As Prepared:
IISS Manama Dialogue 2009
Panel on Regional Security Architecture
13 December 2009
General David H. Petraeus
Well, good morning. ASALAM ALEKUM. MARHABA. SABAH AL KHAIR. CHUKRUN JAZEELAN
It’s great to be with you all and a pleasure to be on a panel with these two distinguished colleagues. And well done, as always, John and Team IISS for organizing a terrific conference that once again addresses wonderfully topical issues.
I’d also like to add my thanks to those of the other speakers to his majesty King Hamad and His Royal Highness Sheikh Salman for hosting us so superbly. Indeed, those of us in US Central Command are especially appreciative not just of another example of typical Bahraini hospitality, but also of the strong and longstanding bond between Bahrain and the United States – a bond that dates back to when an American Hospital opened its doors to provide medical services here one hundred and fifteen years ago. Needless to say, the relationship with Bahrain has evolved considerably since that time – particularly in recent decades, during which Bahrain has developed so impressively and during which time our partnership has blossomed so significantly as well.
The same has also, of course, been true of our relationships with the other countries in the region. It was just sixty-four years ago that President Franklin Roosevelt made a historic journey from war-torn Europe to meet King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake. There, the two of them established a foundation for US engagement in the greater Middle East that has stood the test of time and evolved in response to the ever changing dynamics in the region.
Thirty years ago, President Jimmy Carter described the vital US interests in the Gulf region and, in so doing, established a doctrine that bore his name. And one year later, the US military established a rapid deployment joint task force to defend the interests that President Carter described. That task force evolved into the command I’m privileged to lead today, responsible for an area of 20 countries stretching from Egypt in the west to Pakistan in the east, and from Kazakhstan in the north to the waters off Somalia in the south. This command is, of course, a very tangible representation of the United States’ continued, long-term commitment to the security and prosperity of this region. Indeed, today there are over 230,000 US Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, and tens of thousands of Defense Department civilians deployed in the Central Command area of responsibility and working, together with our US diplomatic counterparts, with our partners and allies in the region.
With that in mind, this morning I’ll begin by describing in general terms the security partnerships based on common interests that make up the regional security architecture in which Central Command is involved today. From there, I’ll move on to discuss the continued commitment of the United States to Iraq, an area where so many of our interests overlap. And finally, I’ll discuss the expansion of the efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, leaving plenty of time for questions.
THE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
As I mentioned in this forum last year, the most pressing security challenges in the region include transnational extremist groups and states that pursue destabilizing actions. Those are the challenges on which we all focus our efforts, recognizing that, in some cases, there are combinations of such transnational groups and states pursuing destabilizing actions that are of particular concern. Indeed, the nexus of transnational and state-centric challenges – where states support militia proxies or extremist elements in other countries in an effort to weaken legitimate governments – that nexus is of particular concern to virtually every country in the region, as well as to those outside it.
But, as I also noted last year, such challenges – as well as the many interests we share in common – have in turn helped to promote cooperation. The best catalysts for partnership initiatives, in fact, have been leaders of transnational extremist elements and leaders of states seen as seeking to destabilize their neighbors and to expand their power. The resulting cooperation has taken many forms, as demonstrated in the past year alone by substantially increased interest in, and commitment to, activities in the following areas: air and ballistic missile defense, shared early warning, counter-terrorism, maritime freedom of navigation and counter-piracy, counter proliferation, sharing of a common operational picture, and whole of governments approaches to countering extremism. In fact, there have been significant developments in each of these areas – and in several others – in the past year. And, in truth, a number of countries in the region that used to keep CENTCOM at arm’s length in certain of these areas have, more recently, embraced CENTCOM programs in response to growing concerns over mutual threats that have evolved during that time. This development has also been reflected in the past year by growth in a number of operations, exercises, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements.
Indeed, as we have interacted with various partners, we have seen further development not just in multilateral and coalition operations and activities, but also of the concept that I described last year – multi-bilateralism – the process by which CENTCOM has sought to integrate bilateral activities to achieve multilateral effects. We see this in particular in certain key areas – especially in shared early warning, air and missile defense, and achievement of a common operational picture. Needless to say, integrating the capabilities of individual countries in these areas with which we have bilateral activities has been a key example of situations in which the whole ends up being larger than the sum of the parts – and it is these activities and the others I highlighted that comprise the regional security architecture that has evolved so considerably since I spoke here last year.
