Dr John Chipman
Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar, thank you very much for your presentation. I think that your call for what I would style an 'inspired pragmatism', to construct what you referred to as a 'strong status quo extra', drawing on a wider and more inclusive definition of the Gulf region is one which I am sure everyone in this room will welcome.
We have a good 30 minutes. We want to bring together the strands of the debate. We have already a dozen people who have volunteered to do so. If I do not call on some of you, it is only because I am exercising a form of conference affirmative action, ensuring those who have not yet had a chance to speak do so in this final session.
William Cohen, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Cohen Group; former Secretary of Defense
Thank you, John, and, General Petraeus, let me thank you for your extraordinary military career and contribution to the security of the USA, our allies and the entire region. You enjoy great support from President Obama and also from the Congress of the USA, and so your reputation and recommendations carry great weight. They have in the past and they will in the future.
President Obama has described the war in Iraq as a 'war of choice' – an ill-advised choice that was made in the past but, notwithstanding, thanks to the perseverance and tenacity of the USA, its allies and all the forces in the region, we now are able to talk about Iraq as being an emerging, stable democracy. In fact, in one of our breakout sessions, Iraq was described becoming an economic power in the region. You have outlined all of the success that has been achieved, in terms of the reduction of violence, notwithstanding the spikes that have occurred from time to time, and the great economic progress, but privately I have discussed this with a number of people and there is concern that the high praise or high-fives and the blaring of trumpets is a bit premature and may serve as a cover for what would be an earlier departure from Iraq. As a matter of fact, Secretary Gates has spoken publicly about the prospect that so much progress is being made that we might be able to accelerate the departure from Iraq from its current timetable.
I have two questions. Firstly, would you be in a position to indicate that you, as a military commander, if you were satisfied that the situation were not as stable as everyone assumes it will be by the departure date, would recommend the USA to continue to make a military contribution of some significant size if necessary, to the President and to the Congress? Secondly, yesterday we devoted a good deal of time to the discussion of Iran's nuclear ambitions, in terms of whether they are benign or are on the path to creating nuclear weapons capability. Could you give us the benefit of your insight as to what it would mean for the strategic consequences of Iran, should it develop a nuclear weapons capability?
Lord Powell, Former Private Secretary and Adviser on Foreign Affairs and Defence to Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major
My question is really just an addendum to that last question. What does General Petraeus think Gulf States should do? What sort of support can the USA and the European allies reasonably look for from the Gulf States in confronting the challenge which Iran seems to represent in that area?
Nader Mousavizadeh, Consulting Senior Fellow, IISS
On the question of Iran, General Petraeus, can you see a situation where the current regime can be included in a regional security architecture broad enough to include both Iran and the USA? If so, how do you see the regime's post-election crisis of legitimacy affecting such a prospect?
Dr Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS
General Petraeus, could you reflect for us on the useful lessons of your experience in Iraq for Afghanistan, and also the comparative involvement in interference and influence of Iran in Iraq and then Iran and Afghanistan?
Participant, UAE
I would like to pick on the saying by General Petraeus that your success is our success. While we like this saying, we do not like the flipside – your failure is not our failure. I think at this moment in US performance and presence in the region, we see more failure than success, in light of your not-so-convincing performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think we see that you are overstretched militarily in the region. We see that you are involved in so many activities, but your delivery is not very credible, and we always remind ourselves that the USA came with the doctrine that you could engage in two wars and win, and it seems that you are not winning in either of these two regional wars. Do you see a feeling in the region, a prevailing perception, that there is a credibility gap when it comes to the USA's performance that makes people in the region distance themselves from your failure?
Dr Mohamed Al Rumaihi, Editor in Chief, Awan newspaper; Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University; Advisor to HH The Prime Minister
Mr Al Anisi, we heard yesterday from Mr Feltman that there is no concrete evidence that the Iranians are involved in a Hawthis insurgency. Do the Yemeni officials have any concrete evidence of their commitment, participation or assistance of the Iranians to Hawthis?
