Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS
Thank you for that presentation. You mentioned the value during the Cold War of the US-Soviet dialogue. A year ago at this conference there was great interest in the findings of the Iraq Study Group and the advocacy therein of US engagement with Iran. Iran, of course, was not invited to the Annapolis conference and was not a participant at the Gulf Security Dialogue, but they were invited to this Manama Dialogue, which could have been a venue for them to engage in various forms of formal and informal engagement; they chose not to avail themselves of that opportunity. Had they, I wondered could such dialogues as this be a place for US-Iran informal discussion?
Robert Gates
I co-chaired in 2004 with Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski a Council on Foreign Relations study on US relations with Iran. The conclusions of that study called for a greater engagement with Iran. In fact, I am told that the current administration may have been unaware of my participation in that study when they asked me to do this job. I believed at that time that there was real merit because, as best I understood it from the briefings that Brzezinski and I received, the Iranians had actually been doing some helpful things in Iraq, as well as doing some harmful things. They had been helpful in certain respects in Afghanistan, as well.
The reality, however, is that there has been a change of leadership in Iran since that study was done in 2004. We have a leadership in Iran now that seems bent on confrontation with its neighbours, that has deeply engaged in subverting stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan; that has threatened the existence of other states in the region, and as I suggest it is ‘willy nilly’ to ignore the UN Security Council resolutions, continuing to pursue its nuclear enrichment, and I just described, for a number of years illegally pursuing a nuclear weapons programme which we hope remains suspended. So I guess I would say, as a person who embraced the idea of engagement with Iran, the behaviour of the government of Iran since the current leadership came to power has not given one confidence that a dialogue would be productive on a range of issues. I think that what the international community has asked for in terms of suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme would provide the basis for there to be a dialogue that would grow out of that kind of an action. In the meantime we do continue to have a dialogue with the Iranians at a lower level; the fourth meeting in Baghdad will take place next month. There are opportunities, but Iran has to take some steps to show that a dialogue would be meaningful, rather than sitting and shouting at each other across the table.
Professor François Heisbourg, IISS Council
Thank you for a very interesting and substantive speech. The presentation of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran in the world’s mainstream media was that of a rational Iran engaged in cost-benefit analysis; of a country where nuclear activities were somehow no longer the cause of intense concern. This type of media presentation has given much joy in the government offices of Tehran and has sowed much confusion among the ranks of America’s friends and partners. Even officials at the IAEA, went on the record to say that, I quote, “We are not that generous with Iran”. You reminded us that the actual picture painted by the NIE is rather different from that initial take. Yet the question does remain what caused the initial spin given to the public presentation of the National Intelligence Estimate. As Secretary of Defense, but also as former Director of Central Intelligence, I would be very interested if you could share your thoughts with us here.
Robert Gates
I do bring a background to this that could possibly inform the questions that you pose and many have posed around the world. One of the phenomena of the American government that is not truly understood either in the United States or around the world, is the degree of independence of American intelligence assessments. When the CIA was created in 1947, President Truman insisted that it not be subordinated either to the Department of State or to the Department of Defense, and that, in fact, it be independent so that it could render to the president completely independent judgments. With the advent of Congressional oversight, particularly in the mid-1970s, increasingly, as I wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1987, the CIA found itself poised equidistant between the Executive and the Congress. So, the intelligence community puts together these national intelligence estimates and other assessments that go to the Congress, and usually to the press, and the government of the United States has virtually no say over the content of these estimates or the timing of when they are issued. The estimate in question has been in preparation for a number of months.
There have always been questions about how truly independent these intelligence assessments are. I will tell you based on experience going back 40 years that although there are often allegations that there is political influence, I have found those occasions to be incredibly rare over the decades. I will tell you that the frustration felt by the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense over the diplomatic problems caused for us by the issuance of this analysis have been replicated many, many times in the past for our predecessors when the CIA or the national intelligence community would bring out an estimate on a controversial issue and the assumption was that it was an act of the policy side of the American government, and what in the world was our agenda. What were we thinking of to put out something that was apparently so unhelpful to the policy objectives we were seeking to pursue. The reality is that the timing and the content of the national estimate were determined entirely by the Director of National Intelligence and the policy-making arm of the national government was left to deal with it. What is important is to emphasise, as I tried to do in my remarks, the full story that the estimate gives rather than allowing either Iran or anyone else to cherry pick the conclusions they like and ignore the rest.
