Dr John Chipman
Thank you very much, Vice Minister, for those very strong words, especially in light of one of the questions that was asked yesterday of Deputy Prime Minster and Foreign Minister of Kuwait, Sheikh Muhammad Al Sabah, about the contribution one might expect to have over time from Asian countries who have developed political and economic interests in this area, but not yet developed wholly sophisticated security policies. Your commitment to finding ways, obviously within the means of the Japanese constitution, to make available a self-defence forces, possibly contribute to security in African and specifically here, in the Middle East. I am sure they are welcome words.
We now have time to open up the debate. I am anxious to ensure that in this debate, there is also a GCC perspective given. I note in the hall the Vice President of the National Security Agency of Kuwait, and if he wishes to catch my eye in order to say something from the Kuwait perspective, I will certainly recognise him to do so. Of course, many European countries including France are engaged in the discussion about how to provide civilian nuclear power, so anyone from France who feels able to make an authoritative statement, I shall also welcome if they catch my eye. In the meantime, I will call, first, Lee Cheung Min, from Korea, to make his remarks.
Dr Lee Chung Min, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asian Security Affairs, IISS; Member of the President’s Foreign Policy Council
Thank you very much. To Mr Narayanan, what specific CBN measures is the Indian government taking, vis a vis, Pakistan, to improve relations with Pakistan in order to ensure that the control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan remains robust.
My question to Vice Minister Shinba, I think the Korean government welcomes the Hatoyama administration’s so-called Asia Diplomacy, but there are concerns in the region that the Hatoyama administration’s relations with the US of late have made a small downturn. There has been a flurry of press reports, that your government might be reconsidering some type of negotiations that may have been made by the previous LDP governments on nuclear issues, and so I wanted to clarify whether the Hatoyama government is willing to reconsider its nuclear relationship with the US, and if so, how do you plan to do so? Thank you very much.
Mark Fitzpatrick
I fear that I have used up my quota of questions for this 6th Manama Dialogue, but if I could be advance my quota from next year! I would like to pose questions for each of the speakers. Those were very rich presentations. National Security Advisor Narayanan mentioned the use of the breeder reactor technology as potentially useful for many other countries. When the US-India nuclear cooperation deal reached its fruition, India put forward a planned division between its civilian and its non‑exclusively civilian facilities. The fast breeder reactor was not included among the list of facilities that were strictly for civilian use. I am wondering whether fast breeder reactor technology is to be shared with other nations, if it will not have to be moved to the civilian use category in the future?
A second question for the National Security Advisor, if I may? North Korea frequently uses the India example as a talking point, and says it wants to be treated like India, and accepted as a nuclear armed state in the future. India is not involved in six-party talks with North Korea, but if you were to be involved in talks with North Korea, how would you try to dissuade them of this talking point?
Vice Minister Shinba, you mentioned the adherence to the three non-nuclear principles: non‑production, non‑use and not allowing introduction into Japan. Given the policy of the new Japanese government to bring to light past secret agreements between Japan and the United States on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese ports, there is discussion in Japan about amending the three principles to make them two and a half principles, to allow the introduction. Is there any prospect for this? A second question, in Iran, Iran says it just wants to be like Japan; it just wants the technology for enrichment and potentially other sensitive technologies. How would you answer this question to Iran?
Dr John Chipman
Thank you. So, we should have Japan in the 5+1 talks, as well as India in the talks with North Korea. I have to work on this nuclear diplomacy architecture.
Professor Aboumohammad Asgarkhani, Professor, Department of International Relations, The University of Tehran
Yes, I am putting this question before Mr Narayanan, National Security Advisor. As you said, India is not a signatory to the NPT, yet it has close nuclear co-operation with the United States. Under the NPT, India cannot and must not be allowed to conclude such nuclear agreements, because it is not a member of the NPT. It means that it is violating the NPT. Again, it is the express wording, language and the spirit of the NPT, it is illegal. At the same time, the United States is also violating not only the NPT under international law, but also, it is infringing its own municipal law, i.e. the 2000 Nuclear Policy Act, according to which, the United States is not allowed to provide such assistance, information and technology to any country which is not a party to the NPT. So, what are the objectives on the part of India and the United States? Is it going to be some kind of containment against China, or is it going to affect Iran-India cooperation in the energy sector?
Waleed Al Banawi, Vice Chairman, Banawi Industrial Group
My question is to the panel. The question is how to ensure that a civilian nuclear technology is available fairly to all countries? The question of nuclear fuel is a key concern in two opposite directions: the producer and the user. At present, this fuel is monopolised by a few countries.