Hatem Bamehriz, Director, Somalia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)
My first question is to Dr Abdul Ghaffar: Sheikh Khalid and many of the Gulf leaders have expressed a need to have the region represented at the table of 5+1 and the Iran dialogue. While many would agree with such a rationale, my question is, what would the GCC bring to the table that is substantial and different and more than just the concerns that have already been expressed? Secondly, to Mr Al Anisi. Since he spoke in Arabic, I will speak in Arabic.
[Arabic: Mr. Al-Anisi, you spoke about that fact that Iran accepts or welcomes a dialogue with Yemen during the dialogue in Arabic, and that this dialogue will focus on the role of Iran with the Houthis and the sixth war in Yemen. The question is: will this dialogue be restricted to Yemen and Iran only, or will the Gulf Cooperation Council be a party in this dialogue, especially since Saudi Arabia has entered into the war as an interested party? What are the general agreed principles for commencing a dialogue, if indeed there has been an agreement on a dialogue? Thank you].
Dr Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs; Editor, Survival
My question is to General Petraeus. One of the clear themes of President Obama's speech at West Point was a recognition of certain limits in the USA's economic, political and strategic reach. That was, I think, what his discussion at the beginning of a transition in 2011 in Afghanistan was couched in, and the President's critics have complained that this is signalling a lack of resolve – our enemies know that they can just wait us out. It occurs to me that you have, in the Iraq experience associated with the surge, considerable experience in trying to turn a situation around in the midst of very divisive debate in the USA and an expression of resignation about what can be accomplished, so I wonder if you could compare those two situations.
Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori, President, Dubai Consultancy Research and Media Centre
Firstly, Mr Al Anisi, I know that you had a programme to negotiate with different terrorist groups and extremists before, which had worked. I think [inaudible] was involved, five or six years ago, in negotiating with al-Qaeda and al-Hawthis at that time. What was the outcome? Why has this not worked yet? What are the real reasons for the emergence or re-emergence of al-Hawthis since that programme, which was, I think, an excellent programme, according to the reports we used to get with coordination with Yemen and from the media. Are there internal or external reasons for their emergence? Also, whatever al-Hawthis are doing right now – are they fulfilling the goals of al-Qaeda, and is that why al-Qaeda right now is not very active? What are you doing to prevent their re-emergence again there?
General Petraeus, there is a general feeling that wherever the USA goes – we have the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan – becomes an attraction for international terrorists. It is like a safe haven for them, and then they grow. Lately, their influence is getting much bigger. Also, in your speech, you mentioned the phrase 'Greater Middle East'. If we are talking about structuring the security of the Middle East, is it not much easier to have the normal Middle East right now, to manage it in a way that to structure the security system, coordinating with different countries, and within each country you have different approaches and organisations for security. Why do you have to expand it and include more problems, which we have not even solved on a small scale? Finally, are these coordination efforts involving other countries from the region or only the general feeling that we have that it is more of a US strategy and a US way of coordinating efforts? Are you involving other countries to have their say?
Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia; Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security; Editor, Adelphis;
Corresponding Director for Military Information and Analysis, IISS
My question is for Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar. If the logical and ideal arrangement you envisage were to be established – in other words, an institutional arrangement involving the GCC states, Iran, Iraq and also extra-regional interested parties, how could it be ensured that this could perform a useful role in proactive terms in regional security? I wonder if it might be useful to look at the extensive security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, which has caused widespread disappointment because of its ineffectiveness and lack of substantive contribution. Indeed, there is such a inclusive regional security institution in the Asia-Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum, which has been specifically criticised for contributing little in the areas of preventative diplomacy, conflict resolution and so on.
Dr John Chipman
Thank you very much. I will start with Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar, move to Chairman Anisi, and then conclude with General Petraeus.
Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar, what do you say to the realism of Dr Huxley's pessimism about too large a regional security infrastructure?