The bottom line is that the estimate clearly has come at an awkward time. It has annoyed a number of our good friends. It has confused a lot of people around the world in terms of what we are trying to accomplish. But, the reality is that if you take the time to read the unclassified key judgments of that estimate, it points to the nature of the problem posed to all of us by the Iranians’ continuing enrichment, by the fact that they had a secret programme, which they did not suspend until put under international pressure. It is a fair question. I would tell you that the timing and the content were not determined by the President, by Secretary Rice or by me, but by the Director of National Intelligence. I think that we need to get past the give and take about how it happened and focus on the entirety of the estimate, and the key judgments that have been released and the continuing challenge that we face by Iran’s enrichment and their ability to return to a nuclear weapons programme at any time they choose. This is why I said in my remarks that it is so important to continue the economic and diplomatic pressures on Iran to make them first of all come clean, then to suspend, then to agree to arrangements for inspection that give the rest of us confidence that they are not, in fact, trying to produce a nuclear weapon.
Dr Mamoun Fandy, IISS
Thank you for a thoughtful speech. Despite what you said about America’s commitment to regional security, the fact remains that your friends in the region feel that sometimes they are sidelined on key issues of stability in the region, and they make a very important point about your engagement with Iran on the question of the stability of Iraq. They feel they were marginalised and that the dialogue at the end of the day accepted regional hegemony by Iran. In that process, they feel they are being undermined rather than helped by America. What would you say to your friends in the region to allay their fears and their perceptions of insecurities? The national intelligence estimate also adds to that sense of insecurity, unless the conclusion for this is scaling down the number of targets in Iran.
Robert Gates
The United States absolutely does not accept the notion of Iranian hegemony in this region. We would like nothing better than for Iran to become a constructive player in this part of the world. I have spent the last 29 years looking for the elusive Iranian moderate; I have yet to find him. In terms of people feeling marginalised or sidelined, I can only speak for myself and the time I have been in office. I think there has been an effort to reach out to our friends, to have a dialogue with our friends. I came into this job on 18 December of last year, and my first trip to the Middle East, and to this country, was in January just a few weeks later. I think we value the views of all of our friends. My view is that we have something to learn from everyone that we interact with among our friends and allies, and so I am not going to speak to history, but I will tell you that I think there is a very strong view on the part of the Secretary of State and myself of the importance of engaging and, above all, of listening.
Dr Majeed Al Alawi, Bahrain
Thank you very much for your excellent speech. Do you think the Israeli nuclear weapons are a threat to the region’s security?
Robert Gates
No, I do not.
Fleur de Villiers, IISS Council
You first of all noted that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons programme under international pressure, and you made a very eloquent appeal for the continuation of that international pressure. Given the reluctance of at least two members of the Security Council to exert ultimate pressure, is the dominant sound after the release of the national intelligence estimate not one of slamming doors and bolting horses, and has the likelihood of that international pressure of unanimity as far as international pressure not been totally destroyed?
Robert Gates
I do not think it has been destroyed. One of the things that became clear to me when I was in Russia with Secretary Rice just a few weeks ago is that the Russians consider Iran to be a serious security challenge for them. In my conversations with the Chinese leaders, we had a very frank discussion about their interest in long-term energy security and particularly their reliance on oil and gas coming from this part of the world, which is not well served by an Iran that is pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, attempting to subvert its neighbours and potentially seeking nuclear weapons. Their long-term interests for obtaining security from this region are best served by working with the rest of the international community to try to get Tehran to change its policies.
I think that the statements that have come out of both Paris and Berlin, as well as London, in recent days makes clear a continued determination to not only continue to seek UN Security Council resolution but unilaterally apply sanctions that bring economic pressure to bear on the government in Tehran. My view is that even if there is not a UN Security Council resolution, a third resolution, that there are ample opportunities on the part of individual countries in this region, in Europe and elsewhere to take actions which bring further economic pressure to bear on Tehran as a means to trying to induce them to change their policies. Frankly, I do not see it change in either the perception of Iran as a disruptive influence in international affairs or the determination to try to work together using diplomatic and economic means to get them to change their policies.
Khalid Al Zayani, Bahrain
My question was more or less related to the earlier question asked, but I wondered if you could allow – or agree – to the Gulf States engaging Iran economically. In this manner, they will be able to involve them within the world creation in this region. If they have financial interest within the region, they will add stability to the region we live in. Would the United States consent to such policy? Perhaps this would moderate Iran, as you have done with North Korea.