Mohammed Ouzzine, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Morocco
Thank you, my thought is a little philosophical, but I would like both speakers to react to it. A great man, Galileo, once said, ‘You can teach a man everything, but you can only help him discover it within himself’. I believe this is what we need to grasp today more than ever, beyond the discussions, beyond the talks, beyond the interventions. My hunch is that unless we invest in more concrete, well-intentioned action, there will always be a wide gap between fact and talk. [Inaudible] to go beyond the truth.
My first question is, do we have reasons to think, with Victor Hugo, that there would come a time when the only battlefields will be those of markets, open for business, and the human spirit open for ideas?
My second question is, can we share the optimism of the Irish poet, Seamus Heaney, that we might look forward to a time when history and hope will rhyme, and similarly, do we have the means today, do we have the means today to work to those ends?
Dr Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East
I wanted to pick up on the last statement by Vice Minister Shinba, regarding his commitment to increased regional security in the Gulf as well as Asia. Given Japan’s energy interests in the Gulf, which you described, and your strong commitment to non-proliferation, which you so eloquently outlined, in Japan’s good relationship with Iran. Do you see a role for Japan in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme? How would Iran’s stance towards Iran be informed by your position on North Korea? Would Japan support international sanctions on Iran?
Ambassador Hossam Eldin Zaki, Official Spokesman of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry
[Arabic: I noticed – by chance – that the panel comprises officials from Asia, which is good. However, I need to make a short comment to cast some light for the west on the Middle East, which is a key region, as we know.
In the morning, we listened to a number of officials discuss the Iranian nuclear program. I was also about to phone in to explain the Egyptian take on the issue. Egypt has a clear and declared stance regarding that topic, so I wanted to seize the opportunity to bring the issue to everyone’s attention.
In Egypt we tend to think that focusing on the Iranian nuclear program, though justified, and though Egypt does join the international community in judging several things, does not serve a purpose if the Middle East is seen as divorced from the Gulf region. In other words, to contemplate security in the Gulf region in light of the Iranian nuclear program alone is to choose to see only part of the reality, unless we take into consideration the fact that a certain country in the heart of the Middle East; Israel, is a nuclear‑capable country. Endless attempts are constantly being made in international circles to keep the Israeli situation above all regional and global censure. It is those attempts that can trigger a nuclear race in the Middle East.
Instead of taking up the initiative led by Egypt in 1990 to clear the Middle East region of nuclear weapons, we are likely to witness a totally different situation in two or three years. This is why I felt I needed to contribute. We have to link the nuclear situation in the Gulf region and of course the Iranian nuclear program… At this stage, I should state that that we agree with the Iranian side on a number of points related to Iran’s rights, in light of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, we object to other things. We also understand a number of aspects highlighted by the international community, particularly the western countries, pertaining to the nuclear programme. The problem is not with the nuclear programme itself. Rather, the mistake lies in viewing that programme away from other nuclear threats in the region. Thank you.]
Jason Alderwick, Maritime Analyst, Defence Analysis Department
If I could ask Mr Narayanan, given that you spoke very eloquently about the need to control proliferation of nuclear weapons and WMD, what is the likelihood of India joining the proliferation security initiative, or at least becoming an active participant or an observer?
Dr John Chipman
Thank you. There may be other points, but I think we have collected quite a few, but if we could begin in reverse order, with the Vice Minister of Japan, for you to address the questions posed specifically to you?
HE Kazuya Shinba
Thank you for the questions, and since my Japanese is better than my English, let me speak in Japanese.
[Japanese: Firstly, the questioner from Korea raised concerns about the Hatoyama administration’s new foreign policy stance. While it may certainly appear that relations between Japan and the United States are creating some anxiety, it has only been a few months since the inauguration of the Hatoyama administration, and there had effectively been no change of power in Japan until now. Now is the time to review the various issues of the past to date, following the first real change of power since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, we do not intend to squander time on this review. However, I would like to make it clear that the relationship of trust between Japan and the United States is fundamentally unchanged. In this regard, there was also the issue of Japan reconsidering the nuclear issue. Our thinking on the nuclear issue is exactly the same as that of the previous administration, namely, we will continue to adhere to the three non‑nuclear principles.
A question was also posed a little earlier from a different angle, concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We also feel that we must be proactive on the FBR issue in particular. Japan is only 4% self‑sufficient in energy. In particular, we depend on the Middle East for 90% of our oil, and we now rely on nuclear for one‑third of our primary energy. However, in terms of the ratio of reserves to annual production, it is said that uranium reserves will last another 60 years or so, and I think it is important to consider how to use uranium effectively in the future, not just MOX fuel, but also subsequently FBR. A once‑through cycle might be appropriate, rather than using nuclear fuel or atomic energy fuel for a long period, or conducting a nuclear fuel cycle within Japan. There is also an argument that MOX fuel might be appropriate, but with a once‑through cycle; as regards the so‑called residual radioactivity level, it takes several tens of millions of years to penetrate the natural sphere. Considering this environmental perspective as well as the energy perspectives, we feel it is extremely important to fully explore FBR.