Dr Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar
I think in my remarks I mentioned from my point of view two perspectives. I did not want to call the first 'ideal'. In the draft of my remark, I put 'ideal', then I changed my mind, took it out and put 'logical'. That is why I explained what logical means. This is a sort of aspiration that it will be like an ideal arrangement. I know that this is not possible now. That is why I emphasised in my remarks that now we have to strengthen the current arrangements, and I used the concept 'Gulf security status quo plus' or 'status quo extra', by which I meant the concept of dual engagement of Iran and Iraq. Undoubtedly, Iran and Iraq are two important countries of the region and, one way or the other, they should be involved. At this moment, we cannot structure or build an ideal or logical perspective for Gulf security because of a lot of problems and challenges that we know. The region is not ready. That is why I am advocating strengthening the current arrangements with 'status quo extra' or 'plus'. That is a dual engagement of Iran and Iraq, gradually. There are a lot of types of relationships that are going on between the GCC, for example, Iraq and Iran, USA and Iraq, GCC and other countries. I am well aware that idealism cannot be implied, but we should look forward that Iran can be involved one way or another. It cannot be in a short time. I remember the Cold War time, when we used to speak about the pillars of security in the Gulf. I always used to say that we had pillars without a ceiling. Although Iran was pro-West at the time, still the GCC used to have problems with Iran. I am very well aware that it is not easy, but let us work together. It is important that contacts and arrangements for the types of security which will be achievable can be working
Ali Muhammad Al Anisi
[Arabic: Many thanks for the questions. There are three questions, and perhaps there will be one connected answer to the questions posed by Mr. Aziz Mohammed al-Rumaihi, Hatim Bamahraz and Ahmed al-Mansouri.
The discussion on the evidence surrounding the Iranian involvement in the Houthi issue in Yemen. We have, of course, taken care not to allow the discussion of this evidence or these proofs to take place through the media, as the media will have its own explanations and its own clarifications and will take the matter further than we imagine, and perhaps we will ask ourselves at that time, ‘What now? What now after these media reports?’ However, I want to confirm here that there are pieces of evidence and proofs which confirm that there is a clear Iranian involvement in this issue or in this problem and this matter.
As we all know, the trial of two espionage networks have taken place in the past, and confessions affirmed the involvement of this network which includes Yemeni elements and has direct contact with brothers in Iran and also had direct contact with the Houthis. Legal sentences were passed and these sentences were announced. There is another, third, network which is under investigation, and there are indications of extraordinary confessions, but I do not wish to publicise them until the legal reports have been completed, and they point to many of the indicators which affirm this involvement.
Alalam News and Radio Tehran are both official media channels which try day and night to give a false picture of this war and manufacture much of the information, news, pictures and montage which gives a different picture of this insurgent terrorist group. Moreover, Friday sermons, which are also official speeches, have regularly started to point to the problems faced by the Shi'ites in Yemen, although this name does not exist in Yemen: there is neither Shia, nor Sunni in Yemen. Besides the last ship which was seized in the harbour of Midi, which is near the frontier to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and near the region of al-Malahiz belonging to the Governorate of Sa'dah. When this ship was investigated with its crew, their confessions pointed to the fact that they were on their way to the Caspian Sea, and the Caspian Sea is at a great distance from this region. All these pieces of evidence or proofs or indicators point to the fact that there is an Iranian involvement. I said previously that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have a hand in this incitement, understanding that all states, i.e. the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab states, the states of the Islamic world, the European Union and the United States of America condemn the insurgency which is taking place in the Governorate of Sa'dah.
As to welcoming a dialogue or the fact that there is a dialogue with the Iranian side, our brothers in the Islamic Republic of Iran asked for a consultation to take place, i.e. secondary evidence. Of course, this idea was not accepted and we did not seek this dialogue and there has not even been any contact with the aim of commencing this dialogue. Of course, there have been previous attempts on the basis of opening the door to mediation by a third party. We have had experiences throughout the five previous wars, and we are now in the sixth war. These experiences included many initiatives and decisions to offer a general amnesty, and they also included permission for members of the group to express their opinion and to form a political party like other parties and to belong to the opposition, but they exploited all these initiatives and strove to expand, spread, dig trenches and also to obtain and try to gather arms and confront the armed forces and security forces and police stations by means of attacks and blockading roads, making this war a national necessity in the view of the people.
