucial in sustaining these efforts.

 

 

We draw inspiration from the fact that we are not alone in this effort. We continue to leverage our initiatives with the support of like-minded friends and allies.

 

Building upon our long-standing defense and security partnership with the United States, we have recently established a Security Engagement Board that will provide us a security consultative mechanism that will enhance bilateral cooperation on non-traditional security threats that include terrorism.

 

With our other friends and allies, particularly in the ASEAN, as well as Australia and ^.other countries in the region, we have proposed the conclusion of agreements on the treatment of visiting forces that will pave the way for cooperative activities among our defense forces. This may include the conduct of combined joint training exercises to mutually improve our capabilities to address current and emerging security threats that include terrorism.

 

With our neighbors Indonesia and Malaysia, we are also constantly seeking ways to enhance cooperation in border control and securing the seas the join us, namely: the Celebes, Sulu and Sulawesi Seas.

 

 

The Philippine security environment characterized by decades-long insurgency leaves us very little choice but to prioritize efforts at addressing our internal security concerns.