Another point was the idea that the three non‑nuclear principles are actually two and a half. That is, there was a question concerning how the change of administration has affected the issue of the secret agreements with the United States. This is currently being investigated under the supervision of Foreign Minister Okada, and I would rather not comment in my position as Senior Vice Minister for Defence. In this regard, the idea that Iran wants to be like Japan was also raised, and we feel that transparency and accountability are the most important factors in relation to nuclear energy. There is also the issue of whether the global rules set by the IAEA are being fully complied with. I think this is a crucial aspect, and a question was posed a little earlier, towards the end, about Japan’s role towards Iran and the difference as compared with North Korea. It is certainly true that Iran and Japan have had a very unique relationship historically. In addition, Japan is reliant on Iran for oil. However, I think the issue of transparency and accountability in nuclear energy is a completely different issue. I think it is only natural to urge transparency and accountability also from Iran, as well as compliance with global rules.]
M.K. Narayanan
There is a very wide range to cover, but let me try to answer them. Some of them are beyond answering in the sense that they are highly complex and complicated. The distinguished delegate from Korea raised the question of India/Pakistan relations and the safety of nuclear weapons. Mr Qureshi is here; I think we can honestly say that we are not fighting a war or a conflict at the moment. That is not the issue. Insofar as India’s concerns about nuclear safety, our nuclear weapons and installations are in very safe hands. We have no reason to doubt their security and safety. I cannot speak for Pakistan, but I think the Pakistani authorities have, from time to time, affirmed that their nuclear weapons are safe. I presume that, as responsible countries and governments, we accept this. As I mentioned, there is always a danger, so we need to keep on enhancing the level of safety and security of these plants, particularly where there are nuclear weapons. That is all I have to say on this issue.
Mr Fitzpatrick’s question is a little loaded, if I may say. The 2006 separation plan between India and the US, which has since been embedded in the IAEA safeguards agreement, refers to those items that are to be kept in the safeguarded category and a few in the non‑safeguarded category. We had a long debate about our position on the fast‑breeder reactor, and the Indian and US negotiators reached the point that the fast‑breeder reactor was still in a very experimental stage. Therefore, it was not yet time to decide whether it should or should not go under safeguards. I want to underline the point that the fast‑breeder reactor is not meant for military purposes. I think there was a reference to that. We have no intention for the fast‑breeder reactor to be put into the military realm.
As the distinguished vice minister said, fast‑breeder reactors are the hope of the future. Uranium, whether in its natural state or otherwise, will become a scarce resource as the world goes increasingly far into its nuclear renaissance. When uranium was not a scarce quantity, many countries, other than France and one or two others, did not experiment with fast breeders. I am not a nuclear scientist; I am only repeating what our nuclear scientists say. If the fast breeder really comes into its own, it will produce more fuel than what it put into it. That would be a very satisfactory state of affairs.
Our intention, why is why I went into such great lengths to express where our energy deficiency lay – we are talking in terms of 400‑odd gigawatts by 2050 – is that we need every ounce of energy that we can. We see the three‑stage, close‑fuel cycle of the pressurised heavy water reactor, the fast breeder and the thorium fuel as the hope of the future. Anybody who has some understanding of nuclear weapons would realise that you do not require the fast breeder to produce nuclear weapons.
Coming to the North Korean example, India has tried to avoid entering international negotiations on this question. It has its own views on this point. This question has been eloquently answered by the chairman here, who commented on continuing to add countries. The six‑party talks on North Korea are being led adequately by the groups that are there. I do not think they need more people. Six is comfortable; seven could be a crowd. We would like to keep India out of them.
A delegate from Iran talked in terms of violation of the NPT. I am sorry to say that India is not a signatory to the NPT. The reason for that is not that we do not agree with the NPT stands for, but we are opposed to the rather discriminatory and iniquitous manner in which it treats certain haves and have‑nots.