For this reason, the overwhelming popular desire to end this war and not to accept any mediators has been confirmed. We have accepted internal mediators and we have accepted mediation by Qatar and the so-called Doha Agreement. This agreement gave the Houthis the wrong impression that they had become a counterpart of the state and that they had become a movement which could not be despised. Whilst the state kept all 13 articles of this agreement, they did not keep even one article, so now we do not leave an opportunity for any type of mediation, internal or foreign, because of evidence that the Houthis believed that they can open up or expand this war and involve brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in their belief that the war is an internal war or a forgotten war. For this reason, they wished to extend the scope of the war and involve our brothers by attacking Saudi centres, and the war would become regional. However, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia became involved and tightened the blockade on them and cut off their supply routes - the supplies of victuals from certain citizens within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This was a result of the coexistence of the citizens of the two brother-countries which led to people who lived on the frontiers feeling under pressure because of their means of living being cut off, and they became one of the factors pressurising the Houthi groups to end this war and cease it in the near future.
The principle of dialogue…is there a dialogue? His Excellency, President Ali Abdullah Saleh calls for a dialogue with all political parties of the opposition and others on all national occasions. But dialogue with the Houthis as an insurgent group does not exist.
I do not understand the question if there has been any previous consultation with the so-called al-Qaeda or the Houthi group. There has not been any consultation, but there has formerly been constructive dialogue with elements of al-Qaeda and with elements who did not bear weapons and were simply deluded people whose thoughts were led astray and exploited for terrorist operations, and before they committed an act of terrorism, a dialogue took place with them. As we said in 2006 on this platform at the Manama Dialogue, the matter has caused us to encourage family stability and also to provide all manner of opportunities to make them good citizens and to help them understand the principles of orthodox Islam and the meaning of moderation and the meaning of extremism. And as I said in the 2006 Dialogue, the matter has caused us to strive for family stability, and we married off some of them, and this in fact became the subject of inquiries to the point that it caused some, after their return from here, from Doha, to Sana'a… that we received hundreds of letters asking to join al-Qaeda so that they could get married. I do not want us to follow the principle of dialogue with these Houthis again, because these Houthis are an insurgent terrorist group and there is no thought of a dialogue with them at the present time. Thank you very much.]
General David Petraeus
Thanks to Secretary Cohen for a great question. I am glad to see that so many have provided an opportunity for me to talk about Iran. Also thanks, Mr Secretary, for all that you did as a senator for many years and then, indeed, as our secretary of defence. As all here know, he is one of those very rare individuals who served with one party in Congress and in the executive branch with another – so the true representation of bipartisanship. With respect to Iraq, in fact I tried to paint in my remarks the fact that there has not only been substantial progress, but obviously that there are substantial challenges remain. It was Ambassador Crocker and I, who used to caution that, while there has been substantial progress, hold off on the high fives and the victory dances and keep the champagne bottles in the back of the refrigerator, because that progress is indeed fragile and reversible. For what is worth the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoshyar Zebari is not in agreement with that assessment. I think the Iraqi leadership is generally quite realistic about that as well.
Having said that, that progress is real; it is substantial. I will expand on that when I answer the gentleman from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who offered a different view. We made plenty of mistakes in Iraq; we tried to learn from those mistakes. We tried to be an organisation both military and civil/military in its efforts. Ambassador Crocker is the greatest diplomatic partner any general could ever have and together we tried to be a learning organisation, to adapt and to constantly assess how we were doing with our partners and other coalition members to make the necessary adjustments. It is a fact that the level of violence has been reduced by more than 90%.
We need to remember what Iraq was like when we started the surge. There were more than 53 dead bodies every day just in Bagdad on average in the month of December. That, by the way, is just from sectarian violence; there were also dead bodies from other forms of violence. In fact it was generally difficult just to keep track of them, because of the sheer stacking up of bodies in the morgues and hospitals. There were also more than 200 attacks at one point in the spring of 2007. In recent months there have been less than 20 or even 15 attacks per day. In the entire month of November there were less than 100 violent civilian deaths. I suspect that is well below the level of civilian deaths per capita in many of the major cities of the world.
There have been the horrific, sensational attacks by al‑Qaeda to try to make a statement, but their capability and indeed the capability of the militia and Shia extremist elements is again substantially reduced. That has allowed the kind of progress that you have seen there, but again there are challenges. Just to assure you that, in accordance with my pledge at my conformation hearing, I did indeed provide my best, professional, military advice to President Obama and the President’s security team during the deliberations on Iraq. I should note that it was very much listened to; I did the same thing on Afghanistan and I would do it again if circumstances required it.