To be sure, considerable work does remain to pursue our common interests and develop our partnerships further. And, again, as we cooperate in each of these areas, we continue to strengthen the evolving security architecture, which is, of course, firmly rooted in our shared interests and perceptions of common threats.
IRAQ
One significant goal we all share is continued progress toward security, prosperity, and stability in Iraq. Indeed, the situation there has improved enormously since we conducted the surge; however, as the attacks this past week reminded us, Iraq continues to face numerous challenges. Nonetheless, we do believe that as US forces draw down from our current strength in Iraq of some 115,000 troopers to 50,000 by the end of next August, Iraqi Security Forces, now nearly 700,000 strong, will continue the process of taking on their country’s security missions and will do so successfully.
Certainly there are, again, periodic indicators that Al Qaeda-Iraq and other Sunni extremist elements, as well as residual Shia militia and Iranian-sponsored extremist elements, retain the ability to execute attacks. We saw the barbaric hand of Al Qaeda, again, most recently last week, when a series of horrific attacks took place in Baghdad. Despite these attacks, however, we must remember that Iraqi forces have made considerable progress throughout the course of this year and since US combat forces moved out of Iraqi cities on 1 July. Indeed, the number of violent civilian deaths recorded last month, in November, was the lowest of any month since liberation, as was the number of car bomb and suicide attacks and the number of attacks in general. In fact, overall levels of violence have been reduced over 90% since the late spring of 2007, and that reduction continued throughout this year. In the late spring of 2007, for example, when Iraqi data is included, there were well over 200 attacks per day on average. In recent months, that number has typically been well under 20 per day – and it has been under 15 per day, on average, in the past month or so. In fact, it appears that Al Qaeda has explicitly recognized that it lacks the capability to carry out the normal level of attacks they’d been conducting and has chosen instead to conduct periodic horrific high profile attacks such as those we saw on 19 August, 25 October, and a few days ago. Those terrible attacks notwithstanding, levels of violence in Iraq have, again, gone down very substantially even as the US has drawn down its forces and transitioned tasks to Iraqi Security Forces.
The security gains have, of course, enabled political, economic, and social progress. And while there have been ups and downs in these areas too, the overall trajectory has been steadily upward. Provincial elections judged free and fair by the UN were conducted by Iraqi authorities in January of this year and new provincial governments were seated in the months that followed. Most recently, an election law has been approved and parliamentary elections have been scheduled for next year. And numerous other laws and reforms have been pursued – and agreed – although, as always, more need to be addressed. Meanwhile, Iraq’s commercial activity has continued to develop, airports have been opened and expanded, major oil contracts have been issued – several in recent days, over 1200 MW of new electrical generation has been added to the grid, new hospitals and health clinics have been opened, and so on. To be sure, none of this has been easy, and more needs to be done for the Shab al-Iraqi in virtually every area. Moreover, the progress has often been accompanied by drama, emotion, and beyond last-minute negotiations and deals. But, some of that is normal, of course. It is Iraq – and I can say that, for, as you’ll recall, after all the time I spent there, ANA IRAQI. But there has been significant progress, and I am confident that Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi Security Forces will enable continued progress, although, as always, they will have to overcome innumerable challenges, just as they have had to in the past.
As we, again, move forward and draw down from our current 115,000 forces to below 50,000 by next August, the United States military remains committed to helping Iraq further strengthen its capability to secure its people, defend its territory, and secure its borders. The United States is also working with partners in the region to help foster closer relations between Iraq and its fellow Arab countries to address common threats. And I would remind my Arab brothers that if there is concern about certain influences in Iraq, then it would be wise to increase the Arab influence in that critical country.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST EXTREMISM
Beyond Iraq, we also partner with virtually all the other countries in the region, of course, in the effort to counter trans-national extremism and the terrorism it spawns. An expansion of efforts in this regard is of vital importance to all our countries, of course, as the extremist networks that threaten many countries in the region pose not just regional threats, but global ones, as well. And this awareness has led to a collective effort against extremism in this region and beyond.
That is, of course, the reason for the recently announced expansion of the international community’s campaign to address the related challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat Al Qaeda in those countries and elsewhere around the globe.
