(Provisional transcript as delivered)
Questions and Answers
Dr John Chipman
Carl, Thank you very much. I think this is a speech whose text will bear re reading. For the media, we will make sure you will have that text very shortly. Carl, you described a European Union that is potentially beginning to emerge from an extensive and repeated period of navel gazing, to establish for itself a larger strategic vision beyond the countries that it is potentially including amongst its own membership, and one that could aspire to having genuine strategic partnerships with other countries beyond this space, to manage what you described as that vast area in between. It was intriguing that, in our debates yesterday, there was a great deal of discussion about how India might be developing a larger strategic vision in order to take more precise policy steps to contribute to peace building also in this area in between. I think your statement interestingly mirrors some of the remarks that were made yesterday, and I am sure that one or two people here would like to ask some questions to advance that debate.
Jeffrey R Shafer
I wanted to pursue the point that you made a little more pointedly. Yesterday we did have extensive discussions as to how India would build relationships and face challenges from various strategic players. The US was mentioned often, China was mentioned often, and even the Japanese Self Defence forces. Never once did I hear Europe mentioned.
You painted an accurate and important picture of a Europe that has emerged as the largest economic entity in the world. It is not yet a presence as a security entity. Do you envisage the day when there will be a Europe with the institutional structure, the coherence of view, and the willingness on the part of the public to commit blood and treasure for Europe to really play an important role in this area?
Dr John Chipman
Before you answer that question, I will ask Liam Fox to come in.
Dr Liam Fox
Thank you very much. Naturally, I would put a rather different spin on Europe. Europe is not a democracy, it is a collection of democratic states differently organised. It is not a nation; it is a collection of nation states. It is not a state, despite the fact that many of its politicians have pretensions for statehood.
The EU has talked about a foreign and security policy, but it simply will not spend the money. Most countries in Europe spend well below 2% of their GDP on defence. In Afghanistan, it is some of the major EU players who are most clearly failing in their duties towards their own NATO commitments.
The EU and India both need to realise that soft power is not enough. If you will the ends, you must will the means. Diplomacy, without military support, has little credibility. In a dangerous world, neither grouping can simply count on talking away any threats that we face. Power, which is one of the themes of this conference, brings responsibility. Frameworks, institutions and agreements are all very well, but security does not come for free. If you want freedom you have to be willing to defend it, fight for it, to die for it if necessary, and to fund it. The EU has a major deficit on that front. It should possibly address that before it lectures anyone else.
Carl Bildt
It might come as a surprise to you, but Britain is a member of the European Union! British forces are part of the European forces. I think the French are ahead of you, but you are certainly ahead of Sweden, for example. We all depend, somewhat, on our geographic and historical positions. We used to have a fighting strength in our air force that was better than the Royal Air Force. That was due to the fact that we had a geopolitical location that was somewhat dependent on there being the Soviet Union. Now the fighting strength of our air force is still quite significant, although what we are going to use it for is somewhat debatable at the moment. Many of the countries in Europe, including Sweden, are now reconfiguring our forces in order to be able to do peace and stability operations.
If I take the UK perspective, you abolished conscription in the 1950s, which was fairly natural because you did not see the need to fight major conventional wars. We still have conscription because we had the need to mobilise fairly big forces until much later. When I started to deal with defence policies in my country, we had a war time structure that is roughly the war time structure, in terms of size, of the US Army today. That perhaps says more about the US Army today than the Swedish Army at that particular time. The US Army was also more well equipped, but we had very big forces. We are now structuring this in order to be able to do sustained peace and stability operations, which we are also doing.
I share the view that we have to develop our forces more, but we should be fairly proud of the record we have in sustained operations. From the Swedish perspective, we have been sustaining a military commitment in Bosnia for 16 years. We have been in Kosovo for less than that, but since 1999. I do not see them disappearing for a very long time to come. We went into Afghanistan not with large numbers, but with the intention to stay for a very long time to come. We are ready to go into African countries and stay there for a very long time to come.
I certainly think that you are right in saying that military power is essential and that we must develop those capabilities, but I would also that what we have learnt is that military power is not enough. You can have incredibly successful military expeditionary forces to crush any opponent in sight, but to build a stable state and peace in that area requires something more than that. Those capabilities, I would argue, are ones that we Europeans, as well as in the international institutions, need to develop further.
I would also argue very strongly that when you go into operations of that sort – such as in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Sudan – these missions are so complex, so demanding, that no nation can do them on their own. Even coalitions of the willing often turned out to be too narrow to be able to handle it. They must be anchored in acceptable global institutions. One of those institutions is the UN. Although they are doing good work in a couple of areas, the UN has its limitations. Another institution is the EU. The EU can do and is increasingly doing work in areas where, for other reasons, NATO cannot work because the Americans are not willing to commit. The Americans are not willing to commit because they are engaged in other places or because they consider these places to be too dangerous. Africa is a place that Americans often consider is too dangerous. It might be considered too dangerous for them, but we are prepared to go in. Chad and the Central African Republic is a concrete example. No one else could do it, but we are prepared to do it. We are also prepared to build up the police and rule of the law missions that are increasingly important. Therefore, I agree that we need the hard power, but I would argue that we need more than hard power. We need ‘smart power,’ and that is a combination of both hard and soft powers.
