Gulf states consider air defence capabilities
Posted Sunday 5 December, 11:30 Bahrain time
By Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace
That there is a delivery mechanism is indisputable, and
there remains a strong suspicion – despite Tehran’s denials – that a nuclear
weapons capability to complement its ballistic missile programme remains the
aim of the regime.
Concern over the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear aspirations
continues to propel regional interest in bolstering air defence capabilities in
general and ballistic missile defence in particular. The challenges related to
providing effective missile defence coverage, however, are substantial,
operationally and politically.
Only days before the Permanent Five members of the U.N
Security Council and Germany were to meet with Iranian officials in Switzerland
to yet again try to resolve outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear
program, sharp rhetoric was being employed at the Manama Dialogue to caution
the regime as to the urgency of the need for diplomatic progress.
Liam Fox, UK defence secretary, warned: ‘An Iranian nuclear
weapons capability will not be tolerated by the international community. It
could destroy hopes for peace in the Middle East, for international stability
and could very well end the Non-Proliferation Treaty as we know it... We want a negotiated solution not a military
one, but Iran needs to work with us to achieve that outcome because we will not
look away or back down.’
Were Israel, with or without the US, to take military action
against Iranian nuclear installations, one option for Tehran would be to
retaliate using conventionally-armed ballistic missiles against US forces in
the region, and against states which provide basing facilities to Washington.
While the US Patriot anti-missile system has been acquired by
countries in the Gulf region, with the more capable THAAD missile defence
system also on order, there is as of yet no integrated regional air defence
capability, with gaps likely existing both in radar and missile interceptor coverage.
Political sensitivities could mean that Gulf states share air defence radar
data only on a bilateral basis with the US. This will complicate the creation
of a coherent air picture. Structuring a multi-national command chain – or
developing the required authority – to provide timely decision making might
also be an area requiring attention.
Cruise missiles would be a further complicating factor, should an Iranian
land-attack capability emerge in this area.
