By Douglas Barrie, Senior fellow for Military Aerospace
That there is a delivery mechanism is indisputable, and there remains a strong suspicion – despite Tehran’s denials – that a nuclear weapons capability to complement its ballistic missile programme remains the aim of the regime.
Concern over the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear aspirations continues to propel regional interest in bolstering air defence capabilities in general and ballistic missile defence in particular. The challenges related to providing effective missile defence coverage, however, are substantial, operationally and politically.
Only days before the Permanent Five members of the U.N Security Council and Germany were to meet with Iranian officials in Switzerland to yet again try to resolve outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear program, sharp rhetoric was being employed at the Manama Dialogue to caution the regime as to the urgency of the need for diplomatic progress.
Liam Fox, UK defence secretary, warned: ‘An Iranian nuclear weapons capability will not be tolerated by the international community. It could destroy hopes for peace in the Middle East, for international stability and could very well end the Non-Proliferation Treaty as we know it... We want a negotiated solution not a military one, but Iran needs to work with us to achieve that outcome because we will not look away or back down.’
Were Israel, with or without the US, to take military action against Iranian nuclear installations, one option for Tehran would be to retaliate using conventionally-armed ballistic missiles against US forces in the region, and against states which provide basing facilities to Washington.
While the US Patriot anti-missile system has been acquired by countries in the Gulf region, with the more capable THAAD missile defence system also on order, there is as of yet no integrated regional air defence capability, with gaps likely existing both in radar and missile interceptor coverage. Political sensitivities could mean that Gulf states share air defence radar data only on a bilateral basis with the US. This will complicate the creation of a coherent air picture. Structuring a multi-national command chain – or developing the required authority – to provide timely decision making might also be an area requiring attention. Cruise missiles would be a further complicating factor, should an Iranian land-attack capability emerge in this area.