Dr John Chipman
We have half an hour for debate. I just want to mention that slightly before the scheduled end of this meeting, Mr Quershi does have a scheduled bilateral with one of the Gulf Arab leaders here present, so if he slips out just before the actual end, please do not over‑interpret that as any sort of diplomatic gesture, other than his commitment to meet his diplomatic obligations here with his Gulf partners.
Sir Hilary Synnott, Consulting Senior Fellow, IISS
Thank you very much. I have a question for Minister Quershi. I hope that he will be able to stay without slipping out before answering it. I thank you for your presentation, though hope you will forgive me if I preface my question with a bit of a prelude, to put it into context.
If I have heard you right, you say that success in Afghanistan requires a complete identity of view, and in this context, I think many commentators and governments, have welcomed the role of the army in South Waziristan in combating what I call the Pakistan neo-Taleban. Many have suggested this, perhaps, represents a new beginning. In this regard, there is clearly a commonality of interest with the coalition forces in Afghanistan, who also do not like the Pakistan neo-Taleban, and I also think there is a commonality of view in respect of al-Qaeda. But, it appears that Pakistan may have a different attitude towards the Afghan Taleban: a political force in their western neighbour, whom Pakistan has little interest in antagonising. This may be borne out by, amongst other signs, the apparent immunity of what used to be called the Quetta-Shura, and this seems to contrast with the coalitions’ view that the Afghan Taleban must be combated either through negotiations or through physical combat. So, on the face of it, in this perspective, there appears to be a collision course between Pakistan and the coalition forces.
My question, and I am sorry for preface, do you think it is possible, and if so, how, to bring together the coalition views, with those of Pakistan, so that there is, what you describe as, a complete identity of view?
Dr John Chipman
I would now like to welcome Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan, and perhaps give him a minute or two more than might normally be given to an intervention from the floor, because I think it is so important to understand the current US perspective on the campaign.
Lieutenant General Karl W Eikenberry, Ambassador of the US to Afghanistan
Thank you very much. General McChrystal and I just finished up three days of testimony at the US Congress in clarifying President Obama’s announced strategy that he made at West Point, the US Military Academy last week. It is nice to be sitting down here rather than up there for a change.
Very briefly, the President did, of course, announce that he was committing 30,000 additional US troops to Afghanistan, the first of which would arrive in several weeks, in Helmand Province, and over the next six months, there would be additional forces that go in primarily at Eastern-Southern Afghanistan, non-US NATO countries have announced another 6-7,000. Four quick points about this decision. First of all, with regard to the rationale, why the increase in troops. Four reasons, one is to break the Taleban momentum. They had gained momentum over the last several years. Our forces, NATO forces and Afghan national security forces will become concentrated in key population areas, mostly in southern Afghanistan, but also in eastern Afghanistan. The second reason is to try to accelerate the development of the Afghan national security forces, the army and police. The third is to provide space and time for the development of governance and economic development, points that have been made by all three of our panellists. The fourth is the signalling of resolve.
The second point, and this going very much to reinforce what the Minister Stanekzai had said, and I think also goes to support what Foreign Minister Quershi had said, that was that this is a comprehensive approach. Of course, all of the attention has been on the military deployment. That is because it has salience, politically, in all of our capitals. I want to emphasise it is a comprehensive strategy, one that includes efforts to improve and support Afghan government. It has a very focused and well-resourced effort to help improve the economy, and it has a diplomatic dimension to it.
The third point is with regard to the timeline of July 2011. The July 2011 timeline, it is a hard date, representing two points. The first is that at that date, we will begin the transition of lead security to Afghan forces. But, in fact, there are many parts of Afghanistan today where, really Afghan forces do have the lead. Kabul, for instance, has had a complete transition to Afghan security force lead. There are other areas, many of the large urban areas’ security efforts are led by the Afghan national security forces. That will mark the formal transition point, as well; it does mark the point where there will be a reduction of US forces on the ground.
The rate of that reduction will depend on conditions at that time. Security conditions and the ability of Afghan security forces to move into the lead in various areas of the country. That date also has another important significance. We believe and the Afghans believe that it has a very beneficial effect, a kind of forcing function. Of course, Afghanistan is nervous about taking the lead of security fully across the country, and the reason for that is that, given there are 30 years of history, a history which international commitments have been made and then withdrawn, given the history in which they have lived in a dangerous neighbourhood. Against that, there is a growing aspiration of the Afghans to take full charge of their security. This was reflected in President Karzai’s inauguration speech, in which he gave a timeline of five years for Afghanistan to take full responsibility for security across the country.
So, this July 2011 date is indeed a good forcing function, a catalyst for Afghan police and security forces, and for the political leadership to move forwards to get the Afghans in the lead everywhere, and the international forces pulling back to the second rank. There will be a long-term commitment from the United States of America to Afghanistan. There is a long-term commitment which has been articulated by our Secretary of State, which has to do with diplomatic commitments, developmental assistance and, of course, security assistance, to help further strengthen the Afghan forces through training and equipping programmes over time.