With respect to insights on a nuclear‑armed Iraq, of course some pretty significant challenges would be provided by that, not the least is that rhetoric, actions and activities have prompted at least one of the countries in the region, albeit not in the central command region, to assess this as an existential threat. Whatever that might portend, its ramification would be quite serious, as Secretary Gates has noted on a number of occasions, particularly the degree of additional assertiveness that one might see as a result of that. I also think there is a very real concern about the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, as some of the countries in the region are unlikely to allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon without having one for themselves. I think again that presents some significant challenges.
In response to the question about the Gulf States’ response to Iran, in many regards that response has manifested itself in recent years and in the last year in particular, as I alluded to in my remarks. There is much greater involvement of the countries in the region in bilateral or multilateral air and missile defence endeavours to protect critical infrastructure, in operations to interdict illegal arms smuggling, to disrupt proxy elements and also to pursue various diplomatic initiatives to be part of international efforts, while also recognising that, if diplomacy does not succeed, that other measures, sanctions and beyond, have to be contemplated and plans made.
Could the current Iranian regime be included in a security regime? I think this question relies on the answer to whether or not you think Iran, to use international relations theory terms, is a status‑quo power, a power that is reasonably satisfied with the distribution of power in the region or is a revolutionary power in more than its title. If you assume the latter, then I think you have answered the question as to whether or not there could be a co‑operative endeavour in a security regime.
There was a question about the impact of the elections. There is a concern about a country that was a theocracy and has become a bit more of a ‘thugocracy’ with the hijacked elections and the people’s response to them, the demonstrations, the enormous support on the streets for the reformers and the opposition to these hijacked elections. More than ever before the Iranian leadership had to turn to the elements of the security apparatus, in particular the Revolutionary Guards and other military groups, to retain control of the situation and indeed to be quite thuggish in dealing with those individuals who were expressing their dissatisfaction with the situation. That in itself presents difficulties. You see the growth of the control of various levers of power in Iran being increased and the movement of the security forces into economic areas as well. All of that creates difficulties for those countries that have sought to reach out a hand to Iran and find a willing partner on the other end.
There was a question about what Iran did in Iraq versus Afghanistan. With respect to the latter, in general Iranian involvement in Afghanistan has been to provide what I think could be described as a modest of lethal support, weapons, arms, training and money to the Taliban in western Afghanistan, enough to cause problems for the ISAF and in Afghanistan in general, but not so much as to enable the Taliban to succeed. Needless to say it is not in Iran’s interest, a Shia‑led state’s interest, to see a Sunni extremist, ultra conservative movement once again take control of Afghanistan and then presumably allow some of its transnational extremist partners in this nexus between these different groups to return to Afghanistan.
In Iraq on the other hand there has been very substantial provision of money, arms, training, explosives and even direction to various militia elements and other extremist groups, although again that has been reduced significantly since those groups were quite substantially defeated in the battles of March and April 2008 in Basra, when Prime Minister Malaki ordered the Iraqi security forces into Basra and then the subsequent engagements that took place in eastern Bagdad and other places in Bagdad and southern Iraq. There has also been a very substantial involvement, what some people label soft power, as Iraq has sought to corner the market to get great control of the religious tourist industry in Iraq. This is a very big endeavour with tens of thousands of religious pilgrims coming to Iraqi cities during the important religious holidays of the year. It is that flow of religious pilgrims that has prompted Bahrain, for example, to open a consulate in Najaf for Iraq to have a major international airport developed in Najaf.
Having said all of this, Iraq has always sought to have a constructive relationship with the country that is to its east and we supported our Iraqi partners as they sought to do that. They have to have a relationship, but what the Iraqis want to do is not to have outsiders meddling in their domestic, political affairs or trying to control one economic sector or another or to make them overly dependent on their neighbour for some item or other.