The first question is we are not violators of the NPT; the US knows as much as anybody else about that. The previous administration recognised the importance of nuclear energy to overcome India’s energy deficiency. It was aware of India’s impeccable and, I would say, exemplary record of non‑proliferation. They recognised that, while we are not a signatory to the NPT and not a member of the NPT, we have conformed to every rule. Certain additionalities were sought from us to strengthen our export legislation. We have carried them out. We have since signed every document required for the purpose, including the IAEA safeguards. We have ratified them and received a declaration. We have started the process of filling out the annexes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSC), which is a grouping of 45 countries, including all the permanent member countries (P5) plus several others, came to the understanding and the recognition that India deserved to be a member of the NSC. I think there is probably a mistake in the mind of the Iranian delegate about where we stand. Of all the countries in the world, India is at the very top in adhering to each of the NPT norms. We are not a signatory purely for the reason that we regard it as iniquitous and discriminatory. If that is removed, we would have no problems.
The delegate from Morocco said that the nuclear dawn is what we want to look for. There is hope and optimism. If we strengthen the IAEA, now that, apart from its normal safeguard, the IAEA also has additional protocols, there will be hope for the future. That is the way we need to go.
A delegate raised the issue of focusing on Iran. We are very clear in our minds. Any country that needs nuclear energy for civilian purposes is entitled to it. I know there have been occasions when India has not sided with them. Take the latest one: we fully support Iran’s need for civil nuclear energy.
However, if there is a violation according to international standards, and if the IAEA and the Board of the Director General says to the contrary, India has tried to play by the rules. That is all we have done. We stand by the commitment that Iran deserves what it needs.
If the international community is making a mistake about what Iran is doing, we should correct it. The word from this meeting is that there is more openness and transparency. We would not hold back Iran. Iran is a great civilisation and an important country. Iran has been a friend of ours for thousands of years. We have the second‑largest Shia population in the world, which looks to Iran. Therefore, we recognise the merits of the case. If we were to move forward on the nuclear issues, the role of the IAEA as a guardian of nuclear safety must be apparent. We stand by it. I mentioned that in my talk and would like to reiterate it again.
Dr John Chipman
Could you reiterate the circumstances under which India would either join or associate itself with the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative?
M.K. Narayanan
There are several issues regarding the Proliferation Security Initiative. While we were debating it, they went ahead with the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention. Once again, the NPT is strongly underpinned in this. I repeat the need to remove the discriminatory clauses. There is also the legality, because there is a great deal of concern about the legality of interfering with or interceding traffic, particularly on the high seas. This is not an insurmountable angle, but at the moment there are difficulties in doing so.
Major General (Retd) Mahmoud Irdaisat, Director, National Centre for Strategic Studies, King Abdullah Academy for Defence Studies, Royal Jordanian National Defence College
My question is to Mr Narayanan, who advocated that nuclear energy is important. I come from a country that does not have oil and we are suffering from a lack of water. I understand the importance of nuclear energy to such a country. Having said that, so many advanced countries have faced enormous difficulties in getting rid of nuclear waste, over the past decades. Many countries in the third world became graves for nuclear waste. With such proliferation of nuclear energy and reactors in third‑world countries, including in the Middle East and beyond, do you not think we are adding a new environmental problem to the climate change we face? How are these countries going to rid themselves of nuclear waste in addition to dealing with the security of such installations, remembering that most of these countries do not have the knowledge and technology to handle such reactors and energy?
Dr Mohammed Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Senior Advisor on Arms Control and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
My question is to Mr M.K. Narayanan. First of all, I must commend his very informative speech and the information he gave about future planning for the development of nuclear energy. As I understand it, the history of India’s nuclear planning does not demonstrate that India will be able to achieve its nuclear target of 50%. Beginning in 1970, the first major plan was the [Asarabi Plan?] which aimed for India to achieve 10% of its nuclear energy by the end of 1990. Even by the mid‑1980s, India was not even producing 2%. It is the same with all the targets India has set itself to achieve. Although you have said you are optimistic about achieving this target, could you kindly elaborate on the basis of your optimism, so that you would be able to achieve these targets by 2030, as you have set out?
I fully agree with you that India has an impeccable record for not passing on nuclear technology or fuel to any other country in the field of proliferation. India’s own nuclear programme has grown out of civilian nuclear facilities, which India has acquired from other countries for exclusively peaceful purposes, like the Canadian/Indian Reactor, US (CIRUS). This was a misuse of those promises India made to the rest of the international community.
Dr Maria Sultan, Director General, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
My question is to the nuclear advisor of India. I would like to congratulate Mr Narayanan for his very eloquent speech and also to state that it is refreshing to hear India’s commitment to non‑proliferation, safety, security and transparency in nuclear material. Please could you kindly elaborate the latest proliferation‑resistance measures that India has taken for its nuclear power plants, especially given the latest stint of illicit trafficking incidents in India? There was an incident in which an Indian scientist had been keeping depleted uranium for almost 18 months. What is the nature of the plant construction problem faced by the nuclear incident that recently happened at the Kaiga Power Plant in India, and resulted in the exposure of almost 55 workers to radiation? Will India be sharing information with the IAEA or any other government body about this incident, in the spirit of transparency and the threat of nuclear terrorism, especially in South Asia?
