ASIA-PACIFIC ARMED FORCES AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
Mr Teo Chee Hean
Minister for Defence, Singapore
Good morning Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.
It is an honour to join my two distinguished colleagues. Senator Hill and Secretary Cruz, in addressing this plenary session.
At last year's Shangri-La Dialogue, we had benefited from a rich discussion on the global terrorist threat. There was a general consensus on the geopolitical and ideological dimensions of the issue, as well as the strategic nature of the terrorists' objectives. We agreed last year that we should use a more a judicious mix of hard and soft measures is needed to effectively counter the threat.
It is fitting that our discussion today moves on to a practical focus — to consider what our armed forces can do to counter terrorism, on their own and in cooperation with one another.
The role of armed forces has expanded after September 11. Many countries now have to harness their military capabilities to deal with the diversity of terrorist weapons — bombs carried by suicide bombers, by aeroplanes and vessels; chemical, biological and radiological weapons. And we have to cater for the whole spectrum of the counter-terrorism threat — from preventing attacks to providing protection to carrying out consequence management. In all these areas, armed forces have unique capabilities and resources that no other agencies possess. The challenge is to improve inter-agency coordination so that there can be a more effective integrated response.
Post 9/11, Singapore set up a national security framework to strengthen coordination across the government for counter-terrorism. Within this framework, the Singapore Armed Forces has been working closely with relevant civilian agencies. The Navy, for example, works hand in hand with the Police Coast Guard, the Maritime and Port Authority, and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, to plan and implement new maritime security measures in our ports and waters.
The Singapore Armed Forces has also developed new capabilities to counter terrorist threats. For example, we recently inaugurated the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosive (or CBRE) Defence Group. This unit has a suite of preventive measures against CBRE-type terrorist attacks, and the expertise and equipment to respond to such attacks and contain the consequences. We have also restructured some units to enhance our counter-terrorism capabilities. For example we have taken one of our battalions, one of our national service battalions, and redesignated it to be specially trained and equipped for the protection of installations. And its principle role is to safeguard key installations. I visited this battalion a couple of weeks ago and we have lots of very enthusiastic young people there with very creative ideas on how they can do this kinda of work more effectively and better. So it need not necessarily be mundane sort of guard duty work or sentry duty work but there are creative ways in which these people can actually carry out their duties, in a sense to counter the creativity and innovation the terrorists have shown in the kinds of ways that they seek out to carry out attacks.
But we have to go beyond our own individual efforts as well. Counter-terrorism requires international cooperation to be effective. Like-minded countries have to work together, for the threat is global in scale and in its objective and it does not respect national boundaries. It exploits spaces between national boundaries to be most effective. We have had useful consultations and dialogues at various levels in multilateral and international fora, from which we have developed useful principles. It is necessary now to move beyond principles to practice, to go beyond rhetoric to concrete cooperative measures – so that we have real capabilities for prevention, protection and consequence management.
The armed forces of the Asia-Pacific are well placed to collaborate in the fight against terrorism. There is a thick network of friendships and cooperative relations built up over many years. This has been nurtured through a multitude of bilateral and multilateral interactions, which include joint exercises and operations, such as the massive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations after the Boxing Day tsunami.
Allow me to offer two illustrations of how our armed forces can collaborate effectively to deal with non-conventional threats. The first is in the area of maritime security. Since our discussion on maritime security at last year's Shangri-La Dialogue, there have been a number of significant initiatives to enhance maritime security, which involved regional armed forces.
Last July, the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore launched the Malacca Straits Co-ordinated Patrols. which provide a 24/7 naval presence in the Malacca and Singapore straits and enhance coordination among the respective navies' ground units and operations centres. Also last year, the Ministers of the Five Power Defence Arrangements agreed to expand the activities of the FPDA to address non-conventional threats. Following this, maritime security serials have been incorporated into FPDA exercises, including in the upcoming major exercise. Bersama Lima. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (or WPNS) – which is a forum that brings together 22 Asia-Pacific navies – has also made considerable progress in developing maritime security cooperation. Most recently, just two weeks ago, 19 WPNS navies took part in a sea exercise and a Maritime Security Information Exchange Seminar in conjunction with the international maritime exhibition IMDEX here in Singapore.