We are developing the instruments in the EU that are going to be of increasing global significance. The UK is one of the most significant contributors. It is certainly not finished. We have started, but history has not come to its end.
Is Europe ready to engage itself? Well, I take some exception to what John said about us being engaged in navel gazing. I would say that we have been involved in restructuring. We have been involved in the third or the fourth biggest attempt. Since what happened at the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars, the Treaty of Versailles was in 1945. We are in now in the fourth major attempt to really build an enduring order of peace and stability in the part of the world that has produced the worst wars and the worst conflicts in recent history. That is a fairly important task.
It is, of course, somewhat more important to the Europeans because if there is war in Europe we are the ones to die first. However, we should also have learnt the global lesson, that if there is war in Europe it does not tend to restrict itself to Europe. To secure peace and prosperity and a model for the democratic cooperation of sovereign nations, I think it is a task that has more of a global importance and significance. We are concentrating on that.
I did not deal with all of the problems associated with Russia, but that is part of it. Then the Middle East. As we develop the institutions, and as we develop the practices, primarily in conflict resolution and state building, the US is going to be forever superior to us in hard power. Although I would argue that what will be required in the future are two capabilities. One is the capability for quick interventions that can be of a limited nature, not necessarily huge forces, but they must be ready to go in to a particular situation, solve it quickly, and then exit that situation. These operations are then be replaced by stability operations that are of an exceedingly long endurance. If we can develop those capabilities somewhat more, preferably with increased expenditure – and I agree with Dr Fox on that one – then we can make a more significant contribution.
Is this of global reach? Well, to some extent it is and to some extent it is not. If I phrase myself somewhat more undiplomatically, much of the mess in the world is in our backyard. Even if our perspective is not global, but is more within areas that are fairly adjacent to us, that tends to be where most of the global challenges are.
Unidentified Delegate
I would be grateful if you could explain for some of us: what is the rationale and the wisdom, not of Europe moving east which is to be welcomed, but of NATO moving east? That raises a whole host of issues. Secondly, the unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo, against assurances given to the UN, which then tends to diminish the UN and makes it irrelevant.
Ashok Kumar
Mr Minister, you very rightly said that the peaceful disappearance of the Soviet Union was a very important event in world history. I hope you would agree that the Russia of today has important stakes in European security, and Russia also has legitimate rights to feel secure. The decision of the US to install missiles in the neighbourhood of Poland, and the Czech Republic, and so on, has created again a state of severe tension between these two major powers, which is not good for European security or stability. India, as a rising power, has legitimate concerns about continuing European stability and strengthening it.
Is it possible to bring this about in a more peaceful and conciliatory manner by consensus among these major powers as to how to go about ensuring European security?
Ambassador M K Rasgotra
Mr Minister, I was interested in your suggestion that India and the EU do some things together in Africa. The European history in Africa brings memories which are still bad and linger. The EU makes things worse by sermonising Africans and Indians on human rights. With their terrible records of human rights’ practices while they were in Africa and in India, we do not think that lecturing people on democracy does any good to the growth of democracy in these countries. What areas would you suggest are there for India and the EU to cooperate creatively in Africa?
Pierre Lellouche
Even though this seminar is on India and not on Europe, I have to add a quick French voice to the exchange between my two friends, the current foreign minister from Sweden and the future defence minister for the UK. I hope by the time he becomes defence minister he will have mellowed in his views because, in the long run, there is no escape for you to be in Europe. We are talking about having relations with countries who have a billion people. We are talking of transnational problems, any one of them being energy, terrorism, development aid, or stabilisation. Everyone needs Europe together, and my dearest objective, which I believe is fundamental, is that with the help of Britain, particularly in the strategic and defence area, we build a Europe that can actually bring a contribution. I think this is completely sterile. Yes, there is not enough [inaudible], of which we need more, including in Asia, but it is not by disparaging and criticising it that we are going to make progress; it will only come through a greater British contribution, which I would welcome.
Carl Bildt
To take an even more complicated issue, there is that of NATO enlargement. The decision that was taken in Bucharest a couple of weeks ago said that although Ukraine and Georgia will not at this time be given what you call the Membership Action Programme, there is a commitment to allow them into the membership. I am not speaking for a nation that is a member of NATO for historical and other reasons, but we are close allies of NATO, if that is a phrase that can be used. I think it is rather the same with NATO as it is with the European Union. We are alliances of democracies, and when other democracies knock on our doors, which happened in this particular case – you have a Ukraine that does have its problems and challenges, but has had a number of impeccable democratic elections, and they come with their democratically elected leadership and say they want to join – it is exceedingly hard to say no. The same is true of Georgia, which has undertaken fundamental reforms. They have their challenges, as well, not the least in terms of the secessionist areas, which are very much supported by Russia, that have taken some rather worrying steps in the last few days. It is very difficult to say no.