Robert Gates
This is the classic question: do you best produce results in dealing with a recalcitrant and truculent government through the application of carrots or sticks? The reality is that a number of countries, over the past 29 years, have engaged economically with Iran. There are many companies that do business in Iran; many countries that do business in Iran; that have hosted Iranian banks. There have been significant economic ties and I see no evidence that any of that has exercised any kind of a moderating influence on Iranian behaviour whatsoever.
It seems to me that if Iran were to begin to show some sign of movement, some willingness to engage the international community on the issues that concern us, then perhaps at some point there is a place where carrots and positive inducements could play a role. However, I have seen no evidence that the activities that have taken place so far have had any effect in moving them in toward that objective.
Ayman Safadi, Jordan
Mr Gates, I am sure you are aware of the fact that the majority of our people do not trust American policies in the region. Public opinion is very suspicious of American policy objectives in the area. Many would argue that there is a very good region for that. They have seen your record in Palestine; they have seen your record in Iraq. What would you tell them?
Why would the Arab public opinion trust you again now that you are handling a very sensitive file, the file of Iran? There is a tremendous amount of fear that you could either end up doing a reckless thing such as a military strike that could set the whole region ablaze again, or you could actually sign a deal with Iran that would be at the expense of Arab interests, and ultimately America will end up doing what it has always done: embarrass its friends, let them down, let its allies down, and sign a deal that caters to its own interests while being detrimental to Arab interests in the region.
Robert Gates
I have been engaged in this region, in one way or another, for nearly 40 years. I do not have enough fingers and toes to count the times when the United States has helped its friends and allies in this region. Perhaps the most signal example of that was liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi invader. We have been the primary sponsor of virtually every peace agreement and ceasefire that has been signed in this region for the last 35 years. We have exercised a constructive influence in trying to promote positive change. I therefore do not accept the premise of the question that we have exercised negative influence.
I know that there are aspects of American policy with which people disagree. That has been true also for the last number of decades. I can only speak for myself, but I believe that, working with our friends and allies in this region is critically important. I believe it is extremely important that, in dealing with Iran, as I indicated in my speech, we keep options open. The focus now is on trying to get the Iranians to change their positions using economic and political measures.
An interviewer from Al‑Arabiya yesterday asked me what the percentage of American policy is for military and for diplomacy in dealing with Iran at the moment. I said that it was 100% diplomatic and economic. I can assure you, on the other side of the equation that you suggested, that the United States is not going to cut any kind of a deal with Iran. Iran must change its policies and its behaviour towards its neighbours, and its own nuclear programme, before the United States is willing to pursue that relationship.
It is very important for us to consult closely with our friends and allies in this region on all of the issues that we pursue. As I indicated in the answer to an earlier question, it is important that we listen. The government of which I am a part is firmly committed to that course.
Dr Dana Allin, IISS
Secretary Gates, you said in your remarks that it is no secret that US troop levels in Iraq are going to start to decline. You also suggested that it is a historically familiar mistake to doubt the resolve and the staying partner of the United States. Iraq, as you know, is an incredibly painfully contentious subject in the United States. Whatever progress has been made in recent weeks and months, at least judging by opinion polls, it is still very unpopular as an American military action.
We are entering an election year in a few weeks. As someone who has notably earned respect and praise on both sides of the political aisle in the United States, I wonder if you have any thoughts on how the United States is going to achieve a coherent, consistent, bipartisan posture on this issue that really does have staying power.
Robert Gates
One of my principal goals, since coming to this position, has been to work to try to create a broader bipartisan agreement, in terms of our strategy in going forward in Iraq. In my discussions in Washington, I used the same language that I used in my address here this morning. I do not care how we arrived at where we are; the fact is we are here. Now how do we move beyond where we are?
We can agree on the consequences of failure in Iraq. We can agree that those consequences would have huge impact, not just for the United States, but for everybody in the region. There has been a growing understanding in the United States, despite impatience with wanting to get more troops out faster, and so on, that we do have to get the next sequence here correct. The consequences of not doing so are huge.
I was struck by the fact that in one of the debates among the democratic presidential candidates, when asked, ‘Would you commit to having all American forces out of Iraq by the end of your first term in 2013?’ the top four in terms of polls all declined to make that commitment. There is a growing appreciation in the United States for the need for some kind of a residual force in Iraq; that would be agreed with the Iraqi government under terms acceptable to the Iraqi government; to continue pursuing Al‑Qaeda; to help with border security; to help continue training and equipping the Iraqi military forces; and perhaps to be some kind of a stabilising influence just by being there.