Such multilateral activities help to build capacity and develop inter-operability to deal with maritime terrorism. They also create a foundation of understanding and trust upon which future operational initiatives can be built. We seem to have developed a set of principles or guidelines upon which maritime security can progress upon. And these 3 principles seem to be that firstly the primary responsibility of maritime security in the Malacca Straits lies with the littoral states. Secondly there is a role that the international community, agencies like the IMO and major user states can play. Thirdly that whatever measures that we take have to be in accordance with international law and the sovereignty of the littoral states. I believe that with these principles we can think of creative and practical solutions to move forward to address this issue of maritime security. These principles also provide a good basis for the extra regional states, the international organisations, user states, to work together with the littoral states, either individually or collectively in order to increase our capacity and capability to deal with maritime security issues in the region.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (or PSI) is a second positive illustration of how defence establishments can develop multilateral cooperation against non-conventional threats — this time at the global level. PSI started off as a political initiative, but the defence agencies of member countries have become the drivers of PSI's subsequent development through their leading role in the PSI Operational Experts Working Group. This brings together people from operational agencies to work out solutions to operational problems and to design a global programme of counter-proliferation exercises to put these solutions to the test.
In just two years, PSI has built up a global network of like-minded states to counter the increasingly complex threat posed by the proliferation of WMD. PSI is different from the traditional mode of multilateral cooperation in that it is an activity and not an organisation. Unencumbered by organisational rules, PSI members can choose which activities to participate in, while all staying focused on the common objective of countering proliferation.
PSI and the various regional maritime security initiatives we have seen in the past year, demonstrate the solid contributions that armed forces can make to enhance international cooperation against non-conventional threats. These multilateral initiatives could not have been successful without the existing linkages and trust built up over the years among the militaries, and the practical action-oriented approach that they bring to the table. There is also a strong cooperative instinct among regional armed forces. We saw this in their swift responses in the tsunami relief operations.
It is fortunate that there is this trust and cooperative instincts. We shall have to do more — for example, to tighten the mechanisms and channels for working together so that the capabilities that reside in various countries can respond more quickly and effectively and in a more coordinated way. We can establish these mechanisms by increasing the breadth and the depth of multilateral activities among regional armed forces. By conducting more exercises together, for example, we could work out better systems for information exchange, dissemination and warning, procedures for requesting assistance, and agreed standard operating procedures under which multinational forces can work together under proper control of a host state. Whatever we do must be in accordance with international law and fully respecting the sovereignty of the countries involved.
There are already some very useful multilateral activities, such as Ex Cobra Gold which has incorporated counter-terrorism elements since 2003 and offered a useful avenue for the joint training of our militaries. Our counter-terrorism practitioners have also benefited from the Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference that was initiated by Australia last year. Singapore will be hosting this year's conference in November and we hope to enhance the spirit of collaboration that characterised the inaugural conference.
The existing activities are a good start. But a sustained build-up of regional capacities requires a regular and more comprehensive programme of activities that take place within an inclusive setting. One obvious vehicle for such activities is the ASEAN Regional Forum (or ARF) which has got quite a wide membership. The ARF already has an established defence track that brings regional defence agencies together for a dialogue on contemporary security challenges. The next step would be for defence agencies of ARF member states to come together in more substantive cooperation, such as in joint exercises. The range of capabilities, expertise and experience that various ARF countries can bring to such an exercise would make for an enriching experience for all participants.
The security environment we are in today is more complex. To enhance our effectiveness in countering the threats requires more coordination among domestic agencies at the national level; more collaborative and cooperative efforts among countries, their armed forces and other agencies. We shall have to strengthen our existing cooperation and also come up with new ways of working together — and by doing so. enhance our own as well as collective security. It is time now to move beyond principles to effective practice, through capacity-building exercises and other substantive cooperation.
Thank you.