The additional 30,000 US forces that will deploy to Afghanistan in the months ahead are part of the expanded international commitment, which will also include what I have been told now is over 8,000 additional ISAF partner forces and likely will be more as we approach the London conference on Afghanistan in January. As many in this room are aware, the nations of this region are among those that have committed to increase their contributions to Afghanistan. But beyond that, of course, the 43 ISAF nations and the other countries engaged in Afghanistan are, and must be, increasingly enabled in the campaign by the Afghans themselves. As President Obama explained at West Point two weeks ago, the international forces in Afghanistan are intended to serve as a bridge and a vehicle to eventual Afghan self-sufficiency. So, in addition to reversing the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and improving security for the Afghan population, we will focus on increasing Afghanistan’s capacity in both governance and its security forces.
I think it’s important to note that President Obama sought to convey two important messages in his speech at West Point: first, a message of resolve – represented by the commitment of additional military forces, an increased civilian component, further funding for Afghan Security Forces and general development, and so on – all accompanied by further commitments from ISAF partner nations and other countries seeking to help Afghanistan contend with its various challenges; and second, a message of urgency, noting that, in July 2011, we will begin – and I stress the word begin – to draw down our forces in a process whose pace depends on the security conditions on the ground and the capabilities of Afghan forces and governmental structures to deal with them.
This does not mean we will “race for the exits” in 2011 – far from it. The United States, as President Obama has said, intends to see this job through to its finish, to do so “responsibly,” as he put it. Indeed, we all recognize that, above all, we cannot allow Al Qaeda and its extremist allies to reestablish in Afghanistan a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks such as it had in the years prior to the 9/11 attacks – attacks which were, of course, planned by Al Qaeda in Kandahar and for which initial training of the attackers was conducted in camps in Afghanistan before they departed for western Europe and American flight schools.
Meanwhile, the United States and other countries have also increased substantially their commitments in support of Pakistan, a country in which we should note there have been significant positive developments in the past year. Indeed, over the past 10 months, Pakistan’s leaders, citizens, clerics, and military have united in the face of the extremist threat to their country posed by Tehrik e Taliban Pakistani – the Pakistani Taliban – first in Swat and other districts of the NWFP – and then in various agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Area, including most recently and most significantly, eastern South Waziristan, the area from in which were based the TTP elements headed by the late Baitullah Mehsud, until his death a number of months ago. It was this organization that has carried out repeated attacks of indiscriminate violence against Pakistani officials, security forces, and innocent civilians. And the determination and resolve of the Pakistani people and leaders in the face of this threat have been most impressive, as has the conduct of the operations against the TTP over the past year by the Pakistani military, Frontier Corps, and police – and the overall pressure that has been put on extremist leaders in the FATA as well. The Pakistani security forces – and the Pakistani people – have sustained very tough losses in this effort, and we should recognize the sacrifices they have made in the fight against the extremists that have come to be seen as the most pressing threat to the writ of Pakistani governance and, indeed, to the very existence of the Pakistan state.
CONCLUSION
Well, I have spoken today about partnerships and cooperation and the situations in several key endeavors in the region where partnerships are countering mutual security threats. As I’ve done so, I’ve been mindful of the unique history of a region that stretches back to antiquity itself. One lesson we may draw from the tapestry and the sweep of that great history is that when various elements of the region have interacted and worked together, the whole has evolved to be greater than the sum of the various parts, as all benefit together from sharing and partnership. This is, in fact, a bit like the effect of the spread of one of history’s great mathematical discoveries: the Arab invention of the ‘sifr,’ the notation for zero, an invention from which all – including the west – gained enormously as it was shared.
We have all come a long way in the ten centuries since that invention. And our collective progress since that time has shown that, when all work together, developments in various spheres are not zero-sum propositions. Frequently – where there is cooperation – as one has gained, so have others. And that is especially true when all work together. When we labor cooperatively, our fortunes invariably rise in concert.
In truth, an awareness of the benefits of working together and of partnering in the pursuit of common interests guides the actions of Central Command as we carry out our missions in our area of responsibility. Indeed, when I was the commander of the multinational force in Iraq, we often used to say to our Iraqi partners: “Your success is our success.” NAJÁ-HUKUM NAJÁ-HOHNA. That remains true of our effort in Iraq, and it has also been one of the guiding concepts for Central Command overall as well. Indeed, that concept leads us to pursue partnerships, bilateral and multilateral relationships, and collective vice individual endeavors. As President Obama has stated repeatedly, we do not want to go it alone, we want to pursue our important common objectives and aspirations together. And it has been a privilege to be able to describe just a few of our activities together here with you today. CHUKRUN JAZEELAN, thank you very much.