I stopped predicting the future when I left CIA, but I think that there is a very good possibility that you will see – regardless of who wins the election in the United States – a policy that is designed to promote stability in this region, as well as in Iraq, and one that protects our interests as well as yours. I believe there will be a reassertion of a bipartisan leadership in the United States, in terms of our interests and our actions in this region.
Dr Mansoor Al Arayedh, Bahrain
Thank you very much for your comments regarding Iran that, as we move forward, we need to consult with the neighbours of Iran to ensure stability in the region. There was a recent proposal from the Saudis regarding the enrichment of uranium and a possibility that it might be centralised somewhere, for example, a bank. They proposed initially that it might be Switzerland. Do you have any thoughts regarding this way forward? Would you support such a proposal?
Robert Gates
There have been several proposals along these lines. Even the Russians have made some constructive proposals in terms of controlled enrichment. Of course they would like that business, but that is fair. Some kind of independent institution or organisation that could provide access to enriched uranium for civil purpose, and under very significant controls, is a very interesting proposal. I think we should be willing to think creatively about how the international community could provide such a thing.
Iran will not be the last potential proliferation problem that we face. Looking for a longer‑term solution that a number of other countries could look to as a resource would be most worthwhile.
Khalid Al Khater, GCC Secretariat
I have several quick comments. Firstly, regarding Iran, and with regards to the Iran NIE, it seems that the option is still open. Is the United States still planning on attacking Iran actively, whatever ‘actively’ means in the Department of Defence terminology? Are you still planning to attack Iran?
My second question: do you not think that saying that an Israeli nuclear weapon does not pose a danger is another example of the double standard and an arrogant US policy in the region?
Regarding Iraq, it actually does matter how we got here. The United States did not listen. It is responsible for the issue of Iraq and what has happened in Iraq. The United States has not listened to the advice of its friends in the region. This is an important issue which we should not simply brush aside.
My fourth comment: it is time for the region to be allowed to create its own narrative for the future.
Robert Gates
Firstly, as I have indicated on several occasions during this session, the United States’ focus on trying to deal with the Iranian nuclear challenge is 100% focused on economic and political pressures. Secondly, Israel is not training terrorists to subvert its neighbours; it has not covertly shipped weapons into a place such as Iraq to kill thousands of innocent civilians; it has not threatened to destroy any of its neighbours; it is not trying to destabilise the government of Lebanon. There are significant differences in terms of both the history and the behaviour of the Iranian and the Israeli governments. I understand we have a difference of view on that.
Does it matter how we got here? I am sure that it does. However, it seems to me that it is not productive to spend our time arguing about how we got here instead of considering how we go forward. Historians can argue all they want. There are some lessons for us to learn about how we got here. Many of those lessons, frankly, have been learned. Focusing our efforts on the past, however, is not as productive as looking to the future.
In terms of having the Gulf States create their own narrative: absolutely. That is the way it happens with sovereign states. The United States is a friend and an ally, and we are prepared to work with you. The truth of the matter is that we help you to create the security climate in which you can create your own narrative.
Lord Powell of Bayswater, IISS Council
Mr Secretary, thank you for your very strong affirmation of the United States’ staying power in the region. I think many of us where very pleased to hear that. Indeed I suspect that many more people in this hall were pleased to hear that than would like to say so openly.
Coming back to your answer to the last question about Iraq, you reaffirmed that the United States’ focus is on economic and political pressures. That is surely very wise for the time being. Nonetheless, the president has wisely said that no option can be excluded. I understand that most democratic candidates for the presidency have said something similar. Therefore, can we be confident that the United States will maintain the capability in the region to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if that were to become the only option?
Robert Gates
As I indicated in my remarks, as the Secretary of State has said repeatedly, and as the president has said clearly: all options are on the table. However, the focus is clearly on international cooperation to bring economic and political pressures to bear.
Dr John Chipman
Mr Secretary, on behalf of everyone assembled here, I would like to thank you for an extraordinary important statement and for such excellent replies to very difficult and challenging questions. I think everyone in this hall would agree with me that no one can accuse Secretary Gates of lack of clarity or of shirking a question. I would invite you all to read his speech in order to see how precisely and comprehensively these issues are examined. We are hugely grateful for the conversation we have had this morning with Secretary Gates. I would like to thank you very much for agreeing to be with us here and for the debate which you have animated. Thank you, sir.