M.K. Narayanan
I am glad the question was raised by General Irdaisat. The essential point I was trying to make was that we have an opportunity today to rebuild our capacity. In the past, most countries across the world, particularly the US, did not believe in reprocessing waste fuel. The fundamental difference that has taken place, in which India has been in the forefront – although it has had a small nuclear programme – is in the amount we have invested in reprocessing. We are not building up mountains of waste fuel, like the mountains in Udai and other places; we are reprocessing the spent fuel that comes out of the nuclear reactors. A considerable portion is then put back into the reactors. Once the fast‑breeder programme is properly underway, the bulk can be recycled. As this goes forward, we will be able to build on that strength.
The fear that has been expressed that there will be an environmental hazard or that a major tragedy will happen will not be seen. There will be no mountains of spent fuel; there will probably be small amounts at the final end, but none of it will be radioactive. We have been very anxious to see that, if there are changes or advances in reprocessing technologies, they should be made available. The US has a law that prevents that and we accept it, but other countries, which do not have that, are sometimes willing to do so. As time goes on, we hope that, if advances have been made in reprocessing technology, they will be made available to India. Let me tell you that, today, India possesses an excellent concept of reprocessing technology. Over the course of time, we may have a more than adequate amount of uranium available for our own use or even more.
I presume that Dr Cheema has an Indian background. He seems to know a lot about India. I plead guilty. India’s promises are not always kept. We would rather look into the future than into the past. The main reason why the 123 and the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with the US – which led on to the IAEA safeguards followed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) exemption – were so critical is that all this time we were dependent on uranium from within our resources. After 1974, we were cut off from international nuclear commerce. We had to break out of that cycle, because our resources are limited; they are in inaccessible areas; the quality so the uranium that we have is rather poor.
Thanks to the assistance that we have received from the US, Russia, France, other countries and, most importantly from the NSG countries backed by the IAEA’s support, nuclear commerce is now open. We now have adequate access to uranium. We are in the process of building many more nuclear reactors. I asked if we would be able to achieve these targets once the fast‑breeder reactor is underway. I will not be alive in 2030 and 2050, but we can hope. There are ways and means. We have set in motion a series of timelines and benchmarks and we hope to achieve them.
The question of us having misused or misutilised is an old story. We have talked to the Canadians, and they were satisfied with what we said. The Canadians were anxious to have a nuclear cooperation agreement with us. We signed that in the presence of the two prime ministers. That issue is no longer alive. If anybody wishes to continue talking about it, I cannot help that.
As Dr Sultan said, I underlined nuclear safety and security from time to time. It is very crucial and very important. What happened at Kaiga was not a nuclear accident. It was mischief. I know it should not have happened and we are investigating that. Whenever there are violations of this kind, they are reported to the respective authorities, including the IAEA. I did not quite understand the reference to illegal trafficking. I am not sure what was mentioned there, but we have very tight accounting standards. If somebody has managed to get away with it, we will look into it. I do not want to make a sweeping judgment on what has been said on that.
Kazuya Shimba
[Japanese: Thank you very much. A little earlier, there was a suggestion about nuclear waste. Japan currently has more than 50 nuclear power plants, and as a state founded on nuclear power we have two nuclear policy concerns. One is earthquakes: Japan is a country with an extremely high incidence of earthquakes. Another concern is the issue of nuclear waste. Not all countries with nuclear power plants can dig salt domes several hundred metres deep, such as the one at Gorleben in Germany, to store waste. However, because of this, we think scientists should be involved in the development of nuclear energy from the nuclear power plant construction phase, and that checks should be properly implemented by parliament. Therefore, I think that countries around the world should be serious about investigating the peaceful use of nuclear energy – constructively, scientifically and peacefully – rather than conducting research into downsizing nuclear weapons or developing nuclear warheads, for example. To achieve this, I think it is important to build a consensus for creating a security framework for global energy in a form that encompasses these issues.]
Dr John Chipman
Vice Minister and M.K. Narayanan, National Security Advisor of India, thank you very much for those two presentations and for the very detailed answers to questions. I am sorry, M.K., that your offer to share technologies at low cost inspired some in the audience to look at the fine print of your agreement, but strategists like fine print; I am glad for your clarification on that. Those were some very interesting proposals, both from Japan and India. We look forward to examining them in more detail once your remarks are published on our web page and distributed. Thank you very much.