The last point I would make, the fourth and final point is, what are the challenges that we are going to face together, all of us, the international community, NATO ISAF, and our Afghan allies. It is three-fold. One is if our way forward is, in counter-insurgency terms, to clear, hold and build. Now we have added, clear, hold, build, transfer to Afghan control. This will be a challenge for the Afghan national security forces, the army and the police, with the ambitious timelines, but they are manageable. The second will be trying to help the Afghans establish credible governance in some of the provinces in which the insurgency has been the strongest. The third and final challenge will be the fact that, as was just made clear by the previous question, that there are areas beyond the Afghanistan border, where Afghan Taleban leadership and capabilities exist, and there is no viable means to address those as things stand.
We have clarity now, for the first time, we believe, since 2002, in what our combined mission is. We have clarity on the ways ahead, and for the first time, we have adequate resources committed against those. As I have said to our United States Congress, success is by no means guaranteed, but we have a lot of confidence now for the first time as we start to go forward here.
Lord Powell of Bayswater, Former Private Secretary and Adviser on Foreign Affairs and Defence to Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major, UK
Thank you. I listened intently to three excellent presentations, but I did not find an answer to what seems to me still the fundamental dilemma. We had a lot of very worth and very sincerely-meant sentiments about helping, about protecting, about conferences and pathways to progress and timelines and benchmarks, but I found it very hard to relate to reality. I was thinking of a story I was told by someone who has been living down in Helmand for the last 18 months, visiting a village recently recaptured from the Taleban, and asking the village elders what were the three things they most wanted. After consulting amongst themselves, they came back and said, ‘First, we want the Taleban to go away; second, we want you to go away; and third, we do not want either of you ever to come back again.’ It does seem to me that this underlies this very fundamental dilemma: how can you ever effectively help people whose highest value is to be left to their own devices. Secondly, can NATO really secure its aim of preventing Afghanistan being used as a base for terrorist operations without fundamentally alienating the Afghan people in the process? Can we ever get to General Eikenberry’s point of transfer without achieving that unfortunate result along the way?
Alexander Nicoll Director of Editorial; Editor, Strategic Survey; Editor, Strategic Comments
My question is about President Obama’s announcement that troops would begin to be withdrawing the middle of 2011, and as Ambassador Eikenberry has already eloquently explained this, but with great respect to him, would like to ask all three speakers how they interpret that part of President Obama’s announcement? What do they see as being the motivation for that announcement? How do they think it will affect security in Afghanistan, and what would they actually expect to happen as a result of that announcement?
Dr John Chipman
Minister Quershi, I know that they are questions to Minister Stanekzai and Minister Schmidt, but just Minister Quershi to answer those questions, beginning with Hilary Synnott’s point about the attitude that Pakistan has towards the Taleban in Afghanistan and how that may be distinguished, and awkwardly so, with the attitude that you have towards a so-called neo-Taleban, and addressing Lord Powell’s points as well, as to how one can safely ensure that that general area is no longer a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, when so many people in that general area see the highest value as being left alone. How can they be helped?
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi
Thank you, I will begin with Sir Hilary Synnott’s question. As I said, identity of views is important. I meant, not just identity of views between us and the coalition forces in Afghanistan. We had to develop a consensus within Pakistan on what we were trying to do, and what we were trying to achieve. The fight was one, for the last so-many years, but when this government, the democratically elected government, came into office, we realised that it lacked political ownership, and in order to give this fight against extremism and terrorism ownership, we have to develop a national consensus. So, what did we do? We initiated a debate within Pakistan, inside and outside the Parliament, so that we evolve a strategy of our own. I think, in the last year and a half, we have successfully done so, today. It is acknowledged all over the world that today, in Pakistan, you can discern greater resolve and determination. How has that come about? It has come about because we are clearer today in our own views on what the threat is, where the threat is coming from and how we need to protect Pakistan, and Pakistan’s interests against this threat.
You have said that we differentiate between the Pakistani Taleban and the Afghan Taleban. Well, I can assure you that we do not differentiate between terrorists, and in our view, there are no good terrorists, and there are no bad terrorists. They are all alike, and they are all hurting us. Obviously, we have to prioritise, keeping in view our resources, and our priority has to be Pakistan’s interests come first. Those of that element that is hurting Pakistan has to be taken out first, and that is exactly what we are doing. What we are realising, the increasing mix between the two, and I think that differentiation, with the passage of time, is evaporating in Pakistan.