In terms of lessons from Iraq for Afghanistan, I think firstly there is the caution as always, that every situation is unique. It has its own context and its own specific circumstances. Having said that, in countering an insurgency, you have to focus on providing security for the people and as we conducted the surge in Iraq, it was not just a surge of 30,000 forces; it was a surge of ideas, a fundamental change in focus of the coalition and Iraqi forces from transitioning tasks to the Iraqis to securing the population. That was an enormous shift. In Bagdad alone with our Iraqi partners we created more than 77 additional locations at which we had forces, so that we could truly put into operation the idea that, if you want to secure the people, you have to live with them. Beyond that there was the idea of a comprehensive approach. You have to go at a problem as big as an insurgency in a number of different ways, not just the conventional focus on increasing the security of the population, but also by countering terrorism, going after leaders who will never be reconciled and they, therefore have to be killed, captured or run out of the area; by pursuing reconciliation and supporting and embracing it; supporting the development of host nation security forces and enabling local forces to participate in and be mobilised for their own security such as the community defence initiative in Afghanistan.
We have tried to take the lessons we learned in Iraq and to understand the situation in a highly nuanced fashion, village by village and valley by valley, because that is how initiatives such as reintegration and reconciliation will take place in Afghanistan, but to understand that situation and then use those lessons with that understanding very much in mind.
With respect to the gentleman from the UAE, who commented on the not so convincing performance in Iraq, that is obviously a viewpoint I would not share, given the metrics and statistics I have already mentioned about the developments in Iraq, although I will very freely recognise the additional challenges that exist there, as indeed would Minister Zebari. The situation in Afghanistan has certainly deteriorated; there has been a resurgence of the Taliban and clearly there has to be more work done there and that is indeed why the United States is committing 30,000 additional forces, more money and more civilian elements as well.
As to a credibility gap, I find that a bit puzzling candidly, because I find a warmer embrace than ever before in the region. There is a term called giving them the Heisman. This is a football trophy that was awarded last night. The trophy has a football player with a football under one arm and a hand out blocking a would‑be tackler with the other. A couple of years ago, as you went around the region to pursue various initiatives, you got the Heisman from a lot of the partners here. I can tell you the Heisman has turned into an embrace. The recruiting officer responsible for that is President Ahmadinejad and the other leaders from Iran. The countries in the region are not flocking to Iran; they are flocking to the countries from the West. The fact is there were no Patriot missile batteries a couple of years ago in the Gulf countries. In the Gulf countries US Patriot missile batteries are now eight and counting. Shared early warning in the past year alone has multiplied enormously, so have a variety of command and control initiatives. With respect I would look at the Emirates themselves and the fact that there is $18 billion worth of business there in just the past year just with the United States, $9 billion from foreign military sales and $9 billion in direct commercial sales. There is a reason why they are buying US and we think it is because the products are quite good. The fact is that, because of those purchases and because of training and assistance and some great investment in human capital in the Emirates, the Emirates’ air force itself could take out the entire Iranian air force, I believe, given that it has somewhere around, depending on how many are in the United States at the time, 70 Block 60 F‑16 fighters, which are better than the United States Air Force USAF fighters. They may not be better than the F‑22s, but they are better than our own F‑16 fighters, much to General Hostage’s dismay, as he is a frustrated former F‑16 pilot I think.
Beyond that, where do you send your kids to university; which universities are now in the Gulf States? By and large, in the different states I think the answer is fairly obvious.
With respect to recognition of limits on US abilities, I think that was in a quite realistic portion of President Obama’s speech. I do not think that was a lack of resolve at all. I felt that he sent two messages. One was resolve – 30,000 forces, civilians, equipment and money, accompanied by commitments from other countries, but there is an undeniable sense of urgency in that as well and I think he tried to convey both of those messages in a very sensible way. By the way, to those who will occasionally quote it back to me, as the commander in Iraq I said that everything had to be conditions based. That is correct and again that was part of President Obama’s speech. I would remind people that when I testified before Congress in September 2007, I did state that we would start to draw down our forces in December 2007 and that we would also begin a conditions‑based process of transitioning security tasks to Iraqi security force leaders.
I just want to reassure you that the Greater Middle East is largely a figure of speech. We are not trying to construct any architecture for a Greater Middle East. We are pursuing as always a variety of bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The truth is we would love to see more multilateral partnerships than the many bilateral partnerships that exist. It is impressive and heartening to see the handful of GCC exercises and other statements about GCC co‑ordination. We certainly welcome and hope to see more of that, while noting that at this point in terms of security effectiveness and truly significant military partnerships, there is still room for improvement to put it mildly.
