June 14th 2003
By V. R. Raghavan
That the United States looms large in the security calculations of Asian states is well known. The superpower's new ideas on security, evolving since 9/11 and now getting crystallised after the campaign in Iraq, have not reassured the major states of Asia. Their anxiety and doubts became apparent at a major international conference held in Singapore during the last week of May.
There is much in the Asian states' thinking which is of relevance to Indian security. The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, organised its second Asian Security Conference in Singapore. Titled the Shangri La Dialogue, the conference has gained immense stature as a platform to assess and make known security perceptions in a non-official, yet, serious high-level forum. Defence Ministers of the U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, India, Malaysia, Singapore and other countries were presentor addressed the meet. The C-in-C Pacific Command, the Chief of Australian Defence Forces and senior military officers of South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia and other nations were also present. Directors of major think-tanks and policy groups were prominent participants. The Chinese were present and watchful of the proceedings as always. There was a senior Russian delegate from the Foreign Ministry.
The star attraction was Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence, even if the incomparable Lee Kwan Yew stole the show by his outstanding survey of the security scenario. The venerable Singapore leader was as forthright in his analysis of the U.S.' global military dominance, as he was doubtful of its ability to be sensitive to other nations' concerns. He highlighted that almost all states wanted Saddam Hussein removed from power, and yet the U.S. could not obtain the needed legitimacy for the war in Iraq. He cited ASEAN dilemmas resulting from the U.S. approach to the use of power. The ASEAN states found it impossible to support the U.S.' military operations as they wrestled with their Islamic populations' anger, but also saw the need for the war under the United Nations aegis. Consequently, ASEAN found it expedient not to take a position and decided to issue no statement. His sage advice for the superpower to be inclusive in its search for security, instead of choosing between allies, evoked a wide resonance.
Mr. Wolfowitz dwelt on the technical competence with which the Iraq war was conducted. He found it necessary to list the `no refugees, no epidemics, no food shortages, no oil wells or dams destroyed,' as proof of a war well concluded. According to him, the end of the Baathist regime gives Jordan and Saudi Arabia greater manoeuvre space in the Middle East peace process. He saw a secular government demand building up in Karbala. None of these assertions was questioned, but there were widespread doubts on their validity amongst the participants. On terrorism, he posited a theory that terrorist attacks, however lethal, are only a tactical success but strategic failures since they turn the population against the perpetrators. That such attacks have changed national strategies and forced a dialogue between states and non-state actors was not lost on the participants.
The cat was firmly set amongst the Asian pigeons when Mr. Wolfowitz announced that the U.S. was re-examining its Asian military deployments, in the light of the success in Iraq war. Precision attack technology, long-range fighting and strike capabilities, the dispensability of foreign military bases as against facilities that can be obtained to stage forces for future wars, were put forth as the rationale for redeployment of the U.S. forces from Asia. This was either not anticipated by the major East Asian states, or, they were not adequately prepared by the U.S. Lee Kwan Yew was proven right within hours of his taunt about the American `style' of functioning as a global leader. Senior Ministers, analysts, military officers, and even Western scholars expressed consternation at the impact of the U.S. forces being reduced in Asia. They were unanimous in seeing the contradiction between the redeployment policy and Mr. Wolfowitz's reminders to strengthen deterrence and remain united in existing alliances. The strongest, yet typically oriental and courteous, warning against this came from the Japanese Minister of State for Defence. He found it necessary to discard his Japanese script and speak in English to emphasise his nation's concerns. He left no one in doubt on the very strong sentiments in his country's policy circles on safeguarding its interests by securing the necessary deterrence capabilities, if existing arrangements are found wanting.
Mr. Wolfowitz added a special intensity to the debate by his views on North Korea and its nuclear brinkmanship. He faulted North Korea on many things; nuclear proliferation, technology transfers, nuclear regime violations, as also the favourite U.S. `mantra' of human rights violations. He was, however, clear that a nuclear or near-nuclear North Korea needs a multilateral and dialogue approach rather than any firmer action. He wanted North Korea to follow the Den Xiao Peng model of China to modernise. There was widely expressed surprise that the U.S. now extols a Chinese model which had been found inadequate in terms of democratic credentials. Mr. Wolfowitz was not present to hear the extreme measures recommended by his own countrymen, and the British at another session, which discussed options to deal with the North Korean nuclear intransigence. South Korea's objections and unwillingness to accept a nuclear North Korea were stated in no uncertain language by its Generals and diplomats.
It is clear that serious doubts have arisen between the U.S. and the Asian states on ways to deal with the threat posed by North Korea. Mr. Wolfowitz, when asked how the Bush doctrine of pre-emption might operate in the North Korean situation, came up with an astounding interpretation. He claimed that the pre-emption idea had been overstated. Apparently, the Bush doctrine has many interpretations of convenience. This inevitably raises questions of credibility not only of U.S.' assertions on policy but also on security assurances, on which its alliances are predicated. The growing concerns in America's Asian allies are therefore not ill-founded. American interests were better interpreted by Senator Jack Reed of the Democratic Party, who wanted the Bush administration to decide between engagement and containment policies. He warned that waiting for the North Korean implosion would be a dangerous policy. He advised that North Korea be left in no doubt that force is an available option. He wanted the military victory in Iraq to be converted into global security through responsible policy choices based on international cooperation.
The Defence Minister, George Fernandes, represented India at the conference. This is the second time that he has attended the event. He made a balanced speech identifying terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in non-state actors' hands, as India's security concerns. His measured responses to questions were well received. One does however wish Indian leaders would state their Asian affinities more strongly. While the issue was not addressed to Mr. Fernandes, there was no dearth of anxieties and doubts expressed privately by others on the merits of the military deployment that India undertook in 2002. The Shangri La meet juxtaposed the tensions and security anxieties which drive the Asian states' responses to the U.S. Concern over not being consulted and unilateral decisions taken in Washington on Asian security were palpable amongst official and non-official delegates. The sombre mood of being not partners but mere clients to a powerful patron could not be missed.
The paramount misgiving was of the superpower, after having built an alliance network in the region, considering diluting its military presence when security in the region is being imperilled. Its preoccupation with terrorism as applicable to its homeland is viewed as a negative and serious portent. The U.S.' unwillingness to act firmly and decisively with North Korea is seen as evidence of its shifting commitment to its allies' security interests.