Coming to the question of the troop withdrawal, how do we see it? I think since the announcement of the new strategy, it has been to some extent qualified, and as Ambassador Eikenberry has just said, that the rate of reduction would be determined in line with the ground situation. Obviously, if the ground situation improves quicker, the reduction would be faster. If you feel that there are more challenges still to be confronted, you will have to calibrate accordingly. The message has to be that we are here for an objective, and that objective has to be fulfilled. We cannot just exit as we have experienced in the past, in the 1980s, where Pakistan played a significant role, helped the free world, in overcoming a challenge. Then, you packed and left without paying enough attention to the consequences, and we have suffered the consequences, and we are suffering those consequences. So, even the withdrawal has to be carefully planned and it has to be done in consultation with your partners. If you consider us partners, you have to consult us and you have to listen to us, because we feel that we understand the culture, the tribes, the traditions, the local rivalries more than you do. The more we consult each other, the better results we will get in the days to come.
On the issue of sanctuaries, you must have noticed that today, the people of Pakistan and the armed forces of Pakistan and the law enforcement forces of Pakistan are working in harmony, in co‑ordination, with a clear objective. We have shown results. Look at the operations, in Swat and elsewhere, and look at the successful operation we have undertaken in South Waziristan. We have a clear objective, and we are moving, I think, successfully ahead. The nation, the people, are supporting the armed forces of Pakistan. There is political support for this operation, and there is a grater resolve in the country.
We have seen some serious security challenges: innocent lives have been lost in Pakistan. We are victims, and when people complain of Mumbai, I can sympathise with that, but they have to understand that we are facing a Mumbai every second day. But, that has not weakened our resolve. Today, I think we are more determined than ever before to defeat terrorism, to defeat extremism for ourselves, because we have our own way of life, and we want to protect our way of life. We do not want the Talebanisation of Pakistan.
Dr Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs; Editor, Survival
Thank you, my question to Foreign Minister Quershi has been asked and answered, but while I have the floor, I will pose one question
to State Secretary Schmidt. You said in your remarks that the German presence in Afghanistan flowed from 11 September 2001, but you have just had elections in Germany and there is a new coalition partner that is no less sceptical about Germany’s use of military force than the Social Democrats, and maybe more so. I just wondered if I could ask you to reflect on the question of whether the strategy, the new strategy as laid out by President Obama has real sustainable support in the German public?
Richard Dalton, Associate Fellow, Chatham House
Thank you, I leave it to you to direct my question; it could be for Mr Stanekazi, or Mr Schmidt, or even Ambassador Eikenberry if he were willing. Two pieces of quick background, first the possibility of further confrontation between the United States and Iran, and secondly, in the past, some limited weapons supply to insurgents in Afghanistan. The question is, do you assess that Iran supports the Afghan and coalition strategies as they have been explained to us, or will they be chipping away at them, making them harder to achieve, and if there is any doubt about that, what should the coalition be doing about that doubt?
Dr John Chipman
To Minister Stanekzai, the questions addressed to you, and can I just add to that one question of my own? The current towards Afghanistan by ISAF, the coalition forces, is very much premised on the presumption that unless the Taleban is comprehensively defeated, degraded, there is a material risk that al-Qaeda would re-establish itself if Afghanistan. To what extent do you subscribe to the idea that a residual important presence of Taleban serves effectively as a permanent invitation to al-Qaeda to re-establish itself, or would there be a tolerable outcome in Afghanistan, where the Taleban were in control of some parts of Afghanistan, and yet there was neither an incentive nor a capability for al-Qaeda to re-organise itself in your country?
Masoom Stanekzai
Thank you, let me respond to that question regarding Helmand, whether the villages do not want the Taleban, they do not want the international forces. It depends where you are: if you are in a place where the civilian population are on the front line, between the Taleban and the coalition forces, then the people will have that answer. But there are places where people are not under that kind of threat, but the people are under the general threats that the Taleban are coming to their villages, beheading their people, cutting their nose, cutting their ears, and then there are examples where the people stand against them and say, ‘We do not want the Taleban’. All of these efforts depend on how we can provide protection for the people. When there was broader discussion with some of the elements who joined with the peace process, they were asked three questions. The first question would be: ‘Whether the government and international security forces provided the protection, so that the other element of Taleban and al-Qaeda would not come and behead us?’ The second question was: ‘Whether, if we joined with the peace process, the different security agencies operating in Afghanistan would not take us into custody?’ The third question was, ‘If we join, where are the jobs? How can we support our families?’ There are ways that we can address those problems, but it is complex, we should not expect that we can do it only military means.