Dr John Chipman
General Petraeus, I was more than happy to give you virtually all of my time, because I think all of those remarks were enormously valuable and clarified a number of points and questions that were raised. I do want to thank you and Dr Mohammed Al Ghaffar and Chairman Al Anisi for your tremendous presentations and discussions today and begin to draw this 6th Manama Dialogue to a close.
Firstly, I would like to give extremely generous thanks to the Kingdom of Bahrain for the personal support that we have been given by His Majesty King Hamad, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, the extraordinary efforts of the office of the Crown Prince, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Bahrain defence forces and very many other departments and agencies of government for this truly national effort by the Kingdom of Bahrain to support this Manama Dialogue process. We thank you all very warmly and we know Dr Mohammed Al Ghaffar that you will bring our thanks to the highest levels of this kingdom’s leadership.
I also want to thank the staff of the International Institute for Strategic Studies for their help. We talk a great deal here about 6+2, 6+1, 6+3. We have a group of 11: Mark Allworthy, Eleanor Pitt, Becca Wasser, Kate Floyd, Neil Goodman, Katie Shrimpton, Richard Saunders, Stuart Newton, Nick Moody, James Howarth and Sarah Grant and all 11 of those have supported these 28 government delegations and 360 participants and issued the 4,000 to 5,000 different forms and passes we had to issue to make this event work. I thank them very much.
I would also like to thank very much the personnel and staff of the Ritz Carlton Hotel. I am sure we would thank them all the more warmly if we had been able to maintain our body temperatures exactly as we would have liked. The air cooling has been very powerful during these last two days. I apologise to those who may have contracted a minor cold, but I can assure that next year we will have regulated the system of air cooling in the Ritz Carlton Hotel to perfection. This is an organisation, like ours, that wants to do things absolutely right every time around and I thank the Ritz Carlton for all their efforts in accommodating us and also the staff of the very many other hotels that have been engaged in supporting this.
Let me just conclude with one remark. Our effort in creating and nurturing the Manama Dialogue is genuinely to develop an informal, regional security arrangement for this area. We hope that the very informality of the Manama Dialogue paradoxically allows for much bolder and more ambitious policy innovation and collaboration. In this Dialogue we have heard a number of proposals that might not have been floated so easily in a formal institution. The fact that no‑one is obliged to agree a final summit communiqué gives more time, we believe, in the private bilateral and many multilateral meetings that take place during the Manama Dialogue on the sidelines of this affair to advance serious policies and plan for future official exchanges.
Our experiences at the International Institute for Strategic Studies from the Shangri‑La Dialogue in Singapore are that by about the seventh year the seeds we planted for institutional development really fully flower. These dialogues are not feats of engineering, but of horticulture and their development is organic. The habits of diplomatic consultation that this series of dialogues has attempted to inculcate have now become happily more entrenched and I celebrate the strength of participation from military and diplomatic circles that continues to deepen here at the Manama Dialogue. The frankness of discussion at this sixth Manama Dialogue contrasts so much with the diffidence one might normally expect in treating these very sensitive security issues.
We at the IISS, very much in collaboration with the Kingdom of Bahrain, look forward to the seventh Manama Dialogue in 2010 and as I indicated on Friday, from our regional office here in Bahrain, we will consult throughout 2010 with all the key regional states to ensure the agenda of the 2010 Manama Dialogue corresponds to regional defence and diplomatic requirements and perspectives. We will bring senior officials together from regional states during the year and from the key outside powers and travel to all the GCC and neighbouring states to consult with ministers and military leaderships. The ISS looks forward to hosting in 2010 with the Kingdom of Bahrain again some 28 countries led by ministers for these important debates of security issues.
Our provisional dates, to be confirmed in the New Year, for the 2010 Manama Dialogue are Friday 10 December to 12 December 2010. I look forward to seeing you all in about 12 months’ time and many times between now and then. In the meantime, may I thank all of you for your tremendously vigorous participation, for the tribute you pay to the Manama Dialogue by your presence here and wish you a safe trip home and a happy and prosperous New Year. Thank you very much.