Although you should consider the strategic significance and implications of saying yes, I think what was driving those decisions was the perhaps even greater consequences of saying no. If you say no, that sends a message on where one wants those countries to be heading. That might not necessarily be a direction that is in our interests. I am saying that with all of the respect for the complexities of these particular decisions. If you look at what was coming out of Bucharest, it was not entirely clear-cut. It was produced by vigorous debate, and that debate is going to continue. If there is the continued same direction in terms of domestic development of these respective countries, I am quite certain that they will, step by step, come closer to the security cooperation within the North Atlantic alliance.
Kosovo is an even more complicated case with the fact that its independence has now been recognised in the order of 40 nation, my own among them, although it has to be said that when we recognise the independence of Kosovo, we recognise an independence that is under international supervision. We did not recognise it because we thought this was the best solution; we recognised it because we had very thoroughly contemplated all alternative solutions and found them to be even more complicated. We are aware of the legal complexities surrounding this particular issue, and that is why there is an element of international supervision. It is also an absolutely unique case. To my knowledge, it has never happened before in the history of our modern global political system that we have had an area that has been under Chapter 7 jurisdiction and administration by the UN. There have been a lot of other UN missions, but never anything of the Kosovo sort, where it was obviously impossible to find any solutions, and we had to go for something and then try to manoeuvre that so as to build a state there, which is going to take some time, and to try to mitigate the consequences on the global scene because one should not be naïve – there are consequences of a negative nature on the international scene. Then, we should try to see if there are ways of coming out of some of the blockages that we have seen in the region. However, I can assure you that it was not an easy decision. It might have looked easy to some people who were farther away, but it was an exceedingly difficult decision for us, and it will remain a difficult decision to handle for years to come.
It is the missile controversy between the United States and Russia that is now one where I think that the Americans could have handled somewhat more diplomatically in the beginning of the entire situation. I think it burst upon the scene somewhat too fast, and people were not prepared for it. It is, of course, not primarily a European system; it is an American system – or, it is part of an American system that has installations in Europe. It has to do with Iran, of course, and as it has to do with Iran, it is dealing with a threat that is not first a threat towards the United States because by sheer range Russia and Europe will be there before the United States in terms of being potential realistic targets. Accordingly, there is reason to engage Russia in a dialogue. That dialogue is ongoing and has been concentrated on the possibility of sharing some radar installations in southern Caucasus, or potentially in Russia, and some other things. There is still not agreement because the Russians object to some of these installations, but the file has not been closed. From the European perspective, we are urging the continuation of that particular dialogue because if it is that particular threat, and that is the threat it is, it should be possible to achieve somewhat more of a common understanding between Americans, Europeans and Russians on how those installations should be handled. Some of them could be common and some of them could be joined, but the possibilities should be there.
We all have different histories in Africa. The Swedish history of colonialism has been somewhat limited; we tried with the Danes, but never quite made it to Africa. There are different European traditions in Africa; we have not all been running colonial empires. If I take the Nordic group of countries, we have extremely good relationships with a number of these countries due to the fact that we have supported them during part of what they call the liberation struggle, and we have been supporting them with development aid in large quantities. Whether that has been wisely spent money or not is a somewhat separate issue. European countries do have credibility. If you look at the UK Zimbabwe relationship, of course there are complexities, and there are a couple of other such cases that are fairly obvious. Take the conflict over Western Sahara between Spain and France, it also gets somewhat complicated. I think there is the scope for Europe to be more engaged. Of course, we do lecture them somewhat on human rights; Europeans tend to do that. I think that you will have to get used to a Europe that is doing somewhat more of that in the future. Why is that?
A change that has occurred, which is significant, is that we now have 10 member states who were suffering under dictatorship and oppression. The individuals sitting there as foreign ministers of these particular countries are the ones who were locked into coal cellars and dungeons by their regimes. They were the ones who really now and again heard the faint voice of support from the West for human rights in Eastern Europe. Some of them can tell this rather movingly that this more or less kept them alive, and kept hope alive that there would be a better future. They are now the leaders of their respective countries. They feel very strongly, and I think there is merit to their case, that when you have oppressive regimes – take Zimbabwe as an example, although we have the complexities of the colonial relationship – what that man has done to that country is beyond belief. Millions of people are fleeing the country, it has an inflation rate of 160,000%, 80% are unemployed, the median living age has gone down 20 years and people are dying. It is not entirely wrong to speak up. As we now have a Europe where we have political leaders who are coming from a background of having fought for human rights and democracy, I think you will find – for better or for worse – that Europe will be somewhat more of a voice on these particular issues. Sometimes we will have to take some short-term problems with different regimes, but I think it will be argued in the councils of the European Union that one should look at the long term, and beyond the regime of today there is always a regime of tomorrow. Our ambition has always been that that regime is somewhat more democratic, more the rule of the law, and more respectful of human rights. Then, we want to be more on the side of the regime of tomorrow than of the oppressors of today.
Dr John Chipman
Thank you very much for that spirited defence of the values of these countries.