Coming to the question about the implication of President Obama’s announcement in relation to the phrase that the international forces
will start the withdrawal in June 2011. I think one should note four points. Firstly, I think that there was some concern in the general public, whether they will leave us again, and that was a source of public concern. The second issue was with the Taleban; they will say, ‘Hey, time is on our side. The US will leave; we will wait until that time and we will start coming back’. That was the threat received from that side. Thirdly, it was a message to those countries who had concerns about the presence of international forces for a long time in Afghanistan, and I think it was a signal to those countries that the US will not stay forever in that country, and that is not for occupation. I think that was a positive message that was delivered to them. Fourthly, that was the explanation that the condition under which the international security forces would start to withdraw. That was based on some condition, the condition where the ground reality would allow them to start the withdrawal. There was a formal explanation by the Secretary of State, by the Congress and different people from the US government, that explained thoroughly that that commitment of the US is not the same commitment that the Afghan felt when they were left in the 1990s, on their own, so I think that gives a balanced message, and that balanced message will be useful in terms of: yes, there is a commitment, but at the same time, there is challenge.
Coming to the other question regarding the possibility of support of the government of Iran to the insurgency or to the weapons supply or those issues. I think Iran has played a very constructive role during the Bonn process. That is acknowledged by the governments of the international community, and that is a very welcome idea. Iran is contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and as a neighbour, it has a great role to play. Iran is suffering from the same phenomenon of insecurity in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan becomes insecure, it is quite clear that the insecurity can go beyond the border and that will make the security situation in our neighbourhood more difficult. More importantly, I think Iran is suffering more than any other country from the drug trade.
Those are some of the common grounds that will help; there are reports. Maybe they are not from the official side, there are drugs traders operating on both sides of the border; they might provide some cooperation between the drug elements and also between the insurgency, but as far as the government of Iran has supported the efforts of peace building in Afghanistan. I think we are optimistic for more and better cooperation, and working in bringing stability in Afghanistan.
Christian Schmidt
I think your observation, Lord Powell, your observation is right. If, after eight years, we are in a situation that quantity in terms of presence, can switch into quality. So, in the sense that we should be aware that military commitment remains part of the solution, instead of part of the problem. So, I would not say that in 2011, this would be the end. I understand, Ambassador Eikenberry, that this is the peak of military commitment, and if we would not manage in the years ahead, to hand over to Afghan authority and security structures, we would have to prove that we are failing. I do not see that if we have not achieved any improvement in five years, that we could do it better in this time.
I know that in Kosovo, we are there for 10 years, and for the first time, last year, I had a very strange experience. It is very seldom that Generals are saying to politically responsibility people that they have too many soldiers. I had this experience in Kosovo, and at the same moment, we reflect that the presence in Kosovo is now longer than World War I and World War II collectively. So, I think that there is a limitation, by time, that gives us the opportunity to act as part of the solution.
The second question, Dr Allin, about the Obama announcement and the new coalition partners. As a new coalition partner, I am representing the Christian Democrats. The Liberals have a very long tradition in foreign policy: Hans Dietrich Genscher, Klaus Kinkle and some others, have done work in foreign policy in our country. So, we have felt that in our coalition negotiations, that there is a lot of responsibility in understanding that it is not just outgoing in the next years, but with a commitment to go out successfully. I think that, as I have said, a necessity or it is obvious that there should be more commitment, that we are prepared to contribute to this increase commitment in Afghanistan, in due time.
I agree with your comments on Iran. We have not the assessment that Iran does not have the possibility or the perspective to take advantage of this comprehensive understanding. I will just come back to our national discussion, the comprehensive understanding that is mirrored in President Obama’s present strategy. It comes very close to our understanding. I think that the advantages for Iran to contribute in whichever way to such a strategy as more in the sense of the country and the neighbours than any opposition, so somehow, it is stabilisation, contribution of Iran to Afghanistan. What we expect is maybe, not to come back to what we have discussed this morning, but if Foreign Secretary’s comments on the necessity to co-operate and to talk and to have regional co-operation, this could be one example where we could work on this together.
Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry
Just following on from what you had raised about Taleban presence in Afghanistan. The ultimate objective of our strategy, the first principle, is the denial of Afghanistan for any kind of safe-haven or foothold for al-Qaeda or other international terrorists. In order to achieve that, two things have to happen. First of all, Afghanistan has to feel safe within the region. Secondly, the government of Afghanistan needs the wherewithal to provide for the security of its own people, not through 30,000 additional US forces, or 37,000 additional NATO forces; it is the government of Afghanistan being able to provide for the security of its own people.
When that point is reached, when they are able to deliver that security, can there still be violence in small parts of Afghanistan? Is it still possible that a severely degraded Taleban is still fighting the government of Afghanistan, in parts of the country? I would assume that it is possible, even as political efforts are going on, to continue finally to defeat Taleban, or for them to be fully reintegrated into the society of Afghanistan. The point is that this condition cannot exist with al-Qaeda having no prospects of getting a foothold back into Afghanistan.
Dr John Chipman
Thank you very much. We have had an extraordinarily rich day of statement, debate, questions, answers and I want to thank all this panellists in this fourth plenary for their presentations and all of you for having contributed so much to this debate.
