Asian multilateralism gets a lift

 

Four new high-level regional multilateral forums have been established in the past few months alone

By Ralph A. Cossa

 

Multilateral dialogue seems to be taking on new energy in Asia. Not since 1993 -- when foreign ministers attending the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference held a separate breakfast session to discuss security issues and decided to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and APEC heads of state gathered for their first "Leaders' Meeting" in Seattle -- has there been such a flurry of activity. Four new high-level Asian multilateral forums have been established in the last few months, even as existing organizations continue to thrive -- the ninth ARF was convened in Brunei at the end of July, with APEC leaders scheduled to assemble once again in October.

 

In April, the first annual Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) took place in Boao, China. Luminaries included Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji (ŽéèOŠî), Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hang Don. The BFA is aimed at strengthening economic exchanges and cooperation within the region. Beijing has high hopes that this Forum will become an Asian version of the influential annual Davos World Economic Forum. Whether sustained interest will be generated remains a question, however, given the complaint by some observers that this "non-governmental" forum seemed to closely follow an official Chinese script.

 

Another quasi-official gathering, this time involving security dialogue, took place in late May. Senior defense officials in attendance at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue (after the hotel in which it was held) included defense ministers from Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore, as well as US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. This unofficial "defense summit" allowed defense officials to meet "privately and in confidence, bilaterally and multilaterally, without the obligation to produce a formal statement or communique." At the defense ministers' request, the Shangri-La Dialogue will be made an annual event.

 

While the meeting was unique, senior defense officials have for several years participated in the ARF, although the senior representative is the foreign minister. Security issues are the focus of ARF discussions but some key issues have been left off the table or dealt with only tangentially. It remains to be seen whether regional defense establishments will see the Shangri-La Dialogue as a useful complement to the ARF or as a preferred alternative. At a minimum, it should put pressure on the foreign ministers to ensure that the ARF dialogue becomes more relevant.

 

Another new official multilateral forum involving selected East Asian states has been formed in Central Asia through the initiative of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. The first Conference on Interactions and Confidence building measures in Asia (CICA) summit brought heads of state from China, Mongolia, and Russia together with counterparts from 13 other Central, South, and Southwest Asian states. (Lower-ranking observers were present from several East Asian countries plus the US). Media attention focused on the presence of Indian President Ali Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the inability of both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin (]àV–¯) to get these two antagonists to sit down and talk. CICA itself received almost no attention.

 

CICA's main objective is "to enhance cooperation through elaborating multilateral approaches towards promoting peace, security and stability in Asia." Other objectives include increased trade and economic cooperation and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Summits are to take place every four years, with foreign ministers meeting every two years; working groups will gather annually. The fact that summits will occur only once every four years may keep Russia and China (among others) interested in supporting this Central Asian initiative, if for no other reason than to maintain their own influence in this buffer region.

 

A Thai-initiated Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) added yet another definition of "Asia" to the mix, involving ministers from 9 of the 10 ASEAN states (all but Burma, which refused to participate due to ongoing border tensions with Thailand), ASEAN's Plus Three partners (China, Japan, South Korea), three South Asia states (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan), and, inexplicably, Bahrain and Qatar. It was initially supposed to be an informal gathering of foreign ministers but was later opened to ministers in general after several foreign ministers were unable (or unwilling) to attend. Discussions focused on economic, social, and cultural issues, rather than political or security concerns. While Prime Minister Thaksin proclaimed the meeting an "historic Asian event" marking the "beginning of a new chapter in world history," critics have been less enthusiastic, with one former Thai diplomat describing it as ADC (Asia Diplomatic Confusion) rather than ACD. No one seemed to view this initiative as a potential threat to the ARF, even though the ministers agreed to meet again in Thailand next year.

 

One formulation still not being tried is an Association of Northeast Asian Nations, despite this being the region where some of East Asia's most pressing challenges reside. While creating such a forum may be difficult today, all the Northeast Asian states (including the US and Canada, if one stretches the definition) take part in the ARF. Perhaps a separate breakfast meeting of these ministers could help sow the seeds for Northeast Asian cooperation. Expanding the current "Plus Three" grouping may be another way to achieve this goal -- the foreign ministers of Japan, ROK, and China are expected to hold a trilateral session along the ARF sidelines in Brunei.

 

One common element in the above forums is China. Beijing has become a big believer in multilateralism, playing the lead role in the BFA and a central role in CICA, and sending its foreign minister to the ADC and a two-star general to the Shangri-La gathering. China also remains a driving force behind the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which links China and Russia with four of their Central Asian neighbors (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). Several ministerial-level SCO meetings have already taken place this year, culminating in a Summit Meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia in June, where the six heads of state signed a Charter, giving the SCO formal legal status. They also set up a joint regional anti-terrorism agency.

 

To its credit, the SCO had already been focusing on anti-terrorism prior to last Sept. 11. At that time it was also touted as a check against "unipolar tendencies," with SCO pronouncements strongly condemning missile defense and supporting the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. While the SCO was "not aimed at any third country," it was not too difficult to discern a growing anti-US bias. Those themes are now being played down, with Putin stating that others, including the US, now welcome to join the SCO.

 

None of these new initiatives presently challenge the ARF or APEC, but will hopefully put pressure on them to be more forward thinking and aggressive in addressing the region's security and economic challenges. Senior leaders will find it difficult to attach equal priority to this ever-growing list of dialogue opportunities and will likely concentrate on those that promise to be the most productive and responsive.